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ABSTRACT 
This original thesis explored the nature of corporate governance in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines within the private limited liability companies limited by shares. These were unlisted 
companies. The period under review was from 1845 up to and including 2013. The hypothesis 
questioned whether there was an indication about a small category of these companies that 
contributed to a new variant of poverty referred to as genteel poverty. The lack, absence or 
disregard of corporate governance best practices within these companies seemed to have 
impacted the nation’s gross domestic product through a major liquidity crisis from 2009 onwards.  
 
These companies were part of a cross border business network and became embroiled in an 
unprecedented financial crisis originating in and from a conglomerate headquartered in the 
neighbouring islands of Trinidad and Tobago. There were existing networks of business 
relationships between member states within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) of which St. 
Vincent was a part. Historical and legislative legacies were not limited to British company laws 
and the UK Companies Acts but recently to aspects of German corporate law. A combination of 
at least seven research methods was used to analyse the hypothesis and to provide a further 
understanding of the hybrid corporate governance system, which currently exists on the island.  
 
The main thesis posited that the admixture of British corporate law, with adaptations from 
German corporate law, constituted the substantive nature of corporate governance jurisprudence 
and consequently impacted the financial sector on the island. British Company law recognised 
two major organs namely, the board of directors and the company itself (shareholder assembly) in 
meetings. The research discussed these matters further in keeping with national aims and 
objectives articulated by the Vincentian dichotomous regulators: the Financial Services Authority 
and the Commercial and Intellectual Property Office. The major recommendation was a Code on 
corporate governance for all these unlisted companies. 
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PREFACE 
In this original thesis the research topic was engaging. Coincidentally, there was an evolving 
debate about corporate governance within the private limited liability companies limited by 
shares. Within the Caribbean these were some key institutions within the financial sector. The 
principal objective was to present a unique perspective about this phenomenon but for the period 
1845 to 2013. There were no known monographs specific to St. Vincent about this actual nature 
of corporate governance within this category of private companies for this period under study. 
These companies were originally conceived as family oriented businesses with emphases on 
meeting the needs of a stakeholder community within a post colonial emerging economy. 
 
As information was released for public consumption, stakeholders within the regional grouping in 
the Caribbean geopolitical landscape were brought to accept that a major liquidity crisis had 
occurred. Initially the facts were blurred. These private companies were part of a network with 
complexities in management and business models. They were spread across porous borders. In 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the British American Insurance Company was the identified 
insurance company. While it was a single entity, its capacity to be the channel of an 
unprecedented financial contagion was beyond its singleness. Attention was drawn to its 
affiliation to the conglomerate CL Financial Limited with headquarters in Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
The nature of corporate governance within private companies on St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
was predicated on British company laws and the UK Companies Acts for more than two 
centuries. There was a radical reshaping that was taking place up to the current time. The 
response by the local legislature was to borrow aspects of corporate governance practices and 
procedures from German corporate law. The introduction of a two-tier board to assist with a 
piecemeal response to corporate governance was phenomenal. This was untried and now formed 
part of a hybrid. In this context therefore, corporate governance best practices was still about the 
delivery of accurate information and disclosure within and among economically viable 
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companies. Corporate governance best practices are evidenced through a sometimes discreet, yet 
robust, reliable and practical business and fiscal recording system.  
 
There was no doubt that corporate governance best practices had undergone tremendous and 
radical changes for over two centuries. There were other influences that impacted stakeholders’ 
responses from the Caribbean in the context of the aforementioned crisis. The sovereign nation 
states of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago were member states of 
CARICOM. They were part of the Commonwealth group of nations. There was a real sense that 
the British jurisprudence was the core of corporate law on these islands as former colonies.  
 
The current debate about corporate governance best practices and corporate governance was 
critical. It served as the backdrop for the research question. Whether there was some correlation 
between the lack, disregard or absence of best practices to genteel poverty in an already 
impoverished nation and if at all, any corresponding negative impact on the gross domestic 
product of St. Vincent and the Grenadines was positively answered. There were societal 
complexities and conditions not limited to the post slavery phenomenon of emancipation. These 
were considered antecedents to the application and interpretation of corporate governance best 
practices within the identified companies. In this original thesis, respectfully, the aforementioned 
issues provided some support for contextual analyses of the documented unprecedented crisis that 
spanned the period 2009 through to 2013. 
 
There was evidence of efforts by several Caribbean governments at seeking redress for the havoc 
that was wrought on their economies through the phenomenon of the private limited liability 
company. The financial contagion disrupted lives. The IMF was part of the consultative process. 
Among local and regional initiatives were corporate refinancing initiatives, judicial management 
reviews and other analyses. These were distilled and well articulated and communicated through 
some media houses. The inclusion hereinafter of the two case studies as private limited liability 
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companies limited by shares was pertinent. St. Vincent was already an impoverished nation and 
the existence of additional strains on its fiscal budget through an imbalance within its financial 
sector was unwelcomed news. Trinidad and Tobago, the more economically advanced of the two 
named countries was also impacted in similar and other varied ways. Through comparative 
analyses the private limited liability company was a versatile British construct. In the first case 
study, the private company was used as a multipurpose department store. The second case study 
was primarily for insurance purposes. Not as an overemphasis, but the resulting modern social 
conditions within the aforementioned states were shaped by their own political and historical 
development to a large extent.  
 
There was evidence that pointed generally to the synonymous occurrences of incorporation of the 
limited liability company with its corporate governance best practices. On the other hand, the 
fundamental concepts found within best practices had their genesis outside the remit of 
incorporation. For instance, the matter of fair and square dealing in financial matters was a 
‘family laden’ value. This was well articulated in one of the companies through one of its organs. 
The two organs of the company are the directors and the company in meeting (shareholder 
assembly).  
 
As British companies developed so did their best practices as outlined in their Articles of 
Association, Model Articles and or Table A, the substantive constitution so called.  The 
constitution of the British company has metamorphosed and responded to the prevailing socio 
economic factors. This bore heavily on the similar construct in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
and other former colonies of Great Britain. Private companies were emerged from experiences 
within common law, from the fundamentals of British partnership law, British company laws, 
UK Companies Acts, elements of the Deed of Settlement and the Unit Trust. Therefore, the 
original contributions hereinafter are outlined in this five - chapter monograph.  
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Beginning with Chapter One and concluding with Chapter Five, this exploration was done and 
brings to bear a measure of originality in interpretation and application. In Chapter One for 
instance, the central theme of the thesis, the nature of the study and explanation of terms used 
throughout the text are presented. Chapter Two provided clarity on the antecedents of the nature 
of corporate governance within the identified companies evident on the island. Chapter Three 
provided the first case study and analyses the first house or established company in 1845 on St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. This was the John Hazell Sons and Company Limited. There was an 
attempt to reconcile its claim to establishment in 1845 prior to the emergence of the British 
legislation on ‘private’ companies that was enacted in the UK Companies Act 1907.  
 
Chapter Four discussed and analysed the second case study of the British American Insurance 
Company Limited. It was part of the regional conglomerate CL Financial group. It is to be noted 
that the British American Insurance Company Limited in its original corporate portfolio was in 
existence within the Caribbean region for well over (80) eighty years. The final subdivision of 
this Five - chapter thesis detailed observations, analyses and conclusions. To rate the maturity 
levels of compliance to corporate governance, an assessment tool was utilised. An observation 
made was that close to 10,000 private companies were without an autochthonous Code on 
corporate governance. As such, a Code was advocated and submitted as part of the appendices.  
 
Analyses contained hereinafter are the results obtained from seven research approaches namely: 
ethnography, doctrinal methodology, narrative, grounded theory, institutional theory, 
phenomenological and case studies methods. Additionally, through thorough examination of 
primary and secondary sources, discussions with various stakeholders who worked and lived both 
in Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent as well as visits to the island of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines were germane to this original work. A number of other supporting tables, figures and 
appendices formed part of this submission. Finally, the aspiration herein was to encourage others 
to continue with the research on corporate governance best practices in the interest of Caribbean 
corporate law and national and regional corporate development 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE PRIVATE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES 
IN SAINT VINCENT  
‘…Company …a valuable instrument for the promotion and working of new industries, and 
for the mobilization of national credit…'' 
Sir William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, (2nd edn Methuen & Co Ltd, UK 
1925) Vol VIII, 213 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis was an original contribution to the themed research about the exploration 
of the nature of “corporate governance” 1 within the “private company,” 2  more 
precisely the “private limited liability company limited by shares”3 from 1845 to 2013 
in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. On this English speaking island, this was just “one 
of a number of private companies by shares”4 recognisable by the island’s legislature. 
This juridic association was inherited from the British because the island was a former 
British colony. During the period of this study, it was noted that commercial activities 
were not just regulated by a copy "of several hundred Acts."5  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  International Corporate Global Network: Global Governance Principles (5th edn 
International Corporate Governance Network, UK 2017) 4; see also for an additional 
reference to a historical concept of corporate governance which is still relevant today Gower, 
L.C.B, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (5th edn Sweet and Maxwell, UK 1992) 
37; and see also Gower, L.C.B, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd edn 
Stevens & Sons, UK 1969) 40 - for historical references to the existence of companies in 
early corporate UK. The private limited liability company also struggled to establish its 
relevance to economic development and incorporated aspects of the separation of powers, 
representation and varying forms of enfranchisement. 
2 Kershaw, David, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd edn Oxford University 
Press, UK 2012) 12 
3 Andenas, Mads, Wooldridge, Frank, European Comparative Company Law (Cambridge 
University Press, UK 2009) 109 
4 From the records at Commercial Intellectual Property Office and the Financial Services 
Authority up to 2013, approximately 10,000 companies were registered as classified as 
private limited liability companies limited by shares.  These were comprised of domestic 
companies whose share ownership was among indigenous family members; others were 
international business companies; international insurance companies; hybrid private 
companies meaning International Business Companies limited by guarantee (not limited non-
profit organisations, clubs, social enterprises, community projects) but has a share capital (for 
the purpose of fund-raising for instance) although not profit motivated. 
5  Sheppard, Charles, An historical Account of the island of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
(Routledge, UK 2013) 204 - 205 
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The island’s corporate laws reflect substantively the British companies’ laws and the 
UK Companies Acts. During the period under review, emphases were placed on a 
multiplicity of factors that were germane to the functioning of the companies in these 
sovereign states of “St. Vincent” 6and to some extent in neighbouring island of 
“Trinidad and Tobago.”7 The latter was part of the study in so far as references were 
drawn from one of its companies. This was because both islands developed a network 
of business relationships using the insurance companies that were a category of the 
private limited liability companies limited by shares. This was possible given that 
these islands were member states of “CARICOM”8 whose emphases remained on 
regional integration and sustainable economic growth among member states. 
 
The substantive matter of corporate governance did generate active discussions 
among and within the island’s growing intellectual populace in more recent times. 
These discussions became more widespread within the last decade (2003 – 2013) 
given that the nation state along with other member states of CARICOM grappled 
with the consequences of the global financial crisis; some “regional financial crises,”9 
and an “unprecedented financial crisis”10 caused primarily by insurance companies 
that reacted within an already destabilised and weakened financial sector within 
member states of CARICOM in 2009. The small category of companies that were 
constituents within a conglomerate was the insurance companies. They became 
central to the debacle predicated on corporate governance best practices.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 St. Vincent gained independence from Great Britain 0n 27 October 1979: See also the St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines Termination of Association Order 1979: Constitution of St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, 1979 - Statutory Instruments No 918, 1979; Statutory 
Instruments No 916, 1979 
7 Trinidad and Tobago gained independence from Great Britain on 31 August 1962 – See also 
10 & 11 Eliz. 2 Ch. 54: Trinidad and Tobago Independence Act, 1962 
8 Berry, David, Caribbean Integration Law (Oxford University Press, UK 2014) 107, 171 
9 Fortin, Henri, Barros, Ana Cristina Hirata, Accounting for Growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Improving: Improving Corporate Financial Reporting to Support Regional 
Economic Development (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The 
World Bank publication, USA 2010) 129 – 141 
10 Report No 09/175: IMF Staff Country Report: Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: 2009 
Discussion on Common Policies of Member Countries (International Monetary Fund 
publication, USA, 2009) 90 
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These insurance companies were a small category of the private limited liability 
company limited by shares and were physically located across porous borders within 
CARICOM. Albeit the corporate governance of the insurance companies outlined 
among other issues the specific roles and duties of directors who were tasked with 
among other things, fiduciary obligations to their respective companies. These were 
best positioned to provide some clarity about the nature of corporate governance 
within the private limited liability company either on St. Vincent or Trinidad. They 
were to assess how external and internal factors exerted influences on the formation 
and functioning of these companies. The defining incident and probably the most 
catastrophic change within the nature of corporate governance on St. Vincent was due 
to an unprecedented financial contagion that originated outside of the island, from 
within similar companies in Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
As a result, the dynamism of these changes attempted to distort the substantive 
concept of corporate governance best practices. This was quite remarkable especially 
since there was a generally accepted notion that corporate governance was 
synonymous with incorporation.. However, there was also an acknowledgement by 
some that corporate governance in St. Vincent may have not been statute driven but 
arise out of family laden values. In one of the case studies to follow, this is looked at 
in more detail. 
 
On St. Vincent, there was another British construct if only with a similar name to its 
predecessor the “British American Insurance Company Limited”11 [BAICO]. This 
registered company was a branch of one of the private limited liability companies in 
Trinidad and Tobago. It served as the conveyance for the corporate governance crisis 
and is detailed in Chapter Four. It was conjoined with another private limited liability 
company – the Colonial Life Insurance Company [CLICO]. References to BAICO in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 St. Vincent Insurance Act 2003; Certificate of Incorporation 119 of 2002 - St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, 7 May 2002; See also The Story of British American Insurance Company – 
accessed 6 September 2016 - https://sites.google.com/site/thestoryofbritishamerican/chapter-
6-the-final-years-1989-2012 - where the original British American Insurance Company was 
“sold to CL Financial in 2009 – under Judicial Management”. 
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this regard were also a reference to CLICO substantively, given the interdependence 
of both companies and their joint liability to insurance premium holders. To facilitate 
commercial endeavours within and among these entities, there were legislative 
provisions that facilitated interdependence. Company law among and between these 
former colonial countries of Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
was and is applicable.  
 
The research in this area determined that corporate governance within the private 
limited liability company limited by shares was geared foremost and ultimately 
towards economic efficiency and bolstering investor confidence. Given the fact that 
the Caribbean region did encounter several “corporate scandals”12 over the past 
decades this research about company law is deemed to be relevant. It was not about 
the development of a Caribbean perspective on company law per se, but it 
nonetheless provided an insight into corporate governance practices experienced at 
this level. It was noted that although substantive texts were written about the issues of 
corporate governance as part of the academic discipline within the wider Caribbean, 
very little if at all, was mentioned about St. Vincent and the Grenadines specifically. 
 
Notwithstanding this, in this original thesis importance was placed on non-listed 
companies, which aspire to high standards of “corporate governance practice.”13 The 
private limited liability companies limited by shares within St. Vincent presumably 
adhered to international corporate governance standards, those advocated by British 
company laws and the UK Company Acts in the absence of an autochthonous 
corporate governance Code. These corporate governance practices within the private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Grosh, Margaret, Bussolo Maurizio, Freije, Samuel, Understanding the Poverty Impact of 
the Global Financial Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean (Eds) (The World Bank, 
USA 2014) 1 - 257 Between 1995 and 1998 six commercial banks accounted for roughly 
60% of the deposits of the population of nine commercial banks, five life insurance 
companies, pointed to 90% of the premium business in the business); a further one third of all 
banks and building societies were reportedly insolvent and were closed eventually. See 
Bonnick, G., “Storm in a Teacup: Crisis in Jamaica’s Financial Sector” Adlith Brown 
Memorial Lecture (Thirtieth Annual Conference of the Caribbean Centre for Monetary 
Studies, Bahamas (October 1998, final version May 1999)  
13 Op. cit. [International Corporate Global Network] fn 1 
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companies appeared to be workable for well over a century but were subject to 
legislative amendments.   
 
On the other hand, in the case of Trinidad and Tobago for instance, there was a study 
conducted by “Syntegra Change Architects”14 in 2011 on corporate governance 
disclosure and thereafter in 2014, a workshop on implementing best practices. The 
latter was geared towards improving corporate governance within that state. The 
private limited liability companies and categorically insurance companies were likely 
to be in attendance. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
The research findings were based on seven major “qualitative research methods:”15 
case study; doctrinal methodology; ethnography with a socio legal bias; 
phenomenological; grounded theory; institutional theory and narrative. Additionally, 
a number of legal perspectives on the research topic utilised comparative analyses 
between “hard law ... black letter law; [and] ‘soft law’ [that] includes voluntary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Kravatzky, Axel, et al, (Eds) Corporate Governance Disclosure in Trinidad and Tobago: A 
case study by Syntegra Change Architects of Trinidad and Tobago, (Presented to UNCTAD 
Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR), 
Palais des Nations, Geneva, Syntegra Change Architects Ltd, Session 12 – 14 October 
2011Although the report no longer was available and downloadable, and was read but not 
saved to personal files, it did conclude with the following words, “ while the sample has 
relatively high rates of disclosure for a few topics, with most companies exceeding the 
disclosure requirements of Trinidad and Tobago, the overall level of disclosure remains low 
compared to other emerging markets. See also “Improving Corporate Governance in T & T: 
Implementing Best Practices Workshop, February 5, 2014 (Project for IADB Project 
ATN/ME 12783 – TT); see also www.caribbeangovernance.org/In-The-Press/3159062 - 
accessed 18 August 2019. While reference was made to a Caribbean Corporate Governance 
Institute, small island states like St. Vincent and the Grenadines were not necessarily 
members of this institute as it was developed in Trinidad and Tobago. Members of the Board 
of Directors represent nation states like Guyana, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. It was 
incorporated in 2012 as a not-for-profit organization “dedicated to advancing principles of 
corporate governance across the Caribbean…” 
15 Schwartz, Michael Hunter, et. al., What The Best Law Teachers Do (Harvard University 
Press, USA 2013) 11; for additional reading see also Editors and Contributors Severally, 
Research Methods in Consumer Law: A Handbook (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2018); 
Wertz, Frederick. J., et al., Five Ways of Doing Qualitative Analysis: Phenomenological 
Psychology, Grounded Theory, Discourse Analysis, Narrative Research and Intuitive Inquiry 
(The Guilford Press, NY 2011) 2-3; 15 
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sources of corporate governance standards that companies have the freedom to adopt 
or not;”16 British company laws and the UK Companies Acts. The recent inclusion of 
German corporate law provided a further understanding as to how the corporate 
governance process worked. The admixture of these perspectives provided diverse 
analyses that were discussed subsequently.  
 
Firstly, the “case study”17 method was used to present combination of features of 
actual and at least realistic events, which is to give a more comprehensive 
understanding of the early corporate life of stakeholders. Among the overall 
appreciative values were those of corporate social justice, rights of individuals, 
operation of the rule of law, respect for each individual stakeholder and the diversity 
of initiatives that pointed to the commitment of and dedication to engagement within 
the corporate entity. The apparent ‘value-laden’ procedures articulated by the English 
company laws and the UK Companies Acts were those that eventually made their way 
into the centrality of corporate governance best practices. What was deduced was that 
‘early stakeholders’ in post colonial developing states alluded to earlier, made 
adequate use of the outlined procedures to their benefit and succession planning 
within their respective companies.  
 
Secondly, the method of “ethnography”18with a socio-legal bias gave a purview of the 
complicated and critical challenges associated with corporate governance best 
practices within the identified companies in St. Vincent and to a less extent, some 
analogous comments about the conglomerate in Trinidad and Tobago. The researcher 
observed and interacted at length with some aspects of the target audiences in ‘lived 
experiences’ of the “corporate governance ecosystems”. The third technique used a 
people focussed approach, which was conducted within the environment of corporate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Jacques du Plessis, Jean, Hargovan, Anil, Harris, Jason, Principles of Contemporary 
Corporate Governance (4th edn Cambridge University Press, UK 2018) 138 
17 Yin, Robert, K, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4th edn Sage Publication, USA 
2009) 3 
18 Flood, John, Socio legal 
Ethnography:www.johnflood.com/pdfs/Socio_Legal_Ethnography_2005.pdf - accessed 12 
April 2018 
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development through the “phenomenological”19 research method. In this context, the 
relevance and significance of corporate governance best practices or their absence, 
lack or disregard in new and diverse ways gained a new appreciation This method 
allowed for what ‘might be at work or what might be assumed’ given the 
phenomenon of scandals associated with the procedure and practices of corporate 
governance that impacted St. Vincent and may have been allowable elsewhere within 
the Caribbean region that contributed to the resulting unprecedented crises. The fourth 
method borrowed from the “grounded theory”.20  In its originality of presentation, a 
number of guidelines were adapted and applied to the analyses, given the guidance 
provided by Melanie Birks et al. For instance, examples were drawn from the health 
sector in those documented instances, and the theoretical integration processes 
discussed were useful in their general application, to company law in society. There 
was urging from other authors to use this method in order to identify as “novice 
grounded theorists to develop fresh theories …to avoid seeing the world through the 
lens of extant ideas.”21  
 
Following the well - constructed and time - tested format within “grounded theory,”22 
this was well articulated and endorsed by Dawn Watkins et al. There was an 
identification of a core category. It was considered that a core category as a 
phenomenon during the period 1845 to 2013 was identifiable. This was so through the 
targeted concept of ‘genteel poverty’ that negatively impacted the gross domestic 
product of the already impoverished nation state of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. It 
was of course channelled through the insurance companies external to the island but 
none the less an integral part of the nature of corporate governance.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19Vagle, Mark, Crafting Phenomenological Research (2nd edn Routledge Publishers, USA 
2018) 10 
20 Birks, Melanie, Mills, Jane, Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide (Sage Publication Ltd., 
UK) 115 - 123 
21 Charmaz, Kathy, Constructing Grounded Theory (2nd edn Sage Publication Ltd, UK 2014) 
8 
22 Watkins, Dawn, Burton, Mandy (Eds) Research Methods in Law (Routledge Publishers, 
UK 2013) 56 - 59 
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These companies may have emerged as legal phenomena with their practices, but not 
necessarily as a response to autochthonous or home - grown statute within their start 
up phases. Again, analyses were arrived at when this method was combined with the 
case studies methods of Chapters Three and Four for greater emphases and coherence. 
Having identified a core category, the next phase according to Birks et al, was to 
challenge the concept of ‘theoretical saturation of major categories’. Here, data 
collected fell short of adding newer properties and or dimensions to these recognized 
‘categories under review.’ There was a re-examination of some elements of the 
grounded theory on corporate governance. As such there was further clarity and 
contextual application of the theory to highlight the early corporate life of St. Vincent 
as extracted from the John Hazells Sons and Company.  
 
This consolidated the basis of Chapter Three as the first case study of the private 
limited liability company considered as the first “established”23 company on the 
island. Its location was in capital city, Kingstown. The “original site”24 on which its 
first headquarters were erected is evident even up to present day. A similar 
comparative analysis on the British American Insurance Company was done utilising 
a similar approach. The latter presented with some complexity in its structure as an 
example of a ‘series’ of private limited liability companies.  
 
The strength of the grounded theory could not be disputed as being positive and its 
use as an appropriate application proved that there was some saturation of that theory. 
No refinements were needed or could be applied to this formulated theory as a pattern 
emerged while the research was in progress and up to the point of it completion. The 
analysis did continue but with a theoretical grounding that there was indeed a lack, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Appendix I (4) - As recorded – Excerpts from the minutes of the company in 
commemoration of the centenary celebrations: also [Visit to the Coreas Hazell Company 
Limited in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2012 and 2013].  
See also www.goddardenterprisesltd.com/in_co__.cfm?com=8 - accessed on 19 June 2019, 
where mention was made of the company as having been ‘established’ in 1845 and the ‘oldest 
registered company in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Goddard Enterprises acquired it in 
2001. 
24 Appendix 1(i) – Original site for the first established company in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
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disregard or absence of best practices, which resulted in a negative impact on the 
gross domestic product of countries that were so affected. Here were the linkages 
between the final theory and the data and or information collected over the specified 
period of study.  
The ‘accumulated bank of analytical memos’ as posited by Birks et al, was reviewed 
and sorted at each stage and did provide conclusions germane to the grounded theory. 
It was reflective of the sum total of the data and or information that was gathered over 
the period under review (1845 through to 2013). The use of the fifth 
“narrative”25research methodology contributed to analytical discussions about the 
concepts of corporate governance within the private limited liability companies 
limited by shares. Of critical relevance was the examination of narrative production 
deduced from the historical records of companies in meetings and the “imperfect path 
of the research process.”26 These were inherent especially within and among historical 
findings. It was a useful method of inquiry into the stories not limited to short stories, 
minutes of meetings, as was the case in this area of legal research. 
 
In some interesting instances, synoptic views of the narrative method sufficed to lay 
the foundation of the commonalities of corporate governance as a practice of ‘the 
times.’ The objective of the narrative approach did not fall short of exploring the 
existing phenomena and to propose change. The researcher’s narrative was one also 
that was influenced by ‘lived experiences’ that were analysed in tandem with existing 
phenomenon and these, when combined, brought some evaluation of the broader 
social context of corporate governance best practices; the implications for the 
identified companies; their relevance to the economic development of the country and 
the shaping of the corporate governance systems that were emerging. This point also 
to an process and a hybrid system that was and is evolving.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Kim, Jeong-Hee, Understanding Narrative Inquiry: The Crafting and Analysis of Stories as 
Research (Sage Publications Inc., USA 2016) xv; see also Clandinin, Jean. D., Engaging in 
Narrative Inquiry: Developing Qualitative Inquiry (Routledge, UK 2013) 11 
26 Halliday, Simon, Schmidt, Patrick, Conducting Law and Society Research (Cambridge 
University Press, UK 2009) 2 
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As the research developed the narrative method captured concisely that there was an 
unprecedented corporate governance crisis. The change advocated was that of a Code 
on corporate governance for unlisted companies. There was none that existed over the 
period of study as far as was known. The sixth theory was the institutional theory. 
Although applicable to organisations generally, the view that the “institutional 
theory”27was one that can be used to explain the functioning of the private limited 
liability company limited by shares. This was especially so given the nature of the 
commercial sector and the commensurate environment. The application of this theory 
appears to support the resilience of the social fabric of the identified companies within 
the context of their corporate governance systems. The theory ‘spoke’ to the structure 
and procedure that ‘provoked’ a collaborative mechanism for the delivery of 
sustainable services and products to all stakeholders. From the inception of the 
company on the island and their perpetual existence up to 2013, guidelines for social 
behaviours within the companies were created.  
 
After careful examination of available records for each company, these corporate 
governance processes and procedures undoubtedly impacted how, when, where, why 
and what business activity was conducted and by whom.  There was a further 
explanation as to the synergy within the company that catered to its functionality over 
time and the factors that restricted the company or those that caused it to remain a 
viable social and economic entity. Stakeholders were responsible for creating, 
diffusing, distilling and recreating corporate practices within the internal organisation 
of the company. The efforts by stakeholders held these processes and practices as 
influential elements in conducting business amidst the prevailing forces external to 
the companies.  
 
Borrowing from Greenwood et al, there was that sense of a logical perspective and or 
balance given the applicability of the institutional theory. There was more than a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Furusten, Staffan, Institutional Theory and Organizational Change (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, UK 2013) vii 
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suggestion that “institutional logics”28 are or were “socially constructed, historical 
patterns of material practices...[that did] provide meaning to their social reality.”29 If 
indeed companies were also considered social entities then the assumptions about the 
identified companies were implicit and practicable. It is respectfully contended that, 
the companies under study are not to be confused necessarily with “social 
enterprises”30 and no such challenge should be considered. A combined observable 
view is taken of the company as a social organism, one that had competing 
stakeholder interests albeit within an emerging post “emancipation”31 competitive 
economy.  
 
The research sought to explain further, the nature of the corporate governance within 
these types of companies given their assumed duality of purpose. This was coupled 
with hybrid views of their responsibilities to loyal stakeholders that spanned 
centuries; their permanence as evolutionary creatures of the law and their relevance to 
economic development and social order if but as contributory to a small degree of the 
latter. An important point is that of the essential element of the institutional theory of 
law itself. The theoretical framework proposes and contends that, institutional theory 
characterised corporate governance best practices and may be explained if only at 
certain perceived levels.  
 
Company law in post emancipation West Indian societies cannot be understood unless 
attention is paid to relationships between and among contemporaneous legal forms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Thornton, Patricia, H, Ocasio, William, Lounsbury, Michael, The Institutional Logics 
Perspective: A New Approach to Culture, Structure and Process (Oxford University Press, 
USA 2012) 20 
29 Greenwood, Royston, Oliver, Christine, Lawrence, Thomas, Meyer, Renate. E., (Eds) The 
SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (2nd edn SAGE Publications Limited, 
UK 2017) 136 
30 Frankel, Carl, Bromberger, Allen, The Art of Social Enterprise: Business as if People 
Mattered (New Society Publishers, Canada 2013) 20 
31  See Appendix 2(2) – Article on Sugar Slavery and Emancipation in St. Vincent – 
Newspaper article, July 2010, August 2010, by Dr. Adrian Fraser, Retired Resident Tutor – 
University of the West Indies Open Campus/UWIDITE  
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and all other evolving forms of life and livelihood in a “democratic society”32 co 
called. There could be no ‘short-circuiting’ of a definition on the historical context 
and British legacies inherited by small island states with these institutions that were 
and are channels of the ideals of democracy.  
 
While the term democracy was understood to mean that it constitutes all those 
processes reflective of “responsiveness to the will of the people,”33 at times of course 
it became questionable as to its workability. Whether this was within the island or 
observable within the companies on the island, such a parallel existed and still exists 
up to the time of researching this thesis. One important question to be asked was 
whether corporate governance best practices were appreciated, conveyed or 
understood within this non-dichotomous paradigm.  
 
It is rhetorical though, in that whatever the theoretical framework, corporate 
governance practices were identifiable by many stakeholders as having elements of 
democracy in terms of contributory to leadership and decision making within the 
institution of the private company. Last but by no means least was the “doctrinal ”34 
or black letter research methodology. This was achieved through re-examination of 
case – law, statutes and other legal sources. In this method, the analysis of the law 
was preferred to analysis of the effect of the law on society or on organisations. The 
rest of this chapter was divided according to the following sub categories: the central 
theme of the thesis; the nature of the study, major objectives; justification for 
corporate governance; the early corporate governance focus; the hypothesis; the 
problem; explanation of terms; the island as an incubator for corporate governance 
and the conclusions.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Isakhan, Benjamin, Stockwell, Stephen (Eds) The Secret History of Democracy (Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK 2011) 2 
33 Op. cit. [Frasier, Adrian – Appendix 2(2) fn 31 
34 Watkins, Dawn, Burton, Mandy (Eds) Research Methods in Law (Routledge, UK 2013) 7 - 
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1.3 Central theme of the thesis 
The discussions turn on the importance of the central theme of the thesis. It posits that 
UK Companies Acts and British Company laws, with adaptations from German 
company law specific to the GmbH, (the Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung – the 
private company with limited liability) constituted the current nature of corporate 
governance best practices within the private limited liability companies limited by 
shares on St. Vincent. The underlying arguments and analyses were best understood 
within this context.  
 
The information contained in this thesis in its originality demonstrated that there were 
indeed negative implications generated by corporate governance. This was as a result 
of procedures and practices crystallising within the classic case of an unprecedented 
financial crisis within and among Caribbean companies. The crisis originated from 
the sub category of private limited liability companies limited by shares. This was in 
contrast to the reality of corporate best practices operative in other successful private 
limited liability companies limited by shares especially on St. Vincent and elsewhere 
in the Caribbean.  
 
Those who generally had the power to execute corporate governance best practices 
and who held the factors of production in their hands were generally responsible 
persons. The crisis unfolded and stakeholders were currently experiencing its 
consequences and other stakeholders were likely to be ‘held’ accountable to the 
company in meetings. In the main none of these categories of stakeholders were seen 
as exploiters of others for maximum economic gains. 
 
It became intuitively clear as the study progressed that there were poor levels of 
interconnectedness within and among identified companies that were at the heart of 
the contagion. This significantly facilitated any transmission of shock throughout the 
islands and within the regional financial groupings. It became clear that there was a 
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likelihood that a lack, disregard and absence of corporate governance best practices 
significantly increased the magnitude of losses experienced by all stakeholders. The 
consequence of this in St. Vincent was a new variant of poverty called genteel 
poverty. This term is explained subsequently. When genteel poverty became a 
prominent feature within an already impoverished state, there was a commensurate 
negative impact on the nation’s gross domestic product. 
 
This deplorable condition led to the destabilising of an entire financial sector. Several 
attempts were made to bolster the confidence of investors and other stakeholders who 
were domiciled on the island and overseas. The philosophy of corporate governance 
best practices inherent in the UK Companies Acts and the British company laws was 
well positioned to counter most if not all of the effects of the financial contagion. 
Also, there were precedents for dealing with other financial chaos that were well 
documented but the current situation was unparalleled in the history of the Caribbean 
region.  
 
This presents a new level contagion that destroyed the lives and livelihood of many. It 
offered a diversity of challenges to corporate governance practitioners, stakeholders, 
technocrats and others that followed the British company corporate governance 
practices. Arguably, this must have been a manifestation of a corporate governance 
phenomenon that was in stark contrast to the perception of the versatile private 
limited liability company limited by shares that was seen as a ‘panacea’ to alleviate 
poverty and assist with economic development goals of post - colonial states. The 
discussions now turned on the particulars of the study; the research question; the 
hypothesis and objectives of the study. 
 
The study was about exploring the nature of corporate governance within the private 
limited liability company on St. Vincent and the Grenadines over the period 1845 
through to 2013. Corporate governance was presumed to have best practices given 
that its constituents were consistent with the model and system laid down in British 
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company laws and utilised by the UK Companies Acts. These elements were drawn 
from the “deed of settlement;”35 “the unit trust,”36	  examples of	   “common law”37 
practices; the influences of voluntary “ large partnerships"38	  and the “struggle”39	  for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Kan, Sin Fan, The Legal Nature of the Unit Trust (Clarendon Press, Oxford UK, 1997) 13 - 
19 for an exhaustive historical introduction to what constitutes a deed of settlement company, 
the use to which the business man put it, how the courts viewed such a company and its 
impact on company law as it developed in modern corporate society. 'The deed of settlement 
was the progenitor of the articles of association' as known today. These articles formed part of 
the constitution of modern day companies and were captured under the default rubric 'Table 
A' in the UK Companies Acts since the 1800s. This deed of settlement [Company] was 
deemed - "a new business vehicle' as opposed to the companies that were practically outlawed 
with the passage of the Bubbles Act 1720.'The deed of settlement [Company]…was the 
offspring of the joint stock company and the trust. It was noted that the deed of settlement and 
the unit trust have the commonality of being contractual in nature. A company emerged in the 
Vincentian society that could only bear the exact replica that existed in Great Britain at such 
times. The treatment of directors and shareholders were the same in the colony as it was in 
Great Britain and this major fact laid the premise on which the treatment of directors and 
shareholders were viewed generally.  
36 Duncan, W. D., (Ed), Joint Ventures Law in Australia, (2nd edn The Federation Press, 
Sydney, Australia) 152; Hudson, Alastair, Understanding Equity and Trusts (4th edn 
Routledge, UK 2013) 15 - 17 - the unit trust being the oldest form of collective investment 
scheme under English law. 
37 Van Sandan v Moore (1826) 1 Russ Ch 441, Lord Eldon appeared to think the joint stock 
associations were illegal at common law. He said that they could not “effectively demand 
what they had a right to demand or be effectually sued for that for which they were liable.” 
This was so because the partners were numerous and as a result the courts were unable to 
attend to all the necessary parties in a suit. Six years later in 1832, Lord Brougham dictum in 
Walburn v Ingilby (1832) 1 Myl  & K 61 – 77, was the opposite, “to hold such a company 
illegal would be to say every stock company not incorporated by charter or Act of Parliament 
is unlawful, and indeed, indictable as a nuisance and to decide this for the first time, no 
authority of a decided case being produced for such a doctrine. The clause intimating that 
each subscriber is only to be liable to the extent of his share is not enough to make the 
association illegal…” see also Garrard v Hardey (1843) 5 Man. & GR 471 where Tyndale, 
CJ dictum – “the raising and transferring of stock in a company cannot be held in itself, an 
offense at common law; such species of property was altogether unknown to the law in 
ancient times; nor indeed was it in usage and practise until a short period antecedent to the 
passing of the statute (Bubble Act) as is evident from the preamble to the eighteenth section 
which recites that it is notorious that these projects and undertakings, which it is the object of 
the clause to put down, had been contrived and practiced within the kingdom since the 24th 
June 1718, evidently showing that the act was looking to some grievance of late 
introduction.” 
38 Wen, Shuangge, Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Governance: Legal Aspects, Practice 
and Future Directions (Routledge, UK 2013) 194 - quoting Harris, Ron, Industrialising 
English law: entrepreneurship and business organization 1720-1844 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) as historical reference and consolidation of what constitutes the common 
practice of large partnerships. 
39 Bloomberg, Philip et al., Bloomberg on Corporate Groups (2nd edn Aspen Publishers, 
USA 2009) 16; Davies, L. P. Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (6th edn Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1997) 40 – 46 on the struggle for limited liability in the UK in greater 
detail. This was a type of contest between and among those entities that were aware of the 
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limited liability itself. Over time it was observable that the fundamentals on corporate 
governance best practices were enshrined within British jurisprudence on the 
development of the company. It was not merely a matter to follow blindly, but there 
was an established template. There were certainly major differences of application of 
these fundamental principles and the levels of qualitative and quantitative strategies 
used by stakeholders within emerging economies of Small Island developing states.  
 
Research question 
It follows therefore that the research question asked whether there was any correlation 
between a lack, disregard or absence of corporate governance best practices to genteel 
poverty within an already impoverished nation and if so, to what extent did this 
negatively impact the nation’s gross domestic product over time. 
 
Justification 
This thesis has a practical and legal relevance to the existing debate on corporate 
governance in its original historical context. There is no known monograph on 
corporate governance within the legal phenomenon of the private limited liability 
companies limited by shares on St. Vincent and the Grenadines over the specified 
period of study. This research represents a positive contribution to the existing debate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
privilege extended to all types of businesses on one hand, and to those that were in opposition 
to any grant of the said privilege unless the entity was of somewhat public in nature, like a 
railroad or a canal.  Individual grants of limited liability as per royal charter or special Acts of 
Parliament were already discussed elsewhere in this chapter to verify the point. The Bubbles 
Act 1720 did make it a criminal offence for any unincorporated company with the 
presumption that they so act as any such corporation. In 1825 an Act to repeal the Bubbles 
Act, did gave the king such legislative power to grant charters to corporations, which 
Parliament thought he did not possess. The dual nature of this was that it denied the 
corporation the privileges of limited liability. The Joint Stock Companies Registration and 
Regulation Act of 1844 required registration of all partnerships that possessed transferable 
shares and a membership in excess of 25, and when registered they then were conferred with 
corporate privileges except the privilege of limited liability. Not until the Companies Act 
1855 was limited liability granted to registered companies. No such struggle nor indeed need 
of it, in the commercial sector in the then colony since prevailing law of Great Britain was the 
law of the colony. 
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about corporate governance on the island generally and further will add to the 
accessibility and availability of written material.  
 
Further, this original thesis should augment a progressive search for an understanding 
of the current milieu about the nature of such corporate governance on the island and 
to some extent within the wider Caribbean region. It will therefore fill such a gap in 
legal research on the topic. Hopefully it will assist with developing associated 
‘research and scholarship’ rich curriculum.  The practical relevance of this original 
thesis can be seen through its pages of information that quantifies the importance of 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Their significance of roles in the development of 
corporate governance could not be discounted. All such stakeholders benefitted in 
knowledge and skills from increased and varied approaches taken towards corporate 
governance over time.  
 
To further highlight their dynamism, private limited liability companies limited by 
shares did not have the benefit of an autochthonous Code of corporate governance. 
However, the British company laws and the UK Companies Acts as well as adherence 
to international best practices, were historical legacies that underpin existing 
legislation on companies in the island. By extension, this was the same across the 
Caribbean region that encompassed other islands as well as the islands of St. Vincent 
and Trinidad and Tobago. Nothing outside of this remit could have served as 
preparation for a crisis of this magnitude. 
 
This available plethora of corporate governance material support, which was in 
practice and well documented did augment the private companies’ functioning for 
centuries.  There was a real sense that British laws and the UK Companies Acts 
pointed to homogeneity in the corporate governance agenda and philosophy. If the 
hypothesis can be supported, and eventually it was, there was no doubt that the 
answer to the research question was demonstrated in its practical relevance and 
application.  
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Shareholders and other stakeholders had more knowledge on how to appreciate 
corporate governance best practices. They were guided or had book knowledge as to 
how to serve the wider stakeholder community. The available guidance even if but for 
limited application should have served as signposts or navigation on the paths towards 
corporate governance as well as corporate social responsibility for many if not all 
private companies. In so doing, the ultimate goal would have been a greater 
appreciation for corporate governance best practices and their ultimate and wider 
impact on the economic growth of small island states or their stagnation.  
 
In further contemplation of the research question, other considerations come to mind. 
To begin with, one of the issues was whether corporate governance best practices in 
all Caribbean territories were about the delivery of accurate information and 
disclosure within and among the identified companies. If so, then this would be 
reflected in the outcomes. The latter would have been identifiable in the choices made 
by many stakeholders, which would have assisted them with making informed 
decisions. All of this is in light of the financial contagion currently being experienced.  
 
Also, if it were about proper disclosure with and among identified companies, then 
stakeholders would have been presented with documentation that had a bearing on the 
nature of all transactions. The media houses across the region, premium holders, 
institutional stakeholders and others testified that the considerations articulated herein 
were not documented in any way judgmental or as prejudicial in intent or design. 
These were live examples of functioning of aspects of company law in society. To aid 
with the process of communication about corporate governance, documentation was 
not limited to written information on paper, but was found among electronic 
messaging that utilised social media and other associated gadgets.   
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There were some aspects of documentation that evolved over time but stakeholders 
more so, directors and other categories of staff ‘grew’ with the times. For instance, 
some directors were attracted to the identified companies and were drawn from a pool 
of professionals that were skilled and educated to use electronic devices to transmit 
information commensurate with the developing and evolving nature of corporate 
governance best practices. Their ability to communicate effectively across geographic 
landscape and in cyberspace was of great significance to corporate governance within 
the Caribbean region. This remains largely unchanged in an advancing technological 
age. 
 
1.4 Research hypothesis 
The thesis explored and proved that there was a relationship between the lack, 
disregard or absence of corporate governance best practices within the private limited 
liability companies limited by shares to "genteel poverty"40 that negatively impacted 
the gross domestic product of the nation state of St. Vincent and the Grenadines for a 
segment within the period of study.  The empirical hypothesis was proved correct that 
there was that direct correlation between the "lack, absence or disregard of corporate 
governance best practices" 41  within a small number of private limited liability 
companies limited by shares. It was identifiable as having had a causal link to genteel 
poverty that adversely impacted the “gross domestic product”42 of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The word “gentile” and “genteel” were generally used interchangeably but referred to the 
same concept when describing levels of poverty experienced by persons who were not 
necessarily within the category as indigent poor or dispossessed. This state of poverty was a 
new phenomenon and could not be a feature in the Country Poverty Assessments in 
2007/2008 
41 Layne, William, Permanent Secretary (ret.), Recent Financial Failures In The Caribbean - 
What Were The Causes And What Lessons Can Be Learnt? (The Ministry of Finance – 
Barbados) www.da-academy.org/Financial_Crisis_in_the_Caribbean.pdf, 6, para 2 - 3 - 
accessed in 17 April, 2019 
42  Gonsalves, Ralph. E, Budget Speech 2010: Economic and Financial Stability, Social 
Cohesion and Fiscal Consolidation at a time of Global Recession and Uneven Recovery (St. 
Vincent 2010) 1 
	  
	  
	  
20	  
The hypotheses provided the researcher with the theoretical framework on gathering 
materials needed to explore further the actual nature of such corporate governance on 
the island during the period of study from 1845 to 2013. The subcategory of insurance 
companies was located off island, which was highlighted as the ‘incubators of an 
unprecedented crisis’. The contagion was possible given that it infiltrated porous 
borders within and among all CARICOM states. An insurance company on St. 
Vincent was affected which served as the catalyst for other institutional investors and 
shareholders who were part of the fragile financial sector on the island. Although all 
associated states within the Caribbean region were affected, there was a natural 
limitation placed on the scope of this research in its originality.   
 
Only two such states (St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago) were 
either referenced and or had aspects of their affected insurance companies examined. 
On St. Vincent it was the British American Insurance Company as part of the CL 
Financial Holdings that was in question. This private limited liability company held 
such a pivotal role so as to provide a magnification of the contagion within the wider 
region among so many companies of a similar corporate governance constitution. As 
such the nature of “corporate governance”43  within the private limited liability 
companies on St. Vincent by extension was re-shaped by the adverse impact of 
“genteel poverty, which was a variant of “poverty.” 44  Notwithstanding this, 
“poverty”45 in St. Vincent was a critical factor and remained so to date.  
 
Major research objectives of the study 
The overarching research objective sought to explore and did explore the nature of 
corporate governance best practices within the private limited liability company 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Worthington, Sarah, Gower, L.C.B, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (5th edn 
Sweet and Maxwell, UK 1992) 37; see also Gower, L.C.B, Gower’s Principles of Modern 
Company Law (3rd edn Stevens and Sons, UK1969) 40 for historical context and application. 
44 Poverty Assessment Report Vol II (Kairi Consultants Limited, Trinidad and Tobago 2007 – 
2008) 4 – 7; National Report St. Vincent and the Grenadines: Third International Conference 
on Small Island Developing States – National Report (Ministry of Health Wellness and the 
Environment, July 2013) 5 
45 Ibid 
	  
	  
	  
21	  
limited by shares for the period 1845 to 2013. The exploration sought to identify best 
practices as a natural consequence of company law in motion. Additionally, the 
research sought to isolate and or specify whether there were conjoining factors that 
influenced or negative corporate governance best practices; whether these were to be 
evidenced in all private limited liability companies and were all part of the financial 
sector within the post colonial emerging economy of St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  
 
Another objective was to satisfy to some extent the claims made by the statement that, 
“there is a growing recognition that economic performance is closely associated with 
the quality of underlying institutions…and practices that determines how a society 
functions and is organized.”46Having analysed the nature of corporate governance 
best practices within the aforementioned context, another major objective of the study 
was to provide corporate governance policy makers with a corporate governance 
Code for unlisted companies in St. Vincent and the Grenadines..  
 
1.5 Why corporate governance? 
Moreover, when the question was asked in keeping with the current debate on 
“corporate governance”47 within St. Vincent and the Grenadines, two major concepts 
were borrowed from the famous “Cadbury Report.”48 Firstly, that, “ Corporate 
governance is the system by which businesses are directed and controlled;”49 and 
secondly from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in that, 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  DaCosta, Michael, Colonial Origins, Institutions and Economic Performance in the 
Caribbean: Guyana and Barbados (International Monetary Fund Publication, USA 2017) 3 
47 www.iod.com/MainWebsite/Resources/Document/policy_article_corp_gov_unlisted_compa
nies_eu.pdf, 11 - accessed 27 May 2017  
48 The Cadbury Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee & Co Ltd, UK 
1992) - accessed 12 January 2019 
49 Ibid 
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“ Corporate governance is one key element in improving economic efficiency and 
growth as well as enhancing investor confidence. Corporate governance involves a set 
of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which 
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide 
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring.”50.  
 
Therefore, the answer to the ‘why’ of corporate governance was that it was an 
imperative within any system that was operative and functional through its financial 
and commercial sector. It was a given that corporate governance did exist through the 
private limited liability companies under study. They had to be directed and 
controlled efficiently. The compulsory result had to be efficiency and corporate and 
financial growth once all things were being executed and regulated properly. The 
determinants of such execution and regulation were deemed necessary for a balanced 
approach to the delivery of goods and services to the beneficiary stakeholders. The 
relationships between the management of the private company and its board and 
shareholders and other stakeholders were huge. The prescription for corporate 
governance best practices or end results was critical to the success of the private 
company. The anticipated mutual benefits were favourable at best. 
 
By way of clarity on the ‘how’ of corporate governance, some argued, that, 
“governance of corporations began with the charters for early commercial voyages.”51 
Therefore, corporate governance in St. Vincent was largely according to British 
jurisprudence. It was to its advantage that corporate governance practitioner draw 
lessons from the well articulated historical and time-tested premise. Corporate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50www.iod.com/services/information-and-advice/resources-and-factsheets/details/UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-July-2018, accessed 17 January, 2019 
51  Davies, Adrian, Best Practise in Corporate Governance: Building Reputation and 
Sustainable Success (Gower Publishing Limited, London 2006) 3 
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governance best practices were never done in isolation or hidden from view within the 
‘world of company law’ per se. According to Monk et al, corporate governance 
detailed how a special relationship among various participants existed in determining 
the direction and performance of corporations (private companies included).  
 
The primary participants were “(1) the shareholders, (2) the management (led by the 
chief executive officer) and (3) the board of directors, all internal and structural.”52 
Consequently, from their appearance on the corporate landscape of this post colonial 
emerging island state, the private limited liability companies limited by shares were 
endowed with some (if not all) of the identifiable and critical components of 
aforementioned constituents. This however presupposed that corporate governance 
arises only upon incorporation. There was that subtle notion within St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines that there may have been another factor or factors that led to a 
departure from the generally accepted belief about ‘corporate governance initiation’ 
so called on St. Vincent. Respectfully, this is explored in Chapter Three. 
 
Early Corporate governance focus in St. Vincent  
From the pages of its own history, Saint Vincent (St. Vincent) appeared to have 
wrestled with such a 'corporate construct’, the company known as ‘one of the 
“greatest inventions of all time.’"53 There were the early forms of partnerships that 
transitioned to the private limited liability company. Subsequent discussions 
explained this occurrence. This was post World War 1 and thereafter the corporate 
landscape in St. Vincent was reshaped through the influences of many other external 
forces. The aim undoubtedly was good so as to facilitate economy expediency, 
efficiency and to cater to the needs of stakeholders that sought varying means of 
‘financial depository and corporate governance enhancements’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  Keay, Andrew, The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance 
(Routledge, UK) 7 reflecting similar sentiments  - Monks, Robert, Minnows, Nell, Corporate 
Governance (5th edn TJ International, Cornwall UK 2011) 4 – posited that interaction 
between and among key constituents aid functioning of the company. 
53 Horrigan, Bryan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and 
Practices Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, UK 2010) 5 
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Having had imposed British dominance since 1763, the island had to navigate several 
stages of colonial status prior to its independence.  The island of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines became an independent state in 1979. There was ’sameness’ in the 
companies both in Britain and in the island. In this instance, reference it to the private 
company that retained its corporate governance structures and procedures. On the 
island, the private company remained the same juridic construct for well over two 
centuries. Successive governments since “Statehood”54 adhered to the concept of 
moving the company with its commensurate corporate governance best practices to 
the forefront of the nation’s economic development. It took many years post 
Statehood to amend British company laws in guided responses to economic and 
financial diversification. 
 
1.6 A company: social organism and or a nexus of contracts 
An incorporeal concept but nonetheless a very real and functioning company limited 
by shares, is described by many corporate governance practitioners and literature on 
company as a corporate entity. It has evolved to having possesses limited liability and 
does so upon incorporation. It is a “separate legal person from its controlling 
shareholder.”55The “economic theory’s notion described”56 the firm or the company 
as a “nexus of contracts.”57 The company within the Caribbean islands was not just an 
entity that operated as a bundle of contractual obligations between people. The 
company blundered about on the Caribbean economic landscape as an unruly beast.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Government Gazette, Vol 102 No 8, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuesday 23 December 
1969  
55 Reisberg, Arad, Donovan, Anna, Pettet, Lowry and Reisberg’s Company Law (5th edn 
Pearson Education Limited, UK 2018) 36 
56 Druta, Diana, The Company Law in the European dimension: Freedom of establishment, 
competition between jurisdiction, protection of creditors (Diana Druta [Commercial Law 
Work Paper] 2014) 16; see also Bratton, William. W., The Nexus Of Contracts Corporation: 
A Critical Appraisal, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 407 (1989) 409 
57 Dine, Janet, Koutsias, Marios, Company Law (8th edn Palgrave McMillan Publishers, UK 
2014) 18; Griffiths, Andrew, Contracting With Companies Contemporary Studies in 
Corporate Law (Hart Publishing, USA 2005) 46 
	  
	  
	  
25	  
The evidences were seen in classic examples of “scandals, crises and corporate 
failures”58 that were well documented. These were fine examples that tested the 
fundamental tenets of the “law of contract.”59 Nonetheless, the activities within a 
private company could be explained as those originating from a mere entity classified 
as a singular example characterised by the ‘economic theory’ or having merely ‘nexus 
of contracts’. 
 
The private company expedites contracts and contractual obligations, as it does exist 
for the purpose of economic gain. However, it is also about a community of people. 
The company is an entity with relationships and communication processes that proved 
effective in the ways in which all businesses was conducted. In this context, corporate 
governance best practices (processes and procedures) facilitated such economic 
pragmatism. The nexus of contracts theory served to explain the company’s value 
within the cycle of economic production. On the other hand, the private company 
elucidated how, as a “social organism of people,” 60  it served the purpose of 
transmitting “human values”61 hinged on a company’s corporate social responsibility 
and practices at optimum levels.  
 
The "most critical actors in national economic activity are creatures of the law - 
juridical entities, like the corporation, the limited liability company and the firm."62 
While its primary focus was to engage in productive economic enterprises, the 
company was seen as a conjoined entity for both the nexus of contracts and as a social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Persaud, Wilberne, Jamaica Meltdown: Indigenous Financial Sector Crash (Universe, Inc., 
USA 2006) 7 – 21 – the book serves as good reading for greater understanding of the crisis 
and the role of the private limited liability company 
59 O’Sullivan, Janet, Hilliard, Jonathan, The Law of Contract (7th edn Oxford University 
Press, UK 2014) 1 - 7 
60  Bounfour, Ahmed, Organisational Capital: Modelling, measuring and contextualising 
(Routledge, USA 2009) 9 – 11; See also Cohen, Don, Prusack, Lawrence, In Good Company: 
How Social Capitalism Makes Social Organizations Work (Harvard University School Press, 
USA 2001) 17; Bell, Geoffrey, The Competitive Enterprise: 10 Principles of Business 
Excellence for Increased Market Share (McGraw Hill Australia Pty Ltd, Australia 2002) 237 
61 Zukauskas, Pranas, Vveinhardt, Jolita, Andriukaitiene, Regina, Management Culture and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (IntechOpen, UK 2018) 107 - 109 
62 Pollard, Duke, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Closing the Circle of Independence (The 
Caribbean Law Publishing Company Ltd, Jamaica 2004) 106 
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organism. The company remained an ill-disciplined and amoral beast that lacked the 
capacity to think and reason but none the less a juristic person. The regulatory 
regimes of company law remained tied to centuries’ old debates that emanated from 
the UK Parliament and posits itself on post colonial states like St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and other nation states that followed the British 
legal tradition. 
 
The company was a “robotic person that has the capacity to function (independent of 
its members)...being owned by its shareholders, recognized by the law as being 
capable ...to own and run a business.”63 It is maintained that as that as “a new 
person...a ‘limited company' has that day come into being”64 upon its incorporation. 
Respectfully, the “company”65however cannot be divorced from its role as a social 
organism or be isolated as a mere nexus of contracts. There is a historical and causal 
link that pervades the private company.  
 
The ingenuity of corporation lawyers as seen in the UK Bubbles Act between 1720 
and 1825 must be referenced. The legislative procedure and practices of corporate 
governance was conceptualised as visionary hallmarks of this nexus of contracts and 
enabled through the mechanism within this social organism. It is this same 
subcategory of the private company that became operational in St. Vincent and 
Trinidad and Tobago and other former colonies that were adherents to British 
company laws and the UK Companies Acts for more than two centuries. 
 
A company may be formed for general and several purposes. The private limited 
liability company limited by shares was one that remained as versatile as when it was 
conceived. St. Vincent and the Grenadines as well as other former colonies of Great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  Hicks, Andrew, Goo, H.S., Cases and Materials on Company Law (6th edn Oxford 
University Press Inc., USA 2008) 1; 5 
64 Ibid 
65   Sealy, Len, Worthington, Sarah, Sealy and Worthington’s Cases and Materials in 
Company Law (10th edn Oxford University Press, UK 2013) 5 - 7 
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Britain boasted of having such phenomena. It was Sealy who opined that within this 
same construct of the “company”66 it had its own “internal organization.”67  It was to 
that internal organization that corporate governance remained pivotal.  
 
Classification of companies in St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Private limited 
liability) 
From 1845 to 2013 on St. Vincent, there were approximately 10,000 companies (see 
Figure 1(1) below) that were considered private limited liability companies limited by 
shares. 
Figure (1) 
Number of companies classified as private limited liability companies limited by 
shares: 1845 – 2013 
 
Years Companies within the Financial Sector on St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
 
Domestic 
Sector 
International Sector 
1845 - 
2013 
 
Limited 
Liability 
Companies 
International 
Insurance 
Companies 
International 
Business 
Companies 
Totals 
 
2000 
approximately 
18 5 7728 
9, 751 
*(10,000) 
*A more realistic figure given that some historical records were in a state of 
disuse/wet/crumbled documents/barely decipherable at the time of examination of 
records (CIPO – SVG) 
Source: Compiled by researcher - 2019 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Sealy, Len, Worthington, Sarah, Cases and Materials in Company Law (8th edn Oxford 
University Press Inc., USA 2008) 510; See also Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189, that any 
wrong done to the company, that the claimant is the company – a distinct legal entity  
67 Ibid 
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Each company provided for their own individual interpretation of its corporate 
governance best practices with the aid of a default set of bylaws inherited from Great 
Britain. With amendments to that codified procedure, private companies were able to 
outline what they considered best practices and whether they wished to abide by the 
existing version of Table A borrowed from the English company laws and the UK 
Company Acts. For nearly two centuries of corporate governance best practices 
experienced on the island of St. Vincent, this remained largely unchanged to its 
predecessor legislated creature – the British company. 
 
Policy makers had a vision of what the versatile private limited liability company 
could accomplish as a statute driven phenomenon. The intention by successive 
governments was probably part political meddling or part legislative provision for 
rebalancing the economic wealth of the nation.  If both, then, the company remained a 
product of corporate restructuring to the benefit of investors and other stakeholders 
both domicile in St. Vincent and overseas. It was this same construct, the juridical 
body that was referenced earlier as a custodian of its nexus of contracts and an 
adherent to its claim as a social organism. There is a point of almost legislative 
departure as to the ‘appearance’ of the private company presumably in 1845 on the 
island of St. Vincent. Its origin was shrouded in some controversy. In Chapter Three, 
a case study highlighted some important aspects of this phenomenon. While 
concentration was on the genesis of the company in St. Vincent and the actual nature 
of its corporate governance, periodic references were made and will continue to be 
made to Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
In the latter island, the significance of similar private limited liability companies is 
discussed. This highlights the nature of corporate governance within the private 
limited liability companies limited by shares in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and is 
extrapolated in Chapter Four. There can be no discussion about the nature of 
corporate governance within the identified subcategory of companies in St. Vincent 
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without the case study in Chapter Four. The corporate governance procedure and 
practices were those that followed along similar lines. Both countries were among 
CARICOM states that encouraged cross border networks of businesses. Private 
companies on both islands were predominantly the repositories of British made 
corporate governance practices and procedure. In the case of companies on St. 
Vincent however, the more recent addition of aspects of German corporate law and 
other influences proved that a hybrid corporate governance system existed on the 
island up to present time. 
 
1.7 The sociology of law and sociological jurisprudence  
Greater insight into this rich diversity of corporate governance best practices under 
review in St. Vincent was arrived at, given a nexus between “sociological 
jurisprudence”68 and the “sociology of law itself.”69 Reza Banakar was credited with 
the aforementioned nexus. The claim was that “the sociology of law and sociology 
jurisprudence are influenced primarily by mainstream sociology, Law and 
Society…[that] Socio-Legal Studies and policy research are influenced by both 
sociology and other social science disciplines.”70  
 
The said author made significant distinctions between “Socio-Legal and socio-legal”71 
so as to highlight the scientific studies within the field of law. As much as it cloaked 
‘legal persona’, respectfully, the focus was also on the socio-legal perspective of the 
same juridical construct – the company. It was undeniably a social institution. As was 
mentioned previously, the dictates of social dynamism as contributory to an 
institution as the private company and its corporate governance practices cannot be 
divorced and isolated in any on-going discussion. Borrowing from the current 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Cotterrell, Roger, What is Sociological Jurisprudence: Juristic Thought and Social Inquiry 
(Routledge Publishers, UK 2018) 1 - 5 
69 Wacks, Raymond, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal Theory (4th 
edn. Oxford University Press, UK 2015) 187 
70 Banakar, Reza, Normativity in Legal Sociology: Methodological Reflections on Law and 
Regulation in Late Modernity (Springer International Publishing, Switzerland 2015) 42 - 44 
71 Ibid 
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scholarship on the sociology of law and sociological jurisprudence, the researcher 
utilised diverse methods that would hopefully and positively “challenge and 
stimulate”72 practitioners and scholars within the field of company law towards a 
renewed thinking about the company.  
 
The researcher recognised the usefulness of an admixture of methodology in studying 
corporate governance best practices critical to exploring this historical and legislative 
phenomenon. With its legacy of a jurisprudence that was shaped by debates pre and 
post - financial crises; here was the possibility of placing an accent on theories and 
methodologies already in use in mainstream social sciences. The findings hereinafter 
recorded, illustrates how company law was constrained by and researched from a 
socio-legal perspective. This “empirical” exposition was a ‘systematic’ collection of 
information that could not stray from established company law but utilised a 
combination of methods alluded to earlier. This formed the basis of the originality of 
this thesis.   
 
Limitations of study 
Finally, a more scientific robust and quantitative testing of the hypothesis was not 
possible but respectfully, was not deemed to have placed significant limitations on 
this thesis in its originality. This was due primarily to the lack of or scope of 
substantive data in circulation. These limitations were recognized. There was the 
absence of some presumed recorded historical data and some statistical analyses had 
to be premised on well-calculated realistic assumptions. The interaction of law and 
society was the phenomenon that provided the greatest non-scientific basics for some 
of the legal arguments when comparative analyses were made to existing primary and 
secondary sources. The process was time consuming but effective.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Cane, Peter, Kritzer, Herbert, (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 
(Oxford University Press, UK 2010) 3 - 5 
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There was validity and reliability even as the island grappled with the reality of 
“genteel poverty.” It was another observable characteristic where law met society in 
motion. These actions created a corporate governance dissonance and a paradigm 
shift for the better understanding of corporate governance practices. The situation was 
not static or ‘an established state of the corporate governance related law’. The other 
issue was that two types of companies were contrasted in the format of case studies. 
Their choice had more to do with being the best representatives of the whole spectrum 
of the phenomenon of corporate governance ‘best’ practices.  
 
This turned on the substantive matter that one company represented as an established 
company and called itself the First House on the island. The other was one of the 
largest private conglomerates in the Caribbean region with a branch on the island and 
a conduit of the greatest financial contagion to disrupt economic development. This 
remained the largest negative economic and financial ‘weight’ in the history of the 
island of St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  
 
The issue of quantitative data had to be “gleaned” from historical records that were 
evidently in great disrepair. Reliance was placed on discussions and experiences of 
some generational stakeholders, the sifting of information within the public domain 
(printed and electronic), and the assessments made as to the validity of the news 
medium were among some challenges. Having said that, the findings expressed in this 
original thesis contribution were substantiated and corroborated by valid legal sources 
external to but relevant to the vagaries of financial contagion and the conclusions 
drawn about the nature of corporate governance generally. These could not detract 
from the conclusions of the hypotheses 
 
The Problem 
The problem that was discussed in this study centered on the symbiotic relationship 
between the lack, disregard or absence of corporate governance best practices in the 
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private limited liability company limited by shares to genteel poverty on St Vincent 
and its impact on the Gross Domestic Product of the country. The country by and 
large was recognized “internationally” 73  as an impoverished nation. This was 
documented and well articulated. This constitutes part of the overall nature of 
corporate governance. The other issue was that a small breach so called, came through 
a branch of the private companies. This was an insurance company on the island with 
the magnitude of the small breach in practices was dependent on the factors originated 
within the holding company. The British American Insurance Company Limited 
registered on St. Vincent could not be divorced from the phenomenon in the 
conglomerate on Trinidad and Tobago – the CL Financial Limited and more 
specifically the Colonial Life Insurance Company of the same entity.  
 
Besides these issues such as other international financial crisis within the global 
economy that impacted the region, there were major downturns in the “mono-crop 
economy”74 of St. Vincent, which exerted significant pressure on the economic 
growth of the nation and the quality of life for its people. The private limited liability 
company was one avenue for a perceived sustained economic progression for many 
stakeholders. Sugar cane, “bananas, ... arrowroot and sea island cotton”75 were among 
those crops planted as cash crops at one period or another throughout the history of 
the island. The companies responsible for cultivation and harvesting were external to 
the island. In other words, commensurate with the days of colonialism and slavery, it 
will not be strange to the truth that corporate governance best practices were initially 
externally driven and not necessarily in the interest of domestic stakeholders. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Appendix 2 (1) Table showing membership of international organisations to which the 
island belongs. 
74 www.IPBUS.COM - St. Vincent and The Grenadines: Doing Business, Investing in St. 
Vincent Guide  - Vol 1: Strategic, Practical Information, Regulations, Contacts (International 
Business Publications, USA 2019) 65 
75 Gonsalves, Ralph. E, The Political Economy of the Labour Movement in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines (Independently Published, USA 2019) 26 – 97; see also Grossman, Lawrence. S., 
The Political Ecology of Bananas: Contract Farming, Peasant and Agrarian Change in the 
Eastern Caribbean (The University of North Carolina Press, USA 1998) 91 – 92, 102 
	  
	  
	  
33	  
There were additional phases of negative growth with the resultant poverty caused by 
the shifts in the mono crop economy over the period of study. The importance of one 
crop to another did very little else than to trigger additional phases of a spiralling 
downturn in economic growth. Throughout its historical development, and through 
incremental reform of its legislation on companies, the policy in St. Vincent was to 
encourage foreign direct investments to boost its economic growth and progress by 
placing private limited liability companies at the “forefront of national”76 change. It 
took more than three decades to reform company legislation on private companies 
from the time of Statehood in 1969 to 2008. Up to 2013 another reform was on going 
in light of the more recent financial contagion. The process was piecemeal. 
 
Only one subcategory of private limited liability companies limited by shares was 
being held responsible for the current state of compounded poverty. There was no 
challenge of positioning the created status of genteel poverty as being part of the 
nature of corporate governance given the history of corporate governance within the 
private limited liability company limited by shares on the island. The subcategory of 
the private limited liability company (the insurance companies) was deemed as 
unfortunate repositories of genteel poverty in this instance. Whether genteel poverty 
could occur as a separate and distinct phenomenon outside the remit of the private 
limited liability company (the insurance companies) limited by shares was for another 
debate beyond the remit of this study.  
 
Genteel poverty if it did exist prior to the history of corporate governance on the 
island, was not a phenomenon that was experienced in the way or ways that it was 
manifested up to and including the year 2013. As the discussion develops, the roles 
played by the regulatory authorities namely, the “Commercial and Intellectual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Government Gazette, Vol 102 No 8, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuesday 23 December 
1969 – This concept of companies being moved to the forefront of the economy could be seen 
in practice with its inclusion in policy decisions and a plethora of laws to strengthen and 
regulate the financial sector and documented: www.svgfsa.com and www.cipo.gov.vc - 
accessed 10 January 2020 
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Property Office”77 and the “Financial Services Authority”78 cannot be overlooked. 
Both of these emerged as establishments that were post the first company on the 
island with its unique mechanism for the genesis of corporate governance on the 
island.  
 
Explanation of Terms  
 The explanation of terms used in this original thesis contribution seeks to provide a 
greater context for an appreciation of the substantive subject matter being discussed 
hereinafter. It was understood that St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago or any other 
territory differ in their own local corporate governance traditions.  The formation of 
any company is influenced by the prevailing social, political and economic factors 
within the individual state. As such these factors not only help to shape the corporate 
governance system, but they impact the affairs of the company, shareholders and 
stakeholders alike. Each listed term that follows was used in greater detail elsewhere 
in the text.  There are three major Caribbean associations or unions that were pivotal 
to the understanding of the existing networks of the private limited liability 
companies limited by shares. They are CARICOM, the OECS and the ECCU. 
 
Corporate governance  
The question is whether corporate governance was a relatively new concept or 
whether it was one that was a recognizable concept even in early corporate St. 
Vincent. Corporate governance as a practice is said to be “as old as trade”79 began 
within civilisation. The terms governance and management were used 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Figure 5(1) – Organisational structure of the regulator the Commercial and Intellectual 
Property Office – its establishment mentioned elsewhere in the text and the comparison to its 
counterpart. This may be an indication of the scope of the work to be undertaken by its 
assigned officers to regulate corporate bodies/domestic companies included as part of the 
financial sector. 
78 Figure 5(2) – Organisational structure of the regulator Financial Services Authority of this 
regulatory body and again one is given a view of the number of employees that may be tasked 
with assigned duties within the international/financial sector. 
79 Tricker, Robert Ian, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd edn 
Oxford University Press, UK 2012) 4 - 7 
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interchangeably but an outright definition was elusive at best. The closest definition 
was credited to R. I. (Bob) Tricker who opined that, “corporate governance is 
different from management.” 80  Tricker draws a line of distinction in that, 
“management is responsible for running the enterprise, but the governing body 
ensures that it was running in the right direction and being run well.”81In other words, 
in their recent blog posts, the expressed thoughts again pinpointed that, “if 
management and governance are used interchangeably, the fundamental distinction 
between the two is lost.”82 Whether there was an organisation within the wider 
community that was used for private members or one that was a company, it needed 
governance.  
 
In the situation of a company, the board of directors was that body charged with the 
responsibility of governance. To try and incorporate this distinction between 
management and corporate governance with another, the Cadbury Report gives a 
sharp focus where, “Corporate governance is the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled.”83Both statements from Sir Cadbury and Bob Tricker agree 
that the role of the board of directors is crucial in that they have the responsibility for 
the governance of their respective companies. The strategic alignment of 
shareholders, board of directors and the management of the company can also be seen 
in diagrammatic format below.  
 
 
Figure 1(2) 
See overleaf 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Tricker, Bob, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd edn Oxford 
University Press, UK 2015) 4 
81 Ibid 
82www.corporategovernanceoup.wordpress.com/2017/03/27/corporate-governance-is-not-
management/ - accessed on 12 March, 2018 
83 Report of The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee and 
Company Ltd., 1992 UK) s.2.5 
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Figure 1 (2) 
The constituents of the corporate governance system: 
Direction and control of a private limited liability company limited by shares 
 
 
Source: Compilation by researcher - 2019 
Each globe represents a critical component of the system of directing and controlling 
of the company and are interdependent. Management ‘manages’ the capital raised by 
the shareholders. The latter as entrepreneurs raised the capital for starting the 
business, which evolves as the company. The board of directors and the management 
staff are not necessarily the same persons. In some instances, management were paid 
to ‘manage’ the company. Management reports to the board of directors on a regular 
basis and implements the strategy that is developed by the board and they in turn see 
to it that management functions effectively. The directors are charged with the 
responsibility to guide the processes on decision - making and supervises the 
management of the company. The board on the other hand is the representative of the 
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shareholders and report to them through the company in meetings. The shareholders 
can elect and “dismiss the members of the board”84 according to legislation. 
 
CARICOM – the Caribbean Community 
Reference was made to a number of islands within Caribbean region. Fifteen states 
are comprised this community. They belong to a grouping referenced as CARICOM 
established by the "Treaty of Chaguaramas"85 In alphabetical order they are listed as 
“Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Montserrat, St. Lucia, Suriname, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago.”86  
Figure 1 (3) 
The CARICOM region 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Brouwer, Maria, Governance and Innovation: A historical view (Routledge, UK 2008 ) 124 
85 Caribbean Community and Common Market Business Law Handbook, Vol 1 (International 
Business Publications, USA 2011) 8-10, 
www.caricom.org/.../caribbean.../caribbean_corporate_governance_f... – accessed 18 July 
2019 
86 www.iccnow.org/?mod=caricom - accessed 5 March 2019 
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Source: www.caribbean-atlas.com 
 
The aforementioned has to be positioned against the backdrop that, “there is a 
growing recognition that economic performance was closely associated with the 
quality of underlying institutions…and practices that determines how a society 
functions and is organized.”87The objectives of CARICOM are outlined which 
include but were not limited to “improve standards of living and work…coordinated 
and sustained economic development and convergence…and enhanced functional 
cooperation.”88 In this thesis presentation, mention was made mostly of “St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines”89 and “Trinidad and Tobago,”90 as they formed part of a business 
network within the wider grouping of islands. The objective of CARICOM with 
regards to enhanced functional cooperation can probably best be exemplified through 
one of its legislative constructs - the private limited liability company limited by 
shares.  
 
This was as much a CARICOM institution as it can be found within St. Vincent and 
Trinidad. Within the private limited liability company limited by shares, aspects of 
the ‘mission’ of CARICOM was to “systematically reduce poverty, unemployment 
and social exclusion and their impacts…and to increase savings and the flow of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Op. cit. [DaCosta, Michael, Colonial Origins, Institutions and Economic Performance in 
the Caribbean: Guyana and Barbados] 3 
88 Ibid 
89 Martin, Cathy & Toy, Mike, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 
UK 2003) 5 – 6; St. Vincent and the Grenadines: Statistical Appendix - Staff Country Report 
(International Monetary Fund, USA 2003); Shephard, Charles, An Historical Account of the 
island of St. Vincent (Routledge Publishers, UK 2013) 1 -18; Pinnock, William, A 
Comprehensive grammar of modern geography and history, For the use of Schools and for 
Private Tuition (2nd edn Holdsworth & Ball, Paternoster Row, UK 1834) 296 
90 Hobbs, Joseph. J., World Regional Geography (6th edn Cengage Learning Inc., Canada 
2009) 570; Brereton, Bridget, An Introduction to the History of Trinidad and Tobago 
(Heinemann Educational Publishers, UK 1996) 114; MacDonald, Scott, Trinidad and 
Tobago: Democracy and Development in the Caribbean (Praeger Publishers, USA1986) 1 - 
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investment within the Community.”91This was attempted through the private limited 
liability companies limited by shares that spread throughout and across the said 
Caribbean region.  
 
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States – OECS 
Another union of states within the Caribbean was that of the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States where a number of private limited liability companies limited by 
shares could be found. This OECS was an associate institution of CARICOM. St. 
Vincent was part of this grouping. Among other objectives, the OECS focuses on 
greater integration within and among the Eastern Caribbean States.  It was because of 
this focus that the private limited liability company limited by shares found great 
resonance. There were repeated attempts at a harmonised approach towards reform on 
company laws but this was a process in motion.  
 
The organisation was “an International Inter-governmental Organisation dedicated to 
economic harmonisation and integration, protection of human and legal rights…in the 
Eastern Caribbean.”92This was why there was a concerted response by governments 
within this grouping to the contagion effect of the recent financial crisis. Respective 
governments spoke with one voice in an attempt to restore confidence within the 
regional financial sector so vital to the economic and social fabric of the affected 
stakeholder society. 
 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union – ECCU 
The “ECCU”93 was a monetary union of states within the Caribbean region for the 
purpose of fund consolidation within those member states that contribute to the fund. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91  www.caricom.org/about-caricom/who-we-are/vision-mission-and-core-values/ - accessed 
21 March 2018 
92 www.oecs.org/homepage/about-us - accessed on 21 March 2019 
93 Beek, Van Frits, et al, The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: Institutions, Performance 
and Policy Issues (International Monetary Fund Publication, Washington, 2000) 1 
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There was a broad arrangement since 1983 such that the union provides for financial 
stability and economic development within the Caribbean. Up to 2013 within this 
union, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank “provides support and actively monitors 
developments primarily in the credit unions and insurance sectors.”94 This does not 
negate the fact that insurance companies were supervised by the regulatory regime 
(FSA and CIPO) in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and similar regulatory units 
perform similar tasks in Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
For instance, the insurance company of British American Insurance Company and 
Colonial Life Insurance Company were companies registered on the records at the 
Central Bank in Trinidad and Tobago.  While supervised by other regulatory 
authorities, according to the Insurance Act, the Central Bank in Trinidad and Tobago, 
were authorised to exercise its rights “at any tine [to] intervene in the affairs of a 
company registered under this Act to carry on insurance business.”95  The private 
limited liability companies limited by shares “(insurance companies)”96 and other 
juridical bodies comprise the financial system in Trinidad and Tobago. St. Vincent 
was part of the ECCU and remains up to the time of writing this thesis.  
 
As far as was known, both countries remained part of their respective currency unions 
and the insurance companies stayed within their respective remits. The regulatory 
authorities in both countries, Trinidad and Tobago in particular were urged to 
continue to be vigilant and improve their “supervisory regimes”97 to combat financial 
fraud and improve risk management even before the financial crisis of 2009. The 
latter issue was one that fell within the remit of corporate governance. While risk 
management may be an area that received great attention “from reports to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 www.eccb-centralbank.org/p/financial-system-of-the-eccu - accessed on 22 May, 2019 
95  www.central-bank.org.tt/core-functions/supervision/insurance-sector - accessed on 29 
September 2014 and 21 March, 2018; Trinidad and Tobago Insurance Act 1980; Trinidad 
and Tobago Insurance Act (amended) 2009, s 65 ss.1; s. 65 ss. 2 
96 Ellis, Jason, (Ed) Business and Company Legislation 2018/2019 (University of Law, UK 
2018); Burling, Julian, Lazarus, Kevin, (Eds) Research Handbook on International Insurance 
Law and Regulation (Edward Elgar Publishing, USA 2011) 3 – 18; Ibid 
97Reform of the Financial System of Trinidad and Tobago – A White paper, Ministry of 
Finance (Government of Trinidad and Tobago 2004) 11 
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OECD,”98 especially about listed companies, all unlisted companies face risk. This 
substantive matter was a board practice. An “assessment tool”99 created by OECD 
was adapted to rate the level of maturity of compliance on corporate governance in St. 
Vincent. The discussion turns on the explanation of this expression of corporate 
governance. 
 
Organs of the private limited liability company 
The two major organs of the company were its directors and the company in 
organizational meetings. “They share between them the most important corporate 
functions, and (except in the case of the single member company, the wholly owned 
subsidiary or the company with only one director) each organ normally, historically, 
acted by decisions (resolutions) taken at meetings.” 100The “board of directors,”101 the 
board or commonly referred to as “Directors” 102  do not necessarily form the 
management teams of the company but exercises its responsibility of supervising the 
management of the company. These persons in turn manage the capital on behalf of 
its shareholders that contributed such capital in the first instance.   
 
There was really no director of directors or head of directors. Both non-executive and 
executive are very important within this remit. However, it was the executive 
directors that were tasked with managerial roles while simultaneously carrying out 
their responsibilities as directors of the company. These lines were blurred during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Risk Management and Corporate Governance (OECD Publications, 2014) 11- 
www.dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264208636-en - accessed on 27 February 2017 
99 Appendix 1(5A) – Assessment Tool; also Appendix 5 Section B was instructive at general 
guidance and interpretation of stakeholders views on corporate governance generally 
100 Op. cit. [Sealy, Len, Worthington, Sealy and Worthington – Cases and Materials in 
Company Law] 179 
101 St. Vincent Companies Acts No 8 of 1994;s. 58, s. 52; Trinidad Companies Act No 35 of 
1995, ss. 60 - 92 
102  Ibid, See also Mangal, Rambarran, An Introduction to Company Law in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean (Canoe Press, UWI, Kingston, Jamaica, 1995) when he spoke of, 
“Every registered company must have a board of directors.” - 68; see also Howard Smith Ltd. 
V Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821, Lord Wilberforce, it is established that directors 
within their management powers, may take decisions against the wishes of the majority of 
shareholders and indeed the majority of shareholders cannot control them in the exercise of 
these powers while they remain in office” 
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early establishment of ‘corporate St. Vincent’ where “shareholders” 103  in some 
instances served simultaneously as directors especially in the early life cycle of some 
companies.  Legislation provided for this phenomenon. Yet the developmental stages 
and reform of company law provided for specified functions and a distinction and 
separation on management, the board of directors and shareholders is mandated.   
 
The board of Directors  
One of the fundamental institutions or organs of the company was its “board of 
directors”104 that comprised of its directors. Historically, the powers of the directors 
derived from “shareholders.” 105  For successful perpetuation, the company in 
meetings,  held the board of directors accountable. Its responsibility and power cannot 
be delegated at will as the modern operation dictated, “directors’ powers derive from 
the company itself.”106  Continuing in the tradition of the UK “boards are subject to 
law.”107  
 
Board members generally need a sufficiency of skills and understanding to review 
and challenge management and to “safeguard long term interests of the company”108. 
The OECD “outlined a number of principles”109 for the boards of directors as they 
were to act in an ethical manner with good faith, care, due diligence and in the best 
interest of the company.  These principles were codified in “the model by-laws.”110 
Board were tasked with “reviewing and guiding [of] corporate strategy,”111 “annual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Ibid, [Companies Act Trinidad and Tobago, ss. 107 – 115] 
104 Appendix 1 (8)  - Model By-Law for Companies in St. Vincent, for meaning and role of 
directors  – Art 4 - 10 
105 Dine, Janet, The Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge University Press, UK 
2004) 35 
106 Ibid 
107 [Companies Act 1994 (SVG)] s. 65; s 141; see fn 78 [Model By Law 1 Art. 4]; Dine, J., 
Koutsias, Marios, The Nature of Corporate Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing, UK 2013) 
142 
108 www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081438.pdf - accessed 30 June 2019  
109  www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf, p. 24 -25 - 
accessed 1 April 2019 
110 Companies Act 1994 (SVG) [Model By-Law No.1] Art. 4 - 11 
111 Ibid 
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returns; and annual reports;”112 the acceptance of “special resolutions;”113 and to 
discuss matters that allowed for accountability and transparency within the company.  
 
Shareholders 
The private limited liability company limited by shares is one type of company 
registered in St. Vincent and other former colonies of Great Britain. Much has been 
written about the company as a separate juristic entity. Ordinarily the creation and 
incorporation of a company was when the prescribed set of documents has been 
lodged with the Registrar of Companies. The “shareholders”114 are persons who raise 
capital to finance the activities of the company and legally own one or more of the 
shares of a company. Shareholders are also classified as members of the company. 
The names of the shareholders are written in a register held by the company. In St. 
Vincent and Trinidad, a “shareholder”115 is subject to applicable company laws and 
has a number of rights outlined in the law. The situation is similar under “company 
laws for the UK.”116  
 
The company in Meetings (Shareholder Assembly) 
The other major organ was the shareholder assembly or the company in meeting. 
There are a number of “meetings”117 that the company can engage in during its life 
cycle such as general meetings and special meetings to name a few. The company in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Companies Act 1995 (TT) s. 151 - 156; s. 157 
113 Companies Act 1994 (SVG) s. 98 
114 Berle, Adolf A., Gardiner, Means C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property (10th 
edn. Transactions Publishers, UK 2009) xv; Wright, Mike, Siegel, Donald S., Keasey, Kevin 
& Filatotchev, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 
UK 2013) 491  
115 Trinidad and Tobago Companies Act 1995, s 107 - 126. ; St. Vincent Companies Act 
1994, s. 105 - 123 
116 UK Companies Act 2006 
117 Dignam, Alan J & Hicks, Andrew, Hicks & Goo’s Cases and Materials on Company Law 
(Oxford University Press, UK 2011) 424; Op. cit. [St. Vincent Companies Act] ss. 78; 399; 
440 & [Companies Act Trinidad and Tobago] ss. 67; 109; 114 as examples of the private 
limited liability company limited by shares in meetings 
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general “meetings”118 is a vibrant organ. This has not changed in St. Vincent or other 
former colonies for over two and a half centuries according to English company laws 
and the UK Company Acts. It is a phenomenon that is archaic but it works.  
 
Shares 
The private limited liability company limited by “shares”119 was provided for by UK 
Companies Act 1908 where the word ‘private’ was first used to refer to such 
companies.  Prior to this, companies were public companies as investment was drawn 
from the public.  In the case of private companies, these were in keeping with private 
investors and became as the most popular and versatile in corporate history.  St. 
Vincent Company Law 1994 recognises the private company limited by shares as one 
of the categories of its companies.   
 
A “share”120 denotes a unit of measurement or of an account for multiple investments.  
It was used to identify a quantity or portion of the assets of a company. Those who 
purchased shares were part of the ownership of such units of accounts in a company. 
It was a monetary unit of measure or currency to denote the real worth or cost of the 
commercial item. In the instance in St. Vincent and Trinidad, the plural form – 
“shares”121 – were purchased by investors, entrepreneurs and others in the insurance 
companies. The items of monetary value were insurance policies or pledged accrued 
income or assets.  A share therefore was a unit of measurement that was purchased by 
individuals (shareholders) when the company needed to raise its share capital.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Ibid 
119 Op. cit. [Worthington, Sarah, Sealy and Worthington’s Text, Cases, and Materials in 
Company Law] 
120 Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol X1V 2009, para. 1 - 692; Vol XV 2009, para. 693 - 
1841; p. 1042 
121 St. Vincent Company Act 1994 – s. 33; s. 36; s. 45; s. 46; s. 213; s. 236; s. 241 – for 
legislative provisions about shares within the company 
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The owner of a share holds as a representative, an equal portion of the company’s 
funds or capital.  The holder of such a share or shares was a shareholder and he or she 
was entitled to a claim on the company’s profits.  That claim is equal to the assigned 
value agreed.  Not only an equitable claim on the profit of the company but a 
shareholder has an obligation for the company’s liabilities.  In British laws and UK 
Company Acts applicable to Caribbean states under review in this text, two types of 
shares are mentioned. A number of shares are discussed in the legislation. A 
shareholder ‘holds’ a share and may be an individual or an institution. See Figure 1(4) 
for a diagrammatic view as to where shareholders are likely to be identified. 
Figure 1(4) 
Composite Of Corporate Sector Showing: 
Stakeholders Of Private Limited Liability Companies generally from Multiple 
Corporate entities and individuals 
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Source: Compiled by Researcher -  2019 
Contagion 
 In this instance, the word was used to describe and analyse a financial crisis with 
unprecedented effects upon all private limited liability companies within the 
Caribbean region and beyond. As a result of such a “contagion”122 resulting from an 
unprecedented financial crisis that engulfed the named category of companies, it was 
more specific to the insurance companies within the CL Financials Limited holding 
company with its negative impact on the islands Gross Domestic Product.  All these 
islands were among others that suffered financial distress and “genteel poverty”. The 
named islands were part of the grouping of former colonies either as the OECS and or 
belonging to the CARICOM.  The analyses of the insurance companies and their lack, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Trinidad and Tobago: Selected Issues (International Monetary Fund Publications, USA 
2011) 3 
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disregard or absence of corporate governance best practices formed the basis of this 
text. 
 
Use of the term ‘St. Vincent’ interchangeably with ‘St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ 
‘St. Vincent’ and ‘St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ are used interchangeably to 
differentiate between the main island and those smaller islands in the Grenadines that 
are its dependencies. There were times however, when the word ‘St. Vincent’ or and 
“St. Vincent and the Grenadines” was used interchangeably with the same effect.  
 
Poverty 
 Here was a condition that was said to be “fundamentally about deprivation and can 
be defined as any situation in which an individual, a group, or community possesses 
less than some standard of living that is deemed generally as acceptable.”123 Further, 
"Poverty in St. Vincent is measured in terms of income and consumption levels... 
affecting with particular severity children, women and the elderly who together 
account for a significant per cent of the estimated population."124 "St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines was assessed as a country that was gradually emerging from baseline 
poverty."125   
 
Over the years, several “poverty assessments”126 were done. The idea was to guide 
government in their policy decisions to alleviate conditions that pre-dispose 
individuals to poverty or the onset of poverty. The indigent poor (dirt poor) were also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123www.cepal.org/portofspain/noticias/paginas/0/40340/4_CPA_SVG_CPA__FINAL_REPOR
T__Vol_1__Revised.pdf, - p. xv - accessed 27 June 2012 
124 ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper - 
Prepared by The Poverty Reduction Task Force (PRTF) Of The National Economic and 
Social Development Council (NESDC) Final Revision, June 2003, 13 
125Ibid, 4 
126 Poverty Assessment report Vol II  - (Kairi Consultants Limited, Trinidad and Tobago 2007 
– 2008) 4 – 7; National Report St. Vincent and the Grenadines: Third International 
Conference on Small Island Developing States – National Report – (Ministry of Health 
Wellness and the Environment – July 2013) 5 
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those within the vulnerable category of poverty that are found within the developing 
island state. 
 
Genteel poverty 
 Sometimes mistakenly referred to as “gentile poverty” 127 , the words “genteel 
poverty” refer to a coined term that was marked by a false ‘delicacy, prudery or 
affectation’ and was genteel on the surface of the matter, but there was a hard core of 
poverty underneath. This was not about pleading poverty when someone was not 
poor.  The condition exists when money had run out and an organization or person 
tries to keep up appearances, deceiving others into thinking that money exists when 
there really was none. Genteel poverty is that variant of “poverty”128 within an 
already impoverished state according to “poverty assessment reports.”129  
 
Genteel poverty exacerbated these conditions some of which were still being felt up to 
the time of writing this thesis. Irrespective of initiatives aimed at eradication of 
poverty over the years. Within the last decade, the indication was that a small 
percentage of these companies, namely the insurance companies; contributed to the 
existing state of "poverty;"130 "a new species,"131 called "genteel poverty."132 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127  www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120229/business/business7.html - accessed on18 
February, 2019 
128 Poverty Assessment report Vol II  - (Kairi Consultants Limited, Trinidad and Tobago 2007 
– 2008) 4 – 7; National Report St. Vincent and the Grenadines: Third International 
Conference on Small Island Developing States – National Report – (Ministry of Health 
Wellness and the Environment – July 2013) 5 
129 Ibid 
130 Word Investments [Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 
204; 251 ALR 206; [2008] HCA 55 @38; Int. J. Law Context, 7, 2 p. 139 –179 (2011) @145 
131 See fn 127 
132 Ibid – the word ‘gentile’ and ‘genteel’ are generally used interchangeably but refers to the 
same concept when describing levels of poverty experienced by persons who are not 
necessarily within the category as indigent poor or dispossessed. This state of poverty is so 
unique in that it was not featured in the Country Poverty Assessments to which the island was 
subjected. 
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"lack, absence or disregard of corporate governance best practices"133 was central to 
the process of corporate stability within the identified companies.  
 
Additionally, the members from the general public constitute the category of 
stakeholder within these companies. The resulting financial crisis originating from 
similar private limited liability company limited by shares located in Trinidad and 
Tobago are held as contributors to the current situation. The hypothesis provided 
proof of the magnitude of a corporate contagion that negatively impacted the “gross 
domestic product”134 of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Private limited liability 
companies limited by shares affected the gross domestic product of member states of 
CARICOM. 
 
The private limited liability company  
This type of business known as a “company”135 was one that was privately owned as 
opposed to being owned by the public.  In St. Vincent as well as in Trinidad and 
Tobago, the private company limited by shares as well as the “GmbH in Germany”136 
were among some of the companies considered as private liability company. Take for 
instance the GmbH bore similar characteristics to a corporation and a sort of limited 
partnership. The GmbH with its emphasis on supervisory boards is likely to have 
inspired the hybrid of the proposed corporate governance practices proposed here in 
St. Vincent. The characteristic features of its private limited liability companies are all 
enshrined in the Vincentian company law.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Layne, William, Permanent Secretary (ret.) RECENT FINANCIAL FAILURES IN THE 
CARIBBEAN - WHAT WERE THE CAUSES AND WHAT LESSONS CAN BE 
LEARNT? The Ministry of Finance - Barbados 6, para. 2. 3 – www.da-
academy.org/Financial_Crisis_in_the_Caribbean.pdf - accessed on 12 August 2019 
134 Gonsalves, Ralph. E, Budget Speech 2010: Economic and Financial Stability, Social 
Cohesion and Fiscal Consolidation at a time of Global Recession and Uneven Recovery (St. 
Vincent 2010) 1 
135 Re a Company (No 00709 of 1992), O'Neill v Phillips [1999] 2 All ER 961 at 966, [1999] 
1 WLR 1092 @ 1098, HL, per Lord Hoffmann  
136 See Appendix 1(7) – explanation about the GmbH and mention of its supervisory board 
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One major identifying marks of the private company was its “separate legal 
personality”137 and with this its capacity to be legal owner of property. Property does 
not belong to a director or shareholder or members. Prior to the House of Lords 
decision where a company has its own legal personality under “English law in 
Salomon’s case,” 138 the company had been a partnership between the 
“shareholders”139 (members) of the company and any property for the company was 
held on trust for the shareholders as beneficiaries.  The situation today was that a 
company was now the legal owner of its own property and that the members 
(shareholders) have “merely rights against the company but no title in any of the 
company’s property only until that company was wound up.”140 
 
The GmbH in Germany 
This company was considered the equivalent to the private limited liability company 
within the British jurisprudence on company. The GmbH (Gesellschaft mit 
beschrankter Haftung) as a German private company was a company with limited 
liability. The aforementioned suffix when used after the name indicated what type of 
company and differentiated it from one that was a public company. Aspects of its 
board structure was used to inform the new ‘thinking’ on the direction and control of 
private limited liability companies in St. Vincent in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis referred to earlier. The Financial Services Authority put legislation in place 
beginning in 2011 as it “ expects that institutions will adopt the two-tier model in 
structuring their boards."141 An expectation was not a direct appeal to companies to 
adopt such a measure provided for under the law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Anderson, Helen, Directors’ Personal Liability For Corporate Fault: A Comparative Fault 
(Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2008) 139 
138 Saloman v A. Saloman & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 
139 When companies first became incorporated by registration in the UK as a result of 
enactment of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 one of the definitions in s 3 was: “The 
word ‘Shareholder’ bore the meaning that any person entitled to a Share in a Company, and 
who has executed the Deed of Settlement.” 
140 Hudson, Alistair, Understanding Equity and Trusts (4th edn Routledge, UK 2013) 163 - 
192 
141  Directors of domestic regulated financial institutions - (with particular reference to 
insurance companies and credit unions) - minimum requirements for approval and continued 
approval by the authority (effective 15 May 2013) - Statement from the Financial Services 
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Historically, for reasons of comparison, in British law as opposed to German law, 
there is not much on exactly how corporations are to be organized, namely the 
division of functions between shareholders and the boards. While this may be so, "the 
equivalent rules for British companies ...are located in the company's own constitution 
or even in rules made by the board itself."142 The distinction is significant in that 
Germany as with most of continental Europe has separate laws for public and private 
companies while the UK has a single Act to regulate all companies.  
 
Many analyses exist about the corporation, and one such is the contract analysis, 
which says that the corporation and the things they do were "regarded as a private 
phenomena."143 It is cautiously advocated that the analysis claimed to be a significant 
advantage over others, in that it shed light on the 'internal operation of the firm.' The 
direction and control of the firm therefore were restricted to boards of directors and 
shareholders or owners. The claim made was that control and direction of the 
corporation or company had less to do with the influence by the legislative dictates of 
the state.  
 
West Indian islands, West Indies, Caribbean islands 
 The terminologies ‘West Indies’ and or ‘West Indian islands’ and Caribbean islands 
were in keeping with historical literature but used interchangeably as expressions that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Authority as per Financial Services Authority Act 2011 of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
See also Appendix 2 (11); see also the ‘financial sector’ as at the 28th February 2013 in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines comprised the domestic and the international financial sectors. 
The domestic sector consisted of six banks; one building society; nine credit unions; thirteen 
‘motor and general insurance’ companies (four local and nine CARICOM) and nine long term 
and life insurance companies (all CARICOM). The international financial sector consisted of 
five banks; two international insurance companies; one international insurance broker; one 
insurance manager; one hundred and thirty trusts; 7728 IBS's; five hundred and sixty five 
CTD's; eighteen LLC's; one hundred and twenty seven Mutual funds - 
Public/Private/Accredited Managers and seventeen Registered Agents  
142 Davies, L. Paul, Introduction to Company Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press, UK 
2010) 107 
143 Bottomley, Stephen, The constitutional Corporation: Rethinking Corporate Governance 
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd., UK 2007) 33 
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convey the same meaning to ‘Caribbean islands’. St. Vincent and the Grenadines as 
well as Trinidad and Tobago are part of these islands. In some specific instances 
clarity was added to individual countries within that grouping but the meaning and or 
references was to the same group of islands. 
 
1.8 Conclusion  
Arguably, the real reason behind corporate governance in a private limited liability 
company limited by shares was to place a limit on who holds the greater power. The 
companies possessed a separate personality from its shareholders. A balance on that 
power was created when legislation mandated how such power was to be distributed 
between the two major organs, which were the board of directors, and the members of 
the company (the company in meetings). Although the company was versatile, once 
there was a lack, disregard or absence of corporate governance best practices this 
inevitably become clear to all stakeholders.  Those main organs operated in such ways 
that were in proportion to interests shared among stakeholders.   
 
The board had delegated authority and used this for the success of the company and 
the benefit of its members who are entrepreneurs or investors. The existing legislation 
up to 2012 detailed that corporate governance practices best practices be exhibited 
through a one-tier board structure inherent in the British company laws and the UK 
companies Acts.  
These versatile private limited liability companies were spread across the platform for 
domestic stakeholders and external investors. An unprecedented corporate crisis was 
further exacerbated by an international recession that was evidenced within the 
period. As the study revealed “genteel poverty” remained a real phenomenon that 
impacted the gross domestic product of an already impoverished state and other states 
within CARICOM.  
Arguably, governments within these West Indian islands came to recognise that there 
was a flawed business model instigated within the conglomerate CL Financial 
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Limited. The next chapter gives greater understanding as to the contextual 
phenomenon and other constituents of the nature of corporate governance within the 
private limited liability companies limited by shares on St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
CONTEXTUAL PHENOMENON FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WITHIN  
THE PRIVATE LIMITED LIABLITY COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES ON 
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 
"... Worse, democratic pressures may force governments to shackle corporations, limiting 
their independence and regulating the smallest details of their operations. And we shall all be 
the losers. 
" Charles Handy, What's a business for? Harvard Law Review, 2002 
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2.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two was included as part of this original thesis contribution to “corporate 
governance”144 within the private limited liability companies on St. Vincent. The 
chapter provided some contextual analyses and advanced the arguments that indeed 
there were antecedents to corporate governance practices on the island of St. Vincent 
within the category of companies under review. Similar companies on the sister island 
of Trinidad and Tobago were referenced periodically. The significance of this was 
mentioned previously in Chapter One so that there were corporate governance 
commonalities within practices. The intent was that they served to augment and 
solidify business arrangements that would be efficient, effective and exemplify the 
tenets of codified procedures within British rule bound company law.  
 
This study could have been constrained by the parameters of an exercise in political 
economy. However, on a much smaller scale, similar analyses are made here between 
individuals (stakeholders) and the society. Some reference was made to the money 
markets especially within Trinidad and Tobago. There was a borrowing from other 
disciplines to gain a broader perspective about the nature of corporate governance of 
the private company. The disciplines of economics, political science and sociology 
lent a measure of support to the derivative conclusions. The nature of corporate 
governance within the private limited liability companies was complex. This exercise 
exemplified “researching law in society” 145  where the aspects of corporate 
governance were in motion. Whether such motion within the wider society exerted 
pressures on the government of the day to place shackles on Companies was a matter 
of opinion.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Chapter One (fn 1); see also Appendix 1(1) about the Principles fundamental to corporate 
governance that made their way into the genesis of the practices within early corporate St. 
Vincent  
145 Vago, Stephen, Law and Society (Routledge, UK 2016) 415 - 419 
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Without substantial primary and secondary sources, the arguments hereinafter were 
constrained significantly. The use of some aspects of qualitative research methods, 
assessments and analyses, some insights were arrived at so as to gain a better 
understanding of corporate governance practices.  These were identifiable and 
distinguishable over the years. The islands remained within the same CARICOM 
region, with similar elements of a political agenda and a focus on economic 
development and financial stability. These were post emancipation societies that 
provided enabling legislative environments for the development of company law.  
 
However, there was an imperative imposed externally on Small Island developing 
states as they sought to manoeuvre their way into sub regional and extra regional 
money markets. Governments here were required naturally to respond to the growing 
needs of their stakeholder societies. Companies having been placed at the forefront of 
economic development were well positioned to lobby government to provide 
safeguards as they sought to collaborate within business networks across borders.  
 
This was in keeping with changes within the wider commercial sectors and a 
development agenda for the financial sectors. This ‘naturally occurring environment’ 
impacted corporate governance practices to the extent that comprehensive overhaul of 
existing legislation on company became imperative. This was further redefined by a 
politico-economic national agenda on development. At other times corporate 
development was hampered by “natural disasters” 146  and other vulnerabilities 
endemic to small open economies. The aspiration for companies within CARICOM at 
the very basic levels may have been an attempt at integration. This was problematic at 
best. The prevailing sentiments by some were that “the natural state of our Caribbean 
is fragmentation.”147 Nonetheless, the subcategory of private companies under review 
maintained a somewhat closed perspective on their inherent corporate governance 
structures. They relied on their own application of a substantive legislative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Drexl, Josef, Fox, Eleanor, M., et al.  Competition Policy and Regional Integration in 
Developing Countries (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK 2012) 170 
147 Ibid 
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phenomenon to the growing needs of individual stakeholders, institutional 
stakeholders as well as the general public.  
 
Notwithstanding this, there were ‘internal codes or business practices’ within the 
Vincentian and Trinidadian context especially among the financial sector that gave 
rise to the following observable practices: 
• Companies were encouraged to ensure the safety and delivery of services in a 
timely and efficient manner. They were further advised to test capacity and capability 
of services in co-operation with regulatory regimes. 
• Some companies raised the bar on transparency through a thorough analysis of 
their own corporate governance agenda especially in public offerings and or sale of 
premiums to stakeholders so that there was a minimization of incentives for 
corruption. Corruption was hard to prove in many instances if at all it existed. 
• Companies were encouraged to pay their workers according to wages that 
positively impact life and livelihood.  
• The practice of any form of discrimination was discouraged as companies 
sought to give equal remuneration for equal work.  
• Companies were persuaded to minimize damage to the environment from the 
activities they were engaged with. A regular report on any progress was a mandate by 
management. There was a disconnect between companies and government that 
refused to support the aforementioned ethical principles 
 
Several areas were considered with regards to the private limited liability companies 
on St. Vincent such as: 
Ø  The physical composition of stakeholder communities 
Ø Effects of slavery on the development of institutions 
Ø Theories of corporate governance 
Ø Rationale for a dichotomy in regulation 
Ø Phases of corporate governance development in St. Vincent 
Ø Conclusion 
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The chapter closed with a synoptic view on all facets of the aforementioned factors. 
The discussion now turns on the composition of the stakeholder community and 
proceeds along chronological order as aforementioned. 
 
2.2 Physical composition of the stakeholder communities 
Along with eight other “OECS territories”148, St. Vincent and the Grenadines formed 
part of the Windward Islands and was located at the lower end of the Caribbean 
archipelago. Due to its size St. Vincent was also generally referenced as the Gem of 
the Antilles. The main land is 133 square miles (344 square km) and the other islands 
of the “Grenadines"149 comprised of seventeen square miles (44 square km). The 
cluster of these gems of thirty-two islands covers 150 square miles (388 square km) in 
size. The largest island of the Grenadines was Bequia - 7 square miles; Mustique 1.9 
square miles; Canouan 3 square miles with Mayreau and Union Island of 3.5 square 
miles and 5.5 square miles respectively. The majority of the other islands were largely 
uninhabited but were home to unique coral reefs and breeding grounds for a variety of 
sea life.  
 
St. Vincent was situated between Grenada 75 (120 km) miles to the south, St. Lucia 
24 miles (43 km) to the north and Barbados 150 miles (160 km) to the east. The 
islands were well within the Atlantic Standard Time Zone; one hour ahead of Eastern 
Standard Time and four hours behind Greenwich Mean Time. Private limited liability 
companies were scattered across this landscape catering to a variety of causes and 
needs.  
Figure 1 (5) 
Map showing of greatest concentration of private companies in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 www.oecs.org/about-the-oecs/who-we-are/about-oecs - accessed 8 December 2014 and 12 
April 2018 
149Cameron, Sarah, Focus Caribbean: Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Thompson 
Press Ltd, India 2014) 100; Kaufman, Will & Macpherson, Heidi S., (Eds) Britain and the 
Americas: Culture, Politics and History (ABC - CLIO, USA 2005) 29 
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Key: Where arrow points to 4 – Location of capital city – Kingstown, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines – 1845 to present 
 - Greatest concentration of private companies is located/Regulators (Register of 
Companies) are also located here so that registration of all companies remained 
centralized for more than a century. 
Source: Adapted by Researcher from public domain for ‘free use and to share’ used 
according to conditions specified. 
 
The historical analyses pointed to Arawak Amerindians that migrated from South 
America and inhabited the island of “Saint Vincent”150 and the Caribs who were also 
another Amerindian tribe later subdued them. Some early inhabitants of the island 
were “Black Caribs did like the French, establish small farms where they grew cotton, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Adolphus, John, The Political state of the British Empire, Vol IV (A. Strahan, Printers 
Street, London, 1818) -The name St. Vincent was bestowed upon it by the Spaniards. 
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indigo and tobacco which they traded with the French for arms, ammunitions, tools 
and ornaments.”151 Commercial activities generated by the private limited liability 
companies on the island or within the Caribbean region were not well documented in 
the format as was so ably done by the British.  
 
Indigenous peoples and their intermixture had more to do with subsistence farming 
and fishing. They also resented the idea of a ‘new order' to their way of life. 
Subsequently they were deemed by some historians to have engaged in “guerrilla 
warfare”152 tactics to preserve their way of life and their livelihood. A little over four 
hundred years would elapse before British “legislation on company law”153would 
become the prevailing law about companies in St. Vincent. 
 
These early inhabitants were on the island when “Christopher Columbus”154 arrived 
on 22 January 1498. The nation was one of the last of the West Indian islands to be 
settled. The island was taken formally from France by Britain in 1763. During the 
period 1779 to 1783 the island reverted to France. However in 1793, the British 
regained control of the island through the Treaty of Paris. There was a rebellion 
against the British in 1795 aided by the French.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151  Kirby, I.E, Martin, C.I, The Rise and Fall of the Black Caribs of St. Vincent (Kingstown, 
St. Vincent, 1972) 18 
152  Op. cit. [Kirby, I.E, Martin, C.I, The Rise and Fall of the Black Caribs] 14 
153   St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Consolidated Index of Statutes and Subsidiary 
Legislation 1981 edition for discussion on references to statutes as Ordinances and Acts, all 
of which were directly from the UK, 22 - 23 
154  Sullivan, Lyn, Adventure Guide to Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Hunter 
Publishing, Canada, 2003) 1 - Columbus thought he had discovered St. Vincent but there 
were people living on the island believed to have been the Ciboney Indians who arrived some 
5000BC. They were followed by the Arawaks (from South America) and later the Caribs. See 
also KIM, Julie Chun. “The Caribs of St. Vincent and Indigenous Resistance during the Age 
of Revolutions.” Early American Studies, vol. 11, no. 1, 2013, pp. 117–132. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/23546705; See also Suchlicki, Jaime, From Columbus to Castro and 
Beyond (Potomac Books,Washington, USA 2002) - Further discussions on Columbus' arrival 
to the West Indies where he met people occupying the land-  Hansen, Valerie, Curtis, 
Kenneth, Voyages in World History Vol 1 (Cengage Learning Publication USA, 2010 )437 
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In 1776, the island had a representative assembly. In 1877 a Crown Colony 
government was instituted. In 1925, a legislative council was created and in 1951 it 
was granted universal adult suffrage.  The island advanced to being “recognised 
internationally”155 having attained membership of several international organisations 
in keeping with the status of an independent sovereign state. Figure 1(6) gives a 
diagrammatic view as to where St. Vincent is located in relation to the rest of the 
islands in the region. 
Figure 1 (6) 
Map of St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
 
Source: www:uk.images.search.yahoo.com/search/images 
A correlation existed between revenue earning on one hand and the alleviation of 
economic burdens across the rural urban divide though lines of demarcation on this 
‘divide’ were invariably blurred.  This was precisely one of the outcomes created by 
the mechanism of the private limited liability Company limited by shares, one that 
manifested itself through the balance created within the company in meetings.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Appendix 2(1) Table showing membership of international organisations to which the 
island belong. 
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Mention is made of similar private limited liability company limited by shares that are 
located within “the Companies Act”156of Trinidad and Tobago and other member 
states of CARICOM with shared legislative legacy and jurisprudence on UK 
Companies Acts and the British company laws. There were some differences among 
the individual states with regards to this same juridical construct. Some provisions 
were dictated by the individual domestic policies on investments and categories of 
use. 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The insurance company being a representative part of the private limited liability 
company limited by shares on the islands of Trinidad and Tobago was a constituent 
part of the exploratory process in this thesis. These islands were referred to as the 
twin island states; Trinidad and Tobago rests at the south eastern part of the West 
Indies. These islands were part of the Caribbean chain of islands. Close to the 
continent of South America, the islands were also north east of Venezuela and North 
west of Guyana. Trinidad was the larger of the two islands with an area of about 
1,850 square miles. See Figure 1(7) for a map of Trinidad and Tobago as per 
discussions. 
Figure 1 (7):  
Map of Trinidad and Tobago 
See overleaf 
 
 
Figure 1 (7) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Trinidad and Tobago Companies Act 1995 
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Map of Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 
Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 
 
The factors such as population, size, race, ethnicity and class on St. Vincent were 
considered if only as supporting an infrastructure that somehow assisted with the 
formation of the acceptance of what else constituted the nature of corporate 
governance and the development of company law. Critical to the discussion is that 
there is an underlying notion that the Caribbean has an identity that is vigorous at 
times and at other times it may seem unambiguous. Yet this same identity is exclusive 
to each island but couched in terms that allow these islands within the specified 
region to grow together in their separateness. This phenomenon does have some 
relevance. 
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The Caribbean identity is diverse and unique. Irrespective of a shared historical and 
legislative legacy it is influenced largely by colonialism. Each island has its own set 
of beliefs, mannerisms and philosophical views on race, ethnicity, religion and 
linguistics. This geopolitical space has its cultural identities that shape island identity 
and “culture" 157  in their individualistic fashion. These factors are important 
considerations when defining the antecedents to corporate governance. These also 
underpin the business and trade agreements through one of the facilitating 
mechanisms called CSME but also every facet of life deemed “authentically 
Caribbean.”  
 
As an economic bloc with its private companies, it is anticipated that it is to be 
strengthened by shareholders and stakeholders with a common identity. A disconnect 
comes when there is insistence on the shareholder primacy concerns within the 
Caribbean company. The company directors have a mandate on duty of care but only 
to the extent of shareholders and employees. The stakeholders who are generally in 
the greater proportion experience a sense of almost ostracism. The law is clear on the 
fiduciary obligation by directors in dispensing that duty of care and to whom. 
 
Generally, the lives of the people are reflective of corporate interests. As in St. 
Vincent and the region, there is a reinterpretation of the role of the company as it 
responds to the needs of the wider stakeholder community. Stakeholders see 
themselves as holding as much interest in the company as do shareholders who 
provide capital for start up. Each individual with this Caribbean identity and culture 
within a restricted space seeks relevance and recognition for their contribution to the 
private company. A mutually benefitting private company that can respond to the 
needs of people is of critical importance. There are legislative guidelines, reform on 
company laws but its corporate governance procedure has to be understood within the 
context of cultural identities that co-exist in individual states as well as in the wider 
region of CARICOM. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157Minahan, James, Ethnic Groups of the Americas: An Encyclopaedia (ABC-CLO LLC, 
USA, 2013) 370  
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The company transcends the common legacy of slavery, colonialism and the 
emergence of globalisation. The various norms and values commensurate with 
plantation society brought with them a common inheritance that should not destroy 
corporate governance. Finally on this point, there are noticeable family norms that are 
related to hospitality that support the idea of having a ‘fair and square dealing’ 
between stakeholder and shareholder. However, “centrifugal tendencies"158amidst the 
ubiquitous “state policies”159about foreign direct investments have to be balanced 
against these matters. Put another way, centrifugal forces have to exist along side 
“ideals on one hand, while individual beliefs, family and kith and kin on the other 
hand…[along with] fragile democratic structures.”160 A Caribbean identity should 
give support to the private company for the interest of all. 
  
There is room for “nationalism" 161  and "corporate philosophy" 162  to co-exist 
peacefully.  Corporate governance best practices should continue to strive to uphold 
the procedural claims that it can work even within the insurance companies towards 
nationalism with its corporate philosophy. A Caribbean private company when 
understood within the aforementioned context can only promote its corporate 
philosophy and strengthen efforts towards Caribbean nationalism. The ensuing 
discussions turned on these matters.  
 
Engagement of domestic private limited liability companies 
For just over a century of corporate existence, conventional attempts have placed the 
domestic companies, on average across the following spread of sectors within the 
local economy: "a 20% of private limited liability companies maintained an agro 
industrial base through the development of small enterprises; 25% engaged in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158  Johnson, Malcolm, (Ed) The Cambridge Handbook of Age and Ageing (Cambridge 
University Press, UK 2005) 511 
159 Ibid 
160Charles, Andrian, Political Change in the Third World (Routledge, UK 2011) 31 
161Harris, Peter. B., The Commonwealth (Prentice Hall Publishing, USA 1975) 66 
162Mangal, Rambarran, An Introduction to Company Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
(Canoe Press, UWI 1995) 22 
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domestic banking and or finance and insurance products; 10% concentrated on the 
provision of manufacturing related initiatives; 8% pursued energy related/services and 
or supplies; professional services engaged 5% of private companies; 
construction/engineering was attributed to 10% of companies; consumer production 
for wholesale and retail purposes was 20% and the category of 'Other' accounted for 
2% of private companies that engaged with sale of foods; beverages and building 
supplies; tourism; sports and entertainment.”163 See Figure 2 (1) 
Figure 2 (1) 
Engagement of domestic private limited liability companies for the period 1845 - 
2013 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
 
 
Source: Compiled by researcher – 2019  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Appendix 1(5A) Corporate Governance Assessment Tool (Adapted from OECD Corporate 
Governance Assessment Tool kit by researcher)  
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* Figures unavailable as to exact number of private companies that remain registered 
over the same period per economic sector. Figures were not available for the 
international sector (private limited liability companies) 
Although there were a number of institutional structures in place, they were 
insufficient to “manage the transformation of the economy,”164post decline of the 
demise of the banana industry.  The growth in the economy declined coupled with 
natural disasters by sea, land and air.  The years 2000 onwards proved challenging 
and poverty was compounded, as there was much difficulty in “adjusting the vital 
export sector that points to the weaknesses or limitations of the institutional structures 
in the economy of the country.”165  The entire report provided an exhaustive and 
comprehensive discussion on existing realities. 
 
On the whole “genteel poverty”166supported the narrative that an ever-increasing need 
exists for an aggressive approach at poverty reduction and alleviation.  “Poverty”167 
for St. Vincent pointed to some critical factors. It was noted that, “unemployment and 
underemployment threaten livelihoods.”168 High unemployment was somewhat offset 
by persons finding and creating local employment “through cottage industries”169 and 
other enterprises.  
 
Does Population matter?  
The population of St. Vincent and the Grenadines would have grown from the earliest 
estimated figures in 1848 of around "26, 300"170 to a current resident population 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Report on the Institutional Assessments: St. Vincent and the Grenadines Country Poverty 
Assessment 2007/2008 Vol III (Kari Consultants Limited, Trinidad and Tobago) 4 
165 Ibid 
166  www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120229/business/business7.html - accessed 2 
February 2013 
167 Op. cit. [Report on the Institutional Assessments: St. Vincent and the Grenadines Country 
Poverty Assessment 2007/2008 Vol III] (n 80) 
168 Ibid 
169 Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (Ian Randle Publishers Jamaica 
2004) 154 
170 Martin, Montgomery R., History of the British Colonies Vol II: Possessions in the West 
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estimated at “109,991.”171 To date, the islands of St. Vincent and the Grenadines have 
a predominant "African derived population" 172  from which shareholders and 
stakeholders were drawn. It was viewed as a "modern competitive post colonial 
economy"173 with emphases on the introduction of the offshore sector nearly a century 
after the establishment of its first domestic private company (John Hazell Sons and 
Company Limited).  
 
To bolster investor confidence was a major undertaking by the government of the day. 
The private company was galvanised into being the stronger catalyst for economic 
transformation and was positioned to attract shareholders and stakeholders 
simultaneously who were not only resident in St. Vincent but also national and non-
nationals domiciled overseas who were enabled by legislation to invest by setting up 
international business companies. There was more than a mere presumption that after 
over a century, the stakeholder population was composed of a rich racial intermixture 
of other nationalities. Within the immediate past decade, these were mainly from 
other racial intermixture other than from the indigenous African derived population. 
For instance, the “composition”174 of the island’s population from as early as the 
1700s was representative of its African diaspora. 
 
Many argued that there should be more engagement on financial matters within 
corporate entities.  This however, was a contentious issue played out in the media and 
was outside the remit of the current thesis. One could not forget that from the pages of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Leonard, Barry (Ed) Basic Facts about the United Nations (Department of Public 
Information, United Nations, USA 1995) 312; Statistical Report, Statistical Department, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2012 
172 Crawford, Michael, Current Developments in Anthropological Genetics: Vol 3 - Black 
Caribs - A Case Study in Biocultural Adaptations (Plenum Press, USA 1984) 307 
173Gonsalves, Ralph. Dr.  - Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines "The Modern, 
Competitive Post Colonial Economy: The Case of St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Office of 
Prime Minister, Cabinet Office, St. Vincent and the Grenadines June 2007) 5 - 6; Spinelli, 
Joseph, Land Use and Population in St. Vincent 1763 - 1960: A contribution to the Study of 
the Patterns of Economic and Demographic Change in a Small West Indian Island 
(University of Florida 1973) … 
174 Appendix 2(5) Table showing composition of population from the 1700s 
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history that Great Britain - a former colonizer - operated a "mercantilist model."175 
This system organised productive activity to obtain economic self - sufficiency and 
short - term gains through favourable trade balances. St. Vincent like sister island 
Trinidad was part of that "economic exchange" generally until emancipation. It was 
the company whether established or incorporated that was part of the cycle from 
which an economic exchange was initiated. Still grappling with their sense of 
economic reality, the period of emancipation in time was recognised as productive 
outside that notion of the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century.   
 
Solow insisted that, “In the Leeward Islands, Barbados, and the Windward, (St. 
Vincent is part of the Windward Islands) wages were lower ranging from 6d. /day to 
1s. 5d/day.”176 Economic development therefore had to come from outside of the 
“plantation economy” 177  through improved minimum wages, more employment 
opportunities and the legislative support for private companies. Long after 
emancipation, Beckford insisted that there was the “‘establishment and growth of the 
peasantry’ and the ‘evolution of the multinational plantation enterprise.”178 These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175  Findlay, Ronald et al, Eli Heckscher, International Trade and Economic History 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US 2006) 243  
176 Ibid; Note that ‘Labourers do not enter into annual engagements (wages 71/2d. to 1s.) 
Schedule of Taxes, duties Fees and all other Sources of Revenue specified under the 
respective Laws or authorities under which they are  – St. Vincent 1852 (W. Clowes and 
Sons, 14 Charing Cross, UK 1852) X-2 – Average rate of wages for labour; Ordinary 
domestics are employed by the month and earn from 16/-to 25/- per month. Butlers, 
Coachmen and Grooms are paid from £1 13. 4 to £2 10.  
177 See Appendix 2(4) – Thierens, Clyde, A newspaper article entitled: History this week: 
Reasons for the rapid growth of a black peasantry in British Guiana and Trinidad immediately 
after 1838 – where the Staff writer of the Stabroek Newspaper in Guyana outlined his views 
as to the rigors of the plantation economy and the effects on the black peasantry not just in 
Guiana (Guyana) but also to other smaller islands like St. Vincent as being part of this post 
emancipation economy in the Caribbean. The socio economic conditions provided a catalyst 
for change or many families who wanted to engage in alternatives to their current livelihood. 
In St. Vincent the emergence of the private limited liability company limited by shares could 
be considered one of the best alternatives for a new stakeholder population. The provision of 
good to gravitate  
178  Abramo, Lais, Cecchini, Simone, Morales, Beatriz, Social programmes, poverty 
eradication and labour inclusion: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean (United 
Nations publication, USA 2019) 10; Beckford, George, Persistent Poverty: 
Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World (Oxford University Press, 
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umbrella ideas provided incubators for further economic activities one of which was 
the versatile private company limited by shares.  
 
As it was in other CARICOM states, so it was with other smaller island states like St. 
Vincent. Documented discussions were sparse but a “newspaper article from 
Guyana”179 captured the salient points on Caribbean society, which was articulated by 
Beckford previously. The researcher agreed with Beckford on the ultimate expansion 
of the ‘money economy’, which was seen in the ‘diversification of economies and the 
linkages between the service and production sectors’. The private limited liability 
company limited by shares was seen as part of this diversification of economies in 
this regard. 
 
The substantive matter of size of the island 
Irrespective of “size of island state,”180 it has been argued that to emphasize the 
smallness of a nation state as SVG is damaging to its reputation and encourages the 
view that it may have very little potential for economic growth. It is not intended here 
to do any such thing. To the contrary there is a very good case for arguments in 
favour of the value of 'smallness'. It is the smallness of such states that allow for 
effective and efficient regulatory and supervisory mechanisms to be put in place when 
it comes to the harnessing of economic activity. See for example states like the Isle of 
Man, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and especially "Guernsey"181 in terms of size and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Op. cit. [Thierens] fn 182  
180 St. Vincent is 133 square miles (mainland) and in the Grenadines they are 17 square miles. 
The location of most of the private companies is on the mainland. See map showing where 
companies are located – Figure 2 (1) - Map showing location of companies 
181  See the following as verified by the Guernsey regulators as bona fide as of 8/5/12 for what 
the jurisdiction of Guernsey holds: www.guernseyregistry.com; accessed 25 October 2019 
(unstable link) 
 www.dixcart.com/articles/2012/01/09/in172-key-features-of-guernsey-company-law-and-
the-guernsey-registry.htm - accessed 25 October 2019 (unstable link) 
 www.ardelholdings.com/file/57/ardel-company-management.pdf - accessed 25 October 2019 
(unstable link) 
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their regulatory and supervisory capabilities when compared to the commercial 
capital of the world.  
 
The issue of race, ethnicity, class and colour  
Within each generation and just over one and a half centuries from 1845 onwards to 
2013, there was a naturally occurring newer configuration of stakeholders and 
shareholders within the private companies on St. Vincent and by extension in the 
sister island of Trinidad and Tobago.  Save and except for amendments to the 
legislation, corporate governance prescription within bylaws and or Table A or the 
law was not radically altered. In terms of the issues of race, ethnicity, class and colour 
these did not constitute a recognisable, mutually reinforcing 'divide' within the wider 
stakeholder/shareholder community or in any company as far as was known.   
 
From the days of colonialism and slavery, there was an identifiable "transition to post 
- emancipation society and new forms of social organizations."182  It was to this post 
emancipation society that the private company was distinguishable as a social 
organisation. The homogeneity between and among social organisations such as a 
company on Trinidad and Tobago, St. Vincent and the Grenadines or any other 
former British colonies was remarkable. The aforementioned issues did not adversely 
affect any director and or shareholder or other stakeholder as far as was known.  
 
Chapter Three gave information about a customer loyalty model that demonstrates the 
strength of corporate governance practices. This was complementary to the over all 
acceptances of all companies positioned within both the domestic and international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 www.careyolsen.com/downloads/publications/incorporating_a_guernsey_company.pdf - 
accessed 25 October 2019 (unstable link) 
 www.tridenttrust.com/PDFs/TGUE-C-KF.pdf - accessed 25 October 2019 (unstable link) 
 www.tridenttrust.com/PDFs/Companies-IND.pdf - accessed 25 October 2019 (unstable link) 
 www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=86326 - accessed 25 October 2019 (unstable link) 
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sectors on St. Vincent. Customer loyalty was the natural by-product of corporate 
governance best practices. A somewhat ‘logically occurring’ dichotomy within the 
‘mushrooming’ private companies did not necessarily equate to a dichotomy in 
corporate governance best practices. This dichotomous phenomenon was mentioned 
briefly here so as to highlight a unique characteristic of the regulatory regime for 
private companies.  
 
Within the Vincentian society, and for nearly two centuries of its existence, the 
institutions, organisations and private companies on the island continued to 
experience a ‘staggered approach’ towards company law and corporate governance 
development. This was understood within the context of attempts at a national 
development plan and the policy agenda for company development. As such a sort of 
tension existed between" centrifugal tendencies"183 and "state policies"184 and ideals 
on one hand; and individual beliefs, family, kith and kin on the other hand.  These 
tensions were further exacerbated by "fragile democratic structures"185 and even more 
"fragile economic and political foundations" 186  on which a viable, cohesive 
"nationalism"187 and "corporate philosophy"188 sought stability. In other words, the 
private company evolved through a somewhat haphazard schedule.  
 
Respectfully, company law and corporate governance were contingent on the 
aforementioned and only as an embodiment of all of these tendencies within the ever - 
growing society that still held its shareholders and stakeholders together. One of the 
primary purposes of the company can be seen when each member co-operated with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183  Johnson, Malcolm, (Ed) The Cambridge Handbook of Age and Ageing (Cambridge 
University Press, UK 2005) 511 
184Ibid 
185 Charles, Andrian, Political Change in the Third World (Routledge, UK 2011) 31 
186 Baban, Serwan, M.J, (Ed) Enduring Geohazards in the Caribbean: Moving from the 
Reactive to the Proactive (University of the West Indies, Jamaica 2009) 193 
187  Kodilinye, Gilbert, Kodilinye, Maria, Commonwealth Caribbean Contract Law 
(Routledge, UK 2014) 55 – 57; see also Harris, Peter. B., The Commonwealth (Prentice Hall 
Publishing, USA 1975) 66 
188 Mangal, Rambarran, An Introduction to Company Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
(Canoe Press, UWI 1995) 22 
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each other and non - paradoxically so but for a common good. This was probably the 
best example of centrifugal tendencies that balanced out towards the company’s own 
corporate existence and its best practices.  
 
2.3 Effects of slavery on the development of institutions  
In the British West Indies (to which Trinidad and St. Vincent belong), this came about 
around 1834, when a law was passed by the British Parliament to abolish slavery 
through the empire….189 This was a breakpoint, an era that allowed for transitioning 
to new realism – one in which stakeholders were willing participants. Although the 
company evolved over time, the ownership of shares in a company and a stake in an 
alternative form of economic exchange was embraced. St. Vincent was comprised 
predominantly of an "African-derived population."190  The issues of race, ethnicity, 
class and colour did not constitute a reinforcing 'divide' in the society although there 
was a rural urban demarcation but not reinforced.  
 
In other words, there was an environment conducive to the nurturing of shareholders 
and stakeholders who were themselves interested in the formation of a company for 
productive purposes. Major stakeholders were drawn from this pool. They were not 
limited to directors, managers, Chief Executive Officers, other officers and staff 
within private limited liability companies. As time progressed, one of the policies of 
government was the ‘Education revolution’, which was responsible for attempting to 
bridge the gap between the educated elite and those who were functional illiterates.  
 
It was obvious that there was a major transformational dynamism so that from the 
days of colonialism and slavery, there was a recognizable "transition to post-
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emancipation society and new forms of social organizations."191  Since the 1930s the 
arguments made on behalf of the private limited liability company limited by shares, 
can still be attributed to it as being a "major social organization."192 Equipped with its 
corporate governance best practices, this social organization engaged in the 
reformation of family life at every level. There was a consensus that corporate 
governance reshaped the juridical body as the family earned that right to do so 
through daily family interaction within the business environment. 
 
It was through this juridical body and more specifically, the species of insurance 
companies that many Vincentians from all walks of life sought ways and means to 
‘better themselves’ financially.  They were able to invest earnings from agriculture 
and non-agricultural products and services through the purchase of premiums 
insurance policies. Interestingly, if any one could give a fairly good assessment of 
Caribbean society and Vincentian society, it would be those who have lived the 
experiences and interpret such experiences through socio-cultural and socio-economic 
expressions.   
 
Some writers and historians depicted the Caribbean society within this categorization 
as "pluralist"193. One of the famous ‘sons of the Caribbean soil’ was Derek Walcott.  
He wrote about the "plurality of society"194 and as a pivotal moment of what was 
coined as a ‘Caribbeanization’ of the region. Caribbean juridical bodies form part of 
such ‘Caribbeanization’ to which Vincentians, Trinidadians and others belonged. The 
“poet laureate Derek Walcott”195 argued in favour of this “ethnic plurality”196within 
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(Transactions Publishers, USA 2009) 3 
193 Besson, Jean, Martha Brae's Two Histories: European Expansion and Caribbean culture-
building in Jamaica (University of North Carolina Press, USA 2002) 9 - 11 - for discussions 
on the Caribbean: Jamaican experience of a ‘plural society' reflective of experiences in St. 
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194 Thieme, John, Derek Walcott (Manchester University Press, UK 1999) 6  
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society. Within his literary sphere of influence and with an emphasis on one of many 
theories, there was some justification for a contemporary pluralistic Caribbean 
society. The private company was a contemporary phenomenon, which sought to 
transmit best practices to its stakeholders. In many respects over the years, it was 
encouraged to doing so by way of the various company laws and Companies Acts. 
 
Both Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines boasted of being part 
of this social phenomenon of the private limited liability company limited by shares.  
A society in which there was an acceptance of benefits to be derived from companies 
also reflected the dynamism within socio-cultural norms and values that, when 
perceived in a positive light, these elements held out as the nurturing ground for 
stakeholders and shareholders with a common interest. That interest was one that 
assisted stakeholders to appreciate the value laden corporate governance best 
practices.   
 
When these factors were combined, many from within the stakeholder communities, 
like Walcott were understood to mean that they recognized commonalities 
irrespective of differentiation based on size of population and or the geography of an 
island. The choice of the private limited liability company or its purpose became 
relevant due to felt needs. The establishment of these companies were made easier 
since the stakeholder population began to readily accept them as social organisations 
for positive and financially rewarding entities. Change was inevitable either in view 
or else. Nonetheless, these characteristics of social interests and the promotion of 
business networking all added to community cohesion within the various islands.  
 
There were shared interests amongst its stakeholders and shareholders as 
entrepreneurs.  Existing legislation encouraged joint ventures and other types of 
businesses flourished within this pluralistic society. Balme opined that intellectuals 
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like Walcott tried to look at cultural dynamism especially through ‘theatre’ to provide 
“the cement” or additional justification for the anticipated maximization of “economic 
and political power.”197 The private limited liability company limited by shares was 
one such organization that allowed for the development of people and for the further 
enhancement of their economic power.   
 
The analyses on corporate governance best practices centered for the most part on 
companies in St. Vincent. With regards to procedural outlines as per bylaws and other 
British company laws and the UK Companies Acts, general trends and thoughts could 
aptly apply to the same construct in Trinidad and Tobago. These analyses were 
necessary since both islands were part of an unprecedented financial crisis, which 
affected their gross domestic product. This substantively supported the hypothesis 
about best practices and the correlation with the gross domestic product of either 
country. 
 
After all, “the most critical actors in national economic activity were creatures of the 
law - juridical entities, like the corporation, the limited liability company and the 
firm.”198 St. Vincent and the Grenadines was the country whose corporate governance 
from 1845 to 2013 was assessed. Corporate governance in this context was relegated 
to the private limited liability company limited by shares on both St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines and on the island of Trinidad and Tobago. Both islands were part of 
CARICOM and were part of a network of businesses using specific business models 
germane to their own sense of corporate governance best practices. These 
“companies”199 were replicated within all other former colonies of Great Britain 
influenced by British company laws and the UK Companies Acts. 
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Caribbean Law Publishing Company Ltd, Jamaica 2004) 106 
199 St. Vincent Companies Act 1994, Trinidad Companies Act 1995  
	  
	  
	  
76	  
 
It was borne in mind that the indicative hypothesis was that it became apparent over 
time how a lack, disregard or absence of corporate best practices within the private 
limited liability companies affected the gross domestic product of certain islands. This 
was especially noticeable during an unprecedented financial crisis that affected sister 
islands within CARICOM. Both St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and 
Tobago are member states within CARICOM. There were also identifiable limitations 
that touched and concerned corporate governance best practices spread across 
geographical space especially with a decided socio-cultural divide. Company laws in 
St. Vincent were especially referenced within the ensuing discussions.  
 
The role of path dependency 
The role of a path dependency towards the expressed corporate governance best 
practices was clearly defined. From 1845 through to 2013, generational assessments 
about best practices cannot be divorced from its genesis. They cannot be divorced 
either from the constituent parts of why such practices were carried out in the manner 
in which they were done. How, what, where and when corporate governance practices 
emerged would normally rest with a few persons who were deemed the custodian or 
the conscience of the company.  
 
It was to a dependency on ‘agricultural mono crops within the region’ that dominated 
the lives and livelihood of many. They were ‘stunted’ into thinking that may of us 
will not e poor. The idea was to dispense what was deemed best. While it was the 
medium through which economic growth was realisable, it was the same medium that 
manifested a stifled entrepreneurial spirit for generations of families. Many wanted to 
get off the “estates.”200 The plantation of cotton, sugar, arrowroot and bananas 
contributed to mainstream economic growth.  
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It was only after the failure of these crops and a renewed thrust towards revitalisation 
programmes, that many stakeholders were encouraged to diversify around those main 
industries. The growth of cottage industries was probably the forerunner to a more 
formalized basis of the country’s economic progress. The private company has to be 
one of the avenues through which families sought to raise the bar on their own efforts 
towards financial stability for themselves within rural and urban communities.  
 
Among the available scholarship on Caribbean unity or attempts thereat, it was 
Andres Serbin since 1998 that added to the debate. He provided a wider context and 
clarity about how the Caribbean was emerging from "an historical genesis that was 
marked by colonialism; by the vicissitudes imposed by its ethnic, cultural, linguistic 
and religious fragmentation..."201 It does appear that small island states like St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines and to a large extent the Caribbean region displayed a 
cautious optimism in attempting regionalism. The private limited liability company 
limited by shares was another useful vehicle in this context. Serbin continued to 
highlight that, “the prioritization of new issues in the regional agenda, which made 
...for ... creation of common policies and institutions...”202  
 
The private limited liability company limited by shares can be seen within the remit 
of a financial institution to effect such a change. On one hand there were a number of 
regional groupings that attempted to consolidate CARICOM, but not to replace it. 
From the pages of history the evidence indicated that colonialism came with bane and 
blessings for the peoples of the Caribbean region. From some experiences gained 
through travelling and working within the region, the effects of colonialism were 
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undeniable. Through a proposed “path dependency,”203 mentioned elsewhere in the 
discussions, respectfully, there is that notion of an alternative trajectory of the nation 
state and its current economic thrust towards its own development. The presence of 
the private companies in St. Vincent was roughly a decade or so post-emancipation.  
 
In the current discourse the evolutionary process of the more vibrant offshore sector 
on St. Vincent was much longer and well beyond the early days of the first 
established private company. The question though is whether economic growth 
through these same private companies limited by shares would be inhibiting 
institutions. These companies came into being because of need and the economic 
focus they were given through the policies of successive governments since 
“Statehood.”204  Within the domestic and international sectors, there is real reason to 
appreciate the role of path dependency such that it, 
” … helps us to understand why and where countries are today in their process of 
evolution. The concept is also helpful in beginning to grasp what is required to alter 
adverse path dependency to decisions that can lead to a higher level of growth and 
development in the future.”205 
 
Some of the arguments in light of the above put forward by Acemoglu are quite 
instructive. He further indicated that, “it might seem obvious that everyone should 
have an interest in creating the type of economic institutions that will bring 
prosperity.”206 He cited the case of the Kingdom of Congo. Using only a bird’s eye 
non-economic perspective on the development of the nation state of St. Vincent, the 
private companies especially those classified under the international financial sector, 
are those institutions that are geared towards the increased wealth of Vincentians.  
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The insurance company was not deemed to be one that would lead to “genteel 
poverty”207 and as it further exacerbated national “poverty.”208  This is a corporate 
anomaly and could not be attributable to the choice made by a government. The 
insurance company from across porous borders of Barbados had made its way into the 
nation state of St. Vincent since 1849. A newer version of the same company was not 
seen as a challenge to the corporate status quo. These companies were seen as the best 
alternatives to any others within the sphere of economic growth for nation states and 
more than “six million”209 beneficiary stakeholder population within the region.  
 
The collective decision to allow the private company to do business for the benefit of 
all stakeholders was a great one but the inherently weak infrastructure, coupled with a 
flawed business model and the lack, disregard or absence of best practices of 
corporate governance manifested in unprecedented financial crisis. A subsequent 
chapter is dedicated to a case study on the current status of such a private company. 
The nature of corporate governance in St. Vincent is the focal point of such 
discussions. 
 
The substantive corporate governance rules and procedures rest with the company. 
Despite the fact that the regulatory and supervisory machinery needed reform, the 
internal decision-making processes of the company remains critical. Those who were 
keen on resisting the imposed vicissitudes of life according to Serbin were provided 
with financial and economic alternatives. However, there was a slow start to 
accessing ‘domestic monetary policy’ in small nation states like St. Vincent. This was 
seen as an alternative policy to the relics of colonialism. 
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“Following independence, the governments in CARICOM through successive acts of 
parliament outlined suitable monetary policies within which they identified various 
goals and objectives based on the extent of institutional…and financial development 
of the economies.” 210 The impact of any monetary policy was held as having direct 
bearing on financial conditions and institutions within the economy. This was not just 
for costs but also where and when anyone can access credit within the financial 
sector. A correlation existed between the aforementioned and the influence of 
expectations about economic activity and measures of inflation.  
 
The overall impact on the price of goods and services, assets prices, exchange rates as 
well as consumption and investments with the financial sector where private 
companies are positioned could not be underestimated. Internally, within the nation 
states it would seem that the private companies themselves had to be leveraged 
against each other across the rural urban divide if it existed at all. External to them 
and geographical land spaces of each territory another leveraging had to be done 
across porous borders.  
 
Initial sluggish approaches to accessing money markets as suitable and enabling 
monetary frameworks were noticeable. Small island states remained more cautious 
but were at a great disadvantage through the same imposed vicissitudes spoken of by 
Serbin. Private companies especially the robust insurance company provided at the 
time, one of the best opportunities for stakeholders as a promising financial sector 
with the greatest returns on premiums and other investment opportunities.  
 
2.4 Theories of corporate governance 
Theories were used continually to explain corporate governance best practices used to 
combat the challenges of governance of the private limited liability companies. On St. 
Vincent for several decades aspects of such theories were undoubtedly implemented 
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so as to facilitate the relationships between and among stakeholders for mutual 
benefits. It was regrettable that corporate scandals gave rise to the question as to 
whether there was a lack, disregard or absence of best practices.  
 
Theories themselves were "malleable and can rarely decide a point one way or 
another."211 They were not a source of law but their usefulness was evidenced in the 
varied explanations for the corporate personality of the private limited liability 
company. There were several theories that were applicable to the post - colonial 
emerging and modern competitive economy within which the private limited liability 
company functioned. Among the five that were discussed, the "agency theory"212was 
the prevailing theory behind the relationships between the financial markets and 
quoted companies. When taken as a holistic unit, the private limited liability 
companies positioned within the domestic and international sectors generally had the 
flexibility as a result of elements borrowed from the philosophical base within the 
agency theory.   
 
The Agency Theory 
The debate on corporate governance can possibly be traced to Berle and Means 
deliberations in the 1930s in the USA. They contended that its characteristic features 
were those that redefined relationships between the principals who were deemed to be 
shareholders of the company and their considered agents – the directors of the 
company. According to this theory, the "principal employs an agent to act on his 
behalf"213 specific to governance of the private limited liability company.  
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Corporate governance was about who served the company’s needs with regards to 
separation of ownership and control. The principals were known to have delegated the 
direction and control of the company to agents or directors. According to legislation, 
the shareholders adhered to the prescribed expectations that their agents would 
perform the tasks of directing, making decisions and control the company in their best 
interests. The agent on the other hand, historically was not obligated to make 
decisions in the best interests of the principals and very often did not comply.  
 
Issues such as self-interests and opportunistic behaviours were aspects of the agents’ 
function at times. Under this theory, there was a line of demarcation between 
ownership and control of the affairs of the private entity. The theory was prescriptive. 
Peoples or employees were held accountable for assigned tasks and responsibilities. 
In the 1970s there was a further refinement on this debate about the agency theory, 
which became known as the "law of agency."214 This was said to be at the root of 
company law such that as a consequence the said theory may be considered as being 
at the root of corporate governance best practices in this context.  
 
The down side to this was that the effectiveness of a board (a one tier board for over 
two decades on the island of St. Vincent) could not be deduced from this type of near 
mechanical relationship. Further, the performance of the company and its relationship 
to good governance could not be effectively determined outside of a ‘tick box’ 
approach on its execution on the island. There was no ‘market’ governance for 
unlisted companies but the openness and integrity of financial disclosures; internal 
and audit functions to be performed by agents were of paramount importance.  
Aspects of internal monitoring did exist in the form of annual general meetings.  
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The Resource Dependence Theory 
The next theory was of significance was that of the resource dependence theory. 
Herein lay the explanation for corporate governance effectiveness through its focus on 
the role of the board of directors. They were responsible for the provision of access to 
resources needed by the company. The director’s role was to provide and or secure 
resources since he/she was pivotal to any linkages to the existing environment of the 
company.  
 
The director performed his tasks in so much as there was improved functionality 
within the company; improved performance and all these factors added to succession 
planning and the longevity of the company. Directors were supposed to bring skills, 
information, and access to suppliers, buyers, policy makers, social groups and others. 
These were geared towards the creation of legitimacy within the company. 
 
There were several criticisms of this theory when applied to domestic as well as to the 
international private limited companies domiciled on the island. Primarily the choice 
of domestic directors was generally along the lines of friendship and family ties. 
Many decades of the company’s service to stakeholders attest to the fact that the 
many directors did not have access to the existing environment that could have added 
to the legitimacy of the functioning of the private limited liability limited by shares. 
Many developed the skills necessary for the functioning of the company as they 
served in the capacity as director. Maybe this was the single most contributory factor 
to less robust activity and growth especially within the domestic sector.  
 
On the other hand, directors for private companies within the international sector were 
more apt to access the existing environments of the development of their companies. 
This was one of the factors that contributed to the prevalence and number of 
companies located within the international sector. Among these companies, there 
were foreign investors and others who demonstrated that they had access to an 
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enabling environment, which impacted the greater sphere of economic development 
of the country at large. 
 
The conclusion arrived at was that directors of such companies provided the private 
company with a vital set of resources.  The directors or boards of directors were 
perceived to have added "capital"215  to their respective private limited liability 
companies limited by shares.  Some directors were known as sources for skills and 
demonstrated the requisite expertise in management, directing and controlling the 
entities. There was undoubtedly a correlation between management and performance 
and this added to the survival of the companies beyond a decade.  
 
The Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship theory was another that was offered to explain aspects of the 
company’s corporate governance. The board was said to exist so as "to govern, not to 
advise or manage the organization."216 A steward was one to protect and maximize 
the wealth of the shareholder. This was done primarily through the performance of the 
private limited liability company limited by shares. Among those deemed to be 
stewards, were executives and managers. Their assigned tasks were to engage in 
meaningful work for shareholders and to protect and create profits for shareholders. 
The stewards’ satisfaction comes from the company’s successes.  
 
This notion of the stewardship theory was noticeable in several companies on the 
island. Additionally, paid chief executive officers could advance their deepest 
satisfaction from being salaried rather than organisational successes attained.  
Additionally, employees and executives were to act as autonomously as possible but 
all in the interest of shareholders’ profit maximisation. The employees were to take 
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ownership of their assigned tasks and work assiduously at them, as this was their 
motive. 
 
The theory suggested that there was potential for what it called the pro-organizational 
motive of directors.  The directors’ personal identification with the aims and purposes 
of the organization drives the private limited liability companies limited by shares to 
succeed.  The theory pointed to the fact of the executive and the shareholder having 
an interest in maximizing the long - term stewardship of the private limited liability 
company.  
 
The roles of the Chairman and the Chie Executive Officer should remain combined in 
order to protect key aspects of high performance, which were the strength, and 
authority of executive leadership.  The steward theory questions the apparent 
pessimistic assumptions of the agency theory on human nature.  It prefers "trust"217 as 
a core concept and "assumes that managers in general should be trusted."218 
 
It further suggests that the problem of governance does not lie in self-interest of the 
executive; but rather in the assumptions that the distant others - investors and 
regulators - make good as to their self-interested motives.  It further contended that 
negative investor assumptions may distort or weaken leadership of the private 
company. The encouragement to investors by government through a robust 
investment policy countered this negative assumption.  There was equilibrium at 
‘play’ in private companies in St. Vincent given the interdependence and 
simultaneous manifestation of elements of the aforementioned theories. 
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The stakeholder theory 
The ideas associated originally with "this theory were developed by Ed Freeman"219 
in the 1980s about 'value creation and trade.' There were problems and 
misconceptions with other theories of corporate governance that the stakeholder 
theory tried to address. The application to corporate governance in St. Vincent raised 
a multitude of questions. Here was an attempt to try to give suggestions as to possible 
outcomes.  To begin with, it was felt that the theory was geared specifically towards 
"how business does and can work"220.  It challenged the assumption of the agency 
theory about the primacy of shareholder interests.  It argued that the private limited 
liability company should be managed in the interest of all its stakeholders. Private 
companies in St. Vincent for instance were generally driven by the need to maximize 
profit and not necessarily in the interest of all of its stakeholders: the employee; 
suppliers and customers; the local community as well as the environment.  
 
Stakeholders have direct and indirect interests.  For instance, the case study of John 
Hazell Sons and Company in Chapter three demonstrated that the principles of the 
stakeholder theory could be aptly applied. On the other hand, there were difficulties 
that some raised with respect to the application of this theory in all areas of 
governance.  It was claimed that the theory was hard to be operational due to 
challenges of deciding what weight should be given to different stakeholder interests 
that corporate governance would serve.   
 
The writer was in agreement with Keasey when considering the aforementioned 
issues with respect to stakeholder interests. He had this to say, "shareholders are not 
the only residual claimants, and encouraging executives to believe and behave as 
though they were may have deleterious and economically inefficient consequences for 
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other stakeholders."221  It was reasoned therefore that the interests of stakeholders 
were pivotal to the outcomes of the financial fiasco that originated with CL Financials 
Limited in Trinidad and Tobago.  More details on this crisis followed in a case study 
in Chapter Four. While it can be reasoned that this private limited liability company 
was not based in St. Vincent, its deleterious and economically inefficient 
consequences for stakeholders in St. Vincent, have tended to a new variant of poverty, 
called genteel poverty.   
 
More will be developed on the correlation between genteel poverty to a decrease in 
the gross domestic product in the case study of Chapter four.  Lessons were learnt 
were not in isolation as the "Cadbury Report"222 had previously provided such a 
discussion platform for similar financial crises as was being experienced by 
stakeholder. On the other hand, referencing the recent corporate scandals and crises in 
the USA it was argued too, that, there was a failure by the board to hold "executives 
accountable"223 for poor decisions and job performances.   
 
Others argued that if executives were to be accountable to all of the stakeholders, they 
would in effect be answerable to none.  In St. Vincent, the matter of holding 
executives accountable would be one that needs thorough assessment both within the 
domestic and international financial sectors.  The standards of executive or "board 
accountability"224 would be deemed commensurate with the particular sectors where 
the executive 'sits'.  It begs the question further as to whether or not the same duty of 
care is applicable for so called domestic 'executives' as opposed to non-domestic 
executives who are generally from outside the jurisdiction or domicile in St. Vincent.   
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Any test on this particular attribute of corporate governance of a private limited 
liability company on St. Vincent could be subjective. There was the notion of the 
Enlightened "stakeholder theory" 225  that suggested the practical value of 
accountability to shareholders even if a board took other interests into account in its 
conduct of the business of the company.  In one sense however, the nature of the 
private limited liability company on St. Vincent could be exemplified through the 
stakeholder theory.  The interests in business; executive pay and the correlation to the 
private company downsizing; the corresponding negative impact on employees and 
the local communities as a result of corporate failure, continued to "undermine the 
legitimacy of the demand for shareholder value."    
 
When stakeholders get involved in the process of money management and allocation 
of limited resources of the private limited liability company limited by shares, that 
affected them, then this generated several important insights.  It was outlined 
especially in the Case study outlined in Chapter Four, that there should have been 
early intervention given that there was a multi- stakeholder process within the C L 
Financial Limited fiasco. A renewed perspective was that management of 
expectations and outcomes for all or a greater percentage of stakeholders.  Further, 
there would have been an assessment of strategic concerns.  The issues associated 
with poverty and "poverty reduction,"226 became even more acute and complicated, as 
expectations for return on investments were not realistic for many, while for others, it 
became challenging. 
 
To sharpen the focus on the nature of corporate governance in St. Vincent a 
conclusion must be drawn given the collapse of a series of private limited liability 
companies within the complex networks of CL Financials Limited. The expected 
returns on premiums and other associated funds to policy holders of an insurance 
company that never materialised, “threaten the basis of any traditional psychological 
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contract”227 that exist between stakeholders of the private limited liability company 
and the “license to operate.”228 All these privileges were afforded to society generally 
by the private limited company limited by shares.   
 
The issue of “globalization”229 raised the concern of the single-issue pressure group 
and a “heightened visibility to corporate governance practices.”  The matter of 
“Corporate value statements”230 and the role of the board in creating “ethics codes” 
and social and environmental reporting all reflected an acknowledgement that there 
exist wider corporate obligations that goes well beyond the delivery of shareholder 
value.  Further there was insistence that such performance by the private limited 
liability company must be realized within certain ethical constraints. 
It was true that "ethical constraints"231 have the potential to affect how performance 
was pursued within the private limited liability company inclusively. This was the 
idea advocated in the "Balanced Scorecard "232 of the stakeholder theory. This was 
seen as the most direct contribution of stakeholder ideas to the private limited liability 
company’s performance. To the best of knowledge, there was no empirical research 
that existed in St. Vincent about performance measurement within the private limited 
liability company.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227  Sage, Andrew, P., Rouse, William, B., Handbook of Systems Engineering and 
Management (2nd edn John Wiley and Sons, Inc., USA 2009) 826 
228  Benn, Suzanne, Dunphy, Dexter, (Eds) Corporate Governance and Sustainability: 
Challenges for Theory and Practice (Routledge Publishers, 2007 UK) xiv; Zinkin, John, 
Challenges in Implementing Corporate Governance: Whose Business is it Anyway? (John 
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230 Idowu, Samuel. O., Vertigans, Stephen, Stages of Corporate Social Responsibility: From 
Ideas to Impacts (Springer International Publishing, Switzerland 2017) 80 
231 Babbie, Earl, The Practise of Social Research (Cengage Learning, USA 2013) 62 
232Niven, Paul, Balanced Score Card Step by Step: Maximizing Performance and maintaining 
Results (John Wiley and Sons, USA 2006) 12 - 22 
	  
	  
	  
90	  
To support this claim about performance measurement, the "ideas proposed by 
Kaplan and Norton"233 were not far - fetched.  They may be deemed applicable to the 
diverse nature of private limited liability company in St. Vincent.  It was 
acknowledged that there was substantial and quantifiable correlation within the power 
of correlation with the performance measurement. This was quite instructive to the 
process of corporate governance best practices in St. Vincent so that, there were 
'potential distortions on operational effectiveness' that can arise from 'purely financial 
accounting measures like earnings per share or return on investment' especially so 
within the private limited liability companies dedicated to the international financial 
sector. 
 
Having viewed corporate governance through the prism of the Balanced Scorecard, It 
was not difficult to explain how stakeholder interests could be embodied in the private 
limited liability company limited by shares such that - specific set of measures, that 
linked important operational drivers to financial performance. Managers were 
provided with a way to explore the correlation between customers' needs and what the 
company must do operationally to meet these needs and sustain competitive success.  
As far as was known, beginning with the early private limited liability companies on 
St. Vincent, there were no scorecards or any such instruments used to assess 
competitive success or customers' needs.  It was observed that the management and 
directors more specifically of the private limited liability companies was mindful of a 
few things.  They were aware of maintaining customer satisfaction while keeping an 
eye on the competition that existed within the sphere of their own existence.  
 
They took stock of their operations and the measures that brought them success.  
Their management capacity and capability were keen on displaying best practices 
throughout.  There was a major drawback in that, some records were not available for 
comparative analyses due to lack of use and or deterioration.  This was from within 
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the domestic sector.  Within the international financial sector, the focus remained 
predominantly on the accumulation of statistics.  The private limited liability 
companies limited by shares had strategy and vision. However, it begs the question as 
to whether these were communicated sufficiently to the leadership of the private 
limited liability companies; to staff and customers. 
 
Other non-British jurisdictional influences on the British company 
The influence of the French 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines was once colonised by France. Arguably, they did not 
have the same objective as the British with regards to the use to which the island was 
put. The French at one time, felt that while the entire island was not under cultivation 
or control by the natives, this gave them authority to access lands using a diversified 
agricultural approach. There was no immediate consideration towards the 
construction of juridical entities such as the private limited liability company limited 
by shares. So they considered, 
“… St. Vincent as their home where they should earn a living and spend the rest of 
their days…[and] preferred to practice diversified agriculture…deep into the 
interior…”234 
 
For well over a century, the layout of the main architecture, naming and infrastructure 
of the island's six major towns were distinguished as being French in origin. Beyond 
that, the influence of the French in corporate governance procedural structures is 
respectfully considered as “thin” and without any depth or influence on corporate 
governance legislation. However, there were practices and customary commercial 
transactions to aid daily commercial life then. Only in the 1990s “French corporate 
governance”235 existed. There was that notion that France’s hybrid of both unitary and 
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two-tiered boards corporate governance structures may serve as viable examples to 
the current St. Vincent and the Grenadines’s model. The latter was currently 
attempting to construct a similar hybrid model through more modern legislation in 
order to address the fallout of an unprecedented financial crisis that impacted the 
private limited liability companies on the island.  
 
Influence of Swiss lawyers 
As an independent nation since 1979, St. Vincent’s corporate governance transition 
can best be described as piecemeal and phenomenal. From as early as 1845 up to the 
1970s the legacy of the British company laws remained predominantly so, save and 
except for legislative changes commensurate with local policy changes and reform.  
Significantly too, was the input of Swiss lawyers when St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines was introduced to a level of corporate governance experiences through the 
offshore sector and a development agenda for its “international financial services 
sector in 1976."236  
 
The timing of this intervention was likely to be in keeping with policy changes that 
signaled a new thrust and response towards the further advancement of the private 
companies. A decade on from the days of Statehood achieved in 1969, this was 
welcomed. A comprehensive package of legislation supported this initiative. While 
Swiss lawyers lent support to the Vincentian experience, "major reforms"237 within 
Switzerland itself were taking place.  This added to the wealth of corporate law that 
became part of the Vincentian corporate model.  
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Continuing Corporate Reform and the private limited liability company 
The unitary board model inherited from the UK was still the prevailing and customary 
standards and practices within the private companies in the state of St. Vincent and 
continued up to 2013. The corporate landscape of St. Vincent through its continuing 
legislative reform from the 1970s through to 2008 thereafter allowed for the private 
limited liability companies to be used as international business companies, “Limited 
Liability Companies”238 [similar to those in the United States] and other hybrids. 
These were regulated by the Financial Services Authority and will be explained 
subsequently. Emphases were on boards of directors and shareholders that were 
generally domicile outside of St. Vincent. These investors were naturally diverse from 
the ‘early’ stakeholders. The creation of two regulatory systems was now in place to 
cater to domestic and international companies. 
 
The piecemeal introduction of new legislation into the Vincentian corporate and 
financial landscape, especially from 1976 onwards and with other policy decisions 
moved the private limited liability company to the forefront of the national economy 
but more so to “push the island to the forefront of emerging jurisdictions.”239  It was 
the accepted norm that the private limited liability company was so versatile to be a 
catalyst for national economic change. This was not a tentative move. With this came 
the understanding that corporate governance practices provided much for scrutiny. 
The offshore sector “did not develop as other emerging centres in the OECS.”240 A 
number of reasons could be cited but prevailing legislation was still in its embryonic 
stages.  
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There were some successes in terms of the establishment of the regulatory regime for 
this international sector. The structures in place were still being developed 
simultaneously on island. Linkages across the region were also being developed with 
oversight stimuli on supervision and regulation functions. While the local private 
limited liability companies limited by shares served the local stakeholders generally, 
greater emphasis was being placed on the regulation of those private limited liability 
companies within the international financial sector. Among the corporate entities, the 
limited liability companies on St. Vincent found some resonance within the law that 
provided for the following categories: 
• International Banks 
• International Business Companies (These included Segregated Cell 
Companies as well as hybrid Companies) 
• International Trusts 
• International Insurance Companies 
• Limited Liability Companies 
• Mutual Trusts 
 
Registration and incorporation of both domestic and offshore insurance companies in 
St. Vincent emerged as simultaneous and complementary occurrences.  For instance, 
insurance companies were considered as domestic insurance companies under the 
“Acts” 241  as well as under specific insurance companies legislation and other 
applicable “international”242 limited liability company laws.  At times both species of 
insurance companies were required by law to submit to visits by the dichotomous 
regulators and were expected to submit the necessary forms and other prerequisites to 
this dichotomous legislative arrangement. Corporate governance best practices had to 
be considered at best as being under double scrutiny by a regulatory phenomenon that 
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could not deliver at best through their proposed and perceived strengths as effective 
and efficient regulators.  
 
Some economic drivers of corporate governance   
As was mentioned previously, Trinidad and Tobago was considered one of the largest 
Caribbean ‘mineral – rich’ countries. On the other hand, as opposed to Trinidad and 
Tobago, predominantly the former colony of St. Vincent remained an agricultural 
based economy and over the years, under periodic economic reviews it was 
highlighted that, 
 
..."Success of the economy hinges upon seasonal variations in agriculture, tourism, 
and construction activity as well as remittance inflows. Much of the workforce is 
employed in banana production and tourism, but persistent high unemployment has 
prompted many to leave the islands.”243 
 
There was that observable notion that sister islands did create commercial networks 
on businesses and other mutually beneficial instruments. The private limited liability 
company was that vehicle that served as the ‘driver’ of economic development to a 
larger extent in St. Vincent rather than Trinidad. The obvious reason was that St. 
Vincent was riddled with a staggered approach towards its own economic 
development for several reasons. The private company was also positioned within an 
agricultural economy that relied on the occasional favourable conditions for the 
export of its crops to regional and international markets.  
 
At best, the export of crops and or production on the island suffered the severest of 
conditions that were either manmade or natural consequences of disasters (hurricanes, 
storms). Trinidad on the other hand was an economy that thrived on its mineral rich 
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acquisitions. As a small nation with historical migratory patterns, within CARICOM 
and under the managed migration programme, all nationals were entitled to work and 
live within the borders of CARICOM “through the CSME and its commitment to the 
Free Movement of People.”244 The private company may have had its fair share of 
stakeholders, but with the movement of people some of whom may have availed 
themselves of the services provided by the private company, were prone to travel and 
live abroad.  
 
Up to 2013, the aforementioned economic conditions of the country have been 
compounded by the “decline in the banana industry”245 which impacted national 
employment. The employment figures stood at “21.5% up to 2012”246 census year. 
Private limited liability companies were encouraged as ‘contributory agents’ to 
economic growth through such areas as tourism, agriculture, construction and others. 
As such the private company provided for some levels of employment amidst the 
appreciable movement of peoples across porous borders. It is difficult to assess how 
such movement impacted corporate governance best practices. However, by 
extension, it was through these companies that there was some scope for the 
expression and expansion of corporate governance best practices but this path was 
quite challenging.  
 
Stakeholders within both states (St. Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago) had at their 
disposal, the same legislative guidance on best practices inherited from the British 
company laws. Yet, Trinidad was that territory that provided for a more active, 
mobilised and educated stakeholder community where the private company 
flourished. Within both countries there were noticeable economic divergences that 
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245 Appendix 2 (3) – An extract from the Guardian – European Commission on Bananas – 
Banana industry in decline - Opinion – See Newspaper – accessed 2 April 2018; See also – 
Saint Lucia: Country Strategy Paper for the Banana Industry, Agricultural Diversification & 
The Social Recovery of Rural Communities (Government of St. Lucia, 1999) 7 - 9. While this 
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shaped the content of best practices and their delivery to stakeholders. St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines was the poorer of the two countries and this in itself held many 
implications for the nature of any established or incorporated company. The further 
comprehensive exploration of these issues remains largely outside of the remit of this 
thesis.  
 
Both states were unequal in their summation of what they had to offer through their 
respective private companies as part of the plan for economic growth and 
development of the wider stakeholder communities. For instance, suffice it to say here 
that, the income inequality of persons within the St. Vincent cuts across the entire 
nation as well as the rate of inflation. These same divergences also influenced the 
capability of companies; the quality of stakeholders and the area of businesses to 
which the companies were put. 
 
Also, other concerns were; the input by shareholders; the value of their contributions 
in general meetings and the capacity of those who were placed in the directing and 
controlling of these companies. Decided differences were noticeable within 
companies found in both countries, which affected the quality of best practices. This 
point was discussed later in the findings of both case studies that formed the basis of 
Chapters Three and Four. Arguably, that category of private companies - the 
insurance companies - within the country that was least developed economically (St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines) became dependent on the execution of such best 
practices of the more developed country of Trinidad.  This was to the extent that a 
symbiotic relationship and dependency developed.  
 
Maybe it was because of years of experiences on how best practices were customarily 
dispensed within the insurance companies in Trinidad and Tobago. Dependence on 
externally driven corporate governance practices resulted in a wholesale acceptance 
of such corporate governance practices in similar insurance companies in St. Vincent. 
In Chapter Four, this phenomenon was explained in greater detail.  
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In light of the aforementioned, corporate governance best practices developed on St. 
Vincent but only as allowable within the confines of some stringent procedural 
practices within the small segment of companies – the insurance companies. These 
were acceptable by management of such companies that would later experience the 
fall out of an unprecedented financial crisis that was discussed more fully elsewhere 
in this original thesis presentation.  
 
The continuing contribution to economic development by the private limited liability 
company 
Historically, high unemployment was offset somewhat by persons finding and 
creating local employment in St. Vincent through cottage industries and the 
establishment of other private limited liability companies. Some persons were 
fortunate enough to have secured capital to finance such causes. However,  
 
“This lower-middle-income country [St. Vincent] is vulnerable to natural 
disasters tropical storms wiped out substantial portions of crops in 1994, 1995, 
and 2002. In 2008, the islands had more than 200,000 tourist arrivals, mostly 
to the Grenadines, a drop of nearly 20% from 2007. Saint Vincent is home to a 
small offshore banking sector and has moved to adopt international regulatory 
standards. The government's ability to invest in social programs and respond 
to external shocks is constrained by its high public debt burden, which was 
68% of GDP at the end of 2011. GDP grew on average 6% annually from 
2002-07 but contracted between 2008-10; as a result of the global economic 
downturn, growth remains slow.”247 
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The country was vulnerable to natural and manmade disasters and other 
vulnerabilities. Its political administration found it necessary to turn to the offshore 
sector through the private limited liability companies. There was mentioned that 
company laws were reformed so as to accommodate the continuous repositioning of 
said companies to the forefront of the economy. This was especially so as they were 
also mediums for employment, raising much needed revenue and to bolster overall 
economic development within the country. These companies were also responsible for 
the personal and financial development of beneficiary stakeholders in the wider 
CARICOM region where other networks of associated insurance businesses were 
located and to stakeholders that were domiciled overseas. 
 
2.5 Rationale for a dichotomy in regulation  
One has to understand that it was only from 1909 that St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
saw the first registration of a company on its register. This was a domestic private 
limited liability company limited by shares. Thereafter only in 1996 that there was the 
mention of the offshore sector where other private limited liability companies were 
even considered for inclusion on a register – under the Financial Intelligent Services 
Authority renamed the Financial Services Authority.  
 
This process of incorporation between and among the same construct for different 
purposes took nearly ninety years to become practicable and was quite slow. The 
“Registry of Companies”248seen was only for domestic companies that provided a 
plethora of companies some of which were amalgamated and or struck off. These 
were regulated through the Commercial and Intellectual Property Office. On the other 
hand, the Financial Services Authority regulated the offshore companies within the 
international sector. Maybe it was due to the time span in terms of the establishment 
of these two regulators and or the policy decisions on the purpose for all these private 
limited liability companies, but this dichotomous regulatory regime was quite unique.   
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These companies were the replica of those found within the British company laws and 
the UK Companies Act. They held property and had identifiable powers and liabilities 
as an individual but were “distinguished from the members.”249  They had a "common 
seal."250  Members on the other hand possessed a "liability to contribute to the assets 
of the company in winding up.”251.  However, exceptions were when crime or "fraud 
was suspected and ought to be proved.”252  This was the same construct that remained 
as robust to date as the day it was introduced to the nation state.  
 
It was within this remit that a Vincentian company or branch of the conglomerate The 
Colonial Life Insurance Company Limited continued to be incorporated and regulated 
through the direction and control of a “dichotomous regulatory”253 regime.  The 
insurance companies as well as all private limited liability companies limited by 
shares were well under the purview of the legislation administered by the Commercial 
and Intellectual Property Office. This was the more established regulator. There was a 
plethora of applicable laws from the inception of the Authority and to the current 
period such as: 
• Companies Act, 1994 
• Companies Regulations, 1996 
• Registration of Business Names Act, Cap. 111 
• Registration of Business Names Fees Regulations, 1981 
• Societies Act, Cap. 330 
• Trade Marks Act, 2003 
• Trade Marks Regulations, 2004 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Salomon v Salomon (1897) AC 22 
250 Op. cit. [St. Vincent Companies Act 1994] s.25; UK Companies Act 1948 as amended by 
UK Companies Act 1980 applicable to St. Vincent - First Schedule Table A, Art. 82, 113; see 
also Appendix 2(10) Historical Table A 
251 Op. cit. [Companies Act 1994] s.37; s.371 
252 Adams v Cape Industries plc. [1990] Ch 433 
253 Insurance companies are regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the 
Commercial and Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) through specified mandates 
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• Patents Act, Cap. 110 
• Patents (Amendment) Rules, 1998 
• Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act, Cap. 112 
• Registration of United Kingdom Patent (Amendment) Rules, No. 29 of 2001 
• Copyright Act, 2003 
• Geographical Indications Act, 2004 
 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is the second regulator of private companies. 
The formation of both the Financial Services Authority and the Commercial and 
Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) fell well within the period of study (1845 to 
2013).  However, the services of these regulatory authorities were unavailable to the 
private limited liability companies limited by shares for the periods of 1845 to 2003 
and 2011 due to legislative enactments of the Commercial and Intellectual Property 
Office and the Financial Services Authority respectively.   
 
Laws specific to “International Business Companies,”254 “International Insurance 
Companies”255 and hybrid companies some of which were the “Limited liability 
Companies256formed part of the portfolio on supervision of private limited liability 
companies by the Financial Services Authority. It must be reiterated that corporate 
governance within the aforementioned private companies was never without 
guidance.  There exist international best practices established and promoted by 
several international organizations and found within British company laws and UK 
Companies Acts. As a post emancipation emerging nation, St. Vincent adhered to 
these established international laws.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 International Business Companies Act 2007; International Business Company Regulations 
2008; International Business (Amendment) Regulations 2010; International Business 
Companies (Amendment and Consolidation) Act 2009 
255 International Insurance Act 2009; International Insurance Regulations 1999; International 
Insurance (Amendment) Regulations 2004 
256  Limited Liability Companies Act 2009; Limited Liability Companies Act 2008 
(Amendment) 2010; 
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The situation was similar in Trinidad and Tobago having its private limited liability 
companies regulated by similar laws and its own regulatory authorities. Although they 
are separate countries each island state is part of CARICOM with its shared 
legislative legacies. Precedents set in any case and the resulting case law was 
persuasive to such similar occurrences in these former colonies.  However, such 
misdemeanours or wrongs within corporation law were not as popular as other areas 
of law.  
 
Reformation on Company law 
The call for a Caribbean wide reform on Company law and the corresponding 
corporate governance practices was contextualized within the dynamic and 
multicultural intermixture of nation states within CARICOM. This was the call on 
individual sovereign states. Corporate governance practices had influenced 
perceptions and practices throughout the life cycles of insurance companies and other 
categories of juridical bodies locally in St. Vincent and in the “wider Caribbean.”257  
 
Although these corporate governance procedures on best practices outlined the roles 
and responsibilities of shareholders and directors, there was a consensus that further 
change was necessary and obligatory and in keeping with public policy and the 
demands made on the companies. From 1845 up to and including 1925 there were 
major amendments made to the UK Companies Act that impacted countries that 
followed British traditions on Company laws like St. Vincent and Trinidad.  As far as 
was known there was slow progress made in St. Vincent and elsewhere since 2003 on 
accelerating a Caribbean perspective on corporate governance. Within its own 
jurisdictional purview a “call was made”258 by one of the regulators on its own agenda 
for reform.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Report on the Caribbean Corporate Governance Forum (A Working Document) 30 – 43, 
ECCB Headquarters, St. Kitts, 3 – 5 September, 2003 
258 Appendix 2(11) – see for information on the Financial Services Authority mandate for the 
reform of its juridical entities to have a two tier board model within its remit on corporate 
governance/company law  
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Individual countries within the region created their own corporate agenda over time. 
Unlike other states that were affected, more specifically in Trinidad and Tobago, there 
were no metals to be extracted from St. Vincent and no “oil and gas discoveries.”259 
Some expressed fears of a further collapse or economic stagnation within the region, 
if more robust and timely steps were not taken to correct major defects in corporate 
governance within the private companies. 
 
Amidst all of this, it was reconsidered that the evolution of corporate law in St. 
Vincent was examined within the context of those changes that occurred within “the 
Commonwealth Caribbean … a homogeneous entity joined by strong British legal 
ties.”260 The Caribbean society responded to a variety of developmental trends as 
“differences in socio-political and economic policy, which are reflected within the 
law.”261 Through “colonialism”262 it was reasoned by some that a “transplantation”263 
or “imposition”264  of English Law was all that was necessary to cater to the 
commercial needs of this “tropical” 265  “economy” 266  and the structure of its 
“pluralist”267populace. Mangal opined that “the territories…used…as a model for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Velculescu, Delia, Rizavi, Saqib, Trinidad and Tobago: The Energy Boom and Proposals 
for a Sustainable Fiscal Policy (International Monetary Fund, Washington 2005) 3 
260  Belle-Antoine, Rose-Marie, Caribbean Commonwealth Law and Legal Systems (2nd edn 
Routledge-Cavendish, New York, 1998) 7 
261  Ibid 
262  Patel, Sujata (Ed), The ISA of Diverse Sociological Traditions (Sage Publications Ltd, 
London, 2010) 226 - where colonialism wrought profound changes in African societies and 
reorganized the purpose and practice of knowledge production in the region (Caribbean) 
263  Nyali Ltd v AG of Kenya [1995] 1 All ER 646, CA 653 - Lord Denning's dictum about 
‘transplant' was in reference to the common law. However, the terminology is applicable to 
legislation that is ‘transplanted' from one jurisdiction to another without sufficient 
consideration for the economic, social and political environments of the receiving state.  
264  Rudling v Switch (1821) 2 Hag Con 371, @ 380 The dictum of Lord Stowell who was then 
the Master of Rolls - ‘When the King of England conquers a country…the Conqueror by 
saving the lives of the people conquered gains a right and property in such people; in 
consequence of which he may impose on them what the laws he pleases. The use of the word 
‘imposition' in this context is noted. 
265   Doumerc, Eric, Caribbean Civilization: The English - Speaking Caribbean since 
Independence (Presses Universitaires Murail, Toulouse, France 2003) 23 
266  Ibid 
267 Besson, Jean, Martha Brae's Two Histories: European Expansion and Caribbean culture-
building in Jamaica (University of North Carolina Press, USA 2002) 9 - 11 - for discussions 
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their legislation, a United Kingdom Act and have relied upon the Case Law.”268 As 
can be seen from Belle Antoine’s discussions though, “substantial differences in areas 
like foreign direct investment law, international tax law and company law exist.”269  
 
It was noted that “ several hundred Acts”270 regulated commercial activities within St. 
Vincent as well as the wider Caribbean region. There were minor changes occurring 
over the years in a piecemeal manner.  The research findings demonstrate that there 
were “statutes”271 and ordinances as well as Acts of Parliament that were “repealed, 
revoked and replaced or amended”272from time to time.   
 
Within recent times, “corporate laws led from the US”273 also influenced legislation 
on companies in the Caribbean. Therefore the evolution of company law within the 
colonial administration of St. Vincent was predicated on these imported laws 
conjoined with those that constituted British legacy. Phases of corporate governance 
development in St. Vincent 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on the Caribbean/Jamaican experience of a ‘plural society'/populace which was comparable 
due to its colonial past in which St. Vincent and the Grenadines' experiences would be 
reflected 
268  Mangal, Rambarran, An Introduction to Company Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
(Canoe Press, UWI, Kingston, Jamaica, 1995) - the words territories, Commonwealth 
Caribbean or the region refer to the same geographical landscape of the former colonies of 
Great Britain. 
269  Belle-Antoine, Rose-Marie, Caribbean Commonwealth Law and Legal Systems (2nd edn 
(Routledge-Cavendish, New York, 1998) 7 
270  Sheppard, Charles, An historical Account of the island of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines (W.Nicol, Cleveland Row, London, 1831) 205 – used for historical account 
271  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Consolidated Index of Statutes and Subsidiary 
Legislation (Compiled at Faculty of Law, Law Library/Ministry of Legal Affairs, Kingstown, 
Saint Vincent/UWI, Barbados, 1981) ii, iii for guide to references and explanations as to 
statues and ordinances; from 1926 to 1969 (attaining of Statehood), statutes were originally 
enacted as and entitled ordinances. In 1978 all such Statutes were renamed Acts by the 
Citation of Ordinances Act 1978.  
272  Ibid, See 22, 23 for Companies Acts that were enacted with references as per (Cap 219) 
2/1518 to 32/1976 
273  Milman, David, National Corporate Law in a Globalised Market - The UK Experience in 
Perspective (Edward Elgar Publishing, United Kingdom 2009) 9 
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Coupled with this, the direction and control of all such private companies were 
generally within a “dichotomous regulatory”274 regime. The issue of ownership of 
shares is quite unique to the domestic sector.  Here, private companies either within 
the domestic or international sectors are unlisted. The guidance on corporate 
governance developed over time. Some adherence to international best practices 
remains entrenched within municipal laws and deemed necessary.  
 
Reform on financial rules 
There seems to be a continual and rigorous reform on financial rules and regulations 
by international regulatory agencies imposed on the state. This was not to say in any 
way that compliance to these rules were lacking. The inhibiting factor sometimes was 
the pace with which compliance was achieved or achievable given the size and scale 
of the available expertise in government and within the private limited liability 
companies. Small states with regulators with close to ten thousand companies without 
a code on governance in this way were generally at a disadvantage. The technical 
expertise within the regulatory regime and government assigned officers operated 
under severe challenges given the current regulations that changed very little for close 
to two centuries. 
 
Money markets 
It was not an overemphasis to say that accessibility to those money markets by 
Vincentian companies remained contingent on corporate best practices that would 
facilitate good places to ‘park’ funds to be used in shorter time frames. Such 
instruments were generally categorised as insurance deposits, collateral loans, 
premium deposits and acceptance and bills of exchange.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Insurance companies are regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the 
Commercial and Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) through specified mandates 
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Operating within the money market was the banks to which shareholders deposits 
were collected through the insurance company. Liquidity was critical to accessing 
money markets and the main purpose or doing so. However, the insurance company 
made a decision to facilitate short -term debt for covering the operating expenses or 
even the working capital of a company. This decision making process is normally 
done through the procedural outline of its corporate governance.  
 
Risk 
Taking risks was "largely dependent on"275 the company's monitoring environment.  
When a company focuses on its shareholders monitoring, it created a tighter 
monitoring environment, which alleviated the effect of a contractual risk-taking 
enticement on risk-taking activities. It was also noted that, better institutional 
governance has been shown to encourage "greater risk taking."276In light of the 
debacle that heavily impacted one of its institutional shareholders, the Building and 
Loan Association the jury is out on how far risk taking can be pushed. These 
instances of apparent corporate irresponsibility and lack of proper monitoring and 
accountability provide for further analyses, which are constrained by this thesis. 
 
It was the decision to maintain a risk-averse profile as far as was possible, that would 
probably be the best use of money markets due to safety. Associated with this was a 
business model that must work in order to keep the private limited liability company 
afloat. Any disregard, lack or absence of such best practices will of course create 
breaks in communication; be detrimental to best practices on corporate governance 
and add to the ultimate ‘demise’ of the company.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Leipziger, Deborah, The Corporate Responsibility Code Book (2nd edn Greenleaf 
Publishing Ltd, UK 2010) 148 
276 Miller, Geoffrey, P, Cafaggi, Fabrizio, The Governance and Regulation of International 
Finance (Edward Elgar Publishing, UK 2013) 172 
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At best there were the associated complexities of the paradigm “risks”277 faced by 
investors, “shareholders”278 and “stakeholders”279 alike. The contextual phenomenon 
to corporate reality on the island as well as within CARICOM was multifaceted.  
Having regard to the discussion on risk, it was obvious that a measure of risk was 
anticipated and taken given the nature of investment. Additionally, the comparative 
analyses demonstrated that the private limited liability companies remained conjoined 
within CARICOM, and were shaped by both external and internal influences.  
 
Law reform in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
In the Consolidated Index of Statutes and Subsidiary Legislation for SVG, “Statutes 
for the years 1926 (May) to 1969 (October),”280 were originally "enacted as and 
entitled ‘Ordinances’.”281 Further, in 1978, "all such Statutes were renamed ‘Acts’ by 
the "Citation of Ordinances Act 1978."282 This was evidence of a transplantation of 
legislation irrespective of whether the Vincentian environment was ready. Within the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, the nation state began to grapple further with the 
realities of its own existence in light of real or perceived “economic growth.”283 This 
of course was within the post independence period. It was no longer the case that “the 
colony was considered part of the Realm of the colonizer”284 and could benefit from 
mere adherence to British company laws and the UK Companies Acts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Chapter One   
278 Chapter One  
279 Chapter One (Figure 1(5)) 
280  Consolidated Index of Statutes and Subsidiary Legislation for (St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines): Abbreviated Version -To the 1st January, 1981(Faculty of Law Library, 
Ministry of Legal Affairs Kingstown, St. Vincent (University of the West Indies, Barbados 
1981) ii 
281 Ibid 
282 Citation of Ordinances Act 1978 
283 International Monetary Fund Country Report No 11/343 (International Monetary Fund 
Publication, USA December, 2011)  
284 The Monthly Review or Literary Journal, Vol 39 (R. Griffiths, London 1768) 324 - 325; 
See also Memmi, Albert, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Earthscan Publications, UK 
1974) 53 where Memmi talks about the colonizer - having come to a land by accidents of 
history, taking away land belonging to the inhabitant, upsetting the established rules, it is so 
in the eyes of the colonized and the colonizer; see also, Edwards, Bryan, The History, Civil 
and Commercial of the British Colonies of the West Indies, To Which is added a Historical 
Survey of the French Colony in the island of Saint Domingo (B. Crosby, Stationer’s Court, 
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A response by government was welcomed in light of changes in the economy. In 
order to begin the process of adjustment and attempts at economic and fiscal policy 
considerations, the growing corporate sector in St. Vincent and the Grenadines began 
to address the issues of repositioning the private company. Several “debates and 
amendments to company legislation with emphasis on “economic”285 development 
were well articulated in the local parliament. Similar discussions across the Caribbean 
region were also within the public domain. 
 
The company laws that were amended were to address corporate governance issues 
that touch and concern municipal matters. Nonetheless, an overall guidance from 
international best practices served, as guidance on corporate governance within the 
private companies on the island that could not operate in a vacuum. See Figure 2 (2) 
that shows corporate governance derived best practices and the impact on private 
companies. 
Figure 2 (2) 
See overleaf 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
London 1798) 103, how the colonizers tried to entrap the natives of St. Vincent to get them to 
comply with their demands 
285 Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 26 June 
2001 (Dr. Hon. Ralph Gonsalves, Prime Minister and Minister under whose portfolio 
regulation of companies fall. (The Companies (Amendment) Bill 2001) – Amendments 
proposed were to amend the Companies Act No. 8 of 1994. The house debated on the merits 
and demerits of the change in the policy of the government. Dr. Gonsalves re-iterated the 
claims made by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank as well as the Caribbean Development 
Bank in light of the real economic growth that was envisaged. He claimed that the change in 
the law as per company legislation would set the premise on which to ‘put some money into 
the economy’; as well as to get the public sector investment programme kick off properly for 
the last five or six months of that particular year. The Prime Minister in response to the 
Opposition Leader’s (OL) comments on the introduction of this amendment, said, that he was 
happy that the “OL does not support rich foreigners to escape the payment of the 10% and to 
avoid them not paying the $3000 where I could get them to pay the $3000 to register the 
company. Remember this; the per capita GDP of this country is just over EC$5000 so if I get 
2 overseas companies registered that’s the per capita GDP of one person in his constituency.”  
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Figure 2 
Corporate governance derived best practices 
 
 
 
 
Key:  
Area Q – International best practices on corporate governance derived from 
established time tested principles originated within companies established by families 
initially and amended in response to corporate failure and legislation 
Area R (Q + R) – Municipal or country specific corporate governance where best 
practices are amended and enshrined in legislation and by-laws 
Area S (Q + R + S) – Company specific corporate governance best practices as the 
sum total of distilled/amended derived practices and executed through the applicable 
system of corporate governance in the country 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s compilation – 2018/2019 
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All in all, it was further contended that company law legislation served as the bedrock 
for the offshore and non- offshore sectors as far as the nation’s “economic”286 stability 
was concerned. This was the sentiment echoed by the current Prime Minister Ralph 
Gonsalves. The amendment to legislation specific to companies was an imperative. It 
was more than an assumption that critical players to the process of reform were the 
role of government, an efficient and impartial judiciary and an impartial regulatory 
regime. 
 
Role of government generally in the reform process 
While the private sector was considered the country’s chief economic force, the need 
for government regulation was one that transcends the very nature of corporate 
governance. The role exercised by government ran corollary to the history of the 
country itself. Within the reform process, the enabling institution was government so 
that its policies dictated the length of the process; the constituents parts as the how 
such process of reform was conducted; why and when it was conducted and the 
beneficiaries of the result of the process of reform.  
 
The constitution permitted government to regulate some commercial activity of which 
the private limited liability company within the financial sector remained a part. There 
was a noticeable increase role of government over time and through its role, the 
private limited liability company positioned enjoyed considerable freedom. The 
private limited liability company was permitted establishment, registration and or 
incorporation in order to operate. The private company created and enforced its 
contractual obligations; the protection of the rights of consumers or stakeholders and 
their safety; the regulation of the environment and its protection as a major 
stakeholder of the private limited liability company; the government’s right to 
taxation to generate revenue from the company and the protection of investors rights.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 26 June 
2001 (The Companies (Amendment) Bill 2001) – Amendments proposed was to amend the 
Companies Act No. 8 of 1994.  
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Signatory to international conventions 
Amidst all of its internal and external influences and its attempt at structural change 
and recovery from financial crises, St. Vincent adhered to and was signatory to 
various United Nations conventions and protocols. It maintained membership of a 
“number of regional and or international organizations”287 some of which advocated 
international best practices on financial and corporate governance issues. The nation’s 
re-interpretation and application of its laws, policies and agenda on corporate 
governance has never been altered but merely incorporated into its existing British 
company laws. The country was accepted as a sovereign law abiding state. It was 
compliant with international corporate governance best practices as advocated by 
international organisations.   
 
2.6 Models of corporate governance 
The discussion now turned on the issue of the models of corporate governance and the 
case made for a hybrid corporate governance model. See Figure 2(3) below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (3) 
Major Characteristics that influenced the hybrid Corporate Governance System up to 
2013 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
 
See overleaf 
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Figure 2(3) 
Major Characteristics that influenced the hybrid Corporate Governance System up to 
2013 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
 
Source: Researcher's compilation - 2018 - 2019 
 
The above gave a synoptic view of the major constituents or characteristics within a 
hybrid corporate governance system up to 2013 on St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
This is how it evolved. From the Anglo American model inherited from Great Britain, 
it has borrowed from German corporate law. The nature of corporate governance was 
influenced greatly within recent times from elements within the German corporate 
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law with emphasis on the two-tier model. When combined with the existing unitary or 
one-tier board model that existed for well over a century it has considerations for 
relevancy. The context therefore presupposes that: 
ü The unitary board existed with emphasis on consensus in decision-making and 
the process of centralisation, control and management. 
ü Efforts currently being made in response to averting further catastrophic and 
systemic shocks to the financial sectors in St. Vincent and possibly to the Caribbean 
region by extension. 
ü In response to stakeholders’ concerns and shareholder primacy, the legislature 
continues to reform the financial sector and company law so as to safeguard overall 
economic growth.  
ü Government has to bolster poverty alleviation strategies and strengthen the 
safety net in light of “genteel poverty.” 
ü There is much to be gained to restore confidence in the private limited liability 
companies within the wider stakeholder regime. 
 
A further analysis of the intricacies of generally accepted models of corporate 
governance applicable to St. Vincent is necessary. The discussion turns firstly to the 
time tested Anglo American model of corporate governance. 
 
Reassessment of the Anglo American model of corporate governance 
The legislation on corporate entities reflects the Anglo American model of corporate 
governance within the context of the English Company laws and the companies under 
review in this chapter. As former colonies of Great Britain whose laws were the 
construct of the British, both St. Vincent and the Grenadines as well as Trinidad and 
Tobago continued to adhere to the legislation on company for the greater part. The 
overriding factor was that the company was directed and controlled in the interest of 
the shareholders primarily. Shareholders generally remain unprotected save and 
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except for the unanimous shareholder agreement that served as a contractual 
mechanism to protect them against corporate decisions that carry risks associated with 
investment decisions.  
 
The creation of wealth was critical to this company. The spill off was an anticipated 
focus on profit maximization that was designed to contribute to economic growth.  
The focus was not on social functions and other associated considerations.  As 
opposed to shareholders, directors’ interests at times appeared not to be sufficiently 
balanced.  The directors did not determine the decided leverage between social 
interests and economic thrust of the company. The shareholders demonstrated up to a 
certain level, an efficient system in investing and thereby creating for some time, 
levels of economic welfare for the company. 
 
 There was no noticeable account taken of other interests besides those of the 
shareholders. These might have included and not be limited to the interests of the 
shareholders and directors; concern for the community in which the company 
operated or an emphasis placed on the company’s benefit to the wider community. In 
the Anglo American Model of Corporate governance there must be a responsible 
management structure.  The board of directors, its executive management and 
shareholders comprised the core of management.  At law the company remains a 
separate legal entity but its actions were demonstrated through its management team. 
The priority was on profit maximization and hence the company’s focus was on 
investments and the generation of profits for the benefit of shareholders. 
 
The social, cultural and political ethos of the state itself transcends the composition of 
the board and the quality of the corporate governance it practices.  The hiring of 
employees, staffing issues, monitoring on a daily basis were aspects of the 
management and control of the company. The board was equipped with the necessary 
policies and legislative mandate on international best practices. It delegated a wide 
cross section of responsibilities.  These were the enabling mechanisms that assisted 
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them with carrying out the objectives of the company and further to monitor how 
these were applied by the management of each of the companies within the CL 
Financial Company grouping.  The main organ of the company was the board of 
directors. It was also true to say that the board acted as ‘agents’ for shareholders that 
supervised the actions of managers. In this model the unitary or one tier board exists. 
 
A unitary or one-tier board was created and was subject to re-election and would have 
served in excess of the year. The Anglo American Model and the quality of best 
practices was dependent on the composition of the board and the qualification of 
board members. Whether they were able to supervise the executive management 
determined the success of the company.  What obtained was that a majority 
shareholder in practice controlled the executive management.  Personnel were elected 
by the shareholders at the annual general meeting of the company for a specific 
tenure, which was normally a year.  
 
The problem on management or the opportunity provided for the majority shareholder 
was played out in the relationship between executive management and the Board of 
which the majority shareholder was a part.  The board in meetings should have been 
technically responsible for the supervision of the Chief Executive Officer and his 
team of management. However, this was not the case as the majority shareholder 
undertook all major decisions.  Also the Chairman was the majority shareholder of the 
company that placed a limit on the powers of the board.  
 
Although outlined by legislation, the unanimous shareholder agreement appeared to 
be at conflict with the original constitution of the company. The legislated 
requirements for the Chairman/Chief Executive Officer and majority shareholder 
dictated a more personal approach towards certification of annual reports generated 
by the company.  In that case the majority shareholder duly serving as Chairman of 
the company had the added advantage of making sure that the reports are substantive 
and quite subjective in intent and design. 
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Board Structure 
The two-tier board: a new consideration 
Considerations must be given to this fully functional hybrid. Upon reconstitution and 
not upon incorporation, the newest addition that constitutes corporate governance in 
St. Vincent as proposed was taken from the established German model. The 
influences from this model were recognised and introduced effective 2013. The recent 
call for a “two-tier model”288 of a board. This was introduced to the domestic private 
limited liability companies and other juridical bodies.  The reasoning behind this was 
a response to the recent unprecedented crisis within the insurance companies.  There 
was an expectation that the insurance companies and other named juridical bodies 
will adopt this model.  It was further expected that the restructuring of the boards will 
be undertaken by the company in meetings and accordingly comply with the 
prevailing law almost immediately.   
 
The expectations further detailed that the Chief Executive office as well as Executive 
directors were to be employed within the company on a daily basis.  The roles of the 
independent non-executive directors as well as the Chairman were to be assigned 
some mundane tasks as they ‘run’ the organisation.  Having very little to do on a daily 
basis was probably commonplace. However, the details of this new phenomenon did 
not set out a proper procedure as to the effectiveness of management and or direction 
and control of the entity. Time was of essence as experience had not yet accumulated 
nor tested this hybrid. 
 
In the 1890s “Germany introduced the GmbH.”289 The similar species of companies 
to the British private limited liability company limited by shares was introduced in 
1908.  Whether the British borrowed the concept from the Germans or elsewhere, 
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Business Groups to Professional Managers (University of Chicago Press, USA 2005) 3 - 5 
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there were certain similarities and differences. The major one was that the GmbH was 
premised on a two-tier board while the private limited liability company limited by 
shares revolved around a one-tier board. 
 
Having worked and served with the Credit Union movement and the Co-operative 
Department in St. Vincent, similar construct exists within this non-company law 
occurrence. The credit unions affiliated to the “Caribbean Conference of Credit 
Unions,”290have clearly defined roles and responsibilities of each board that are 
carefully crafted. This gave validity to their corporate existence in terms of 
functionality, transparency, the levels of power they exerted, the levels of 
independence when acting in the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders and 
above all, their own accountability as to effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
Supervisory board, the board of directors, credit committees, education committees 
and other adhoc committees are critical to good governance within that remit. These 
place restraint on power and the delivery of services within their corporate 
governance regime.  It might well be that this is the singular reason for the proposal of 
the two-tier model on board management within the private limited liability company 
limited by shares on St. Vincent.  Respectfully, however this might be challenging if 
done in isolation of other salient aspects of the German model or the two-tier board. It 
was noted that there has been no reference to the terminology “German model”291 in 
any literature examined locally during the research. It probably was not necessary to 
do so but rather the optimum functioning of the company was to be stressed. This 
may not be significant to non-practitioners of corporate governance.  However, 
research pointed to the German model as relevant to the named ‘two-tier model’. 
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As proposed, the two-tier board structure will conjoin with the inherited unitary board 
structure from the UK and applicable to companies in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
When carefully scrutinized, this “mandate from the Financial Services Authority”292 
suggested that, resonance was found somehow within the German model but with 
minor extractions. The principle behind the two-tiered board is one of “co-
determination or participation of employees in the process of deciding or settling in 
companies and enterprises.”293 The German corporate law makes provisions for all 
three of its corporate entities, but the “GmBH is a private limited liability 
company”294 and similar in a number of respects to the private limited liability.  
 
In both constructs, there are similar legislative provisions on corporate governance. 
Within the GmBH there are ‘mandatory bodies such are its shareholders meeting and 
the managing director(s).’ In the British company similarities exist which are 
shareholders meeting (shareholder assembly) and the directors. While directors may 
be selected or elected based on the internal governance of the company, any hybrid of 
corporate governance structures is likely to be amended over time in light of the 
growing needs of stakeholders and or government policies about the company. The 
call for a supervisory board to be part of the hybrid system of corporate governance in 
St. Vincent is revolutionary. Research indicates that the supervisory board may be on 
a voluntary basis. This is however contingent on having employees in excess of five 
hundred.  
 
Within the Vincentian experience, a consideration might be to have at least a 
representative or representatives of employees within the two-tier board structure as 
proposed.  Howsoever such a hybrid is constructed, the process should replicate as far 
as possible the principles of having a participatory approach to corporate governance 
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293  Cleiss, Mark Oliver, German Co-determination and Corporate Governance (GRIN 
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294  Dine, Janet, Koutsias, Marios, The Nature of Corporate Governance (Edward Elgar 
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by both employees and employer within the newly constituted private limited liability 
company. 
 
There is the concept of co-determination linked to representation at the supervisory 
board level.  Whether the performance of the private limited liability will change, if at 
all, with the introduction of elements of “Co-determination”295is yet to be determined.  
Fundamental too, is the fact that those employees of the 'insurance companies' would 
be representatives of a particular labour force and serve as a determinant of size of 
such a labour force.  Up to one half or fifty per cent of employees representation can 
form the supervisory board. This might not be the qualifier for employee 
representation on the board. 
 
Within the insurance companies as far as is known, the labour force is not near 
enough to five hundred.  On the other hand, it may be that a reduction on the numbers 
representative of a labour force could be radically reduced to accommodate to the 
Vincentian hybrid corporate governance system. It could well be that a private limited 
liability company's representative of whatever sector, may employ five hundred 
employees in the future.  However having said that, the idea behind the two-tier board 
is likely to use a different matrix given that it is a hybrid of both one and two tier 
board models.  
 
Careful considerations must of necessity arise with respect to all directors within the 
hybrid system. As reflections on the recent crisis would dictate, the role of non-
executive and executive directors should be carefully crafted.  One of the major 
questions that could be raised in light of all the current discussions on corporate 
governance was whether it would be appropriate to permit private limited liability 
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companies to “indemnify non-executives even when this was not considered with 
respect to executive directors.”296   
 
The more persuasive arguments in light of the aforementioned could be drawn from 
discussions within the “House of Lords”297 as the legislature in St. Vincent would at 
some time hopefully reference. The dictum was that all directors are treated the same 
at law with respect to liability.  For corporate governance practitioners and those who 
would seek to guide the next generation on company legislation, it is imperative to 
assess the implications for all directors, not only of “insurance companies in the 
OECS” 298  but for other directors within Vincentian private limited liability 
companies.   The idea promoted throughout is that the director's duty is primarily to 
the “company and its employees.”299 The latter upholds the shareholder primacy 
theory. 
 
A series of public releases and board discussions continue to place emphases on the 
unitary board with the role of chairman highlighted as pivotal.  The “Financial 
Services Authority”300 was part of the reform process to counter the effects of a 
lacuna in the law as well as providing guidance.  Previous to this, the IFSA and the 
IFU served as quasi-regulatory bodies as the government continued with its 
‘proposals for company law reform in the state as well as expressing concerns for the 
region.’ The advantages of the unitary boards remained part of the discussions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 See Appendix 2(12) – Newspaper article from the Trinidad Daily – Clients money funded 
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297 HL Deb 21 October 2004 vol 665 cc975-7 
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onwards up to the recent times of 2013 when the two-tiered board was cited as a 
viable alternative. 
 
Based on discussions post CLICO/BAICO debacle, a further demand is placed on 
non-executives.  Not only that but, the qualifications of directors are called into 
question.  It would seem therefore that the more 'academically' qualified the director, 
the better he/she should be at dispensing corporate governance.  All in all, the idea 
was to produce or encourage directors to be qualified and become more competent in 
their fiduciary duties and commensurate with the techniques of management of the 
company. 
 
Additionally, what seems to be driving the process is the issue of control.  The control 
of the executive is of paramount importance.   The 'management' of tensions between 
and amongst boards of directors and Chairman, has not gone unnoticed.  A re-
examination of the role of non-executives; boards of directors generally as well as 
management personnel remain pivotal to corporate governance debates.  One of the 
areas of concern must of necessity be, whether different levels of liability can be held 
out for members of the boards given that decisions are by consensus generally.   Even 
up to the time of writing, these matters remain as focal points in local discussions 
among leading lawyers on St. Vincent. 
 
The one tier or unitary board 
One of the major features of the existing corporate governance system in St. Vincent 
was the “unitary board."301 It determines primarily the procedural manner by which 
companies are run.  There are associated benefits such that the unitary board is a 
single, fundamental, decisive executive 'office' and it is part of the system of 
governance for all private limited liability companies in SVG up until 2013.  More 
would be said of the introduction of elements of the “German two tier model of 
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governance” in 2013, which effectively produced a 'hybrid' system geared specifically 
at the management of one category of private limited liability companies - the 
insurance companies.  However, the question that many would continue to ask as was 
done some years ago, is “whether the unitary board in the form in which has become 
established in Britain and in those countries which follow the same pattern of 
governance, is the best model on offer?”302 
 
 It has been the experience f most companies that the unitary board is a simpler 
management of the financial system within private companies ranging from the 
simplest to the largest companies.  The benefit of discussions from just over three 
decades within the UK Parliament is critical in light of the introduction of the German 
model of corporate governance, albeit specific to one category of private limited 
liability companies (insurance companies). Lord Kings Norton was adamant that there 
were really no differences between the two-tier and unitary boards as he elaborated, “ 
...I did state in the debate on the “Bullock Report,"303 that we have a two-tier system 
here. Call it a unitary board system... but ... under the board, a management 
committee under the chairmanship of the managing director. When we are told, “You 
ought to have a two-tier structure,” the answer is, “We have one”, and do let us 
remember that.”304  It has been 'settled' history that the British preferred a unitary 
board and this has been part of its corporate governance for many centuries.  This 
system remained generally undisturbed within Vincentian companies up to 2013.   
 
2.7 Phases of corporate governance development in St. Vincent 
The following gives an overview of what constitutes the phased development of 
corporate governance generally in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The accuracy of 
this time line is limited but useful in providing a guide on the process. 
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Phase One: 1800s – 1920s:  
1830s: Family members within a post-emancipation modern competitive economy 
established the nucleus of first private limited liability company limited by shares but 
this was in the form of a partnership and under the UK Partnership Acts and 
customary practices. There was no distinction between management and control of 
the entity. Ownership of shares was limited to family members who were partners.  
 
1840s: Continual directing and control of company by shareholders who were also 
directors. Family members directed and controlled the company using best practices 
crafted from family values and other established international best practices. The first 
and only domestic private company transitioned from a partnership firm to a private 
limited liability company.  
 
Some measure of “limited liability” existed in the UK “legislation in 1837”305 prior to 
incorporation allowable under the UK Companies Act 1908. Post 1837 and thereafter 
“in the ensuing 17 years, 50 companies” 306 were formed as testimony to the 
availability of measured ‘restriction on members liability' and corporate governance 
could not arise immediately upon incorporation. Similar conditions were operative in 
the established Vincentian Company from 1845 through to 1908. 
 
1850s – 1900s: Companies compliant with established best practices advocated by 
public companies. Procedural outline of corporate governance best practices 
contained in Table B changed to “Table A” but primarily applicable to public 
companies.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 UK Chartered Companies Act 1837, s. IV 
306  Paul L. Davies, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (6th edn Sweet and 
Maxwell, UK 1999) 37 
	  
	  
	  
124	  
1909: A  “register”307 of companies was kept at a repository in St. Vincent. Corporate 
governance best practices outlined in Table A and on individual company By - Laws 
for procedure on directing and control of companies. The practices on corporate 
governance within family businesses continued through the directing and control by 
the founding families who served generally both as shareholders and directors.  
 
Size of the company was smaller in comparison to similar businesses in Great Britain. 
Corporate governance guidance was still to be found in Table A and any By-Laws. A 
private company was known to have minimum three members and was as effective in 
the conduct of its businesses as those with members in excess of twenty. Irrespective 
of size, the “directors”308within management was recognised as fundamental to 
corporate governance as “shareholders”309 within all types of businesses and with no 
exception within the “family owned businesses.”310  Further “the principle of legally 
limiting the financial liabilities of persons investing in business ventures”311 was laid 
down in British Parliament in the 1800s.   
 
There was the specific “legislation”312 that finally granted full limited liability. 
Legislative provisions for ‘private company’ were according to the “UK Companies 
Act”313 in 1908. Corporate governance did not arise historically as a creature of the 
legislation. Corporate governance best practices consolidated as a result of the 
legislation. Sharper focus was on qualifications of directors and managers.  
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This period under consideration was likely to be influenced by the “industrial 
revolution.”314 Even though the domestic companies on St. Vincent were not involved 
in external trading it was instructive that, “penetration of colonial societies”315 like St. 
Vincent did occur.  Ideas and practices on management were embraced cautiously, 
and tentatively but such evolution of management was gradual and as a natural 
consequence by trial and error or the experiential approach. 
 
Through legal oral history, descendants of early corporate life on St. Vincent spoke of 
the value placed on having a company that represented 'good name'.  Phase One 
characterised the pre-World War I era and lasted until the end of the war. Companies 
were "serving the community faithfully and well through peace and war." 316 
Management decision - making emphasised satisfying the basic needs of stakeholders 
(community) for clothing, foods (imported), building supplies and household items.  
The right to own businesses by the general populace was evidenced within the 
emancipation period and a more robust approach to following corporate best practices 
through procedure. 
 
Phase Two: 1920s – 1970s: - The rise of the "professional managers"317 as there was a 
felt need for greater "separation of ownership and control"318 a philosophy that 
resonated with the domestic companies as was in similar jurisdictions within the 
Caribbean and elsewhere. A few family oriented companies sought institutional 
investors to expand the business venture. This was in keeping with prevailing trends 
expressed through the printed and electronic media.  Conservative estimates of 
roughly 30% of all domestic companies in existence during this period were engaged 
in this practice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314Cohen, Bernard, Revolution in Science (President and Fellows of Harvard College, USA 
1985) 267 
315 Page, Melvin E., Marcus, Harold G., Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural and 
Political Encyclopaedia (ABC – CLIO Inc. USA 2003) 276 
316 Appendix 1(4) – Excerpt of minutes of meeting to mark centenary of the oldest established 
company on the island	  
317 Leslie, Hannah, The rise of the Corporate Economy (Routledge, UK 2006) 77 
318 Berle, Adolf A., Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(Transaction Publishers, USA 2009) 66  
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Following the practices and procedures advocated by its British counterpart, 
"Shareholders voting as per Regulations for the Management of the Company"319 was 
evident in procedural legislative changes within the Companies Act of St. Vincent and 
accompanying "Model By-Law"320 for all private companies and the "Companies 
Law"321 of the UK.  Boards were strengthened and employed managers and were 
better at administering internal self - regulation.  The unitary board remained in 
practice, with its emphasis on 'consensus' decision - making. "Delegated 
management"322 was also a feature of this era. 
 
Phase Three: 1970s – 1980s: - St. Vincent was one of the Caribbean countries or 
Associated States that "negotiated...individually with Britain to seek independence on 
a unilateral basis." 323   It was mindful to maintain dependence on the British 
legislature. As such the laws remained up to present, largely driven by English 
company laws and the UK Company Acts referenced earlier. Corporate governance 
structures with emphasis on the unitary board and shareholder primacy remained 
undisturbed and were replicated throughout the phases of corporate development 
within private companies.   
 
With respect to shareholders’ involvement the responsibilities of the board and the 
auditing components relative to corporate governance in the UK, the "Cadbury 
Report"324 from the UK was quite instructive.  Shareholders were empowered to hire 
and fire managers and a balance of power was created.  There were isolated cases, but 
formally underreported and challenging to access more accurate information on 
exactly how many managers may have been caught in the 'cross fire' with 
shareholders. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 38 - 43; Table A 1929, s.54 - 62; Table A 1862, s.44 - 
51 
320 Op. cit. [St. Vincent Companies Act] By Law No 1 
321 UK Companies Act 1948  
322 Op. cit. [St. Vincent Companies Act] s. 58 
323 Phillips, Fred Sir, Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutional Law (Cavendish Publishing 
Ltd, UK 2002) 214 
324 Op. cit. [Cadbury Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance]- accessed 25 
February, 2018 
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The financial sector was comprised of both domestic and international companies and 
the 'interconnectivity’ was evident. Emphasis was on economic growth and 
employment. Greater emphasis on international companies and the scope of corporate 
governance framework widened. The financial sector on St. Vincent was comprised 
of credit unions and other co-operative societies, banks, “national provident 
fund” 325 later renamed national insurance scheme; limited liability companies, 
unincorporated companies, cottage industries, Small and Medium Enterprises, the 
lone Building and Loan Association and friendly societies.  
 
Shareholder primacy remained a predominant feature of corporate governance. Some 
stakeholders became more aware of the impact of the financial sector and demanded 
more accountability from some private limited liability companies.  They exercised 
their growing concerns about how the company functioned and who are the ultimate 
beneficiaries. Within the last decade, this demand was made through attendance at 
meetings and through the use of electronic and printed media. Stakeholder 
engagement became more proactive.   
 
International financial services discussion became more popular as preparations were 
made for the introduction of international business companies.  Emphasis remained 
on management and control of these entities; the role of IFSA was discussed; the 
nature of the corporate entities; the role of legislation with respect to tax evasion and 
or tax avoidance.  Other jurisdictions were reviewed with an aim to study best 
practices from similar small islands like Bermuda with its well-established "Monetary 
Regulatory Authority."326  
 
If only for a small but important contribution, for many years prior to the research 
period and up to the present, as a former credit union regulator and current minority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 www.nissvg.org/history/ - accessed 20 February, 2018 
326www.bma.bm/SitePages/Home.aspx - accessed 19 January 2018 
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shareholder within a public company, the researcher experiences an active member 
adds to the debate on corporate governance development. Generally, shareholders and 
stakeholders continue to be interactive and rely heavily on printed and electronic 
communication on corporate governance issues. 
 
Phase Four: 1980s - 1990: - Introduction of a menu of laws incrementally through 
Commercial and Intellectual Property Office created in 2003 and specifically geared 
towards domestic companies - Use of “corporate governance” terminology more 
common place. An even greater emphasis placed on profit maximization.  Chamber of 
Commerce and governments called for more transparency and legislation was 
amended legislation.  
 
"Corporate Social Responsibility" 327  remained an integral part of management 
decisions. The company in meeting is critical to succession planning, scrutinized 
board composition and calls made for independent board members. A greater 
awareness evident as to: transparency and accountability in the conduct of business; 
the use of an ethical approach to business and internal governance; the use of SWOT 
analysis and a review of objectives; each constituent member of the company as a role 
player; and an equal concern not just for shareholders but other stakeholders.  The 
annual general meetings were interactive communication platforms. 
 
Phase Five: 1990s – 2000s: - There was a comprehensive review of private limited 
liability companies especially the category of insurance companies.  There was the 
further development of the offshore sector. Reconstruction was imperative within the 
Intelligent Financial Services Authority so as to provide for better regulation of the 
sector. Corporate governance structures were questioned as to adequacy, transparency 
and regulatory responsibilities.  An increase in company registration and corporate 
governance widens with foreign directors and shareholders of international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 Solomon, Jill, Corporate Governance and Accountability (2nd edn John Wiley & Sons, 
UK 2007) 8 
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businesses. Domestic companies not as prominent as foreign businesses/companies 
geared towards economic growth. 
 
Phase Six: 2000 to present:  Formation of Financial Services Authority combining 
Intelligence Financial Services Authority into one consolidated regulatory unit.  
Regulation and supervision were streamlined and in keeping with corporate 
governance reforms in some other neighbouring territories. There were some 
seminars/workshops for financial institutions attended by regulators/Ministry of 
Finance personnel.  Orchestrated by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, a Caribbean 
Corporate Governance code is still in draft format and as a working document since 
2003.  Amendments to the Company law and regulations as the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank continue to initiate discussions on corporate governance. 
 
The existence of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act and the 
Securities Act created awareness for unlisted companies.  Attendance at regional 
workshops on corporate governance made possible by officials from various regional 
government representatives within the Caribbean region.  Financial crises originating 
from outside the state prompted shareholders and stakeholders to question the 
capacity and management structure of one category of companies - insurance 
companies.  This financial crisis contributed to the already impoverished state, new 
species of poverty called “genteel poverty.”   
 
There was a hybrid corporate governance system proposed.  Although the unitary 
board model was maintained and practiced for most of the life cycle of the private 
limited liability companies on St. Vincent and the Grenadines up to 2013, the two tier 
model of board structure has been borrowed from the Germans and introduced in that 
year by way of legislation. In the “two tier system the supervisory board has the duty 
to advise and control the management board.” 328 This was now fundamental to the 
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management and supervision especially of private companies and other juridical 
bodies. 
 
There was no known corporate governance code up to 2013, but efforts had been 
made by the regulatory bodies to draft such an instrument. Emphasis placed on a 
Code believed to be necessary and to create guidelines for unlisted companies.  
Within the domestic register kept at Commercial and Intellectual Property Office and 
the aggregate of international companies from the Financial Services Authority up to 
2013, there were approximately 10,000 private limited liability companies that could 
no longer be without such a code.  Some companies have individual corporate 
governance statements or charters.   
 
2.8 Conclusion 
The company is a historical British construct. It is considered a social organism as 
well as a nexus of contracts.  and having been at the vanguard of the legislative nexus 
of contracts was also incubators for the more modern Vincentian corporate 
governance practices. The impact of the phased phenomenon of company law 
development aforementioned, continued to shape a post-emancipation modern 
competitive economy. The company was viewed as a catalyst for economic and social 
change among and between its shareholders and stakeholders alike. The governments 
of the day attempted to provide the enabling legislative environment for this inherited 
juridical British construct.  
 
Corporate governance evolved and continued through a process of evolution using its 
two organs to provide guidance on best practices from 1845 up to and including 2013. 
The establishment of the category of companies: private companies - was not only a 
legislative phenomenon but also shaped concepts of common justice for all its 
stakeholders locally on St. Vincent as well as within the Caribbean region. Through 
its originality, the research presented some other salient points in exploring the 
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contextual phenomenon of corporate governance within the private limited liability 
companies limited by shares on St. Vincent. This was arrived at through a series of 
analyses from several research methodologies.  
 
At best, these analyses were germane and deliberately synoptic. This could not be 
intended as an overemphasis. The nature of corporate governance in the identified 
private companies was forced and albeit phased over several decades. Maybe 
straddled by a path dependency or other factors. However, corporate governance best 
practices can best be understood given that there were several development plans 
geared towards the national economy that failed. Every plan attempted to position and 
repositioned the private company at the forefront of the said economic development.  
The development plans were the corollary of historical and legislative legacies of a 
former colony.  
 
There were several factors that impacted these occurrences. They could best be 
classified as having multiplier effects on the psychological development of the 
stakeholder communities and the understanding of the true constituents of corporate 
governance best practices. Also, it could well be that perception of corporate 
governance best practices were attributable to their evolution from established and 
customary practices that were family oriented to those that were captured in bylaws 
and other British oriented legislation. Nonetheless, private companies over time were 
geared towards improving overall economic growth in the nation. 
 
When using comparative analyses and other analyses for the private companies, 
repeated references were made invariably to the same British company laws and the 
UK Companies Acts and aspects of doctoral research to guide the discussions about 
corporate governance. This assisted with an evaluation of similar companies from the 
sister island of Trinidad and Tobago in comparison to those located on St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines. There was a shared legislative and historical legacy within these 
companies as sovereign states and as former colonies of the then Great Britain. The 
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imperative on primary and secondary sources were limited and limiting but served 
their purposes adequately at this juncture, for the exploration into the nature of 
corporate governance.   
 
The company with its internal and external factors harnessed corporate governance 
best practices as the enablers not only of some aspects of economic growth but also 
limited financial progress for shareholders and the wider stakeholder community 
locally and within the region.  Additionally, there were some attempts aimed at the 
“harmonisation of company law in the Caribbean Community.”329 The maxim of 
profit maximisation and shareholder primacy remained as enduring tenets over the 
years. To date there were no successful collective approach towards streamlining 
corporate governance best practices and company law within the Caribbean region as 
far as was known.  The researcher suggested a Code on Corporate Governance for 
unlisted companies in St. Vincent. This was in keeping with the call for a reformation 
of company law itself, which recommenced in 2013 as robust and progressive.   
 
As time elapsed, there remains an acceptance of an imposed legislative construct that 
was a versatile vehicle for economic growth to those nations that followed the British 
unitary or one tier model of corporate governance. Until recently, that one-tier unitary 
board has predominated the corporate governance model on the island. A hybrid of 
multiple models was currently being advocated for some of the juridical bodies 
(insurance companies inclusive). As of 2013, the two-tier board borrowed from 
German corporate law and the GmbH more specifically was proposed. Being an 
untested and untried admixture of models, the results whether positive or not, were 
outside the remit of inclusion in this original thesis presentation. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329	  Report of the Working Party on the Harmonisation of Company Law in the Caribbean 
Community, 1979 (University of Texas, digitized 25 October, 2007) 1 
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Having explored the nature of the phased, inherited and evolving corporate 
governance in the island of St. Vincent, even after two centuries and more, it was and 
remained erupting and in embryonic stages. Even so and linked across porous 
geographical borders within the Caribbean region its current status to date has 
reshaped individual sovereign states.  The composition of the post emancipation 
society in St. Vincent remained laden with the private companies but they could not 
be considered as having remained non-static entities. Shareholders and stakeholders 
within the corporate governance agenda became active participants in a transition 
from plantation economy to a competitive post-emancipation economy in which 
financial services were a key component. Many non-domiciled stakeholders were now 
the guardians of a changed corporate governance agenda and sometimes were unable 
to guide the process to maximise corporate advantages. 
 
Within the financial services sector, the more economically viable private companies 
were positioned at the forefront of the economy. This was priority on the agenda for 
government since the days of Statehood. The international financial sector was more 
prominent than the domestic sector where all private limited liability companies 
limited by shares were regulated. The revised policy of the governments recognised 
the dichotomous regulatory and supervisory regimes and attempts were made to 
strengthen them through amended legislation. 
 
There was an unprecedented financial crisis that impacted many lives within the 
Caribbean region. This was best understood within the contextual framework of the 
preceding discussions. The contagion effects originating in and from a conglomerate 
headquartered in Trinidad and Tobago reshaped the nature of corporate governance in 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines. This was facilitated across porous geographical 
borders that allowed for business networks in the interests of improved economic 
wellbeing for all stakeholders. On the other hand, this resulted in “genteel poverty” 
that impacted the gross domestic product of several governments within CARICOM 
of which Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent are member states. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CASE STUDY: JOHN HAZELL SONS AND COMPANY LIMITED 
A PRIVATE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LIMITED BY SHARES 
 
“…That is, I think, the declared intention of the enactment…it would follow that no common 
law partnership could register as a company limited by shares without remaining subject to 
unlimited liability”… Lord Macnaghten - Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1896; UKHL 
[1897] AC 22 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As the caption suggests, this chapter introduces a case study in this original 
presentation about the nature of corporate governance within the category of private 
limited liability company limited by shares on St. Vincent. This is the “John H. Hazell 
Sons and Company.”330 It is important to understand the genesis of this company 
relative to its corporate governance best practices. Accepted from its own records, the 
company was established in 1845. This was prior to the enactment of accepted UK 
Companies Act 1907. There is an attempt to shed light on its origin in relation to the 
complexities of the nature of corporate governance”331 on the island. Critical too were 
the assessment and analyses of the importance of such ‘early’ best practices.  
 
The functionality of this company was similar to others within its category (private 
limited liability company limited by shares). This was effectively executed through its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 Some of the records of this company indicated that the named company was John Hazell 
Sons and Company. It was one that was categorized as private and functioned accordingly. 
There was an indication that John Hazell lived for some time on the nearby Grenadine island 
of Bequia (nearby to mainland St. Vincent). The origin of the family is not fully known and 
could possibly be British or Dutch as a Hazell line is traceable to neighboring Barbados (or 
Hassell which is often spelt Hazell, traceable to Saba, Netherland Antilles). John Hazell was 
one of the company’s shareholders and directors. An update on the amalgamated company’s 
website (Coreas Hazell Inc.) had a slight change in nomenclature so that, it now reads “ ... 
Hazell Limited – the oldest registered company in SVG (established 1845) - 
www.coreas.vc/about-us - accessed January 2020. This is the same company that is 
referenced in this chapter. 
331www.iod.com/MainWebsite/Resources/Document/policy_article_corp_gov_unlisted_compa
nies_eu.pdf, 11 - accessed in March 2015 and 15 January 2018 - provides for a definition of 
corporate governance from OECD as well. This forms part of the discussion in conjunction 
with others sources. 
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internal mechanism outlined primarily within legislation as it developed from its 
infancy. It is noticeable that its corporate governance mandate evolved having been 
driven by family laden values initially. It was reasonable to assume that some 
corporate governance influence also emanated from its predecessor partnership 
philosophy. The private company was understood as an unrestricted private limited 
liability company that demonstrated its capability to control and direct its delivery of 
services and products to all stakeholders (internal and external). This was 
representative of the developed framework and policies that were important for it to 
arrive at a positive outcome on its corporate governance best practices.  
 
Another issue was whether the company’s corporate management systems allowed for 
effective direction and or control of the company. It is understood that corporate 
management and corporate governance were not synonymous. Corporate management 
and corporate governance of this entity and similar bodies were dependant on the 
scope of their decisions. The company’s corporate management was concerned with 
the day-to-day decision making applicable to specific situations. As was alluded to 
earlier on in the discussions in previous chapters, corporate governance was a set of 
policies and procedures. These catered to the needs of the company in its succession 
planning and aid with the mechanism for general functioning. These and other 
observable characteristics helped in arriving at a conclusion about this research and 
accentuated its originality in purpose.  
 
The status of a mid - nineteenth century St. Vincent and the Grenadines was at best 
tumultuous. In “1845 John Hazell Sons and Company Limited”332 was deemed to be a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 The company claimed to be established in 1845. (In some literature John H. Hazell 
(Hazells) Sons and Company/John Hazell Sons and Company refers to the same company 
under study in this thesis) After exhaustive library searches both in the UK and in St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, this must be accepted as being undisputed and a historical phenomenon. 
See Minutes of the Company about its Centenary Celebrations – 1845  - 1945 – inspected by 
researcher 2012 – 2013 - See Appendix (i) as per physical location and Appendix 1(1)  
See also www.goddardenterprisesltd.com/in_co__.cfm?com=8 - accessed 20, June 2017, 
where mention was made of the company as having been ‘established’ in 1845 and the ‘oldest 
registered company in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Goddard Enterprises acquired it in 
2001. See also Appendix (i) – Location of company was Lot 35, which was reportedly 
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company positioned within a poor country. This was a known fact by international 
standards that colonial states like St. Vincent was classified as poor. Nonetheless, the 
‘birth’ of this company was one that had to contend with an evolutionary stakeholder 
community. Critical too, was that its corporate governance could not be considered as 
a simultaneous achievement with incorporation. There is no known instrument of its 
incorporation. Nonetheless, it was established as a private limited liability company. 
This is discussed in greater details later on in this chapter.  
 
The company boasted of a harnessed fundamentalist approach towards autochthonous 
diversification within a country that was premised on a predominantly agricultural 
based economy. There was a notion such a company of any significance was a 
visionary. It was unprecedented too, in that its business partners howsoever diverse 
their business acumen, maintained an outlook towards irreversible and gradual 
commercial growth. This was subject of course to its response to stakeholders’ needs 
and customer loyalty. The company at first was concentrated in its view towards its 
own shareholder primacy. It recognised in its infancy that it had the capacity to lend 
support towards a country that can benefit from its establishment but also that the 
country could advance its own economic growth with an understanding that a 
symbiotic relationship was necessary.  
 
This first private limited liability companies limited by shares was positioned within a 
post colonial and post emancipation emerging economy. “Slavery had been abolished 
in 1833”333 and just a little over a decade old and early pioneers saw that there were 
beneficiary stakeholders outside of the company’s internal mandates. Its keenest 
disposition on corporate governance and its almost philanthropic views about 
corporate social responsibility were the hallmarks of the company’s succession 
planning.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conveyed to John Hazell at some point. See also Appendix 3(2) – An Indenture; Appendix 
3(3) – Section of the Indenture instrument and Appendix 3(4) – Copy of Conveyance – see 
accompanying explanation thereat. 
333 Matthews, Gelien, Caribbean Slave Revolts and the British Abolitionist Movement 
(Louisiana State University, USA 2006) 13 – 14, 29 
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The aforementioned were some of the determinants within the structure of the private 
company that comprised the nature of corporate governance best practices at its core. 
If analyses were done on the then average stakeholder, these would show how they 
were still tied to a “plantation economy”334 as they irked out their livelihood. 
However, even as they co-existed with a relatively new phenomenon, the company 
sought to respond positively to these stakeholders. The earning power of citizens 
gradually increased over time. There was a move away from plantations and many 
stakeholders gravitated towards employment that were seen as contributory to 
services and or products used by employees of this company.  
 
After more than a century, from successive generations of stakeholders within this 
same post colonial emerging state, there was advancement towards new forms of 
employment that were less labour intensive and newer financial instruments and 
organisations. Other companies ‘dotted’ the corporate governance landscape. This 
first company by its own admission recognised its competition and even after a 
century of singular commercial dominance, the emphasis was on providing the best 
services to its customers so that it could maintain its position as “First house”335 on 
the island. This was a synonymous term used to symbolise, first in business, first in 
service. 
 
Many stakeholders welcomed the company that provided them with much needed 
hardware and building supplies. After an amalgamation in 1981, the same corporate 
best practices were seen and or experienced through its services. There were 
enhancement to its buildings as well as consolidation of the following: a “Hardware 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Klein, Herbert. S, Vinson, Ben, African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean (2nd 
edn Oxford University Press, Inc., USA 2007) 85 – for a description of plantation economy.  
There is a scarcity of literature singularly written about the similar occurrences in the smaller 
Caribbean islands and lessons are drawn from these shared experiences. Slavery was 
prevalent in Latin America and the Caribbean (St. Vincent inclusive) 
335 This was a reference to the company being the first commercial and or corporate entity on 
the island. 
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and Building Supplies Department, a Wholesale Food and Liquor Department, along 
with Automotive, Shipping and Insurance Departments.”336 
 
Employment within management and choice of directors appeared to be limited to 
family members both by marriage and or consanguinity. Undoubtedly, on this seminal 
point, its inclusion as a case study is pertinent as it contributes to the understanding of 
the origins of corporate governance best practices and to the “burgeoning debates on 
corporate governance”337best practices generally. This is especially in an era of post 
financial contagions within the Caribbean and from among a subcategory of the same 
private limited liability companies to which John Hazell Sons and Company Limited. 
While this company was not an insurance company per se, it eventually set the 
groundwork for an insurance department that benefitted from its corporate 
governance best practices. 
 
The company was identifiable as economically viable from 1845 through to 1981. 
With a few exceptions, British jurisprudence on company legislation predominates its 
financial sector. As such, even if the John Hazell Sons and Company had written a 
procedural guideline on its corporate governance, the company was mandated to 
comply with the prevailing international best practices. This company was “limited by 
shares”338and was established at a time when there was no local company registry in 
St. Vincent. The “Commercial and Intellectual Property Office” as the regulator for 
domestic companies in St. Vincent, was itself established only in 2003 or one and a 
half centuries after the emergence of this first private company. Establishment and 
incorporation of any company were not synonymous concepts. There was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 http://www.coreas.vc/about-us - accessed 7 January 2018 
337 Grosh, Margaret, Bussolo, Maurizio, Freije, Samuel, Understanding the Poverty Impact of 
the Global Financial Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean (World Bank Publications, 
USA 2014) 39 - 57 
338 In the absence of a contrary opinion, the records of the company revealed that there were 
shareholders presumed to have held a number of shares and were present regularly at every 
meeting continuously so over the years. The current Chief Executive Officer resident at the 
headquarters of the amalgamated companies attested to the fact that shareholders attended 
meetings without fail and that this was well documented. 
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suggestion that this was a corporate ‘anomaly’. There was an attempt at reconciliation 
in light of the provisions of the UK Companies Act 1907.   
 
The findings presented through this case study were divided into several sections 
namely, the history of the company; general principles that influenced fundamental 
best practices; special features within the company limited by shares in the period 
1845 – 1981; relevancy of the post slavery phenomenon; challenges within the 
shareholders assembly, phases of the development of the company; significance of 
findings; beyond the results and the conclusion. 
 
3.2 The history of the John Hazell Sons and Company Limited 
John Hazell Sons and Company at some point prior to 1845 began as a partnership 
and transitioned from that “partnership to a private limited liability Company.”339 As 
was the case, even the name of the company was reflected in its share ownership. Its 
presumed corporate governance practices arise upon its establishment. It was different 
from the reputable “Joint Stock Companies”340 prevalent elsewhere within the British 
Empire. These companies and were created as a direct result of a public-private 
partnership. St. Vincent and other colonies of Great Britain were adherents to British 
laws on companies.  
 
Nonetheless, there were some general guidelines on corporate governance advocated 
by joint stock companies and applicable to companies established for private 
purposes.  “Table B”341 reconstituted to “Table A”342 bear some striking similarities to 
both types of companies. The other issue is that this company may have fallen within 
the definition of being a company that ‘falls’ between a partnership and a corporation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Recorded as per minutes of General meeting of the company held in the 1800s and this 
transition incurred a fee of ‘$913. 80’.  There was no record as to whom was this fee paid and 
whether this was a fee for registration of the company.  An assumption was made that this 
was the case. 
340 UK Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 
341 See Appendix 2(10) – mention made of Table B reconstituted to Table A 
342 Ibid 
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as it related to a shareholder’s liability. Either way, a procedural outline on the 
company’s corporate governance was followed. Even if this was not so, the company 
would have created its own set of corporate governance best practices from 1845.  
 
Thereafter when Table B was introduced in 1856, it would have had recourse to 
statute based corporate governance post 1856. There was not a time period when the 
company was devoid of guidance on corporate governance practices. Also, in 
practice, prior to the enactment of the private companies legislation in 1907, the 
direction and control of the company, there were other corporate governance 
procedure to be followed as spelt out in rules agreed by its shareholders and directors. 
Additional records were not available at the time of research to verify whether 
incorporation was at a later year. Nonetheless, the claims about the company’s 
establishment must be accepted from one of the company in meeting (shareholder 
assembly) as a powerful voice of authenticity and an organ of the company. 
 
The concept of limited liablity was debated in the British parliament for many years 
prior to the development of a Vincentian commercial sector. Such "legislation was not 
to control the conduct of the most wise and of the most virtuous; it was intended to 
check the erring, and to deal with human nature as they knew it to exist."343 Company 
law was designed to protect all stakeholders (internal and external to the company) as 
they sought to engage in commercial endeavours of varying financial magnitude. 
There were ‘crooks’ who saw the benefits of limited liability and begun to use the 
private company for worthless means. The decoupling of the rights of control by 
shareholders from the priviledge imposed by “limited liability”344 has always been 
one of a challenge even to the courts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 HC Deb 26 July 1855 vol 139 cc1378-97@1386 - 1387  
344 UK Limited Liability Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 133) – the general public in the UK and by 
extension within the colonies of Great Britain/UK had recourse to this Act as it was the first 
that allowed limited liability for companies /corporations to be established by the public. 
However shareholders were very much liable to their creditors for those unpaid portions on 
their shares.  There was however that notion that it was the shareholders that was now liable 
to the corporation/company directly and this was introduced through the Joint Stock 
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John Hazell Sons and Company Limited was in existence in the days of the historic 
case of Salomon. Lessons learnt remained fundamental to modern company law. In 
the instance, John Hazell Sons and company was one that had eight shareholders. The 
company had established its faith in British law. The notion that the company was a 
“legal persona”345 and distinct from its member was established law.  
 
The aforementioned statement was not to cast doubt upon the genius of corporate 
governance that held the John Hazell Sons and Company Limited together in those 
early years. Rather it is to agree with the British Parliament that a ‘check on the 
erring’ was an imperative. Stricter legislation became imperatives over time and these 
measures impacted the formation of companies in former colonies like St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines and other nations that followed the British company law 
jurisprudence. John Hazell Sons and Company Limited remained a bastion of 
corporate governance as was revealed by this research. The examination of available 
documents pointed to a well - ordered and well disciplined private limited liability 
company.   
 
John Hazell Sons and Company Limited introduced to the debate a typical domestic 
type company with its British company law traditions. There was some indication on 
transparency on share ownership; levels of authority and autonomy among 
stakeholders; the nature of how the company was directed and controlled; the 
company’s thinking on risk management and other aspects of corporate governance 
best practices. The discussions on the aforementioned elements were specified 
throughout the chapter. Without a doubt, the company in meetings expressed more 
than a ‘singular’ modus operandi as to how the business was controlled and directed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Company Act 1844. Again, this was also applicable to colonies like St. Vincent that followed 
the British legal tradition.  
345Brough, Gordon, H, Private limited companies: Formation and Management (3rd edn W. 
Green and Sons Ltd., UK 2005) 3 - 7 
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Corporate governance practices were also the determinants in the company’s 
corporate social responsibility.  
 
Undoubtedly, there were commercial pre - conditions that led to the transition from 
“partnership to a private limited liability Company.”346 Inherent in this transition were 
implications on a struggle for the recognition of the company’s limited liablity status 
even in these early times. Some insights from discussions on the UK law of “private 
partnerships”347 and the struggle for limited liability generally were provided for a 
wider context. It was the British company laws and the UK Companies Acts that were 
amended as a result of the concerns expressed by British parliament. In 
conceptualising the first established private limited liability company on St. Vincent, 
the following comments were instructive since a historical persuasive was expressed. 
This was significant even though the establishment of a local Vincentian company 
was nearly ten years previous to this debate. 
 
Mr. Lowe commented,  
“It being the present state of the law of private partnerships that property 
and capital not embarked in the concern, and upon which credit was never 
given, is liable for the debts of the partnership, it remains to be seen what is 
the proper manner in which to deal with this question of private partnerships. 
One method would be to carry the present law of limited liability into these 
partnerships, and to say that any number of persons, however small—even to 
one, and there could not be a much smaller number than that—that he or they 
shall be entitled to be formed into a corporation, and to enjoy, as such, the 
privilege of limited liability”348 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 Recorded as per minutes of General meeting of the company held in the 1800s and this 
transition incurred a fee of ‘$913. 80’.  There was no record as to whom was this fee paid and 
whether this was a fee for registration of the company.  An assumption was made that this 
was the case. 
347 HC Deb 01 February 1856 vol 140 cc110-47 
348 Ibid, see cc 113 
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The company on St. Vincent in 1845 did enjoy the privilege of limited liablity but this 
notion does not appear to have been wholly statute driven initially. When the 
transition from partnership to company stauts occurred, there was an 
acknowledgement about the struggle for limited liability among those partners. It was 
Kraakman et al that spoke extensively about “the same struggle for limited 
liability”349 among similar companies at different time periods. However, at the time 
of establishment, the local legislature on St. Vincent was not sufficiently advanced 
nor could have acted independently, but total reliance was placed on the UK 
Companies Acts and British company laws applicable to its colonies within the period 
“1845 through to 1907.”350  
 
It became necessary to filter the debate about corporate governance best practices and 
its commencement on the island through this First House – the John Hazell Sons and 
Company. There was a distinction on how this company was directed and controlled. 
Corporate governance best practices of this local First Company goes against the 
notion that the said corporate governance best practices arise upon incorporation. In 
this instance, the beginning of corporate governance practices were primarily those 
‘coined’ by the predecessors of the company. These were the subscribers to a 
Memorandum prior to the legislation that allowed for private companies under the 
UK Companies Act 1907. 
 
According to an article by Kempin, “limited liability in English thought”351 was 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. It begs the question as to whether the 
conjoin corporate governance arises therefrom and if so, whether all that notion about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Hansmann, Henry, Kraakman, Reinier, Squire, Richard, The New Business Entities in 
Evolutionary Perspective (unknown publisher, 2005) 1 - 4 
350 UK Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 – mention of limited liability served as guidance to 
all types of companies in existence. Limited Liability and corporate governance had to be 
conjoined in the UK Companies Acts 1845 through to 1855; 1862 – 1907. There was no 
mention of private limited liability company until 1907. Yet, the direction and control of 
companies relied on guidance from Companies Act 1862 Table B and then the reconstituted 
Table A 1865 – 1907.  
351 Kempin, Frederick, Limited Liability in Historical Perspective - American Business Law 
Association Bulletin (Unknown publisher, undated) 13  
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full corporate governance was also towards the end of the eighteenth century. Be that 
as it may, the John Hazell Sons and Company alluded to the fact that it was the First 
House or first company on the island since 1845. The point was reiterated in minutes 
about its centenary celebrations that “for over one hundred years” the Company held 
an active status. It was plausible that initially, private companies were not the 
creatures of legislation. 
 
Having said that, a number of issues shaped the corporate governance practices in 
John Hazell Sons and Company Limited, that functioned effectively for nearly a 
century. They were: 
• Joint liability by all partners and the extent of the liability had to be extended 
or maintained,  
• Ownership and dispersal of all assets,  
• The control of the business entity and to whom such functions were to be 
delegated if at all,  
• The direction of the company and the role of directors were specified 
according to guidelines, procedures and systems initiated by the company in meetings 
and, 
• The extent to which that direction and control of the business affected the 
commercial undertakings of the company and whether the management and decision-
making processes were concentrated in the hands of too few.  
 
In the company under study, family members served both as directors and 
shareholders.  There were more than “five members”352 as directors. Their roles were 
specified and naturally some guidance had to be provided by British company laws. 
The influence, authority or intentional actions of any majority among the shareholders 
was not recorded. There was no prohibition by the legislature on the establishment 
and continuance of this company as a private limited liability company. The direction 
and control of this entity was in keeping with the objectives of a family and recourse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Appendix 3 (5) – List of Directors of the John Hazell Sons and Company Limited by 
shares up (Minutes of the Centenary meeting) 
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was made to the prevailing “legislation”353 or other available guidance on corporate 
governance.  
 
As common law juridical bodies, the direction and control of companies whether they 
were joint stock companies or insurance companies, all followed the fundamental 
tenets of British company laws. For instance, in St. Vincent there was the existence of 
a joint stock company in the form of the “Barclays Bank”354 that was sufficiently 
advanced in the conduct of its own corporate governance best practices. Also, there 
was the branch of an “insurance company”355 that operated out of Barbados from 
around 1849. Together, these similar companies undoubtedly exerted some influence 
on corporate governance best practices to John Hazell Sons and Company. 
 
3.3 General principles 
While the company engaged in its progressive corporate social responsibility, it did so 
in order to maintain its ‘competitive edge’ and as part of its corporate governance best 
practices. As such, the discussion on corporate governance best practices cannot be 
divorced from what influences were exerted on its fundamental principles. See Figure 
3 (1) below. The John Hazell Sons and Company was one that vigorously promoted a 
corporate governance agenda for close to a decade. The general principles and ideas 
about best practices were: 
(a) Integrity at its core, which was basic to all corporate governance best 
practices. It took into consideration its beneficiaries/stakeholder community  – the 
people that it served. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 UK Company Clauses Consolidation Act 1845; UK Joint Stock Companies Acts 1862 - 
1878; HC Deb 10 May 1878 vol 239 cc1705-12 – Debate as to the abuses committed under 
these Acts. However, corporate governance practices within these companies would have 
exerted some influence on the direction and control of the John Hazell Sons and Company 
Limited 
354 www.cibcfcib.com/index.php?page=barclay-s-history-in-the-caribbean - accessed on 15 
January 2018 
355  www.sagicorlife.com/Pages/Countries/Countries-St-Vincent-Grenadines.aspx - accessed 
on 8 April, 2018 
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(b) The company demonstrated an ethical approach on the delivery of products 
and services towards them.  
(c) The corporate governance system was one that was reliable in its delivery.  
(d) There was fairness in terms of treating its stakeholders equally as was 
captured in its centenary comments. The Staff was paid dividends and there was 
general encouragement to them to continue to work assiduously. 
(e) Consideration for the welfare of the wider stakeholder community.  There was 
a sense that this was the only way in which to create the necessary balance needed for 
the company to survive amidst the harsh realities of life.  
(f) The matter of transparency in its modus operandi was unquestionable.  Although 
family oriented, the company in meetings was able to report on its yearly operations 
to its members and other stakeholders.  These levels of transparency aided projections 
and objectives for succession planning by the company. 
Figure 3(1) 
General principles that influenced corporate governance best practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by researcher - 2018/ 2019 
At best, specific to John Hazell Sons and Company were fundamental values to which 
members were to aspire. These values were repeatedly advocated by John Hazell Sons 
and Company Limited in meetings and were as follows: 
Integrity 
Consideration for the welfare of beneficiaries (stakeholders) 
Ethical approach on the delivery of products and services 
Reliability 
Fairness towards stakeholders 
Transparency 
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• Square and honest dealing - “Strict adherence to the [principals] principles of 
square and honest dealing…laid down by predecessors”356 
• Loyalty to customer - “Loyalty of our customers…”357 
• Commitment by Staff to assigned tasks - “… The steadfastness and 
application with which our staff has applied itself to the task allotted to it.”358 
 
It was clear that the company had benefitted from some measure of an adherence to 
those principles that were in keeping with honest transactions in its business dealings 
with shareholders and stakeholders. The emphasis was on members who were advised 
to maintain best practices for the sustainability of the company. When members were 
commended for their loyalty to the customers, this category of stakeholders were the 
ones to confirm that the business had served the purpose for which it was established. 
These values were for the sustainability of the company and aided with succession 
planning. What was advocated was that there was no room for failure and a fall off in 
profits if the company did not adhered to the value laden service to its customers.  
 
The Business Model 
The discussion turned on the business model based on loyalty to customers. Without 
customers, the business would have failed in its first mandate to provide quality 
services and or products to its many stakeholders. The First House was capable of 
engaging the general public. However, the Customer Loyalty Business Model was 
proven to have been effective to date. 
As per Figure 3 (2) – The Customer Loyalty Business Model had the following 
characteristics:  
 (1) The quality of the product and services utilized by the company.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Appendix 1(1) – Excerpt from minutes of meeting as per fundamental principles of best 
practices on corporate governance 
357 Ibid 
358 Ibid 
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(2) Customer or stakeholder satisfaction was emphasised.   
(3) Holistically, the loyalty of customers was encouraged and projected. 
(4) The profitability of the company in the long run was the ultimate aim.   
 
The cyclical motion of these key components indicated that the actions and 
interactions by both the customer and the company led to a harmonious relationship 
on profitability and productivity. In other words, the company could not exist without 
the customer. 
Figure 3(2) 
The Customer Loyalty Business Model 
 
 
Advocated by the John Hazell Sons and Company Limited – a private limited liability 
Company limited by shares – St. Vincent and the Grenadines c. 1840s through to 
1900s 
Source: Compiled by researcher 2018 - 2019 
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The suggested format had as an end goal to retain its competitive edge and 
profitability. This model used by the “first house”359 in the island of St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines became popular over time and served the company’s interests. This 
was an ambitious task advocated by the company and its members to 
“maintain…[and] [followed]…we shall continue to keep our place as the first house 
in St. Vincent.”360 Customer loyalty was the motto for the company that proved 
positive for well over a century.  
 
The corporate governance best practices dictated that the company provided quality 
products and services to the customer. When the customer was supplied with the 
quality of product or service in keeping with the desired expectations, he was more 
than likely to express such satisfaction. Thereafter the customer was in a state of 
expressing loyalty to the company. A loyal customer was more apt to purchase more 
products and services expecting the same conditions that promoted his loyalty in the 
first instance. The company received satisfied customers and this ultimately added to 
the company’s profitability. This cycle was repeated for the mutual benefit of the 
stakeholder population as well as the company. 
 
Corporate social responsibility in early corporate St. Vincent 
From the onset, the word corporate was synonymous with the businesses developed 
through the private limited liability companies and part of the wider stakeholder 
communities in St. Vincent. The population was roughly 110, 000 persons. 
Comparatively speaking a similar situation was present in Trinidad and Tobago 
within similar private limited liability companies. The corporate world that 
surrounded these islands was allowed to establish and or incorporate companies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Appendix 3(1) para II – The use of the word “first house” in reference to the Company’s 
delivery of brand identity 
360 Ibid 
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within the vicinity of villages and or towns. Within post emancipations societies, 
villages and towns were generally underdeveloped by world standards. 
 
Corporate social responsibility remained in its infancy stages for a considerable length 
of time and a topic with which some stakeholders had some success. For over a 
century, the John Hazell Sons and Company understood what it was to include and 
promote its corporate social responsibility among its stakeholders. Generally, 
thereafter, the private company either developed their own model or followed 
examples laid down by others. The private company in its role contributed to the 
cause of sustainable development.  
 
The protection of the environment, social welfare and profits of the company are 
some aspects of the company’s corporate social responsibility. It was debatable as to 
whether private companies were to bear the burden for bridging the gap between the 
corporate world and the poor communities in the state. It was noticeable that 
companies created wealth for all its stakeholders by the products and services they 
sell to stakeholders whether rich or poor. It was considered a moral and ethical 
obligation within the corporate sector to contribute to the development of the poor 
through Corporate Social Responsibility.   
 
3.4 The special features within the company limited by shares 1845 – 1981 
1845 – 1981 
There were special features within the company over the period 1845 to 1981. These 
were risk management; transfer or sale of shares; the Memorandum of Association 
and Articles of Association.  
Risk Management 
High on the management agenda was the issue of risk.  This was a somewhat 
appreciative quality of best practices within the direction and control of the company 
	  
	  
	  
151	  
in early corporate St. Vincent.  As they were an integral part of the business, the 
family understood the culture of risk management.  This aspect was integrated into an 
approach to succession planning and the company viewed this as its collective 
responsibility.  An explanation was offered about the decision taken about risk 
management.  Those issues were made clear to the company in meeting “in the 
interest of all concerned.”361  One such concern was whether the company in meeting 
understood the complexity of the risks faced by the company. “The stock and the 
buildings belonging to the company” 362  remained as critical within the risk 
assessment cycle.   
 
Additionally, the management of the company expressed another concern as to 
whether the potential risks were clearly identified.  Further, there was an evaluation of 
the threat profile of the risks or potential risks such that the decision was taken to 
“fully cover”363 against “all the usual risks, such as fire, earthquake, hurricane & 
gales, volcanic eruption etc. and a policy was negotiated through our London agents 
with Lloyds.”364  The company was determined to do what was necessary to protect 
itself all risks as well as to continue with the monitoring and evaluation processes 
within risk management.   
Transfer or sale of shares 
A few “descendants” 365  of the original shareholders explained that this was a 
phenomenon.  Sale and or transfer of shares to other family members enabled the 
purchase of individual homes and other commodities.  The actual dates could not be 
verified but the feature of share transferability was one that was provided for within 
legislation on the private limited liability company limited by shares. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Appendix 1 (3A) – Excerpt from minutes – “in the interest of all concerned.” 
362 Ibid 
363 Ibid 
364 Ibid; see also Appendix 1(2) as symbol was still displayed on the Headquarters of the 
amalgamated Coreas Hazell Company even after a century to demonstrate commitment to the 
undertaking by pioneers of the company in association with Lloyds of England in this regard 
365 Discussions with descendants of shareholders: ‘shares held by shareholders were both 
transferred and or sold so as to purchase homes and other commodities.’ This information 
was relayed to researcher as part of the oral history that surrounds this company. – Mr. Steve 
Maingot (London, UK November 2012) 
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Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association 
There was no record of a Memorandum of Association being filed with Companies 
House in the UK or in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1845. The Memorandum of 
Association is the document, which outlines the details of the company. On the other 
hand the Article of Association detail the rules and regulations of the company.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
These are presumed to have been part of the documentation. In the case of St. 
Vincent, there could not be, as this was by reason of historical. It was not considered a 
legislative anomaly or the occurrence of a lacuna in the law. The memorandum of 
association was to show that the family members’ intention to subscribe to the 
formation of a company.   
 
Memorandum of Association, minutes and more  
In the minutes of meetings, there were records of the directors and shareholders roles 
and responsibilities and the company kept records of the business of the company for 
the years over its life cycle. Some of the records due to years of disuse were 
unavailable for thorough examination.  However, there were records and minutes of 
annual meetings and other special meetings that provided sufficient evidence of a 
functioning organ (shareholder assembly/company in meetings) of the company. An 
amendment to its Memorandum of Association"366 or provision for such transition 
and amendment was proof that there existed a fully formed and recognisable entity.  
 
The Memorandum of Association appeared to have dwindled in significance. It 
appeared that this was due to common law and statutory challenges that were faced by 
companies generally and which might have contributed to such a shift. However, the 
Memorandum of Association was introduced under the Joint Stock Companies Act 
1956 as a constitutional document. Herein lay the procedural outline of the company 
and its corporate governance best practices so called. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 H.K Saharay, Company Law (5th edn Universal Law Publishing Company Pvt. Limited, 
India 2010) 3; Dine, J, Koutsias, Marios, Company Law (8th edn Palgrave McMillan 
Publishers, UK 2014) ix 
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The Memorandum governed the manner in which the company related to its 
stakeholders while the Articles of Association spearheaded its internal affairs. The 
Memorandum was more like the constitutional document that gave a snapshot of the 
history of the company. From 1856 onwards, the Memorandum of Association was a 
document considered as fundamental. It prevailed over the Articles if there were any 
inconsistencies. The Memorandum of Association provided information about the 
company’s name; where it was domicile; the objects; whether the property was 
private and in this case it was and whether in this instance, the company was limited 
by shares. If so, the company clearly, did have the power to amend its constitutional 
documents. 
 
Companies could amend their constitutional documents by special resolution by in 
1856 there was no such provision. However, by Companies Act 1862, companies 
were allowed to amend their Memorandum in so far as to allow the company to 
change its name and capital requirement. The law prohibited any other amendments. 
It was the amendments on those Articles whose scope was widen by subsequent 
Company Acts. There was not a general power given to amend. Every amendment 
was subjected to procedural requirements, which were special procedural 
requirements. 
 
3.5 Post slavery and a British Company structure on St. Vincent 
Additionally, the lasting impact of the Slavery Abolition Act in 1833 on the island 
itself was still felt even a decade on when the John Hazell Sons and Company was 
formed. The socio economic fabric of society was changing.  There was readjustment 
to a new working environment generally for the wider stakeholder population. Greater 
emphasis was placed on the value of their labour. Within this same time frame in the 
mid 1800s, and among the wider Caribbean region, there was also a prevailing anti-
slavery movement inspired in part by many within the wider British Empire. These 
could only be classified as abolitionist agitators. These issues must have contributed 
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to the shaping of the socio-cultural aspects of the internal organisation of the 
company.  
 
Emphasis was placed repeatedly on religious, economic and other social factors 
emanating from this cause. Britain was keen on maintaining peace and economic 
stability within its colonies.  There was no imposition of a British construct such as a 
company like John Hazell Sons and Company. A family oriented business became 
established for economic gain and this was no mean task. It took time to be well 
appreciated by the wider category of stakeholders.  The significance of direction and 
control of the company to the nature of corporate governance itself, took time to be 
assimilated and appreciated by would be beneficiaries. 
 
Coupled with this the company in meeting documented how it navigated its existence 
through other social and economic phenomenon such as World War 1 and World War 
II for the period 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945 respectively.  Its obligations to staff 
for one thing, clearly demonstrated that it acknowledged its corporate social 
responsibility and its fiduciary obligations to customers, directors and shareholders 
alike.  Also, there was always the emphasis on directors’ duties and how they 
responded to many challenges.  
 
Challenges within the shareholders assembly 
The synoptic view expressed by the company about the challenges embraced over a 
century of its existence read this way:  
“But it will mean greater application and harder work than in the past. Today the firm 
faces greater competition than before.  New concerns … it seems reasonable to 
assume that such business available will be more thinly spread….”367  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Appendix 3(1) – Minutes of centenary meeting of the John Hazell Sons and Company 
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What was clear from the outset was the company in meeting, recognized that it faced 
competition as time progressed but that directors and shareholders alike were willing 
to be proactive about charting a decided future for the company.  This was part of the 
company’s corporate governance agenda and one that emphasized those concerns 
held jointly by management and shareholders within the company. Nonetheless, the 
legacy on best practices and overall contribution to what constituted the nature of 
corporate governance within the private limited liability company limited by shares 
remained an undeniable occurrence. 
 
Observations within the scope of the hypothesis 
There were however, two major observations about this company within the scope of 
the hypothesis examined. In the first instance it was not an insurance company and 
secondly it could not be categorized as contributory to the lack, absence or disregard 
of best practices, which contributed to genteel poverty. It therefore could not impose 
any negative impact on the gross domestic product of the nation state.  
 
As far as was known during the composition of this original thesis, there was no 
monograph on the study of “John Hazell Sons and Company Limited”368 nor any 
other article written with an objective on the company’s contribution towards 
corporate governance best practices in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. It is 
respectfully submitted that these observations should amplify any call made to have 
the company recorded officially as part of the island’s “ history of company law.”369  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 John Hazell Sons and Company Limited – see section from Appendix 3(1) - on section of 
the minutes – quote the section where name was written “ John Hazell Sons and Company 
Limited 1945 having been established for one hundred years previously 
369 Appendix 3(2); Appendix 3(3) and Appendix 3(4) - Indenture and Deed of conveyance – a 
historical document on the conveyance of property that constituted the ownership of the 
original property that laid the foundation for John Hazell Sons and Company Limited. This 
was thoroughly discussed with the CEO Mr. Joel Providence.  These were archived 
documents for the company that laid claim to its genesis as the First House/First 
business/First private limited liability company to have been established on this premise on 
the island. 
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Identification Of The Organs or Institutions Of The Private Company 
The establishment of this company was noted as a legislative ‘anomaly’ in a colony 
where the prevailing UK Companies Acts and British company laws were applicable. 
It should not be an overstatement to reiterate that the claim to its establishment was in 
1845 but only in the UK Companies Act 1907 provision was made for the term 
‘private’. Again, this does not preclude this established company from being duly 
recognised as a duly called private limited liability company even prior to the Act. 
The actions of the directors and shareholders were those that were allowable in 
English company laws. The directors and or managers allowed for a transition in 
keeping with guidance provided to the company. This was representative of part of 
their corporate governance mandate for proper corporate procedure and practice to 
date. Nonetheless, for such transition an expense of nine hundred and thirteen dollars 
and eighty cents - “$913.80”370 - was incurred. It was said that, “your Directors have 
considered it wise to write off this entire sum in the past business year.”371  
 
Normally, however, according to the legislation, it was upon incorporation the issue 
of corporate governance arises such that the organs of the company became 
identifiable so as to facilitate the continuance of the company. The narrative here 
seems to suggest that initially, the formation of John Hazells Sons and Company was 
not driven by company legislation. It may have been out of necessity and expediency 
in light of partnership arrangements that may have become too onerous. From the 
pages of its history, the company in meeting identified its directors, shareholders and 
management structure.  
 
There were categories of stakeholders charged with corporate governance practices 
even if the word ‘corporate governance’ was not in popular usage. The identification 
of the institutions within the company is critical. In a broader context, and to avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 Appendix 1(6) of which the details are mentioned elsewhere in this thesis regarding 
payment made on transition from partnership to private limited liability. 
371 Ibid 
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confusion, a distinction has to be made between the word "institutions"372when 
referring to the organs of the company or the company itself.  The company is duly 
called a financial institution. Here in this instance, the organs are also institutions 
within the private limited liability company limited by shares and are identified as the 
board of directors and the (shareholder assembly) /the company in meetings. 
 
Direction and control of the company – 1845 - 1981 
The board of directors  
1845 - 1862 
In this first phase, the ethos behind best practices on corporate governance was 
provided for through UK Companies Acts 1845 to 1862 that governed public 
companies. Companies for private purposes were not yet fully provided for through 
legislation until another four or more decades. They were also presumed to be those 
advocated by family members (value laden) who served simultaneously as directors 
and shareholders. At best, the procedural guidelines (corporate governance best 
practices) appeared to be modeled on the former Table B reconstitued as Table A of 
public companies.  
 
These existing UK Companies Acts and their Statutory Instruments along with the 
default Table A did serve as a general guide to early established companies both in 
Great Britain and in its colonies and former colonies. It was presumed that the 
established John Hazells Sons and Company Limited did follow to a great extent, 
some corporate governance guidelines but not as a private company per se. Within the 
prescriptive Table A a number of key provisions were outlined and relevant to the 
corporate governance of the company and possibly used even though there was no 
record of the its incorporation: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 www.siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/g
overnanceandgrowth.pdf, 2 - 27 July, 2019 
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1. The power and duties of directors, disqualifications of directors; rotation of 
directors; proceedings of directors and,  
2. Shareholders or members; the company in general and other special meetings 
and the procedure as to what and how members can utilize shares effectively. 
 
Other reasonable assumptions were these: 
• The number of directors who were also shareholders and were known to have 
consanguinity. As a result the business strategy was discussed among the same key 
personnel within management who were also shareholders. This would appear to have 
had the effect of a sharper focus on corporate governance. The strong “ownership 
criteria” on shareholding could not be ignored. The company at law was an entity that 
could not be owned by individuals even though its members were drawn from the 
family as well as its shareholders.  These persons formed the management team and 
provided direction to business entity.  The presumption was that it became 
increasingly easier to transmit the corporate governance practices on a more regular 
basis as was communicated.  The company in meetings recorded the outcome of 
management decisions taken over the years. 
• The day-to-day management of the company undoubtedly proved 
“challenging” through the years. There was always an outlined path to follow in the 
interest of the continuance of the business and the execution of best practices. 
• Those who established the company engaged in succession planning; and  
apportion issues that touch and concern management, corporate governance, 
leadership, accountability and other pertinent to effective governance. This had the 
effect of alleviating potential contagion effects of controversies within the family and 
among the wider stakeholder community. 
• The structure of the family business was considered by those who managed 
and controlled the day to day business.  Some of those issues were: ownership rights; 
general rights and responsibilities of shareholders; choice and effectiveness of 
directors and the role of managers and employees. When taken together the sum total 
of decisions about corporate governance best practices positively impacted the 
company that lasted for more than a century. 
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Directors 
At the outset, there were at least five to seven directors.  These were generally family 
members. Whether grounded on the legislative guidelines or on “moral suasion ... that 
is purely informal ... and ... no legal force,”373 corporate governance principles were 
well articulated in the interest of the company. 
 
3.6 Phases of development of the company  
1862 – 1981 
Although references were made to these UK Companies Acts up to 1907, they still 
provided corporate guidance to public companies and private companies.  There were 
debates and public discussions in parliament about the merits and demerits of the 
various amendments in response to economic and political changes in the UK society.   
 
This notion of repeated planning and execution of those plans constituted part of the 
life cycle of the company. The consensus drawn was that although it could not be 
ascertained as to the date the company was incorporated, there was “evidence of 
corporate governance best practices”374 in some instances.  From the applicable UK 
Companies Acts, the version or versions of Table A remained those in practice by 
similar companies within the private limited liability company on St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines for the stated period 1862 to 1981.  
 
For a comprehensive review of the Table A that were likely to have been referenced 
as procedural guidelines on management during the life span of the company, see 
Appendix 3(4). Barring a contrary opinion, even after 1907, the presumption was that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 Gupta, K. R, Mandal, R.K, Guptha, Amita, Macroeconomics (5th edn Atlantic Publishers 
and Distributors (P) Ltd., India, 2008) 483 
374 See Appendix 1(6) – Directors role in the financial decision making process towards 
transitioning from partnership to private limited liability company  
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the company had recourse to “Model by laws”375 and “Model Articles”376 which were 
supplementary to the prevailing UK Companies Acts. Also the company may have 
had the option of placing reliance on the  multiple versions of “Table A."377   
 
The role of Shareholders in this context 
Since the establishment of the private company, a closer examination revealed the 
duality of roles that shareholders [these members] shared. Each shareholder had to 
have at least one share at minimum. The provisions within the UK Companies Acts 
and Statutory Instruments attributed much significance to the shareholder.  He or she 
was a purchaser of shares within the company.  These members or shareholders 
contributed to the share capital of the company; held varying classes of shares with 
differing attached rights; and have had the power to convene and or conduct meetings 
by virtue of the critical role they played. 
 
The Articles of Association 
Default Articles of Association continued to outline the shareholders input into the 
company. The regulating of shareholder’ relationships between and among 
themselves was done by virtue of shareholders’ agreement in conjunction with the 
provisions in the Articles of Association. The shareholders’ agreement was one that 
prescribed privacy among the shareholders.  The Articles of Association on the other 
hand was a public document and available for inspection by members of the public 
and generally so at the Registrar’s Office in the UK up to the early 1900s in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. There was none on record for John Hazells Sons and 
Company. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Appendix 1(8) - Model Bylaws that contained the procedural guidelines on corporate 
governance of the private company that may have been applicable in its current format.  
These guidelines save and except for incremental changes were borrowed from the UK 
Company Acts as legislation for public companies and accordingly amended to fit the 
Vincentian experience 
376 See Appendix 5(1) – Model Articles applicable to private companies registered after 2013; 
see also Appendix 5(2) for Model Articles for private companies limited by shares prior to 
2013 for contrast and comparisons of the UK and St. Vincent Model Articles. 
377 Appendix 5(3) – See for comparisons made of old model Table A/Table B and its 
relevance to corporate governance of an incorporated entity  
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Mention here if only for reference was that the greater binding effect of such a 
document cannot be underestimated.  While the Article of Association bound the 
shareholder in his capacity as such, the shareholder agreement bound the person in his 
capacity as a director, creditor or an agent of the company.  This was presumed in the 
case of the first private company.  The interesting thing about the Articles of 
Association as compared to the shareholder’s agreement, the latter can be amended by 
specific measures namely, the unanimous shareholder agreement. From the minutes 
of meetings, the presumption arose that this operation of shareholder agreement was 
in practice.  
 
Shareholder agreement 
On the other hand, there was a significant disadvantage of any shareholders’ 
agreement. This was due to its contractual nature as it only bound the parties that 
were privy to the contract and could not bind all shareholders. This remained a 
concern when transferral of shares from one shareholder to the next as it could not 
bind the ‘new’ shareholder to the terms of the shareholder’s agreement made. While 
shareholders and shares changed hands it was diffiuclt and next to impossible to 
ascertain the binding effect of the shareholder’s agreement within this first company. 
 
The company in meetings 
Annual general meetings and extra - ordinary meetings 
For the period 1845 – 1981 the John Hazell Sons and Company was under statutory 
obligation to hold its meetings. This aspect of the private company indicated that 
procedurally this organ was functioning. It was not traceable as far back as to the days 
of its early establishment but the company always complied with the prevailing and 
applicable UK Companies Acts and British company laws to hold annual general 
meetings and extra - ordinary meetings; and to conduct the business of the company 
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accordingly. Copies of its annual general meetings and extra ordinary meetings were 
analysed.  
 
All of the company’s shareholders met at duly convened meetings yearly and at times 
dictated by the company in meeting. Local laws were amended to reflect the 
prevailing laws of the UK.  Even after gaining its political independence, this did not 
significantly affect any laws relating to companies save and except where the socio-
political and economic conditions dictated otherwise within the domestic sector where 
this company was classified. The nature of the business meetings varied according to 
the diversity of issues that confronted the company in meetings over those years.  
 
Up to the year of amalgamation, there was still a statutory requirement for private 
companies like John Hazell Sons and Company to hold an annual general meeting. 
Due to the absence of some of the company’s records, the minutes of the centenary 
meeting served to verify that annual meetings and other meetings of the company 
were held.  Discussions were held with the current Chief Executor Officer of the 
amalgamated companies – Coreas Hazells Incorporated.  The legacy left by this 
company indicated that the greater number of directors/shareholders attended 99% of 
annual meetings and other meetings held by the company during its life span. 
Discussions with descendants of at least two of the subscribers also supported the 
claim that attendance at meetings were regular and ‘without fail.’ 
 
As was customary and provided for by the law and the company’s articles of 
association or model articles, the annual accounts were presented as well as the 
directors’ reports.  The election of directors and auditors was also a feature at the 
annual general meetings.  There was a presumption on this point in that the accounts 
were still distributed to the shareholders. It was also reasonable to assume that the 
company for some time was not subjected to the normal rules that provided for the 
requirement of financial reporting.  As a result there was limited information about 
the company’s financial performance.  
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“Extra - ordinary meetings”378 
This was undoubtedly another feature of the private limited liability company limited 
by shares.  Over time and with the increase of business, these meetings were called so 
as to deal with matters that were considered extra - ordinary or to discuss general 
matters that affected the direction and control of the company. These were duly called 
and a register of attendance was kept. 
 
Significance of findings 
If only for emphasis on its historical and legislative significance, it was from the 
minutes of its meetings that it was established that the transition from a partnership 
firm to a private limited liability company occurred in 1845. Partnerships were 
creatures of the common law. These dated back to a time when similar provisions 
were also identifiable within Roman law.  The case in point was the “societas 
universorum quae ex quaestu veniunt”379 or a commercial partnership that generated 
profit or a “general partnership.”380 It was allowable for partnerships to be formed 
through oral agreement, a written document or by the conduct of such partners.  
 
This type of societas was accepted in the absence of proof to the contrary. It was 
highly likely that the partnership (partners) that transitioned to the private limited 
liability company consented which was deemed as per verbal contract. The interesting 
thing was that Roman jurists did not acknowledge this kind of procedure given that 
consideration must first be moved from each partner and recorded.  However, as 
commerce dictated, the partnership phenomenon like many others became codified in 
the UK “Partnership Act”381 in the 1890s having borrowed elements of the societas 
from Roman law.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 UK Companies Acts 1907; St. Vincent Companies Act 1994 
379 Butters v Mncorca 2012 4 SA 1 (SCA) para. 14 
380 Ibid 
381 UK Partnership Act 1890  
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With regards to limited liability, Holdsworth explained that it was,  
“ As early as the fifteenth century it was clear that an individual co-operator was not 
personally liable for the debts of the corporation and after some hesitation this 
conclusion was ultimately accepted in the latter part of the sixteenth century (by 
common law courts).”382  
 
The statement by the John Hazell Sons and Company in meeting was that it was a 
private limited liability company. The “minutes of that meeting”383 was likely to be 
made in 1845 and this status of the said company may have been possible given the 
aforementioned statement made by Holdsworth. However, private limited liability 
status was made possible by the Limited Liability Act 1855 ten years after the claim 
made by the company to having been established. A number of observations seem 
pertinent here in that,  
• The question remained as to whether the company in meeting was referring to 
customary practices in 1845 that may have amounted to being considered as a 
‘private’ company. It must be noted though, that the belief where shareholders were 
accountable to the company was introduced by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844. 
John Hazell Sons and Company was not a joint stock company but one that declared it 
was a private limited liability company. 
 
• Inserting clauses in the Articles of Association that provided for an expressly 
stated and complete liability of shareholders for the company’s debts as though “they 
were private partners.”384 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 Holdsworth, William, A History of English Law, Vol III (Methuen and Company UK, 
1966) 203 – for historical context 
383 Minutes of the centennial meeting – Company records - John Hazell Sons and Company 
Limited, Kingstown, St. Vincent 1945 – See Appendix 3 (1) 
384 Fay, C. R., Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day (Longman, Green and Co., 
UK 1950) 317 for historical context. 
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• Incorporation of companies in the UK was subject to the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844. One year later, the assumed establishment of John Hazell Sons 
and Company limited was not cheap. It may be that the company was the First House 
and not necessarily a private company at that stage ….The factor of cost was implied 
according to the comments made by the company. Additionally, it stated that a good 
decision was made by management to write off this debt in the next financial year. 
• The fact that the company had moulded what was likely to be an 
unincorporated partnership into a form, which would have provided some measure of 
corporate liability, without a formal grant of incorporation remained a strong 
possibility. 
 
John Hazell Sons and Company was positioned within the colony and responded to 
the mandates of its own commercial undertakings amidst a newly emancipated 
stakeholder society. There was evidence of “shareholders”385 who were also the 
directors of the company. This was a singular venture in comparison to the prevailing 
customary practices of multiple established foreign - based companies with associated 
activities. Reference is here made to the “sugar industry, emancipation and slavery in 
St. Vincent”386 from a historical perspective. The climate for an established corporate 
governance agenda was entangled in the aftermath of emancipation, the production of 
sugar and a new environment. Stakeholders then were not the same in terms of their 
holistic view of the benefits to be derived from any indigenous company.  
 
Beyond The Results  
The ownership of shares presupposes that the company in “meetings”387 had a 
fiduciary duty to report to shareholders and directors about the nature of its business 
on a yearly basis and at other special times. Before there was legislative provision for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Appendix 3(5) – Names of shareholders of the John Hazell Sons and Company Limited, 
1945 
386 Appendix 2(2) – Fraser, Adrian, Newspaper article - Sugar, Slavery and Emancipation in 
St. Vincent -  
387 UK Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908, s. 64 – s. 71; Companies (Consolidation) Act 
1908 – First Schedule/Table A: Proceedings at General Meeting s. 49 – 59   
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a “private company,”388 all UK companies were premised on their appeal to the public 
and were public companies.  John Hazell Sons and Company Limited was never a 
public company according to its own records. 
 
Within the whole of the UK and given the remit of public companies, there were 
examples of “limited liability,”389 the phenomenon to be found especially among 
some unincorporated companies. The precedence for limited liability within the 
seminal British company law jurisprudence on Salomon’s case that became trite law. 
The legislation on companies was proactive and responded to the economic and 
political changes within British society. It was well over one and a half centuries and 
the legislation on private companies limited by shares was still the prevailing law of 
St. Vincent save and except for amendments and reform influenced by the Swiss, 
United States and Germany.  
 
Fundamental was the unitary board model, which was key to the corporate 
governance procedural format that predominates within the hybrid system to date. 
The phenomenon of the hybrid corporate governance model seeks to incorporate 
elements of both the unitary and two-tier board structure.  The effectiveness of this 
model remained largely untested to date. 
 
The next generation of stakeholders would do well to continue to explore innovative 
ways in which the elements of limited liability can be expanded. As knowledge 
increases, the depth of corporate governance will also increase. It has the capacity to 
incorporate other aspects of corporate law that will ultimately be accommodative to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 Ibid 
389 The Limited Liability Act 1855 provided for a limit on the liability of corporations that 
were established by the general public in the whole of the UK. Shareholders were liable 
directly to creditors for that unpaid portion of their shares. The modern principle that 
shareholders were to be held liable to the corporation was introduced by the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844. However the 1855 Act provided limited liability to companies with 
more than twenty-five bona fide members or shareholders. The insurance companies were 
excluded from this Act but was covered in the UK Companies Act 1862 thereafter. 
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corporate flexibility, accountability and transparency using technological 
advancements. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines remains part of the Commonwealth Nations and a 
former colony of Great Britain. Its legal system remains largely predicated on British 
laws save and except for ‘borrowings’ from other states’ corporate law. The John 
Hazell Sons and Company Limited was one company that was limited by shares in 
which British company laws and the UK Companies Acts were replicated in form and 
intent incrementally for close to a century. The private company was established by 
family members and transitioned from a partnership to a private company. Both 
partnerships and private limited liability company shared similarities with respect to 
limited liability for members and other requirements for their corporate governance 
practices.  
 
The prevailing legislation as per the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 may have had a 
direct bearing on the formation of John Hazell Sons and Company in so far as 
availability to incorporation by registration. To date, there has not been any indication 
as to whether the company was registered in the UK or locally save and except that 
the company in meetings recorded the transaction on its establishment. The notion of 
limited liability was available to countries that followed the British legal 
jurisprudence. 
 
The partnership instrument also held legislative significance in terms of their 
composition and both the UK Partnership Acts and the Joint Stock Companies Act 
1844 were instrumental in guiding the pioneers of the John Hazells Sons and 
Company Limited towards their transition. The company was a successful 
commercial entity for over a century and amalgamated with other sister companies in 
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1981. Part of its name (Hazells) could be found within and among this family legacy 
on companies. 
 
Corporate governance best practices developed from well-articulated family values 
and were codified and or mandated through legislation. Corporate governance served 
as an insurance against corporate scandal, fraud as well as criminal and civil liability 
within the company. Corporate governance best practices promoted the company as a 
self - policing company with responsibilities to its shareholder and wider stakeholder. 
The shared philosophy, practices and culture of the company and its employees were 
well articulated over time. Its corporate social responsibility indicated that it had a 
soul or conscience.  
 
Corporate governance best practices were specified in the applicable by-laws and 
amended Table A; the latter was a workable but historical document that provided a 
set of rules and or instructions about corporate governance best practices. While these 
guidance about corporate governance was found therein, incrementally, there was 
adherence to common law and customary international corporate governance best 
practices for the private limited liability company limited by shares. 
 
While it lasted, the company was still able to address its challenges through a 
proactive approach on corporate governance. Its unitary or one-tier board model was 
central to the company’s succession planning and risk mitigation. It conducted 
business in keeping with British company laws and the UK Companies Acts from the 
1800s. Having been amalgamated in 1981, the dictates of British company law was 
lasting.  
 
During the years of its continuance, the company was able to remain the custodian of 
purpose that provided assurance to those staff members as well as other key 
stakeholders – customers, other organizations, government and the community at 
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large. It did appear that the company also protected management as far as was 
possible from anything that was deemed short - term distractions.  John Hazell Sons 
and Company held closely to its business model and at times appeared to meld with 
some aspects of the disciplines of a ‘Private equity house’ in its bid for continuity of 
purpose.  It demonstrated and unleashed its potential as a multidimensional company 
by harnessing its full access to available capital and management talent during its life 
cycle. 
 
The company had the policy of dealing fair and square with its stakeholders. This was 
quite commendable for a company that emerged from the earliest days of a post 
colonial, post slavery and post emancipation society. The organs of the company were 
identifiable. For instance, the directors and the company in meetings (shareholders 
assembly) and the latter kept a record of minutes over the years. When it comes to the 
financial aspects of the business, it had equity, which was the value of the asset of the 
company after the value of the liabilities was deducted.  
 
The sum total of the earnings was not recorded, but a reference to the ‘presentation of 
annual accounts’ directed attention to the fact that the company maintained its annual 
accounts. There was mention made of the decision taken by directors to ‘write off ‘ 
the sum payable for the transition from partnership to private limited liability 
company. Additional mention of ‘other assets’ like buildings, the operational costs 
and bonus payable to staff was some of the equity of the business.   
 
Finally, there was evidence of capital, which was not listed on any public exchange 
but garnered from funds, and from investors that directly invested in the private 
limited liability company. The mere fact that the transition from partnership to private 
limited liability company allowed for the company to become a thriving business 
enterprise signals that it amassed more capital through input by its shareholders. The 
paid in capital and retained earnings were part of the company’s balance sheet and 
representative of its equity.  Finally, when it comes to amalgamation of the company, 
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it was reasonable to conclude that the lack of control of negative equity was an 
imperative. It was not suggested that this was the principal reason for amalgamation 
but it was an acknowledgement that consideration must have been given to negative 
equity.   
 
Varying aspects of the company’s corporate governance best practices were always 
utilised in keeping with its undertakings. Shareholders made the decision to 
amalgamate this company based on the calculation of any equity built up over the 
years. The comparison of tangible and intangible assets was also imperative. The 
intangible assets of the company’s reputation and the brand identity were still part of 
the amalgamated company “Coreas Hazells Company”390of present times. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CASE STUDY OF THE BRITISH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY 
LIMITED - THE CLICO/CL FINANCIAL FIASCO 
“The economic crisis doesn’t only make us free to imagine other models, another future, 
another world, it obliges us to do so.” 
President of France - Nicholas Sarkozy, 16 May 2007 - 15 May 2012 
More than GDP: Measuring What Matters 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This penultimate chapter presented a synoptic view about the research topic through 
the use of another case study. In this instance the focus was on the British American 
Insurance Company Limited “registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines.”391 It was 
one of close to ten thousand private limited liability companies limited by shares in 
the state and may also be considered a “branch”392 of the British American Insurance 
Company (BAICO) whose headquarters was located in Trinidad and Tobago. The 
Colonial Life Insurance Company was part of the CL Financial Limited and together 
with the British American Insurance Company an affiliation at times seemed to 
suggest an intangible complexity in structure.  
 
References to CLICO/BAICO but more specifically to BAICO made for the greatest 
comparison. This was in keeping with an identifiable corporate structure registered on 
the island and operating on behalf of policyholders not as CLICO but as British 
American Insurance stakeholders. As such while references to CLICO/BAICO were 
made legitimately, concentration remained on BAICO. For the purposes of analyses, 
the company was treated both as an external company and as a domestic company.  
 
This purpose for the inclusion of this study was two-fold. First, it provided a précis of 
the nature of corporate governance with regards to the private limited liability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391  British American Insurance Company Limited - Companies Act (St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines) 1994 - Certificate of Registration of External Company, No 119 of 2002, 
07/05/2002 
392 British American Insurance Company Limited (Judicial Management): Policyholder 
update: Proposed Plan of Arrangement (KPMG UK LLP /KPMG Europe LLP Publication 
UK 2016) 3 
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company limited by shares, which was used primarily for insurance purposes. This 
was significant since such a legitimate corporate structure was found on both islands 
of Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines as elsewhere within those 
countries that followed the British legal jurisprudence. 
 
Both countries had been part of regional groupings such as “CARICOM and the 
OECS”393 having had shared legislative and historical legacies. It was however those 
business networks within both islands that were brought under scrutiny when the said 
private limited liability company became embroiled in an unprecedented financial 
crisis. From this example there was a sense that the hypothesis was realizable where 
there was an apparent lack, disregard or absence of corporate governance best 
practices.  
 
Indeed a new species of poverty called “genteel poverty” was execrable and 
attributable to the financial debacle. This ‘imposed stakeholder – status’ was 
noticeable especially so from the period 2009 up to 2013. Notwithstanding this, the 
country of St. Vincent and the Grenadines was already classified as an impoverished 
state prior to these issues. Trinidad and Tobago on the other hand, was also referred to 
as having suffered tremendously. That island succumbed to the same contagion risks 
associated with the private limited liability company limited by shares. In the words 
of the Governor of their Central Bank, he lamented that the bank was more than 
cognizant of the “ contagion risks that financial difficulties in an institution as vast as 
the “CL Financial Limited”394 could have on the entire financial system of Trinidad 
and Tobago and indeed in the entire Caribbean region.”395 The CL Financial Group 
will be discussed shortly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 See Appendix 2(1) – for explanation of these acronyms CARICOM and OECS 
394 This was one of the largest privately held conglomerates in the whole of the Caribbean 
region with interest in 32 countries worldwide. Established in 1993 – See [CL Financial 
Company Limited Annual Report] 2 
395 Williams, Ewart. S., “Banks’ liquidity challenges in Trinidad and Tobago” (CIB/CLICO 
Media Conference, Port of Spain, 30 January 2009); see also Appendix 2(6) CLICO shocks 
CARICOM; Appendix 2(7) CLICO Commission report alleges Criminal Misconduct 
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Secondly, the chapter provided substantive analytical information, which followed 
along the following lines: 
v The identification of some issues that contributed to genteel poverty and their 
impact on the gross domestic product and the nature of corporate governance in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines;  
v The collection of identifiable data;  
v The impact of the crisis generally in St. Vincent;  
v A brief history of the British American Insurance Company;  
v Shareholders and the unanimous shareholder agreement;  
v The articles of association;  
v The process used for identification of issues;  
v Evidence of a gap in scholarship;  
v The model of the current corporate governance observed;  
v Lessons learnt; 
v Beyond the results, interventions, the regulatory framework for the insurance 
sector and the conclusion. 
 
Observations and conclusions were made between both Vincentian and Caribbean 
corporate governance practices through the private limited liability company limited 
by shares and used for insurance purposes. As such, special attention was placed on 
analyses of some official transcripts of cases and reports locally in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines and from within the Caribbean region; listening to podcasts from the 
ECCB; letters sent to CARICOM from government officials expressing concerns for 
the “financial stability of the region;"396 reading and analysing newspaper articles 
locally and from within the region; special research on other corporate entities like the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 See Appendix 2(9) – Letter sent to CARICOM from Prime Minister of St. Vincent Dr. 
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Building and Loan Association for relevance and to draw correlation on corporate 
governance practices; analyses of copies of general meetings; annual reports from CL 
Financial Limited; judicial management reports and news feeds; written records of 
board meetings and meetings of shareholders and other special committees of CL 
Financial Limited.  
 
Identification of some issues and their possible impact on the gross domestic product 
There were several issues that led to the impact on the gross domestic product of St. 
Vincent. To begin with, a complexity in structure existed wherein the private limited 
liability companies were held. This configuration of Colonial Life Financial Limited 
(CL Financial Ltd.) held together several other private limited liability companies for 
the purposes of conducting businesses in areas such as manufacturing; distribution; 
finance; real estate; banking; agriculture; insurance; health, energy and 
petrochemicals. The corporate governance practices by which each company were 
directed and controlled were mandated by the same British rule bound legislation.  
 
The model of corporate governance was predominantly one tier board. Decisions 
were by consensus. There were no major differences with regards to specific outlines 
as to how such practices were to be executed. There were differences in the 
personality and the character of stakeholders; management; directors and staff 
members within each entity. 
 
The issue of the date of incorporation seems to suggest that the holding company and 
by extension the insurance type or subcategory of private limited liability company 
limited by shares, would have had years of experience with a well developed 
corporate governance system which allowed for effective and sustained business 
transactions. CL Financial Ltd. was incorporated in 1963. Acting as a holding 
company for the Colonial Life Insurance Company (CLICO) that was situated in 
Trinidad and Tobago, the presumption was that CL Financial was in the best position 
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to monitor and safeguard each type of company that was in its remit as exercising a 
fiduciary duty or obligation to corporate governance best practices. It was observed 
that CL Financial Limited held investments in sixty-five companies scattered across 
thirty-two countries. While CL Financial Ltd. was the largest conglomerate in 
Trinidad and Tobago and was at one time deemed to succumb to the too important to 
fail” syndrome, there was some perceptible best practices that accounted for this 
seemingly observable positive trait.   
 
BAICO was located in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and was a part of this network 
of businesses that operated across geographically porous borders. More specifically, 
the parent company of BAICO was “Colonial Life Insurance Company”397 with 
headquarters in Trinidad and Tobago but still within the CARICOM region. A bank in 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines accepted from 1996 to act as a trustee of certain 
BAICO assets to satisfy statutory requirements in relation to its Statutory Fund. There 
were statutory fund deficits in BAICO that amounted to just below one half times 
total liabilities within the CARICOM region.  
 
There were enormous problems associated with this arrangement when major 
liquidity crises surfaced in CLICO (Trinidad) and British American Insurance 
Company (BAICO). The BAICO branch in St. Vincent and the Grenadines corporate 
governance practices reflected those of BAICO/CLICO in Trinidad and Tobago. The 
crisis accounted for over 60% of total insurance liabilities in the Caribbean region. 
Additionally, it may be argued that the “forces of globalisation”398exerted tremendous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Colonial Life Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited (the Company or CLICO) is 
incorporated in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago …As of December 31, 2008 the 
company was a subsidiary of CL Financial Limited (the Parent). As of 2011...a stay of all 
legal actions against the Company.” Special Financial Statements of Colonial Life Insurance 
Company (Trinidad) Limited, December 2013, p10; Also Deed of Trust for Eligible 
Institutional Investors [SCHEDULE II CLICO PRIOR ASSIGNMENT MUTUAL FUND]; see 
also An overview: CL Financial Limited (The Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance 2009) 
– the company was started in 1937 
398 Appendix 4(1A) – Statement for the CIB/CLICO MEDIA CONFERENCE – Mrs. Karen 
Nunez-Tesheira, Minister of Finance – January 30, 2009 – Statement was also broadcast live 
on regional media to which St. Vincent and the Grenadines have had live access; See also 
Appendix 4(1B) or similar comments by the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
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influences on a number of institutions and governments. However, the internal 
mechanism on corporate direction and control was its corporate governance system 
that was at the heart of the difficulties experienced by BAICO/CLICO as private 
limited liability companies. Used as insurance companies, the difficulties were 
associated with corporate governance practices that led to a focus on short - term 
deposit-like products that paid stakeholders above the market interest rates. This 
decision was likely to have been taken by the company in meetings and or its 
directors. The “tenure of directors”399 was suspect at the zenith of the operation of 
BAICO/CLICO. 
 
Other decisions and or corporate governance procedure, practices, relationships and 
or systems led the private limited liability company - BAICO/CLICO to participate in 
high risk investments that were within real estate, equities and many other ventures 
that were aimed at generating high returns. It was only through corporate governance 
practices that “excessive risk concentration”400 deemed “excessive within the inter-
group investment”401 portfolio which was articulated as well by the then Governor of 
the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was considered among the "smallest independent 
nation"402 states of the world and within CARICOM. The nation's debt to gross 
domestic product in 2010 was "91% with a marginal decrease projected at 90% in 
2015."403 The fall out from the private limited liability company limited by shares 
used for insurance purposes was undoubtedly responsible for further ‘inroads’ into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 See Appendix 4(1) – Tenure of directors which was indicative that there were tell tale signs that the 
corporate governance practices with regards to tenure was suspect. 
400 Williams, Ewart. S., Governor, Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago: Presentation to 
Commonwealth Secretariat Conference on Sustaining Development in Small States in a 
Turbulent Economy (Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, July 2009) 
401 Ibid 
402 Hey, A.K, Jeanne, Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., USA 2003) 31; See also Blouet, M. Olwyn, The 
Contemporary Caribbean: History, life and culture since 1945 (Reaktion Books Ltd., UK 
2007) 66 
403 Guerson, Alejandro & Melina, Giovanni, Public Debt targeting an application to the 
Caribbean (International Monetary Fund 2011) 18  
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nation’s gross domestic product. Figures may vary depending on the source for 
economic forecast but one thing was for sure, there was negative impact on the gross 
domestic product (GDP) during the period of the financial debacle and up to and 
including the year 2013. There were no recorded figures to demonstrate a correlation 
between the financial contagions and the aforementioned fall out but the reality of the 
situation was highlighted by the IMF in its forecast and assessment of the affected 
financial sectors within CARICOM (St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and 
Tobago inclusive). 
 
Like many other private companies, the conglomerate CL Financial limited; and 
BAICO/CLICO were strangled by a corporate governance system as outlined by the 
out-dated insurance legislation inherited from Great Britain that dated back to 1980 – 
the Insurance Act (Trinidad and Tobago). The subsidiaries and branches of CLICO 
(Trinidad) replicated that same system of corporate governance. Insurance companies 
within the CARICOM region and in St. Vincent especially were regulated and 
supervised by dichotomous regimes that were weak and which utilized the same out-
dated legislation for their supervisory and regulatory mandates. Additionally, the 
insurance supervision was vested in a small unit within the Ministry of Finance in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines.  
 
Capital requirements were minimal and there were liquidity requirements that were 
non-binding. Aggregate restrictions on related party transactions were also non-
binding. Even though the oversight bodies made regular checks, the private 
companies themselves did their own internal checks and balances.  Coupled with the 
organizational policies, the company had what was deemed “moral 
conscience.”404This should have helped it to determine what was right from wrong in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 van Luikj, Henk, (Ed) Ethics Management: Auditing and Developing the Ethical Content 
of Organization (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 1998/2012) 4; Vischer, 
Robert K., Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space Between Person and 
State (Cambridge University Press, USA 2010)1, 179 
 
	  
	  
	  
178	  
a corporate governance sense. The company recognised that it should weigh the 
decisions it made and the possible consequences. 
 
At the outset, the decision to create a complex structure had to be a management 
decision. It proved at times quite challenging to decipher such complexity of the 
ownership structure but a network of proportionate smaller private companies served 
the overall objective of CL Financial limited.  It would appear that the law itself was 
not as strong on the defined role of such a complex organization. The private limited 
liability company was duly formed but the scale of operations appeared to be beyond 
the capacity of those who were charged with the responsibility of directing and 
controlling CLICO, BAICO and CL Financial Limited and its subsidiaries and 
branches.  
 
The intention was good as it sought to provide employment and bolster economic 
growth within the region. However, the occurrence of financial crisis of this 
magnitude did little to counteract good intentions. As a result of the associated 
contagion, the nature of corporate governance in St. Vincent was reshaped 
significantly. Three major factors continued to ‘drive’ corporate governance best 
practices. Primarily, the economic uncertainty within CARICOM states with regards 
to their own fiscal arrangements especially, deepened stakeholders’ awareness of the 
reciprocal influences that the private limited liability company might have had on 
issues in politics, all round national fiscal policies and peoples’ own lives and 
livelihood. Secondly, the voice of the shareholder as well as other stakeholders was 
now heard in the given forum at annual meetings especially towards the national 
financial development agenda.  
 
Thirdly, governments became more aware that the nation’s economic growth 
demanded a more robust regulatory system through a reform and strengthening of 
legislation for the financial sector of which the private limited liability company was a 
part. The strength of the businesses that CL Financial promised was critical in that 
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they held the potential for stronger business relationships within CARICOM.  This 
also placed the greatest demand for best practices that should have been aimed at 
ensuring the highest integrity oversight of these businesses. Cross border investments 
within CARICOM were probably one of the more important factors within the ambit 
of best practices of corporate governance that would have created a sense of security 
for stakeholders given the high visibility of corporate businesses.  
 
In keeping with its economic and financial development agenda this insurance 
company was belonged to the category of private limited liability companies limited 
by shares. It was one that was foremost a part of the financial sector. As was promised 
by the political electorate, all private companies were to be positioned within the 
forefront of the economy. This was promised since the island gained “Statehood in 
1969.”405 The emerging nation state of St. Vincent and the Grenadines continued to 
articulate for strong growth in its economy through its foreign policy initiatives.  
 
As as a “signatory to a number of international organizations”406 with appropriate 
instruments and international conventions on financial matters there was every 
encouragement for its development agenda on private companies to be commensurate 
with corporate governance practices. Private companies by virtue of being part of the 
network of businesses within the region were member states of the OECS and 
CARICOM where they were considered “open and vulnerable”407 to external shocks. 
It was concluded that post crisis; “legislation was too weak”408 to contain the spread 
of one of the largest privately owned conglomerates of which British American 
Insurance Company was a part. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 Government Gazette, No. 108, St. Vincent and the Grenadines  (St. Vincent, December, 
1969) 
406 See Appendix 2:1 St. Vincent as a sovereign independent state is signatory to these listed 
organization/agencies 
407 TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD, Fifty-fourth session  Geneva, 1-11 October 
2007 - "Structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies": Who are they? What can 
UNCTAD do for them? 
408 Jhinkoo, Julia, Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance - Newsletter Vol 6, No. 1, 2013 
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One may consider that it was in the 1980s and 1990s, that the “financial sectors were 
the “Achilles heel of economic development in the Caribbean.”409 Since then, it was 
also said that the “region continues to succumb to financial crises” 410  of 
unprecedented proportions. To be fair, at one point, in spite of these issues, the 
financial sectors on St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago emerged 
with some measure of small growth as they continued to cultivate individual internal 
integrative approaches to their own “development agenda.”411  
 
As if echoing the OECD, it was probably best said of the private limited liability 
companies limited by shares that indeed, “Corporate governance is one key element in 
improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor 
confidence.”412 The point that should not be missed was that this was the perception 
of such corporate governance within the private limited liability companies that 
catered to the stakeholders and shareholders among whom were the targeted 
investors. 
 
After several years, there were new actors, financial markets and instruments 
springing up with an added dimension of broadening the financial landscape within 
the Caribbean region.  Even in 2011, a few years on from the collapse of 
CLICO/BAICO, St. Vincent and the Grenadines was said to have experienced a 
“growth rate ...of 0.8 per cent.”413 There were no empirical studies to show what 
effect that the insurance private limited liability companies limited may have had on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/02/pdf/press.pdf - accessed on 23 November 2013 
410 www.bis.org/review/r100305d.pdf - accessed on 14 December 2013 
411  National Economic and Social Development Plan 2010 - 2015, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines pdf/power point presentation - accessed on 29 October 2013; See also St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines - National Economic and Social Development Plan 2013-2025 - accessed 
on 23 February, 2015 
412www.iod.com/services/information-and-advice/resources-and-factsheets/details/UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-July-2018, accessed 17 January, 2019 
413 Gonsalves, Ralph, Budget Speech Theme:  Job Creation, Economic Growth, Financial 
Stabilisation, Fiscal Re-Balancing And Social Equity At A Time Of Continued Global 
Economic Uncertainty (Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2012) 8 
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the aforementioned figure. Although this was considered a “flat”414 growth rate, it 
was enough to be somewhat encouraging.   
 
Process for identifying issues 
In order to effectively identify the causal linkages within the context of the 
hypothesis, several research methods not limited to case study and “socio-legal 
ethnography.”415 These were used to derive contextualize analyses on the private 
limited liability companies limited by shares. A thorough analysis of the issues within 
this private company was undertaken. The species of companies – the insurance 
companies – were assessed within the post colonial developing societies of both St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
This cross-referencing became necessary in light of the research topic and the nature 
of the private limited liability company under review. Comparative analyses of the 
principal British company laws and the UK Companies Acts that provided for the 
incorporation of the private limited liability companies were reviewed. Also, there 
was a comparative analysis of the models of corporate governance in use.  
 
The contextual framework  
As was expected there was evidence of the “Anglo-American model”416of corporate 
governance in use comprehensively with its emphases on decision making through 
consensus within the remit of the one-tier board. It begs the question as to whether 
such decision - making was critical this process. The responsibility of the company 
for its own direction and control to be placed in the hands of a few rests with it 
through its own bylaws and other legislation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Ibid 
415 www.johnflood.com/pdfs/Socio_Legal_Ethnography_2005.pdf- accessed on 17 June 2014,  
34 - 36 
416 See Appendix 1(7) – Comparative Table on Models of Corporate Governance 
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The rights of the shareholders could not be negated from the fact that the company 
operated firstly for the benefit of the shareholder. Comparisons were also made in 
keeping with the OECD principles of good governance. The socio cultural and socio 
economic factors prevalent among the wider stakeholder post emancipation 
community manifested through the interactions of those who directed and controlled 
the company. The associated peculiarities impacted how the company; where it was 
directed and why was the company directed and controlled in the ways that it was 
done.  
 
The communication processes enabled transmission of information about best 
practices that constituted part of the substantive nature of its corporate governance. 
These practices were not followed as prescribed and this is why the hypothesis was 
tested. It would be said that the “law is constantly changing because society 
changes...and current interests are pushing back against pressures for change.”417  
However, when it comes to the private limited liability company limited by shares, 
the bylaws and other inherited British legislation on companies were unchanged from 
since antiquity. 
 
Arguably, the nature of corporate governance was prone to be manipulated by human 
agencies through a “flawed business model.”418 Both contextual and comparative 
analyses gave further clarity on this category of insurance companies that are 
contributory to genteel poverty and the negative impact on the gross domestic product 
of the islands. Of necessity, account was taken of recorded “interaction between the 
driving forces of development and economic, political, social and environmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Gordon, Robert. M & Horwitz, Morton, Law, Society and History: Themes in the Legal 
Sociology and Legal History of Lawrence M. Friedman (Cambridge University Press, UK 
2011) 3 
418www.fss.uog.edu.gy/beware-boasting - accessed 10 April, 2018 – available as Appendix 
5(4) Opinion post from the University of Guyana, September 2017 
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trends as well as decisions taken during that period by authorities, businesses and 
citizens.”419 These impacted both the branch BAICO and the parent company CLICO.  
 
For instance, those forces that cultivated mobility towards corporate governance 
development and the economic, political and social trends emanated from within the 
private company. It was as a direct response to the unprecedented crisis that involved 
the private company, that the pressure was applied by the political directorate to 
consider another model - the two tiered - model of corporate governance. 
 
A theme that runs through private insurance companies on both Trinidad and Tobago 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines using their unique interpretations about socio 
cultural norms was the two dimensional tool - fraud and risk. Fraud has to be proved 
in a court of law. On the other hand, it was too simplistic a view to ignore that 
liability insurance does necessitate some measure of risk taking and that “it is 
certainly possible to distinguish fraud (which involves deceit) from risk taking (which 
does not).”420 CL Financial Ltd business model allowed for a diverse investment 
portfolio into several businesses across business platforms that took some measure of 
risk.  
 
Respectfully, no attempts on the part of the research to raise the presumption of either 
risk or fraud was made here but rather to highlight the fundamental characteristics of 
liability insurance of which CLICO/BAICO were constituted. The decisions taken by 
these companies were those believed to be in the best interest of shareholders and the 
requisite stakeholders alike. However, one is mindful that, considerations taken by 
underwriters in assessing risks would have included but was not limited to, “industry, 
business strategy, accounting policies, who the officers and directors of the company 
are, what corporate governance structures are in place and finally the firm's financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 GEO Latin America and the Caribbean: Environment Outlook 2003 (UNEP, Costa Rica 
2003) 226 
420 Baker, Tom & Griffith, Sean, J., Ensuring Corporate Misconduct:  How Liability 
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statements.”421 Underwriters within the current private limited liability companies 
therefore had to have made the requisite risk assessments towards investments and 
would have addressed their minds to the corporate governance best practices of such 
companies. 
Collection of data 
Extensive research was undertaken that included but was not limited to: visit to the 
location of the insurance facility: review of archived statements and cases and 
discussions with management of the local branch company. Also the use of guided 
discussions, comparative analyses on media and non-media sources; telephone 
contacts and associated correspondences formed part of the collection of data on this 
company.  While the research was being undertaken, the media generated information 
and posted regular updates about this matter. Every effort was made to analyse the 
‘live’ discussions and or debates among stakeholders locally and regionally about the 
contagion effects of this corporate failure and the efforts made by the various 
governments at recovery from financial loss.  
 
 
While in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, visits were undertaken to where the offices 
of the insurance facility were located. Unfortunately, the building was closed and 
there were no signs of workers. Several months were spent in reviewing archived 
statements and cases that highlighted the plight of some stakeholders.  Several 
attempts were made to have discussions with management of the local branch 
company. This proved futile. Discussions were also raised with some government 
officials and legal professionals as to the functioning about this company. The 
measured response was that there was an unprecedented crisis unfolding.  The 
analyses on media and non-media sources were germane to this thesis.  
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4.2 The impact of a corporate governance related crisis in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Nearly a decade ago, there were a number of reports coming out of the Caribbean that 
were indicative of what some referenced as “trouble in paradise.”422The latter 
terminology alluded to a group of islands in the Caribbean inclusive of Trinidad and 
Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines from where the ‘trouble’ emanated and 
the private limited liability companies limited by shares was at the heart of the matter. 
To be specific, in 2009, within Caribbean and its geo-space, its financial sector was 
‘shaken’ separate and apart from the world’s global financial crises. The contagion 
effect was felt in all fifteen CARICOM states save and except countries such as 
Jamaica and Haiti.   
 
Funds were taken from the public and were made up of deposit like investments 
products that were deemed contributory to already impoverished nations and this 
further impacted the gross domestic product of various islands within the Caribbean 
region. The conventional insurance policies and pension schemes were entangled with 
a series of complex investment-focused decisions within the private limited liability 
companies. The monies garnered from stakeholders that included institutional 
investors and premium holders were then channeled through to other companies and 
real estate development initiatives. Some cited that there might have been a knock-on 
effect of the global financial crisis that contributed to loss in value of investments. 
The decisions to invest monies from the stakeholder communities were those resulting 
from the corporate governance practices of the insurance companies. 
 
 The contagion effect was felt by the widest cross section of stakeholders such as 
depositors, investors, policyholders, individuals and corporate citizens and national 
insurance and pension schemes and the building societies as well as credit unions. Up 
to the time of writing, there was still some unravelling of the complex nature of the 
company headquartered in Trinidad and Tobago. The Anglo American model of 
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corporate governance was used critical to the entire process of which corporate 
governance practices was constituted. Governments within the CARICOM region 
made attempts at containing the contagion through various interventions. There were 
no satisfactory resolutions at the time of writing. 
 
Timely interventions  
Corporate governance best practices within CL Financial Limited were predominant 
and influenced corporate governance best practices within all the other businesses that 
it controlled. There were intergroup corporate governance issues emanating from 
those practices that touched and concerned the directing and control of all the entities. 
It does appear that in every which way, there were lack, disregard or an absence of 
best practices. Once CL Financial was illiquid, it appeared that all the other entities 
were illiquid in terms of assets as well.  
 
With the deterioration of global economic conditions in 2008, many of the companies 
within the CL Financial Limited grouping faced liquidity and solvency pressures. 
Corporate governance best practices became essential to the functioning of Methanol 
Holdings, one of the largest methanol producers in the world and a big contributor of 
dividends to CL Financial Limited, suffered a collapse in methanol prices. Real estate 
investments in Florida held by regional BAICO and CLICO affiliates turned ‘sour’. 
As news of such difficulties spread, withdrawal requests from policyholders 
increased, and shortfalls in the statutory funds of many insurance entities became 
acute. 
 
The Trinidad and Tobago authorities intervened in the affairs of CL Financial Limited 
in January 2009 and announced a financial support package for three domestic 
subsidiaries: CLICO, British American Company (Trinidad) Limited (BA), and CIB. 
In emphasising the announcement, the Central Bank identified the key factors leading 
to the intervention as:    
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Ø “Excessive related-party transactions that carried significant contagion risks,   
Ø “An aggressive high interest rate resource mobilization strategy which 
financed equally high risk investments, and,  
Ø “Very high leveraging of the CL Financials’ assets that constrained the 
potential amount of cash, which raised the sale of assets.”423  
 
The Central Bank indicated that it was aware of these deficiencies but had been 
“stymied by the inevitable challenge of change and by inadequacies in the legislative 
framework which do not give the Bank the authority to demand these changes.”424 St. 
Vincent like many other nation states across CARICOM recognised that this was a 
systemic shock and paid close attention to the outcome of the arrangement between 
CL Financial and the Bank of Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
The news items were scattered within the public domain. As part of the government's 
intervention, an additional agreement was reached with the shareholders of CL 
Financial. Under the January 2009 “memorandum of understanding”425 (MoU) with 
the government, the shareholders of CL Financial agreed to take additional steps to 
correct the financial condition of CIB, CLICO Trinidad, and BA (British American 
Insurance (Trinidad) Company by selling its stake in “Republic Bank”426, the 
company “Methanol Holdings Trinidad,”427 and Caribbean Money Market Brokers - 
TT and any other assets as necessary.  
 
The Central Bank assumed control of CIB, CLF agreed to sell assets to meet the 
statutory fund requirements for CLICO Trinidad and BAICO Trinidad, and the 
government agreed to provide loan financing to meet those requirements. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423  Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago (GROTT) and CL Financial Limited (CLF) – 30 January, 2009 
424 Ibid 
425 www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,95143.html - accessed on 17 October 2014 
426 www.republictt.com/about/company-overview- accessed on 1 September 2015 
427 www.ttmethanol.com/ - accessed on 1 September 2015 
	  
	  
	  
188	  
government injected an initial US$191 million.  To date the situation has accelerated 
with renewed discussions and deals orchestrated by the Central Bank of Trinidad and 
Tobago and CLICO. 
 
British American Insurance Company in St. Vincent realized stagnated growth as a 
result of the difficulties experienced by CL Financial/CLICO debacle.  The influence 
on the system of corporate governance within the private limited liability company 
was overwhelming. The difficulties of CLICO were initially perceived to be a 
liquidity problem, which would be resolved as assets were sold and as the economy 
recovered. The objective stated at the time of the intervention was to “return CLICO 
to its original moorings.” 428   The intervention of government at this stage 
demonstrated clearly that the scope and magnitude of the company’s corporate 
governance agenda had to change in order to respond appropriately to this 
unprecedented crisis.  
 
Clearly the response in St. Vincent and the Grenadines from British American 
Insurance to its policyholders and other stakeholders was dependent on the initial 
corporate response from Trinidad and Tobago. Annuity holders from both countries 
were encouraged to roll over policies, and were made to the extent possible.  In June 
2010, the then government announced that repaying principal only to CLICO 
policyholders would require a further injection of capital. This was clearly that case 
where state intervention as an external phenomenon characterised part of the nature of 
corporate governance of private companies. 
 
A Select Committee was charged with recommending a number of preferred solutions 
to stakeholders within the wider CARICOM region ultimately. For instance, solutions 
were sought for the repayment of CLICO’s traditional and non-traditional insurance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428Ewart S. Williams: Banks’ liquidity challenges in Trinidad and Tobago” - Comments by 
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liability products; a financial reorganization plan for CLF that demonstrated financial 
stability and ensures full satisfaction of commercial and inter-company debts; and a 
clear path and timetable on how the Trinidad and Tobago government would exit its 
loan capital position and restore public confidence.  In the meantime, agitation 
amongst institutional and individual investors/shareholders in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines remained at an all time 'high'.  While there were many who remained 
'under the radar', the informal debates took place all through the many months. 
Sporadic pockets of agitators within the media fuelled by some political angst could 
not go unnoticed. 
 
In line with the Committee’s recommendation, the September “2010 budget speech in 
Trinidad and Tobago”429 announced a restructuring plan that would pay all investors 
in full up to a threshold (TT$75,000 or US$12,000) and pay the remainder over 20 
years with no interest. Payments by CLICO to holders of non-traditional insurance 
products stopped at that time. The traditional insurance businesses of CLICO and 
BAICO would be combined and divested. The plan to restructure payments met 
strong opposition from some policyholders in St. Vincent and the Grenadines as well 
as in Trinidad and Tobago and the rest of the affected Caribbean nation states.   
 
After a review, sentiments signalled that moving forward with modifications to 
provide a liquidity support window for credit unions and a compassionate window for 
vulnerable individuals was in keeping with good governance of the situation. The 
reform process began in St. Vincent and the Grenadines with the “Financial Services 
Authority”430and its call for board restructure and emphasis on “qualification of 
directors.”431  In 2012 a regional Financial Analyst reiterated what many have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 The Ministry of Finance: Strengthening Efficiency, Addressing the Challenges: Budget 
Statement 2010 (Caribbean Paper & Printed Products Ltd., Trinidad and Tobago 1993) 
430 Appendix 2(11) – Communication from the Financial Services Authority on minimum 
requirements for boards post financial crisis 
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saying for years “of corporate governance" 432 in ensuring the highest level of 
transparency and accountability of financial institutions. 
 
In retrospect, CL Financial Statement of Accounts through its “2007 Annual 
Report,”433 the last one that was published prior to 2009, declared the consolidated 
assets of Colonial Life Financials were about US$16 billion—equal to some 30 per 
cent of the entire Caribbean region’s Gross Domestic Product. Some policyholders 
were not fully aware of this fact. Discussions with some policyholders proved this 
point.  As a result, some paid little attention except to the fact that they were saving 
monies with an institution that was representative of commitment to financial security 
within the Caribbean region, still. In addition to having no liabilities, the interesting 
thing about the Vincentian British American Insurance Company Limited it was 
revealed that it had no assets except to the extent that such assets were specifically 
pledged to meet the liabilities of the policies issued in St Vincent and the Grenadines. 
 
Further comparative analyses suggest that at one point the company in Trinidad and 
Tobago had assets exceeding US $100 billion.  As at 30 September 2010 it had 
“assets of TT $ 100,666,256.”434For a company as asset rich as CL Financials, this 
was quite commendable for a company to be traced back to its early beginnings to the 
Colonial Life Insurance Company the latter, which was established in 1937. The 
Companies Acts of Trinidad and Tobago that governed this company have undergone 
several amendments to date.  This is the same historical document shared with other 
former colonies that were once British.  
 
It should not be forgotten that the private limited liability company limited by shares 
remained a creature of British and now Caribbean legislation for more than a century. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432www.vincyview.com/2012/01/12/dr-henry-said-the-lack-of-good-governance-was-a-key-
factor-in-the-failure-of-some-of-the-world%E2%80%99s-leading-institutions-in-recent-years/ 
- accessed on 29 August 2019 
433www.clico.com/pdf/AR07/CL%2520Financial%2520Annual%2520Report%25202009.pdf  
- accessed on 10 October, 2019 
434 Ibid, 20 
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These businesses expanded exponentially.  Besides insurance products, CL Financials 
held companies that supplied services and products that could be grouped according 
to energy; financial services; the real estate sectors and the manufacture and sale of 
beverages. 
 
Such was the plight of the Caribbean community as it grappled with the effects of the 
contagion. Within CARICOM, these countries have had a shared historical and 
legislative legacy. In the case of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, it could not compare 
with Trinidad and Tobago in terms of economic development. The former, on the eve 
of the crisis, which took place in 2009, was classified as a poor country in 2007/2008 
with indigence level of 2.9% and a poverty headcount index of 30.2%. However, as 
time progresses indications were that “even if there is debate over the percentage 
poor, there are other data that point to the improvement in living conditions.”435 The 
contagion alluded to could not have occurred at a worst time as there was no rural 
urban divide. “Genteel poverty” became a widespread phenomenon. 
 
It was as much about the effects of a “credit crisis”436 as it was about the collapse of a 
corporate giant - a new breed of conglomerates.  The quotations from speeches like, 
“painful blow to CARICOM,”437 made by the Prime Ministers within the Caribbean 
region, “were used with frequency but in keeping with the reality of the effect of the 
unprecedented crisis”. Ultimately, the nature of corporate governance within the state 
would mirror the results due to the size, composition and interdependence of the 
private limited liability companies to the island’s corporate sector especially in St. 
Vincent.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 Final Report – St. Vincent and the Grenadines Country Poverty Assessment 2007/2008 
(Kairi Consultants Limited, Trinidad and Tobago) xvi 
436 www.capital-chronicle.com/2009/04/credit-crisis-in-caribbean-cl-financial.html - accessed 
on 19 April 2018 
437www.nationnews.com/nationnews/news/9367/painful-blow-caricom - 19 April 2018; See 
Appendix 5(5) 
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Risky environment 
Through ethnography, it was reinforced that "law is constantly changing because 
society changes...and current interests are pushing back against pressures for 
change." 438  Arguably, the nature of corporate governance was prone to be 
manipulated amidst a flawed business model as was seen in the decision taken by 
management within the CL Financial Limited group of companies headquartered in 
Trinidad and Tobago.  The impact was deleterious to the development efforts initiated 
by regional government. This has to be one of the dark periods on the region’s 
developmental paths. Of necessity, account was taken of "interaction between the 
driving forces of development and economic, political, social and environmental 
trends as well as well as decisions taken during that period by authorities, business 
and citizens."439  
 
In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the impact of the contagion was even more 
significant for individuals within other corporate entities caught in the debacle. There 
was the Building and Loan Association, which was regulated by the Building 
Societies Act 1941; and the Credit Unions which were regulated by the Co-operative 
Societies Act 1999.  Institutional investor like the National Insurance Scheme 
invested was regulated under the National Insurance Act 2007. In other words, these 
entities were generally credit worthy but were also affected by the contagion 
emanating across porous borders. The shareholder and/or individual felt helpless for 
many months. 
 
Upon further questioning and discussions on the matter, there seems to be some 
confusion by some stakeholders as to whether they invested heavily with the correctly 
named company.  There were two companies that could be passed off for the other, as 
one company was the British American Insurance Company that was legally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Gordon, Robert. M & Horwitz, Morton, Law, Society and History: Themes in the Legal 
Sociology and Legal History of Lawrence M. Friedman (Cambridge University Press, UK 
2011) 3 
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registered in the Bahamas but was registered and operated from Trinidad and Tobago. 
There was a difference, which may have gone unnoticed “because British American 
was a Bahamian company but all its back offices arrangements and trade were done in 
Trinidad and under the suzerainty, obviously, of CL Financing, a company in 
Trinidad and Tobago, where its body, mind and soul was resident.  So that there is a 
case for the contribution from British American but not to the same extent as there is 
in respect of CLICO Trinidad.”440 
 
Here is the point of contradiction that many persons claimed. There was indeed a 
company that was a branch of the British American Insurance Company (Trinidad) 
Limited legally registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines as the British American 
Insurance Company Limited. Some claimed that policyholders and other stakeholders 
were effectively dealing at some point with an entity that was not legally entitled to 
do business in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. As an Associate member of 
CARICOM and a more established offshore financial jurisdiction, the “British Virgin 
Islands Financial Services Commission”441 in 2009 issued a “warning against CL 
Group Ltd.”442 It appears to be unclear as to which corporate entity was targeted.  
 
One of the major institutional investors in the state was mindful of such a distinction 
among companies. The Building and Loan Association gave recognition to two 
distinct entities that existed namely, “the British American Insurance Company 
(Trinidad) Limited...and British American Insurance Company Limited (BAICO) 
Limited, a Bahamian company which owned and operated branches in the OECS.”443 
BAICO Trinidad was mentioned as being part of the Investment portfolio of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120327/business/business3.html -19 April, 2018 – 
Prime Minister of St. Vincent Dr. Ralph Gonsalves also said, “Trinidad and Tobago 
contravene the CARICOM treaty and allow oil rich twin island republic to treat its nationals 
favourably following the collapse of Colonial Life Insurance Company and subsidiary, British 
American Insurance Co. Ltd (BAICO)” 
441 www.bvifsc.vg/ - accessed 18 February 2019 
442www.bvifsc.vg/News/tabid/160/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/60/language/en-
US/Default.aspx - accessed 18 - 21 September 2019 
443Saint Vincent Building & Loan Association 70th Annual Report of the Directors and 
Statement of Accounts (December 31, 2010) 56 - 57.  
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Building and Loan Association. Some stakeholders made mention of the existence of 
a British American Insurance Company - the Bahamian Company, but this was 
wound up and was insolvent. Its branches were placed under judicial management 
during 2009.  
 
Administration of the British American Company in St. Vincent 
At all material times the different stages within the transaction process were strictly 
adhered to as would be explained. The administration of British American Insurance 
Company Limited on St. Vincent was comprised of a sales and administrative unit 
stationed on the island. A group service company namely the British American 
Insurance Company from Trinidad and Tobago supported them.  It was discovered 
that the British American Insurance Company Limited on St. Vincent received 
application forms for insurance products.  Policyholders were told that they would 
then be sent to British American Insurance Company Trinidad and Tobago.  This was 
done on a weekly basis where they were processed.  A copy of all successful 
application forms was returned to the local office where they were kept.  British 
American Insurance Company (Trinidad and Tobago) also retained cheques issued on 
the “Branch” bank accounts.  
 
Duplicate copies of such documentation were then sent to British American Insurance 
Company Trinidad and Tobago, where the claims were processed, adjusted and 
approved, where appropriate. Cheques in respect of the payment of policyholder 
claims were issued by British American Insurance Company Trinidad and Tobago, 
and sent to British American Insurance Company Limited on St. Vincent for onward 
distribution to policyholders.  British American Insurance Company Limited on St. 
Vincent made a number of small value claims payments, which were reimbursed out 
of the British American Insurance Company head office account.  
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Financial Records 
 ‘QuickBooks’ was accounting software into which British American Insurance 
Company Limited (St. Vincent) staff input data relating to the payment of local 
expenses and very limited payroll (security staff).  Information supporting these 
transactions was sent to British American Insurance Company Trinidad and Tobago 
for duplication on their accounting system on a weekly or monthly basis.  British 
American Insurance Company Trinidad and Tobago maintained a set of records for 
British American Insurance Company Limited (St Vincent) that included the 
information contained on QuickBooks but also other transactions including payment 
of head office and central expenses, claims, premium refunds, annuities and maturing 
policies and loans.  
 
The Administrative Supervisor was the main accounting resource in British American 
Insurance Company Limited (St Vincent) who oversees and maintains control of the 
daily operations, for example, the recording and issuance of cheques and the issuance 
of policy documentation, and provided information to British American Insurance 
Company Trinidad and Tobago. The management of British American Insurance 
Company Limited (St Vincent) was sent credit control reports and was responsible for 
the collection of overdue premiums.   Bank accounts of the British American 
Insurance Company Limited (St Vincent) operated four bank accounts:   
Ø One account, known as the Home Office account, which was an Eastern 
Caribbean (EC) Dollar denominated account with the Royal Bank of Trinidad and 
Tobago Bank Caribbean Limited in St Vincent. 
Ø Three accounts were also known as the District Accounts with First Caribbean 
International Bank.   
Ø Two accounts were denominated in EC Dollars and one was in United States 
Dollars. 
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The Home Office bank account was primarily used by BAICO Trinidad and Tobago 
for the receipt of monies deposited which was used by British American Insurance 
Company Limited (St Vincent) to lodge cash received directly into the office.  This 
underscores a symbiotic relationship between the parent company and its branch. 
(British American Insurance Company Limited Trinidad and Tobago supported all the 
transactions made through British American Insurance Company Limited (St Vincent) 
to CLICO/CL Financial). These intergroup transactions were received by CL 
Financial Limited ultimately. 
 
The role of the Shareholder domiciled in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
There was the claim made that there was evidence of deal making and compromise by 
CL Financials, CLICO and BAICO. There were the organized public forum and 
discussions on the role of the shareholder locally. While the discussions raged 
especially among those who sought to make the issue a political one, the 
understanding of the role of shareholders locally provoked further debates. 
Government sought to persuade individuals who had a stake in the British American 
Insurance Company Limited to be patient and to wait on the outcome of the report of 
the judicial manager.  The entire network of companies in CARICOM was placed 
under judicial management. In St. Vincent the report did little to quell the fears of the 
stakeholder community. 
 
Corporate governance executed in the main company will in effect be the corporate 
governance exemplified in the branch of the company. While the branch in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines was not directly in the deal making or were represented at 
board levels, the decisions made by shareholders at CL Financials affected the 
direction and control of the British American Insurance Company Limited in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. Its operations, decisions and execution of its daily 
corporate governance practices were affected by the results of any deal making, 
investment and or other operations executed by shareholders in CL Financial Limited 
located miles away in sister island of Trinidad and Tobago. 
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If followed as far as was possible, and coupled with the rights conferred through the 
unanimous shareholder agreement, it would be challenging to assess whether 
corporate governance was evaded or avoided. The other point is established in 
Salomon v Salomon that of separate legal personality. The company at law was a 
juristic person, distinct and separate from its directors even if they were the hands and 
feet of the company with whom they had worked. If and only if some form of 
litigation was to be levelled against this current company, the basic principle of 
separate legal personality was the very same on which the English company law was 
premised. 
 
Upon incorporation, the corporate governance of each corporate entity becomes 
established notwithstanding that corporate governance in St. Vincent did not begin as 
a creature of legislation. With respect to this notion of separate legal identity that the 
company possesses upon incorporation, its corporate governance remained bound 
inextricably to this notion. As such any lack, disregard or absence of best practices 
must be addressed accordingly. The established rule in Salomon v Salomon provided 
a precedent that a shareholder could not be held liable for debts over and above their 
capital contribution to the company. The question is whether the same principle can 
serve as a precedent when addressing the lack, disregard or absence of best practices.  
The matter to be addressed is whether shareholders or directors could be held liable 
for bad practices that result in financial loss to a company. 
 
According to the Cadbury Report, corporate governance in the context of the private 
limited liability company limited is a system by which companies are directed and 
control. Corporate governance within the private limited liability company limited by 
shares is the sum total of those external influences upon the system as to how; why, 
when and where such companies were directed and controlled. Such influences 
include but were not limited to a country’s cultural, social and political philosophy.  
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The aforementioned influences help to shape the quality and capability of the internal 
corporate environment of the company irrespective of its physical location. That 
internal environment ought to be an enabling one for best practices but it can also be 
one that has a laissez faire approach towards its own corporate governance. Hence, 
the lack, absence or disregard of corporate governance best practices will be 
detrimental to its own financial growth and contributory to the economic development 
of the nation state in which the private companies are located. 
 
The various boards within the private limited liability companies limited by shares 
were free to drive their companies forward.  It was expected by governments that the 
exercise of that freedom within the legislative framework would have bestowed a 
climate that fostered effective accountability.  This was the quintessence of best 
practices of corporate governance. It was not just the majority shareholder or paid 
director but at law, all directors remain the responsible agents for the stewardship of 
the assets of the company; the monitoring the activities of this company so that it 
operated according to its constitution. Although international best practices were 
prevalent, the CL Financial group disintegrated and created systemic failure.  
 
The challenge its directors had was that they neglected to pay particular attention as to 
how, “the widespread impact of the CL Financial failure within the Caribbean has 
compelled market participants to gain awareness about the financial risks to which 
they are exposed when they make investment decisions within the Caribbean where 
financial conglomerates have grown in terms of size and prominence.” 444  The 
countries of the Caribbean included, “the Bahamas, Barbados; ECCU; Guyana and 
Trinidad and Tobago.”445   
 
The fact that “judicial management” became an imperative for the affected companies 
within the Caribbean proved once again that the region was not inoculated from the 
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445Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance, Newsletter - Vol V1 No1 (January 2013) 2- 3 
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magnitude of corporate collapses.  For instance, the “case of Jamaica;”446 in Antigua 
and Barbuda, the collapse of the Stanford Group was described by journalists as this: 
“In recent years, individuals who have had their ears close to the ground in 
CARICOM’s financial accounting, business, professional, and other expert circles, 
could not avoid being aware of the sordid doubts and deep misgivings swirling around 
corporate governance at the Stanford Financial Group.”447 The “difficulties of CLICO 
here demonstrate a lack of corporate governance and a weakness on the part of people 
who are supposed to oversee the corporations.”448   
 
The CLF and Stanford cases would suggest that a good rule for the conservative 
investor is to avoid private companies whose “governance structures may be weak if 
they exist at all.”449 Further, DaCosta et al in their assessment of recent financial 
failures in the Caribbean identified “imprudent behaviour”450 within the context of 
that rapid growth of business within a holding company structure.  Similarly, they 
noted the departure from primary business lines and the liquidity challenges that 
“erupted in a fiscal storm.”451 The common theme that runs through all of these 
collapses among other things was that the private limited liability company was a 
prominent financial vehicle.   
 
The disregard, lack or absence of corporate governance was evident in all of these 
cases especially related to the “insurance companies”452 that were at the heart of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Tennant, David, Lessons learnt by the survivors of Jamaica's financial sector crisis, 
Savings and Development Vol 111 No 1 (2006) 5 - 22 
447www.idsguyana.org/articles/prof-clive-thomas/global-crisis/60-the-stanford-financial-
group-scandals-and-scams.html - accessed 1 September, 2015 and 12 January 2017 
448 www.broadstreetjournalbarbados.com/2011-03-22/clico-and-corporate-governance - 
accessed 30 August, 2015 and 27 March 2017 
449 www.businessinsightcaribbean.com/documents/1086.pdf - accessed on 31 August, 2015 
and 8 May 2017 
450Da Costa, Michael, Grenade, Kari, Polius, Tracy, The Caribbean: Rethinking Policy 
Frameworks in the wake of the recent financial failures (Da Costa Associates/CBB/CCMF 
2012) 2  
451 Ibid 
452www.caribbean360.com/news/bailout-for-cl-financial-before-tt-parliament; 
www.bnamericas.com/news/insurance/CL_Financial_Roundup:_Guyana,_Bahamas,_Trinida
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financial crises. Interestingly, it is the same structure, under a different name, the 
“Sun Group Inc., bought 100% of the shares of CLICO International General 
Insurance Ltd in February 2012 and immediately took full control of the company.”453 
In retrospect, “a handbook on what corporate governance is not;”454serves to remind 
of what constitutes the new thinking on what aspects of corporate governance that 
were highlighted.   
 
In St. Vincent and the Grenadines was another emerging financial crisis consequential 
to CLICO that challenged the legislative framework of Vincentian company law.  The 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Financial Services Authority advised that its 
interpretation and adherence to best practices of corporate governance was contingent 
on “international best practices”455as espoused by the OECD and commented on by 
Paul Davies. The latter was adamant that company law addresses three main problems 
associated with principal/agent and the associated relationships specific to board 
composition. 
 
 It does appear that in this current financial crisis, board composition and 
effectiveness may have created angst coupled with the business model and hence the 
situation is what it has become. This current financial crisis was likened to one that 
was never experienced previously and that, “There are incidences of such poor 
practices in a number of systematically important financial services entities in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines which if they continue to persist could result in losses to 
shareholders, depositors and the public [as] a whole.”456  
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Visit to the site of the British American Insurance Company Limited, then what? 
Its office was located at the LA Lewis Building at James Street in capital city 
Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. This site was visited in 2012 but access 
was not possible.  Normal business has ceased at the time of the study undertaken.  
There were nine members of staff.  They were employed through British American 
Insurance Company Limited, with their employment contracts held at British 
American Insurance Company Trinidad and Tobago.  It was not possible to get a copy 
of any of those contracts.  Local sales agents were known to sell policies and did so 
within an atmosphere that was quite competitive. They were employed as independent 
contractors and were not salaried employees of British American Insurance Company. 
 
That Anglo American Model, but whose interests were protected, if at all? 
The management of the CLICO/BAICO had to be in the best interests of the 
shareholders of the company.  Within the Anglo American Model of corporate 
governance, the protection of those interests was critical. The interventions by 
governments and takeovers and acquisitions or anticipated acquisitions hold well for 
the Anglo American Model.  The shareholders’ best interests’ were always measured 
against those who managed the company.  
 
In the complicated cases brought against shareholder of the CL Financial Group, the 
workings of the Anglo American Model of corporate governance allowed for due 
process of the law. This was where as a shareholder of the same class such that, “the 
shareholders of CL Financial get to retain assets with a value estimated at $1.6 
billion, with the Government recovering an estimated $15.1 billion from the sale 
of CLF assets and third-party creditors being settled to the tune of $16.3 
billion”457 would benefit along with him.  Due to the nature of this matter, there was 
heightened media coverage throughout the region and internationally. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 www.guardian.co.tt/news/2013-07-26/big-benifit - accessed 11 October 2019 
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The matter of disclosure and transparency were also critical to the Anglo American 
Model on corporate governance. Relationships had to be managed throughout.  There 
were executive management and shareholders given the crises. There was the notion 
that risk and what appeared to be fraudulent activities within a series of private 
limited liability companies. Management was unable to prevent such problems for a 
number of reasons. The controlled environment that should have existed was not 
evident. 
 
The scale of commercial activities across more than half of one hundred companies in 
more than twenty countries without proper controls, disclosure and transparency 
erupted in this contagion. The role of the audit committee was critical to this process 
in that it was spearheaded by the board of directors and charged with such 
responsibilities.  They functioned according to the mandate at law as an oversight 
body for financial reporting and disclosure.  Some board members were part of this 
committee as well as independent outside directors and a qualifying financial export 
who understood the functioning of the private limited liability company limited by 
shares.  They were to ‘ensure that the interests of shareholders are properly protected 
in relation to financial reporting and internal control.’ 
 
It was unclear whether there was a strong oversight body such as an audit committee 
within the grouping of CLICO/BAICO.  Such a liaison should have existed between 
the board, external auditors, internal auditors, the finance director and others.  This 
proper functioning of this committee would have a safeguarding effect by ensuring 
that all financial statements of the company were released to the shareholders and 
other stakeholders most accurately.  It was unclear whether the members of the audit 
committee had the requisite knowledge on the matters that touched and concerned 
internal controls. 
 
Consistent with the narrowest of definitions of corporate governance, there was a bias 
towards shareholder primacy as opposed to stakeholders’ benefits within the 
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corporate entity.  Stakeholders generally have recourse through contractual 
agreements other than reliance on corporate decision-making processes within the 
company. Sometimes such decisions and resulting activities are unpredictable.  The 
shareholders within the private limited liability companies limited by shares carry the 
risks associated with investments. It was argued that shareholders must of necessity 
have the primary as stakeholders within the three dimensional organs of the company.  
 
Given the mandate and emphasis on foreign direct investments, the present 
“Government remains committed to the further development of the International 
Financial Services Sector as a viable component of its economic diversification 
thrust.”458  Comparatively speaking, it was a small but significant number of private 
limited liability companies limited by shares that were responsible for the contagion 
and the damaging effects on the nature of corporate governance within the state.  
These companies were registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and in Trinidad 
and Tobago.   
 
While the company in Trinidad and Tobago could not be classified otherwise, its 
ownership structure and its relationship to the company in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines was held accountable for the existing nature of corporate governance in 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The collapse of the institutions of shareholders, 
directors and the company in meetings could not evade the effects of what some 
called the two edged sword of possible risk and fraud. 
 
The Shareholder 
The shareholder’s right was to exercise ownership rights to the shares contained in the 
company and to protect that investment and this was key to the Anglo American 
Model of corporate governance with emphasis on its unitary board. The interest of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 National Report - St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Third International Conference on 
Small Island Developing States (Ministry of Health, Wellness and the Environment, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines July 2013) 16 
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shareholder remained paramount.  Ownership of shares and the ability of the owner of 
those shares to protect such investment were clearly demonstrated in this particular 
situation with CLICO/BAICO. However, the challenge arose when a separation of 
ownership of shares and the management of how those shares were invested created 
an imbalance.  Ownership separate from those who controlled the entity was 
fundamental to corporate governance best practices. Over time, the owner of shares 
became the controller of the management to the extent that dominance was the normal 
occurrence. 
 
Share ownership structure – dispersed or concentrated? 
The “shareholder”459 had the right afforded him at law to monitor and control the 
company but with discretion and in so doing, to exercise fiduciary responsibilities. 
Share ownership should have been widely dispersed but due to the complexity in 
structure in this case, share ownership was not considered widely dispersed. Even 
though institutional shareholders had a strong presence, the majority shareholder was 
still the majority shareholder that was critical to the functioning of the many 
companies. The unanimous shareholder agreement is discussed in greater details 
subsequently in this chapter.  
 
Institutional shareholders although impacted on the efficiency of the Anglo American 
model, in this case it did not make a difference to the composition of the institutional 
investor.  They were representative of smaller investors but not to the point where 
there was no major challenge to the majority shareholder or to distort efficiency of the 
Anglo American model. There was no challenge to any managerial misconduct to 
date. This might prove to be quite controversial even by institutional investors who 
have lost significant financial worth. The question still remains as to whether this 
challenge would lead to matters that pertain to managerial accountability. It did 
appear that the fixed term strategies commensurate with fixed term annuities and 
other products drove a number of institutional shareholders to relax their influence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 See Chapter One for “Explanation of terms – shareholders” 
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and challenges that could have been made towards greater managerial accountability. 
Actions such as selling of shareholding were preferred to engage in monitoring and or 
supervision of management by institutional shareholders. There was another 
observation in what could be called a trade off between institutional shareholders in 
that role and the role of investor of funds. 
 
Many institutional shareholders were lax in reconciling both roles given that the 
private limited liability company went further and accumulated additional assets 
through listed companies. On one hand they were institutional investors and were 
unable to reconcile such roles with being investors of funds.  Profit maximization was 
their primary focus but when faced with the challenges of mismanagement of the 
funds they invested, they choose to sell rather than to hold management to account.  
They may not have been motivated to do so without additional support. 
 
Shareholders needed to be protected at all material times. The corporate directors and 
managers remained accountable to their shareholders especially the majority 
shareholder.  Shareholders worked assiduously as monitors over the manager and 
senior executives of the company in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and others. This 
was made possible through the statutory rights available and those acquired at 
common law.  
 
The company in meeting is another major organ of the company where shareholders 
have the right to control the management of the company.  This remained their 
statutory right to vote on decisions at the Annual General Meetings.  Shareholders 
were informed of the future and previous activities of the company.  Copies of 
accounts as well as the new fiscal information for the previous year or years were 
presented.  They asked questions of the board and the executive management. 
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Shareholders are responsible for the election of the board of directors and at law this 
mechanism provides for a check on managerial actions of the board of directors and 
executive management.  Shareholders participated in discussions that touch and 
concern the welfare of the company and voted on important affairs that related to the 
company.  Up to 2009 a record of these were recorded in the minutes of the meetings 
and compiled in booklet form with the substantive and detailed statement of financial 
accounts yearly.  
 
To place a restraint on mismanagement of the company and to protect their interests, 
the shareholder’s right to vote at the Annual General Meeting remained crucial.  
Especially so, the minority shareholder also has rights that were categorically clear 
given the financial distress experienced through this company. The number of 
minority shareholders cannot be determined given the complexity of transactions. 
Given the crisis it was presumed that these three main mechanisms of cumulate 
voting, appraisal rights and shareholder’s derivative action were utilized at some 
point. In this instance, a classic case did see a suit against “directors who were also 
shareholders”460 being started in the Trinidad and Tobago courts.  In addition, judicial 
intervention mentioned elsewhere in this chapter was believed to be a critical element 
in good corporate governance practices. 
 
4.3 The critical role of the Unanimous Shareholder Agreement 
The use of the “unanimous shareholder agreement”461 when discussed provoked a 
further awareness on the associated laws. News came that CL Financial Group was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460  www.guardian.co.tt/business/2013-01-30/duprey-named-lawsuit-against-bipa - accessed 
on 7 August 2019; see also Appendix 2(2) as the claim was made that Mr. Duprey benefitted 
personally from being a shareholder in the company of CLICO/BAICO; See also Appendix 2 
(8) for Assets for CLICO in excess of $11 billion dollars; See also Appendix 2 (12) for 
additional information on assets apparently used by shareholder.  The information was in the 
public domain and used to highlight the allocation of some of the funds of the company. 
Although this was mentioned in the newspapers, there were statements from Ministers of the 
government in Trinidad and Tobago to corroborate the unfolding and erupting issue of 
corporate governance best practices gone awry amidst international and domestic financial 
turmoil. 
461 Trinidad and Tobago Companies Act 1995, s. 137 
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attempting to salvage its building – Lascelles deMercado head office located in New 
Kingston while limited information surfaced about the plight of stakeholders. The 
impression was that CL Financials brokered other deals elsewhere in the Caribbean 
and through its complex networks. 
 
Although not harmonized, company law throughout the region generally provide for 
explanations of corporate behaviour so that, interpretation of the causes and effects of 
alleged corporate misconduct and the impact on nature of the corporate governance 
can still be scrutinized effectively and primarily so for both Trinidad and Tobago and 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines. It must be remembered though, that the legal notion 
still exist with respect to the Ltd as possessing its own 'legal persona' and “was 
regarded as a person in law, it can only function through the humans who are running 
the business in which the company is involved.”462    
 
Alleged “fraud and misconduct” 463  have been written, with respect to the 
CLICO/BAICO/CLF affair.   What was not clear, still, was whether at law, exactly 
who or what was to be held accountable for corporate misconduct if at all.  This was 
further compounded by ministerial “statements”464 being made about  “intra group 
funding;”465 accrued mutual benefits; economic efficiency of CLICO and the recent 
call by major shareholder to give back the company to the person who started it in the 
first place. It was more than a presumption that there was a lack, disregard or absence 
of corporate governance best practices.  It was quite remarkable that similar difficulty 
did arise in current discussions as to the exact relationship between shareholders and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462 Dine, Janet, Koutsias, Marios, Company Law (Palgrave Macmillan publishers, UK 2014) 
10 
463www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Statement-From-The-Office-Of-THE-Attorney-General-on-
CL-Financial-Group-181152451.html - accessed 9 July 2019 
464 www.bahamaislandsinfo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=34:Ba
hamas%20National%20News&id=2474:prime-minister-gives-statement-on-clico-bahamas-
situation&Itemid=147 - accessed on 10 November 2013 and 9 July 2017 
465 www.guardian.co.tt/business-guardian/2012-08-15/dookeran-comes-clean-clico-bailout - 
accessed 21 October, 2013; see also 
www.clfhcuenquiry.org/Core/Core%20Bundle%20Item%208/8a-22.pdf - accessed 2 
September, 2015 and 9 July 2017 
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this legal fiction - the company itself. Under English law, to which the Caribbean 
adhered for more than two centuries, definitions proved to be intractable where it has 
been described previously as “term[s] of polite invective;”466  “a mere nominee;”467 “a 
mere fraud,”468 an “agent,”469and “a trustee.”470 The matter rested on the same 
question raised by many over the years, “to whom are directors' duty owed?”471 
 
One should not forget that according to black letter law, the company at law does not 
belong to its major shareholder or a director or its Chief Executive Officer. 
Shareholders invested or raised capital for the purpose of insurance business venture 
and those shareholders at law have a great measure of “immunity.”472 In the case of 
Trinidad and Tobago, the exception was to shareholders within an “unlimited liability 
company.”473 In the instance case with the private limited liability company in 
Trinidad and Tobago and its branch in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the role of the 
shareholders remained a critical component to this study.    
 
The analyses provided perspectives on the law and economics with respect to a person 
being the “largest single shareholder.”474 It is quite remarkable that currently, there 
has been a call by the largest single shareholder of CLICO TT, to 'give him back his 
company.'   One must remember that the company does not belong to the individual 
but rather share ownership determined the structure of shareholding.  Control of a 
company by a single shareholder creates a particular point of analysis among 
companies that are privately held.  A majority shareholder can achieve passage of 
resolution in their favour in as much as there was a majority vote.  Such a shareholder 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 I.R.C. v Sansom [1921] 2 K.B. 492 @ 514 (C.A) 
467Broderip v. Salomon [1895] 2 Ch. 323 @ 330  
468 Ibid, 331 
469 Ibid 338 
470 Ibid, 339 
471Mantysaari, Petri, Comparative Corporate Governance: Shareholders as a Rule Maker 
(Springer Berlin - Germany 2005) 167 
472 Op. cit. [St. Vincent Companies Act] s. 56; Op. cit. [Trinidad Companies Act] s. 58 
473 [Trinidad Companies Act] s. 58 
474www.stabroeknews.com/2013/news/regional/07/26/duprey-to-benefit-financially-from-
clico-deal/ - accessed in 19 July 2019 
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can influence minority shareholders and or at best this is done through a unanimous 
shareholder agreement. The person who makes a minority investment into a company 
does so at his/her own risk and at the risk of a controlling shareholder. 
 
Additional comparative analyses point to the fact that “unanimous shareholder 
agreements”475 may be entered into, as was the case with the “CLICO GROUP of 
companies."476 Therefore, whether the shareholder's agreement prevailed over and 
effectively amended the Articles of Association was critical. For instance, 
“remuneration"477 of officers was subject to the unanimous shareholder agreements as 
well as bylaws and articles. If the "act or the unanimous shareholder agreements 
required a greater number of votes,"478 this should still be subject to the unanimous 
shareholder agreements. The role of the unanimous shareholder agreements was 
therefore significant. "If a company or guarantor of an obligation of the company, that 
company or guarantor cannot assert against the company or any person of the 
company"479that may have rights under the unanimous shareholder agreements, the 
company's bylaws and its articles.    
 
Laws of two countries 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago are analysed to show that 
similar provisions are made with respect to the unanimous shareholder agreements 
The only difference is with respect to identified sections but the construction is 
generally similar or the same in intent and meaning.  For the purposes of avoiding 
duplication, references in this first instance would be predominantly to the Companies 
Act of Trinidad and Tobago.  The “shares issued”480 are also subject to the unanimous 
shareholder agreements as well as “amendments of the bylaws”481 were also subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 See fn 457, s. 58; s.135 
476 www.afraraymond.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/mou21.pdf (Memorandum of 
Understanding 21) as per filed - accessed 5 May, 2019 – unstable link  
477 See fn 460, s. 104; Op. cit. [Trinidad Companies Act] s. 106 
478 Op. cit. [Trinidad Companies Act] s.10 ss. 1 
479 Ibid, s. 25 (a) 
480 Ibid, s. 33 ss.1 
481 Ibid, s. 66 ss 1 
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to the unanimous shareholder agreements Within the unanimous shareholder 
agreements, there was provision for "elections or appointment of directors"482 by 
classes of creditors or employees; and most importantly for the “management of 
companies.”483   
 
The “designation of officers”484  are also subject to the unanimous shareholder 
agreements unless otherwise provided for the “directors fiduciary responsibilities”485 
and duty of care to the company.  It is also critical that "every director and officer 
'shall comply' with"486 the unanimous shareholder agreements. It may be deemed 
strong language that is used which may 'breed litigation' but 'shall comply' denotes a 
mandatory obligation.  The question arises though, as to whether compliance could be 
demanded or mandated.  
 
Amendments of bylaws 
With respect to Vincentian Company law,  “amendments of bylaws;”487 the “articles 
or the unanimous shareholder agreements to provide for election or appointment of 
directors;”488 the “designation of officers;”489the delegation of “borrowing powers”490 
are all subject to the unanimous shareholder agreements Other vital areas that touch 
and concern management of the company are “remuneration;”491 “annual financial 
returns to be published;”492 the unanimous shareholder agreements to “form part of 
the company records;”493 “shareholders has access to a copy”494 of the unanimous 
shareholder agreements, “an order can be made to restrain the conduct complained of, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 Ibid, s. 71 ss. 8 
483 Ibid, s. 60 ss. 1 
484 Ibid, s. 97 
485 Ibid, s. 98 
486 Ibid s. 99 ss.5 
487 St. Vincent Companies Act 1994 s. 64 
488 Ibid, s. 69 ss. 8 
489 Ibid, s. 95 
490 Ibid, s. 96 
491 Ibid s. 104 
492 Ibid s. 148 ss c 
493 Ibid, s. 177 ss. 1 
494 Ibid, s. 190 ss. 1 
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and or to regulate the company's affairs to amend”495 the unanimous shareholder 
agreements  “a person can apply to the court to have a restraining order if in conduct 
they do not comply with”496 the unanimous shareholder agreements ; and that the 
unanimous shareholder agreements  dictates that “a certificate issued by the company 
can be signed by a director.”497 
 
Through the use of the unanimous shareholder agreements there is a fetter or 
interference with the discretion of directors in the exercise of their powers to manage 
the private limited liability company.  As privy to the unanimous shareholder 
agreements, the shareholders then become fiduciaries having accrued rights, powers, 
duties and the liabilities of the directors.  Alternative to this is the Articles of 
Association.  These too may in whole or in part, place restrictions on the powers of 
directors to manage the business and the affairs of the company.  What is operative in 
the CLICO/BAICO scenario was the consistency of the historical role played by the 
Articles of Association as per Companies Acts in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and 
Trinidad and Tobago.  This was inherited from the English system and the 
determinant is that shareholders do not automatically become fiduciaries with respect 
to decisions on matters restricted by the Articles.  
 
The only contract among members is a statutory one where the “company itself is 
included by reference to the registered documents” and to no other documents. The 
articles of association supposedly 'gave' contractual effect by the law to subscribers. 
The need for other regulation within company law was sufficient to bolster the claims 
of the nexus of contracts.  It is also sufficient to acknowledge that the “unanimous 
shareholder agreements ”498was one of the vehicles used by CLICO/BAICO with the 
effect at stabilizing a group of companies in the financial interests of government, 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 Ibid, s. 241 ss. 3 (a) 
496 Ibid, s. 248 
497 Ibid, s. 500 
498Trinidad and Tobago Companies Act 1995  - s. 136, s.137 - Unanimous Shareholder 
Agreements 
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Articles of Association 
In trying to understand some aspects of corporate governance, the articles of 
association carry with them the procedural outline on how companies were to be 
directed and controlled. Attention is now drawn to this common law device. The 
constitutions of these private limited liability companies were comprised of bylaws, 
unanimous shareholder agreement and regulations. Coupled with this is the 
unanimous shareholder agreements alluded to earlier. Comparative analyses of both 
the Companies Law of Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
demonstrated that there were consistencies and similarities between these instruments 
that provided guidance on who controls and directs the company. CL Financials 
utilized both the unanimous shareholder agreements and the articles fully as they 
pertain to “joint ventures.”499 The idea was that a strong economic entity within the 
Caribbean region could not be enabled otherwise.  
 
Articles being subject to amendments would necessitate “resolutions” to be passed.  It 
is implied that an amendment would normally take effect from the date that it is 
registered by the Registrar and not before.  This is a specific statutory mandated 
procedure.  The members of CLF/BAICO did enter into several shareholders 
agreement and the question arises as to whether the shareholders agreement prevail 
over and could effectively amend the Articles of Association.  The “courts has no 
jurisdiction to rectify Articles of Association of a company although they do not 
accord with what is proved to have been the concurrent intention of all signatories 
therein at the moment of signature.”500 
 
Verification of information became convoluted at times given that the current status 
of the crisis was still within the courts, as to the financial viability of the entity that 
was once CL Financial Limited to which the British American Insurance Company 
Limited belonged.  Similar to other entities, in St. Vincent the British American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499www.ccmf-uwi.org/files/publications/companies_profiles/CL_Financial_Limited.pdf - 
accessed on 29 August 2019 – Available in pdf format 
500 Scott v Frank F. Scott (London) Limited [1940] Ch 794 
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Insurance Company Limited was subject to “Judicial management.”501  Again, the 
media was very much responsible for extracting pertinent pieces of alleged financial 
misconduct, giving their own judgment.   
 
The OECS and its leaders were responsible for drafting a “rescue plan” so that there 
was a containment of further crises. Structured discussions were conducted 
comprehensively with some who claimed to be policyholders and other members of 
the general public throughout St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  As the crisis unfolded, 
it affected many stakeholders (individual and institutional). Information about 
“genteel poverty” and the status of the crisis was readily available on a weekly basis 
in some instances and were accessible through electronic and printed media.   
 
Gap in scholarship 
There was a gap in scholarship on the nature of corporate governance within the 
private limited liability companies limited by shares in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. Some publications were about corporate governance generally. As far as 
is known, with specific reference to private companies in St. Vincent, there were no 
written materials about any established causal link between the private limited 
liability Company limited by shares, “genteel poverty” and the bad practices of 
corporate governance. There was an absence of a similar study detailing the 
Vincentian experience given the contagion of the CL Financial Limited Company.  
 
If it was attempted, it was difficult to segregate the corporate entities as being 
independent of each other so that there was a symbiotic relationship between CL 
Financial Limited/British American Insurance Company and Colonial Life Insurance 
Company. They were legally and legitimately established in member states of the 
ECCU and the OECS. They were part of the network of companies and it became 
quite challenging to dismiss the ‘evidences’ that pointed to the lack, disregard and 
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absence of corporate governance best practices and the resultant effects among them. 
Shareholders, directors and the company in meetings that constituted the private 
limited liability companies limited by shares benefitted from intra group investments 
over the period under review. The reassessment of corporate governance models and 
best practices within this company, offered a greater perspective on the nature of 
corporate governance in the company itself and by extension in the country.  
 
The question as to who controlled what size of the shares, what was the value of those 
shares and by whom was the company supervised appeared to be a matter of 
guesswork upon closer analysis. Clearly lines of demarcation were blurred. A 
corporate governance statement appeared to be a mismatch. The closest to finding 
such a philosophical and workable objective on good governance of this company 
was within the mention of the words, “COMMITMENT to...good corporate 
governance; to balance the interest of Shareholders with those of other 
Stakeholders;”502 and further “to continue to develop and institutionalize corporate 
governance...”503 Beyond this it was anyone's guess as to who were the responsible 
agents for setting aright the corporate governance practices policies and principles. 
The statements for CL Financial Limited are replicated among its subsidiaries and its 
branches. 
 
The paradigm of the Business model 
It has been mentioned that the business model used by CL Financial was one that was 
flawed. The Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines commenting on the 
issue where CL Financials was practically holding for ransom, states and financial 
institutions within the OECS/CARICOM/the UK and where ever its tentacles 
extended, stated that,   
“...I mean we are not talking here about one million, two million, we are talking in the 
case of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) of in the region of EC$2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 Op. cit. [Annual Report of CL Financial Limited] 4 
503Ibid, 19  
	  
	  
	  
215	  
billion (US$800 million) in liabilities in CLICO Trinidad, CLICO Barbados and also 
British American.”504 
He further stated that this could be, 
“... translated into serious damage to a lot of people's lives and “a new species of 
poverty” known as “gentile poverty” that has enveloped this region as a consequence 
of the insurance debacle.”505 
The ‘jury’ was still out on whether the extent of damage inflicted would be 
recoverable and to what extent if at all would corporate governance best practices be 
reintroduced amidst the stress caused in peoples lives and livelihood. 
 
4.4 Lessons learnt 
The significance of the contagion created by CLICO/BAICO under the remit of CL 
Financial Limited was a corollary to another crisis from the CARICOM state of 
neighbouring Jamaica. The current situation was said to be “severe...a downturn in the 
real estate and stock markets rapidly resulted in illiquidity problems in the 
overexposed life insurance industry.”506  While there were no stock markets in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, it was still true to say that the overexposed life insurance 
industry through British American Insurance Company Limited was apparently 
caused by illiquidity problems generated by CLICO that had other companies and 
investments tied to the stock markets in Trinidad and Tobago. This decision on 
investment or divestment of funds is a management decision; it is part of the best 
practices.  
 
Up to the time of writing up this research, many persons continued to doubt whether 
or not they will see returns as proposed on their 'hard earned money'. Although 
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accessed on 16 February 2019 
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506 Morris, Verlis, Smith, Sashana Smith, Williams, Horatio, An Empirical Comparative 
Analysis of Financial Sector Crises in Asia and the Americas: American Charter of 
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governments in the region attempted to put measures in place to restore confidence in 
the financial sector, the damage was done. There was the new reality of “genteel 
poverty” in St. Vincent and the Grenadines that has to be addressed. Discussions were 
ongoing as to how to prevent any such similar crises within an already impoverished 
state and how to address poverty related issues to gain the maximum benefit. 
 
During the late nineties the world witnessed the “rise and burst...of the internet 
bubble.”507 More recently commencing in late 2008 and early 2009 the world saw 
what became known as the “global financial crisis” 508which was allegedly triggered 
by the US “subprime mortgage crisis”.509 The macroeconomic effect on St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines was devastating. The critical factor though, was that this current 
financial crisis disclosed severe limitations in the very nature of a company’s 
corporate governance. There was an inability to critically assess the impact of any 
delimitation placed on the branch British American Insurance Company Limited 
through to its shareholders and other stakeholders.  The modus operandi prevented 
this and the ability of the company to exercise its own redefinition of corporate 
governance specific to the nation state even if it was locally registered was under 
‘siege’ by the external management of CLICO. 
 
Parallels to the Vincentian experience and the wider CLICO/BAICO scenario were 
also drawn from the late nineties “Asian financial crisis”510 and other jurisdictions. An 
expressed “real fear,” as well as a sense that the current financial crises wreak havoc 
among the already vulnerable economies of the OECS was evident. This was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 Barfield, Claude, Leiduk, Gunter S, Welfens, J.J. Paul, Internet, Economic Growth and 
Globalization: Perspectives on the New Economy in Europe, Japan and the US (Springer - 
Verlag, Berlin 2003) 209 
508 Ciro, Tony, The Global Financial Crisis: Triggers, Responses and Aftermath 2008 - 
2009(MPG Books Group, UK 2012) 1 - 31 
509 Zandi, Mark, Financial Shock: A 360° look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion, and How 
to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis (Financial Times Press 2008) 9 - 11 for a discussion on 
what constitutes a subprime mortgage - a definition on page 9 as a 'loan made to someone 
with a weak or troubled credit history'. 
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expressed in a statement delivered by the Honourable Prime Minister of St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines on the matter.  He stated, “CLICO debacle could threaten 
CARICOM.”511  Similar to the negative spill offs from “financial contagion” in Asia 
there was a concern of Prime Ministers of other similar small states as well in that 
they, “have expressed strong concern for the plight of thousands of policyholders and 
investors affected across the region while insisting that justice must be done.”512 
 
Additionally, the lessons from the global financial economic downturn brought with 
them a debilitating effect on the world economies.  When placed against this 
backdrop, the economies of the OECS were exposed to even more serious systemic 
financial risks given the decisions by the conglomerate to interpret this downturn as 
an opportunity for management to invest still. The private limited liability companies 
limited by shares remained part of the financial system having been started as family 
concerns.  It does appear that ownership of the company may have been critical to the 
decision making process.  
 
Here, the decisions taken by management to invest may have been influenced from 
the standpoint of majority shareholders, and others who ‘owned’ the company. The 
IMF signalled this within this statement that, “the global economy is in a dangerous 
new phase. Global activity has weakened and become more uneven, confidence has 
fallen sharply recently, and downside risks are growing.”513The systemic shock 
created by the contagion of CL Financial Limited was representative of a spate of this 
weakened economic and financial system. 
 
Significantly too, the OECS with their open and fragile economies and shared 
vulnerabilities were quite adamant that occurrences of financial collapse were 
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unprecedented. Nearly three years on from the collapse, Prime Minister Dr. Ralph E. 
Gonsalves insisted that the CL Financial contagion created the situation in St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines that, “the total exposure amounted to 16 per cent GDP for ECCU 
countries,”514 and that it also translated into “serious damage to a lot of people's lives” 
and “a new species of poverty” known as “genteel poverty”515 has enveloped this 
region as a ‘consequence of the insurance debacle.’ The insurance company is the 
identified juridical body that bears great significance in this matter. 
 
The British American Insurance Company Limited was a branch of the 
BAICO/CLICO alliance. The distinguishing element was that all these companies 
were private limited liability companies limited by shares.  “All offices of BAICO in 
the ECCU are branch offices”516 of CLICO. The CLICO business (also a shareholder 
in CL Financials Limited) within the Caribbean region was managed and 
administered by CL Financial Limited. CLICO remained a “financially troubled 
insurance company”517to many. Just recently attempts to “recapitalised and sell 
part”518 has projected the company into the media.  St. Vincent and the Grenadines as 
well as other OECS territories where its branches were located experienced an 
unprecedented shock.  
 
This was a seminal Caribbean phenomenon as it was afforded a place among the 
'accounts' of the region that was referred to as “A history of events.”519 There was a 
complexity of a number of issues with CL Financial Limited such as ownership 
structure, size and the range of activities that were connected with the Colonial Life 
Insurance (Trinidad and Tobago) Limited (CLICO) and its said parent company.  Six 
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515 See Chapter One – for Explanation of terms - definition on genteel poverty 
516 Update on the ECCU response to issues relating to British American Insurance Company 
and CLICO in the Eastern Caribbean - accessed on 19 April 2019 (Available as a pdf/Media 
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517www.guardian.co.tt/business-guardian/2012-09-12/clico-being-undervalued - accessed on 
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years on from the date of its collapse that took place in 2009, the related issues still 
plague the developmental efforts within the Caribbean region.  
 
“The CLICO meltdown”520 posed systemic risks not only to Trinidad and Tobago’s 
financial sector but also to St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the wider Caribbean. 
The effects were felt in all 15 CARICOM states.  Only Jamaica and Haiti escaped its 
contagion effect.  In Trinidad and Tobago the structure of its financial system 
suggests that between 2006 and 2010, “23% to 27% of its insurance companies”521 
account for the structure of its entire financial system.  
 
There was some indication as to the viability of the insurance sector, where in 2010,  
“…despite the subdued economic climate, low interest rates and the inactivity 
of Colonial Life Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited (CLICO) and British 
American Life Assurance Company (Trinidad) Limited (BA), the insurance 
sector (excluding CLICO and BA) reported growth in both premium income 
and assets...[but], there was some slippage in the overall performance of the 
non-life sector.”522  Significantly too, was that Trinidad and Tobago's risk 
exposure or the “cost net of assets could be as high as 10% of GDP or 
Trinidad and Tobago $13.6 billion.”523   Further, “Trinidad and Tobago T$7.3 
billion already injected”524 so far by the nation's government by way of a 
bailout.  In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, exposure was “17%  - 20% of 
GDP.”525   
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The government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines also “sought and received grants 
...$57 million to assist St. Vincent and the Grenadines BAICO policy-holders 
(traditional life and FPA/EPPA)...This number for St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
will rise to approximately $75 million of the full donation from Trinidad and Tobago 
of US $150 million (EC$405 million).”526  The argument could be that the bailout 
managed by both countries was perhaps contributory to halting an entire meltdown of 
local economies and by extension, within other CARICOM states. 
 
Based on information coming out of an inquiry in Trinidad and Tobago, it would 
seem that for years “corporate governance guidelines;” 527  and efficiency 
considerations were not called into question save and except to the vagaries of deal 
making; and there may be opportunities for renewed legal approaches with respect to 
the avoidance and evasion of legislative arrangements or regulations.   
 
Challenges  
To begin with, the researched information was challenging to document with some 
measure of 'finality' even though the time frame was specified.  It was still unfolding 
in the media with governments within the Caribbean region seeking to adhere to a 
unified approach.  Information was available within the public domain via electronic 
and printed media and this led to further thorough analyses, adjustments and 
comparisons.  Some documents and podcasts had to be revisited on line so as to check 
for updates.   
 
While on visits to the site, the contextual analyses undertaken were hampered by the 
fact that arranged visits and interviews with key stakeholders in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines did not materialize even after repeated visits.  One of the main reasons 
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was that there were major partisan political issues coming out of the contagion 
effects.  Consequently, words of caution were issued to the researcher as to how far 
the current research should or should not go.  Several visits to the building that 
housed British American Insurance Company Limited were undertaken and at those 
times of the visits, the offices remained closed to the general public.  It is likely that 
normal business has resumed since the last visit to the island was made, given that a 
“rescue plan”528 has been arranged to facilitate restoring confidence within the 
insurance sector. 
 
Beyond results 
A Code or Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Unlisted Companies in St. 
Vincent is deemed necessary to supplement the existing internationally accepted best 
practices. This should address some issues such as the modus operandi of companies 
like the insurance companies that should be held at a higher level of accountability. 
The "soft touch"529 to legislation and governance issues should inform a balanced 
approach especially to insurance companies that were engaged with direct contact 
with stakeholders who invested directly through purchase of financial products. A 
Code was proposed and forms part of the original thesis presentation. 
 
Secondly, although the government has taken a very serious approach towards 
redress, the further education of the stakeholders generally about the nature of 
corporate governance was a felt need. Levels of responsibility and accountability 
towards insurance companies should be a major part of on-going financial education 
offered more consistently and freely within the public domain. Further, practitioners 
within the field of insurance and the legal profession may find it necessary to lead on 
this as a matter of urgency. 
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The reform of the legislation with respect to regulation and supervision to deal with 
the private limited liability company limited by shares and especially towards 
conglomerates should probably be addressed as a matter of priority.  Other 
conglomerates or companies nearing such capacity should be monitored and be a 
priority of the corporate citizen. Additionally, there is a need for on-going debates and 
engagements among stakeholder groups about the nature of corporate governance.  
 
The dynamics of the influences from culture, economics and politics should feature 
greatly so as to give an appreciation of such factors and their contribution to an 
understanding of all corporate entities. This should be offered as added features 
within curriculum specifically designed for business ethics; corporate social 
responsibility; corporate governance; the company; the deed of settlement; the trust 
and other corporate structures. As part of the on-going education promoted through 
the education revolution, a greater emphasis on education for board members, 
shareholders and directors was seen as an imperative.  
 
Local and or regional educational institutions should be encouraged to design and 
deliver targeted programmes on qualifications for boards of directors to equip them in 
their jobs.  The fiduciary responsibilities of board members as enablers to function, 
was also priority. It was seen as critical that directors be persons of high integrity, 
independent in thinking and knowledgeable about financial products and services. 
When it comes to dealing with the public as it pertains to money, a greater sense of 
financial accountability and responsibility should be exercised at all cost.    
 
The regulatory framework for the insurance sector 
 The Insurance Act of 1966 governs the insurance sector in Trinidad and Tobago. 
Similar provisions are in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Central Bank in 
Trinidad took over supervision of the insurance sector in 2004. To address 
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shortcomings of the Act, the Central Bank issued Guidelines on matters including 
corporate governance, prudent lending, and claims handling. Financial returns are 
required quarterly, and companies are subject to on-site inspections roughly every one 
and a half [1½] years. Enforcement has been constrained by legal challenges to these 
Guidelines and the Act.    
 
Similarly according to the Commissioner of International Insurance, the insurance 
sector in St. Vincent and the Grenadines was under the control of the Offshore 
Finance Authority. The insurance regime did offer a great deal of flexibility to 
insurers wishing to conduct international insurance business. The sector was regulated 
by the International Insurance (Amendment and Consolidation) Act 1998. This came 
into effect on December 15, 1998 and, the International Insurance Regulations on 
June 22, 1999.  
 
These legislations were augmented, particularly by the International Business 
Companies Act 1996, as amended, and the Mutual Funds (Amendment) Act 1998 and 
generally by the other legislations, which governed the operations of the international 
financial sector. Together it was felt that these legislations did set the legal framework 
for the highest quality of regulatory and administrative processes. These were pivotal 
to fostering and maintaining full market participation, transparency and confidence.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
It was clear that this 'debacle' originating from the private limited liability companies 
headquartered in Trinidad and Tobago enveloped the entire Caribbean region. The 
insurance companies and more so the insurance sector in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines were severely compromised. There was an unprecedented financial crisis 
with its contagion that resulted in the loss of several thousands of East Caribbean 
dollars for a vast majority of Vincentian policyholders and many others who were part 
of the wider stakeholder community. 
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This situation has placed many at a disadvantage, which was rightly deemed unique. 
This species of poverty was called “genteel poverty”. The hypothesis claimed that 
“genteel poverty” was part of the nature of corporate governance in St. Vincent, 
which was the result of a lack, disregard or absence of corporate governance best 
practices within the insurance companies. The CL Financial Company Limited 
headquartered in neighbouring Trinidad and Tobago, with its complex structure of 
private limited liability companies limited by shares has a separate and independent 
legal personality from its shareholders.  
 
Nonetheless, the company at law can create a moral hazard for its stakeholders and if 
proved, can be held liable. Whether the directors and shareholders can be held liable 
for acts done by the company will be a matter for the court to decide within the 
interpretation of the British company laws and UK Company laws. The rights, 
obligations and or liabilities of this company may be held separate from its 
shareholders. Whether shareholders pursued economic purposes without any exposure 
or “risks or liabilities in one’s personal capacity”530were also matters for the courts.  
 
Issues examined in cases such as Adams v Cape Industries established at common law 
and developed through case law may surface again.  These would be issues such as 
“equitable remedies”531 for agency; the matter of fraud; the company being used as a 
façade or sham; group enterprise and injustice or unfairness.  Nonetheless although a 
few exceptions may exist, the rule established in Salomon v Salomon532 of separate 
legal personality remained as an uncompromising precedent. The issue of “piercing 
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531 Oh, Peter B., ‘Veil Piercing Unbound’ (2013) 93 B.U.L. Rev. 89 
532 [1897] AC 22 
	  
	  
	  
225	  
the veil of incorporation”533 and to what extent this may be used was also a matter 
that should occupy the minds of the legal experts. 
 
The matter of the regulatory and supervisory capacity and capability of the insurance 
sector was being addressed through a series of discussions and legislative reform. In 
addition, there were a number of inter-ministerial and inter governmental dialogue on 
the statutory regulations and reform for the corporate sector generally.  A Code on 
corporate governance was non-existent for unlisted companies. The researcher has 
proposed a corporate governance Code for these companies. This was submitted as 
part of the Appendices. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OBSERVATIONS, ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS 
“A firm is inherently fragile if its value added emanates more from conceptual as 
distinct from physical assets... Trust and reputation can vanish overnight, a factory 
cannot.” - Greenspan, Alan (Chairman: US Federal Reserve - March 2002) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This original contribution to the debate about the nature of “corporate governance”534 
best practices was motivated by a need to provide another perspective generally about 
company law in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. These issues were explored over the 
period 1845 to 2013. The choice of topic had more to do with gaining a better 
understanding of law in motion within the Vincentian corporate experience. This 
further elucidates the existence of the prevailing complex corporate governance 
environment that became complicated, having been generated externally.  
 
The private limited liability company limited by shares remains an evolutionary 
phenomenon. There were several factors that impacted its stakeholder community 
who are beneficiaries. The effect of country level forces on corporate governance was 
multifaceted at best. These were such that the stakeholder (institutional shareholders; 
individual shareholders, directors, management and staff of the private limited 
liability company) community remained unfazed by an unprecedented crisis detailed 
in Chapter Four. It could be that this was a psychological modus operandi where the 
human will to succeed against the odds became entrenched.  
 
There was always the quest for a better way of life for Caribbean peoples even from 
the days of slavery. The pursuit of emancipation probably best explains how an 
officious stakeholder is able to continue to add value to the company just by 
remaining part of this august body. It is after all a British juridical construct, ‘built to 
last.’ There were observable emancipative values and civic entitlements to the 
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stakeholder. Institutional or otherwise, stakeholders continued to be encouraged, to 
stay motivated and enabling within the corporate environment. Directors, 
shareholders and other stakeholders continue to participate in the private limited 
company for its resourcefulness. Its nature of the company and its corporate 
governance is as complex as society itself, the same ‘fabric’ from which it is 
composed. It is more challenging to dissect it, as there comes a point when acceptance 
of some if not its entire rule bound principles have to be accepted. 
 
The results of the hypothesis show a positive correlation between a lack, disregard or 
absence of best practices to genteel poverty, which negatively impacted the gross 
domestic product of several small islands with the CARICOM grouping. In other 
words many stakeholders (institutional and individual alike) are poorer. Corporate 
governance has a multiplicity of factors that are time tested. The procedures and 
practices served as a framework to guide corporate performance and enhance 
shareholder primacy, but the interpretation and application of these are confined to 
such interpretation within the socio-economic context. At the end of the day, the 
‘bread and butter’ issues are those that occupy the minds of all stakeholders.  
 
Corporate governance in its entirety is evolutionary and its components are still to be 
understood in terms of why and how an entity as the versatile private company could 
withstand such an unprecedented contagion. There is an integrated framework within 
corporate governance that offers a more encompassing, complete and theoretically 
richer picture of what constitutes those best practices. The evidence gathered through 
an unprecedented contagion caused by a lack, disregard or absence of best practices is 
to be extended to assess national drivers (regulators, successive governments and 
hybrid of models and theories) for the broader corporate governance interpretations. 
The evaluation offered a perspective about the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats displayed by the private limited liability company limited by shares. 
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That evaluation utilised several research methods that borrowed from disciplines 
other than law. This narrative was constrained at best. Peoples’ lives and livelihood 
were exposed. It is within that subcategory of insurance companies varying analyses 
are presented in this study. Lessons were drawn not from within the island of St. 
Vincent but from a particular conglomerate located inside of Trinidad and Tobago but 
nonetheless part of the Caribbean region. Historical and legislative legacies 
characterised the beleaguered private companies.  
 
To begin with there were particular historical interests where value laden best 
practices appeared to be established initially in early corporate constructs on St. 
Vincent. Those philanthropic endeavours are deemed to be the constituents of what is 
now appreciated as corporate social responsibility. Corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility cannot be considered as synonymous but rather the 
latter was just one of the best practices of companies. The company is still the 
company.  
 
The precise legal meaning of the word “company”535 was historically problematic. In 
the Vincentian legislative context it cannot be overlooked and its definitive scope is 
used here interchangeably where it is a “body corporate;” 536  and as such, a 
“‘company’ means a body corporate that is incorporated or continued under this 
Act.”537Stakeholders were subject to much dynamism in the maintenance of corporate 
governance procedures and practices within that same construct - the private 
company. This was not the only type of company on the island, but the magnitude and 
scope of a financial contagion endured was not confined to these two islands 
(Trinidad and St. Vincent) nor was this an isolated case.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 Re Stanley [1906] 1 Ch 131, 134 
536 St. Vincent Company Act 1994 s. 543; Trinidad and Tobago Company Act 1995 s. 4 
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Strategies used by successive governments on repositioning these private companies 
to the “forefront”538 of national economic development were commendable. It was 
probably the main reason why several attempts were being made to seek redress in 
light of an unprecedented financial contagion emanating from within such a construct. 
It was through its versatility and complexities in networking across the region, that 
the private limited liability company (companies) warranted another analysis. The 
value of the shareholder and shareholding; the genesis of the company; protection of 
liberties and rights of all “stakeholders”539 were relevant. The use of the word 
Caribbean corporate governance at times did not do justice to smaller islands like St. 
Vincent. Maybe because of its size and population and therefore a more thorough and 
robust exploration of its corporate environment is generally left to be deduced from 
what obtained in the larger islands. 
 
Corporate governance best practices were always keys to the success of businesses 
especially in “Small Island developing states”540like St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Trinidad and Tobago is the larger of the two and more prosperous economically. It 
has the natural resource of oil, which is a highly sought commodity. However, there 
was a contradiction about membership of the company (shareholders assembly or 
shareholding)/number of “shareholders”541 that may have lead one to believe that best 
practices could be more easily executed and appreciated.  
 
This was the case in point within two case studies (Chapter Three and Chapter Four) 
included in this analysis. They had one major thing in common. They were both 
directed controlled either by individuals or families that were products of 
consanguinity or related through marriage. They held the controlling shareholding 
interests. Within both case studies, it was revealed that there was no problem of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
538 See Chapter One  
539 See Figure 1(5) 
540 See fn 43 where mention was made about these states (St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
inclusive) within the context of poverty assessment. 
541 See Appendix 2(10) - UK Companies Acts applicable to St. Vincent companies from 1800 
– 2013 - [see also applicable historical Table A] 
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maintaining relationships between and among board members and or shareholders. 
This was a characteristic feature within unlisted companies. It was from examination 
of those who were supposed to control and direct the companies that lessons were 
drawn on the lack, disregard or absence of best practices. 
 
These practices were not just about companies complying with formal rules and 
existing legislation. They developed to the stage of establishing consistency on the 
delivery of services emanating from the internal mechanisms within the company; 
demonstrated positive attitudes to be displayed by directors and staff to all 
stakeholders internal and external to the company; and a controlled approach that 
added more value to the business and eventually an enhanced reputation that was to 
lead to customer loyalty. The reputation of some businesses grew and this became an 
attractive devise especially to external stakeholders.  
 
The succession planning of the business was also augmented. While it holds true that 
unlisted companies had little codified guidance about good corporate governance, 
there was always some form of corporate governance procedural guideline and 
awareness from a historical standpoint. British company laws and the UK Companies 
Acts, case law and other naturally occurring best practices were available directly or 
indirectly to stakeholders. There were other similar organisations that functioned 
within early corporate St. Vincent and were discernible by way of their own 
constitutional framework. 
 
After more than one and a half centuries, the UK Companies Act 2006 made 
provisions for simplification on private companies; the application of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement and the procedure on sale of shares among other pertinent 
issues. There were other policy documents on dispute resolution among stakeholders 
external and internal to the private company, and so there was an expectation that 
aspects of the concept of corporate governance best practices was inevitable. Even the 
occurrences of other financial contagions especially within the region should have 
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alerted other private companies to seek clarification of corporate governance best 
practices.  
 
Having said that, there was a marked difference between both companies presented in 
the form of case studies. One was successful and the other was not and this disconnect 
was primarily because success is not acquired by ‘chance’. Corporate governance best 
practices were predicated on a combination of factors. There was cultural diversity 
and this is still prevalent up to modern times, countries within the Caribbean 
geopolitical landscape were once colonies and the associated commonalities of 
historical legacies manifested in municipal governance and legislative jurisprudence.  
 
These remain part of a colonial construct now inherited by Caribbean islands. 
Nonetheless, a growing stakeholder population had to make the choice to accept 
directors and management teams from private companies. These persons who were 
placed in the direction and control of such companies had a major qualification. They 
had to ‘fit’ or have the right business ethos and acumen. Either developed elsewhere 
on the job they found themselves positioned within the correct ‘market.’ Corporate 
governance best practices did help some companies to achieve maximum levels of 
success at a faster rate. The aforementioned assisted and ensured that a private limited 
liability company remained attractive especially to its beneficiary stakeholders. 
. 
The East Caribbean Currency Union, the East Caribbean Security Exchange, the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and CARICOM are a few examples of 
institutions that seek to strengthen a cohesive nationalism and "regionalism"542among 
the corporate sectors and peoples of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Both St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago are signatories to these regional 
groupings. Emphases remain on the private limited liability companies given their 
versatility specific to economic diversification within this context. Private companies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542  Hall, Kenneth & Chuck-A-Sang, Myrtle, Caribbean Integration from Crisis to 
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generally were likely to respond to challenges having regard to their status within the 
aforementioned remit. This response is likely to remain amidst the reality of 
constantly shrinking regional resources both economic and otherwise. The 
subcategory of private companies for insurance purposes of necessity must rethink 
their modus operandi and pay particular attention to the ongoing call for company law 
reform. By extension this is also a call for a reform of corporate governance 
procedures and practices. Noticeably, the political will is ever present in tandem with 
the rising importance of the private company. It cannot be denied that across the 
region, governments have always encouraged a review on company law but with 
emphasis on “harmonization rather than uniformity.”543 This process presents with 
tremendous challenges subject to the format and substantive Company Acts 
themselves. There are variations within these formats and the country specific 
applicable matters they contain. 
 
The concept of the private limited liability company limited by shares was a novel 
one. Its genesis on the island of St. Vincent may have had very little to do with being 
a creature of the UK Companies Act 1907. However, it was a response by families 
pressured by a number of issues to transition from partnerships to private limited 
liability companies. It must be from this autochthonous version or ‘root’ that such 
family value laden corporate governance best practices emerged. The company is a 
legal entity and could not be owned by individuals. Irrespective of the family values 
on best practices, this could not supersede the inevitable operation of the law that led 
companies to incorporation. The British based literature applicable to colonies and 
former colonies is not ambiguous. Immediately upon incorporation a private limited 
liability company limited by shares coagulates with its corporate governance 
mechanism. There were exceptions of course to ‘that incorporation status’ of 
companies so constituted. Whether the company called itself a ‘private company’ 
prior to the enactment of the UK Companies Act 1907, in this instance, the reality was 
that the company did exist and did engage in best practices. The rest of the 
justification of this incongruity must lie outside of these arguments for now. 
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The return to an assessment of share ownership in early corporate St. Vincent is 
pertinent here. The spread of shareholding was predominantly among family members 
from whom the idea about business was first presumably orchestrated. In this real 
sense, the private company grew to become more than a collective family oriented 
concern but as a resourceful vehicle to be used by the state, later on in its evolution. It 
was used to promote and encourage investment and employment among the wider 
stakeholder population. It was not that the actual family oriented company was used 
but the flexibility of the type of company itself was promoted to effect its cause used 
by government and policy makers for the wider and more nationalistic economic 
enfranchisement. Employment and investment were encouraged from within the 
Caribbean region and internationally through the vehicle of the same British construct 
– the private limited liability company limited by shares. This is why networks of 
companies (examples found within Chapter Four) were so encouraged. 
 
Objectivity about corporate governance 
At best, the research objectively tested whether corporate governance best practices 
addressed their adaptability and application to a post emancipation society and the 
commensurate roles played by the private limited liability companies. Positioned 
within a post colonial, modern emerging economy, corporate governance practices 
erupted and were ‘evolving’ at the time of the research. Whether the sum total of 
factors within a colony could negative best practices as opposed to a similar private 
limited liability company with the same legislative procedural outlines operating in 
Great Britain was probably too broad a test. The culture of a country or an island, 
diversity of choice of shareholders; the constraint of shareholding, qualifications of 
directors and a host of other factors influenced corporate governance best practices. 
What was critical to arriving at some measure of objectivity was assessing that the 
same Models of corporate governance did exist and continues to exist. The famous 
Table A, the constitution so called of all British based Model on corporate governance 
is timeless. 
 
	  
	  
	  
234	  
In the colonies as was in Great Britain, the same ‘default’ on corporate governance 
and limited liability exist. The infamous Table A is that ‘default’ that could be 
amended to suit the needs and versatility of the shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Also, while the UK Company Act served as the ‘default’ on companies, even in the 
Caribbean, each island had its own particular set of internal variables that ‘triggered’ 
its legislative drafters. This is possibly and or precisely why there is no single 
Company Act to serve as one size fits all for the Caribbean region.  
 
Remember, several small sovereign states (former colonies) are members of 
CARICOM. This is not a critique of that notable grouping of former colonies and 
associated states but rather an objective observation as to the absence of a Caribbean 
Company (Law) Act or such similar construct. On this matter of objective 
assessments of the private limited liability companies on the various islands it was the 
sizes of companies that reflected appreciable differences. Having said that, it has to be 
concluded that best practices were standards that allowed for the British company 
positioned physically in Great Britain or on a colony far removed.  
 
Lived experiences: a contributory factor 
As a shareholder of a public liability company and having had ‘lived experiences’ 
within the co-operative societies, credit unions and other financial institutions, these 
provided a greater depth and understanding of the nature of corporate governance best 
practices. Additionally, these co-operative societies as well as private companies and 
other juridical bodies were part of the financial sector on the island. It was through a 
category of the private limited liability that was negatively affected by the 
“unprecedented financial crisis that arose in 2009.”544 The role of the shareholder was 
purchaser of shares. They raised capital in the process of time in every which way and 
contributed to the capital base of each juridical body. The shareholder needed others 
in most cases to act on their behalf in a relationship for mutual benefits. However, 
legislative provision was for directors to carry out functions such as decision - 
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making, management and supervision of the company by using the financial resources 
garnered from shareholders. This relationship deemed part of the corporate 
governance practice was critical to the perpetual existence of companies, co-
operative, building and loan societies and to the nature of corporate governance 
generally. 
 
The procedures, practices and structure of corporate governance could not be 
executed without the social interactions between stakeholders (shareholders inclusive) 
across committees and the company in meetings. A small percentage of the private 
limited liability companies on St. Vincent did contribute to a variant of poverty called 
genteel poverty but only as a result of a contagion that originated outside of the 
island. This was from similar specie of the private limited liability company limited 
by shares known as insurance companies. “Genteel poverty”545 was a variant of 
poverty that existed in the already impoverished state of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines.  
 
The contagion originated from neighbouring Trinidad and Tobago where one of its 
conglomerates CL Financial Limited, a holding company behaved like an unruly 
corporate beast. There was no fetter placed on this conglomerate, which stated that it 
was too big to fail. By all intents and purposes, it did fail. The gross domestic product 
of St. Vincent during the period 2009 through to 2013 realised a negative impact 
estimated at 16% - 20% that compounded the diverse nature of its impoverishment as 
a result of the aforementioned. 
 
5.2 Critical issues  
Path dependency 
There was an issue of path dependency or reliance placed by the population on a 
monocrop economy. This was done for over a century, which led to an 
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underdevelopment of the private sector. The private company was therefore a viable 
alternative to further promote and channel economic efficiency and productivity for 
many stakeholders. Maybe there was also a lack of entrepreneurial skills among 
stakeholders within a monocrop state and ‘economy’ that held families captive to a 
more stable source of income as part of the wider plantation economy. It emerged 
from crops such as bananas, arrowroot and other staple food crops.  
 
However, this aspect of entrepreneurialism could not be explored further as a direct 
contributory factor in keeping with the thesis statement. What was disturbing were the 
implications made as to the more recent decline in the “banana industry.”546 The 
question was whether the reality matched the sentiments expressed. For certain 
though, the incorporation of the private limited liability company continued to be 
encouraged as another mechanism used to diversify around bananas. 
 
Correlation between the Gross domestic product and corporate governance practices   
Corporate governance practices were pivotal to the “gross domestic product”547 of St. 
Vincent. When referring to the crisis then, Prime Minister Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, 
described the situation as thus, 
 
“…The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) consists of the six independent 
countries of the OECS plus Anguilla and Montserrat.  The CLICO-BAICO debacle 
has caused an exposure in insurance liabilities of EC $2 billion (US $800 million) or 
roughly 16 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the ECCU.”548 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546 See Appendix 2(3) – An article entitled: Europe’s trade policy has sold the Caribbean 
banana industry down the river, exacerbating drug trafficking and poverty. 
547 See Appendix 2(9) Letter to CARICOM, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves wrote to H. E. Mr. Irwin La 
Rocque on the Strategic Directions for CARICOM, February 09, 2012 
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St. Vincent and the Grenadines remained part of this “ECCU”549 which was a 
monetary union of states within the Caribbean region for the purpose of fund 
consolidation within those member states that contributed to the fund. There was a 
broad arrangement since 1983 such that the union provided for financial stability and 
economic development within the Caribbean region. Up to 2013 within this union, the 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank “provides support and actively monitors 
developments primarily in the credit unions and insurance sectors.”550 The private 
limited liability company limited by shares was used for the purpose of insurance. 
The insurance companies were therefore private limited liability companies.  
 
In St. Vincent for instance, this small category of private companies was contributory 
to the negative impact on the gross domestic product of the island through a lack, 
disregard and absence of corporate governance best practices. There was however a 
distinction to be made such that those practices which impacted on the nation’s gross 
domestic product, originated from outside of St Vincent through the same category of 
companies. This was because the insurance company in St. Vincent was part of the 
conglomerate – C L Financial Limited where a major liquidity crisis erupted from 
within and among similar companies whose corporate governance best practices were 
compromised. Were they not compromised in one way or the other, an unprecedented 
financial crisis could not have arisen. 
 
The insurance company at the heart of the debacle 
With their historical legacies and conjoined legal jurisdictions, private companies 
were used simultaneously and at times conjoined on both islands in the case of 
insurance companies. Corporate governance was therefore primarily directed at the 
wider stakeholder society in an attempt to justify the existence of the private 
company. The private companies that purported to be insurance companies were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549 Beek, Van Frits, et al, The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: Institutions, Performance 
and Policy Issues (International Monetary Fund Publication, Washington, 2000) 1 
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constituents of a conglomerate and for all intents and purposes functioned as part of 
the whole in terms of their corporate governance best practices.  
 
As such, in every which way, the corporate governance best practices in British 
American Insurance Company Limited on St. Vincent and the Grenadines were those 
of Colonial Life Insurance Company located in Trinidad and Tobago and also part of 
the corporate group and networks. This arrangement created the conditions for the 
insurance company in St. Vincent to be susceptible to the effects of the contagion 
originating out of similar insurance companies in Trinidad and Tobago and vice versa. 
In both islands and within their private limited liability companies limited by shares, 
the Anglo American model of corporate governance predominated with emphases on 
consensus on decision making through reliance on one - tier boards.  
 
This was primarily so until 2011 in the case of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Post 
crisis, a call was made by the legislature in St. Vincent and the Grenadines for the 
inclusion of the two –tiered boards borrowed from German corporate law. Only those 
aspects from German corporate law that appeared to facilitate functionality of affected 
juridical bodies within the crisis were marked for piecemeal amendment to the 
prevailing company. The jury was still out on whether this amalgam or hybrid was 
workable. There was generally harmonised legislation within and among the private 
limited liability companies in the banking and insurance sectors that allowed for 
accessibility that facilitated business transactions across porous borders within 
CARICOM and the OECS. 
 
The far - reaching implications and impact of the small category of private limited 
liability companies was surprising. The majority of domestic companies were geared 
towards the provision of products and services and remained tied to the growth of the 
domestic economy. In St. Vincent, the case of the British American Insurance 
Company through which the contagion occurred, was tied to the domestic economy 
but also operated within the international sphere of the economy. This was 
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contributory to the overall financial sector on the island and an example of a corporate 
entity that is part of the “dichotomous”551 regulatory regime.  Size did matter in this 
sense. A mere 0.01% of the private limited liability companies in St. Vincent was the 
insurance company over the entire number of years that reshaped corporate 
governance best practices for all times.  
 
5.3 Summarising: Observations 
The data was analysed using summarizing, tabular and comments formats. There was 
no other quantifiable format to filter the data given the nature of the research. Some 
themes emerged a priori in that, the generalization was that, a lack, disregard or 
absence of corporate governance best practices inevitably contributed to poverty 
among stakeholders. This meant that stakeholders were left in worst off positions than 
when they first became part premium folders of insurance policies within the 
company.  
 
Absence of a corporate governance Code 
Justification for a Code 
The Corporate governance “Code”552 for unlisted companies was one major outcome 
of this research. It was not an original focus but as the research progress, the need 
became obvious. In the case of St. Vincent, among the many themes that emerged ‘a 
posteriori’ was the absence of a corporate governance Code that brought about the 
following concerns: 
• A lack of needed guidance on direction, control and governance of financial 
matters within the private limited liability companies, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 Regulated and or supervised by both the Commercial and Intellectual Property Office and the 
Financial Services Authority as related by officers from both entities. Information obtained through 
visits to the island – Visits to St. Vincent and the Grenadines: 2012 and 2013. 
552 See Appendix 5(6) – Code for Corporate Governance in St. Vincent 
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• Guidelines on best practices were not to be limited to listed companies only so 
that a Code was needed to establish a framework to add value to the companies and 
their respective businesses. 
• Close to 10,000 businesses should not be left further, to a chanced existence in 
terms of procedures and processes as to how they were to be directed and controlled. 
• The exercise of common sense of purpose and in observation and application 
of such guidance when creating a Code on good governance. 
• Practical and pragmatic principles of good governance were not addressed 
without a Code. 
• Companies’ impact economic growth and employment – they go unrecognised 
and should not be allowed to function without a Code. 
• The fallout from the crises that surround British American Insurance 
Company and Colonial Life Insurance Company – both private limited liability 
companies was estimated at $375 million or roughly 29% of gross domestic product 
during the years 2009 through to 2011. Forms of corporate governance redress and 
other corporate governance issues could best be guided through a Code on 
governance. 
• There was a lack of value for shareholders, who needed to be protected, as 
their dependence on good corporate governance was critical. 
• There was an absence of a balance of interest between founding families with 
success of companies with those that needed experiences to further set guidelines for 
future economic endeavours. 
• A long-term success of the company was at stake as well as the ability to 
attract external investment and bolster investors’ confidence at the micro and macro 
levels. 
 
The development of a Code could be taken further through a robust consultation 
process within the stakeholder communities as well as to be debated in the local 
parliament. Thereafter, a publication of the Code for further community input is an 
imperative. In these ways, there could be greater awareness about the relevance of a 
Code post the financial contagion of 2009. The case is to be put to the beneficiaries in 
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the public domain. Discussions about the emerging themes within corporate 
governance and their importance are to be highlighted.  
 
Comments about the “corporate governance assessment tool”553  
This assessment was about the levels of compliance on corporate governance best 
practices observable in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. An adaptation from the 
OECD's Corporate Governance Assessment Tool was utilized for the purposes of 
evaluation of performance on six areas based on applicable legislation in use in St. 
Vincent and widely accepted international principles. Six major areas were assessed 
[as far as was practicable]. They were: 
 
1) Roles of Board members 
2) The composition of the Board 
3) The assigned tasks of Board members 
4) The processes of the Board 
5) Disclosure and Transparency mechanisms 
6) Relations with shareholders 
 
Please note that the British American Insurance Company Limited was under judicial 
management/considered as per Level of maturity as: Undecided 
 
The summary of findings 
Mention must be made of the maturity levels that were examined such as: 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding the need to professionalize corporate governance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553 See Appendix 1 (5A) Corporate Governance Assessment Tool where St. Vincent is compliant with 
the legal baseline on corporate governance.  
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Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
Level 4: Advanced governance practice.  
Level of maturity for Vincentian companies was generally Level 1: – Complying 
with the legal baseline 
Therefore according to this assessment tool, the level of corporate governance 
maturity for Vincentian private limited liability companies within the domestic sector 
was that there was basic compliance within the legal baseline.   
 
This was an original assessment and had limitations given that the material (raw data 
was subjected to a number of natural and manmade manipulation due to /loss of some 
information over time/disrepair/other). Some specific details were given as per 
itemized in Appendix 1(5). Nonetheless sufficient results suggested that there was 
room for improvement within the field of corporate governance within the domestic 
companies. The idea was that companies were to aspire to Level 4 where the target 
was: Advanced governance practice. As far as was known, testing for corporate 
governance compliance within unlisted private limited liability companies limited by 
shares on St. Vincent was never done. 
 
It was challenging to get data to properly assess the private limited liability companies 
that were considered international companies for a number of legitimate reasons. 
They were subjected to higher standards of tests. The regulations and current 
legislation itself were subject to levels of ‘legislative probity.’ There was a limited 
placed on examination of records specific to directors and the requisite Register.  
 
5.4 Justification for corporate governance best practices formula 
There was a justification for the inclusion of a formula to calculate corporate 
governance best practices. This computation was based on a “unique assessment” by 
the researcher on the effects of corporate governance practices post financial 
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contagion and offered a pragmatic approach when evaluating whether there was 
evidence of a lack, disregard or absence of best practices. The formula made the 
statement that best practices were the positive result indicators of the performance of 
the company interacting with an enabling environment. 
 
 
Source: 
Originality of compilation by researcher known as: 
The DCI Frederick Corporate Governance best practices formula @ 2019 
 
Bp = best practices, r = result indicators; poC = performance of the company; Ee = 
enabling environment. Through several research methods employed in this study, the 
observable characteristics of the corporate entity lent themselves to the interpretation 
of stakeholders’ interaction within the private limited liability company limited by 
shares. Generally, these companies allowed for pragmatic approaches on legislated 
corporate governance practices. However, best practices were positive results of the 
whole spectrum of interactions not just by the company but also with stakeholders 
both internal and external to the company. 
 
It was that positive interplay of corporate interactions that was highly effective. 
Directors controlled the functioning of the legal person (the company), which was a 
body corporate (body of persons) with separate legal personality. It was evident that 
the company in meeting elected through mandatory clauses in the bylaws, the persons 
to control and direct the corporate person. This body corporate did not operate in 
isolation but had its legal personality impacted by socio-cultural, socio – political and 
socio-economic influences. Generally, it is legally capable of ownership of real 
property and personal property as it was equipped to function with juristic and 
Bp = r (poC, Ee) 
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corporate authority. It could buy and sell, mortgage or lease property and there were 
consequences to its actions just as if it (the company) was a person. However, the 
corporate person although recognizable by law, could not reason as if it was a non-
legal or natural person.  
 
While it was true that procedural guidelines were laid down in the legislation, 
interactions in and among stakeholders changed over time. However, once the 
company recognized this and acted to either counteracted bad practices or to uphold 
its best practices, it was on these matters that corporate governance turned. The 
difference came about when persons were able to be positively expressive and 
appreciated that enabling environment. Also the pertinent question was whether there 
were competing forces within a specific environment that was not enabling.   
 
As the assessment of corporate governance is carried out using the formula, the 
factors that influenced the behaviour of shareholders and other stakeholders are to be 
interpreted, respectfully by borrowing from the discipline of psychology. They both 
have much in common. The discipline of law was about the regulation of human 
behaviour while the discipline of psychology explained human behaviour. Both of 
these disciplines made assumptions about what caused people to act or behave in a 
certain manner.  
 
In the quest for the explanation about the reality of the events that led to corporate 
governance best practices in the context of the formula, aspects of psychology and 
law must conjoin to give the best alternative to an expression of corporate governance 
best practices in quantifiable and qualitative terms. This is made good for effective 
communication and execution of corporate governance best practices. It was this 
aspect that was critical in corporate governance best practices over the years within 
the private company.  
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If only for a small but principal theme, for corporate governance to be effective it 
must consist of a whole expression that was requisite for its execution all together. 
The juristic personality of the company is endowed with corporate governance and is 
itself an integral concept that was not made of ‘parts’, but corresponded to all the 
activities of the company wholly and howsoever they were constituted generally but 
became statute driven immediately upon incorporation. Corporate governance 
continued within given time scales and manifested within an enabling corporate 
environment. 
 
5.5 The phases of development of the two organs of the company  
As early as the seventeenth century, within British company laws it became necessary 
to have a separate board of directors to direct a company through its delegated 
powers. The occurrence of this was incremental and the legacy of this was evident in 
early corporate St. Vincent.  Just as the investor (shareholder) of the early nineteenth 
century became attracted to the corporate form as opposed to partnership, it does 
appear that there were lessons to be learnt.  
 
The corporate form as opposed to partnership recognised that, 
“... the management [and] control of the company would be allocated to the 
board, and the stock holders ...would share in the profits. Separation of 
ownership and control was from the earliest period a key aspect of the 
corporate form.”554 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 Vasudev, M.P., & Watson, Susan, (Eds) Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK 2012) 51; see also Bartman, M. S, (Ed) European 
Company Law in Accelerated Progress (Kluwer Law International Publication Netherlands, 
2006) 56 - mention being made of the discussions by Berle and Means on their debate about 
corporate governance. The distinction that existed seems to be blurred as corporate 
governance evolves. Also Murray, Peter; Poole, David; Jones, Grant (Eds) Contemporary 
Issues in Management and Organisational Behaviour (Cengage Learning Australia 2005) 
215; See the discussions on the foundations of capitalism from 1776 - 1880 about the 
separation of management from ownership (the agency) in Caroll, Archie, Lapartito, J. 
Kenneth, Post, James, Werhane, H. Patricia, Goodpaster, E. Kenneth, Corporate 
Responsibility: The American Experience (Cambridge University Press, USA 2012) 39 - 
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It was this demarcation between those who controlled and those who directed the 
company that was so critical to those who recognised that this construct was more 
beneficial. It did not follow that they (both investors/shareholders and directors) were 
necessarily drawn from the same pool of individuals. Partnership hinged on joint 
venture and upholds the principle of partnering of control and direction on the whole 
corporate structure (partnership); while the corporate governance of the company 
balanced between powers that were mandated by statute to both control and direct the 
affairs of ‘business’ within this newer corporate form (a company with its separate 
personality).  
 
Corporate governance was also about the balance of power within the private limited 
liability company. In order to maintain this proper balance of power it must be the 
subject of procedures and relationships between and among all stakeholders of the 
company. If at anytime there was a demonstrable lack, disregard or an absence of best 
practices, there would be an imbalance of power that would undermine the 
fundamental principles on which the company revolves. This would lead to chaos 
within the company that was set up for the purpose of profit maximisation even as 
early as the seventeenth century. As analysed in Chapter Four, there was an imbalance 
in power and the result was a lack, disregard and absence of corporate governance 
best practices. The same was also true of every private limited liability company 
either established or incorporated along the spectrum of establishment or 
incorporation and registration. 
 
Re-evaluating the Organs of the company 
The board of directors and the shareholder assembly (company in meetings) are the 
two most powerful organs of the company. Policy formation and implementation; 
formulation of objectives and executing them through strategic directions are those 
tasks associated with the board of directors. A director is appointed by the members to 
carry out the assigned tasks by the company. A company secretary is appointed by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For differentiation in German law as per organs of its companies that reflect the organ theory, 
which is not part of UK Company law in this form. 
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board of directors to assist them in their day - to - day function of the company. In 
some cases a Chief Executive Officer manages the entity. At all material times while 
the aforementioned were features of the private limited liability company duly 
discernable in the case studies. 
 
The other organ was that of the company in meetings (shareholder assembly or 
members of the company). They were essentially investors or in some instances 
entrepreneurs who are not tasked with interfering in the company’s internal affairs 
save and except there were compelling reasons. Members at the annual general 
meeting and the extraordinary general meeting and there were several indications that 
companies were adherents to this organ.  
 
Inherited principles about these two major organs of the company had their sound 
precedence in British laws. The early companies adhered to this rule and all other 
companies still adhered to the dictum. There were changes to the assumption that the 
“general meeting of all shareholders as the supreme organ of the company [that] 
occurred in the nineteenth century in the UK.”555 The view then, was that the  “board 
of directors in many instances were but a mere agent of the company”556 and were 
subject to the control of the shareholders especially at the general meeting.  
 
The more modern private limited liability companies limited by shares had lessons to 
learn from this seminal case that holds precedence to this day in company law. This 
issue then was of agency, which has been clearly answered, in the seminal “Salomon's 
case”557 since 1897. In the High court, the case of “Broderip v Salomon”558, it was 
Vaughn Williams J who said that Mr. Broderip's claim was valid. He said that the 
company had a right of indemnity against Mr. Salomon and that the signatories of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 Mäntysaari, Petri, Comparative Corporate Governance: Shareholders as a Rule-maker 
(Springer Berlin - Heidelberg, Germany 2005) 251 
556 Ibid 
557 Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 
558 Broderip v Salomon [1893] 
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memorandum were mere dummies. He claimed that the company was just Mr. 
Salomon in another form, an alias, and his agent. 
 
It was the Court of Appeal that confirmed Vaughn Williams J's decisions against Mr. 
Salomon on the grounds that he had abused the privileges of incorporation and limited 
liability. If corporate governance best practices were to be added as a separate legal 
issue, respectfully this would have added to its prominence as it continues to provide 
for animated debates in some quarters. Parliament then, had intended only to confer 
the aforementioned privileges on 'independent bona fide shareholders, who had minds 
and wills of their own and were no dummies or puppets'. The point was this, the 
distinction between those who directed and those who controlled the company was 
reflective of the legislative mandate laid down in the Companies Act 1862. Since 
1845 on St. Vincent those who directed the process and those who controlled 
corporations or juridical entities remained clearly separate and identifiable. 
 
Under English Law the historic Table A is referenced substantively elsewhere in this 
text, but mentioned here to express the view that such a normative procedure for 
directors was codified and expressly part of the corporate governance of the company. 
Viewed then as a 'modern doctrine' it was expressly stated in Shaw & Sons (Salford) 
Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 by Greer LJ as per, 
"… a company is an entity distinct apart from its shareholders and its 
directors. Some of its powers may according to its articles, be exercised by 
directors ... certain other powers may be reserved for the shareholders in 
general meeting. If powers of management are vested in the directors, they 
and they alone can exercise these powers. "559  
 
The more modern private limited liability companies limited by shares may do well to 
continue to exercise their legislative mandates on corporate governance practices in 
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light of the aforementioned. The discussions now turned on two major phases of the 
private limited liability company on St. Vincent.  Periodic references are made to 
Trinidad and Tobago but not substantially so given that the thesis presentation is 
primarily about those companies on St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  
 
First phase: 1845 - 1945 
The manner in which a Vincentian company (or Trinidadian company for that matter) 
was directed and controlled was largely outlined in their specific company’s 
constitution shaped historically and legislatively by the British company laws and the 
UK Companies Acts. This was by virtue of being former colonies of Great Britain and 
due to legislation that created uniformity in purpose and intent.  The problems that 
were encountered on the islands stemmed from the synergy between shareholders and 
directors or in some cases management of those limited corporate resources.  
Additionally, there were diverse layers of management especially the day – to - day 
execution of direction and control of the company. This was done largely under the 
management of the chief executive officer or a general manager in most instances 
who spearheaded daily management of such businesses. 
 
To compound matters, the existence of the allowable unanimous shareholder 
agreement among shareholders was one vehicle used for pragmatism in an 
entrepreneurial spirit. The objectivity of such an agreement was questionable at times 
given the context of the socio cultural and socio economic dynamic of the larger 
stakeholder society. This undoubtedly compromised best practices of corporate 
governance. While an aid to flexibility on business expansion, the unanimous 
shareholder agreement was not always a mechanism that served the best interest of 
the majority of stakeholders. It may be that such agreement was in need of a review as 
to its philosophical perspective as part of corporate governance practices. 
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Second phase: 1945 – 2013 
During this time period, the composition of boards of directors generally followed the 
same procedure for appointment. Historically, there was some balance of power 
between directors and “shareholders.”560 The board was held accountable by the 
company in meetings, for successful performance of the company.  Its responsibility 
and power would not be delegated at will as the modern operation dictated, “directors 
powers derive from the company itself.”561  Continuing in the tradition of the United 
Kingdom Company Acts “boards are subject to law.”562 Board members generally 
needed a sufficiency of skills and understanding to review and challenge management 
and to “safeguard long - term interests of the"563 company. This was the same view 
held by local private companies. The board of directors continued to select the chief 
executive officer who in turn, delegated function to the board and supervises the day - 
to - day management of the company; provided feedback to management on the 
strategies of the company; compensated senior executives; monitored performances 
and risks and ensured accountability.   
 
Historically, two major pillars on which corporate governance of the company stood 
were inclusiveness and accountability. The board was responsible for these. Further, 
in order to consolidate good governance, historically in Great Britain and replicated in 
colonies like St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the boards participated in the processes 
of inclusiveness and accountability. In order to execute these functions, the board 
reasserted itself by having a voice in the decision making process and exercised its 
role with respect to these processes (accountability and inclusiveness).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
560 Dine, Janet, The Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge University Press, UK 
2004) 35 
561 Ibid 
562 St. Vincent Companies Act 1994, s. 65; s 141; St. Vincent Companies Act Cap 143, By 
Law 1 Art. 4; Dine, Janet, Koutsias, Marios, The Nature of Corporate Governance (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, UK 2013) 142 
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Other functions of the board were those that led to its credibility as a viable organ of 
the company. It was the board, by using other skill sets were able to exercise a 
measured approach on selection, accountability and replacement of authorities, 
ascertained its size; the structure for and of its management; qualification of its 
members in keeping with the law; levels of independence and commitment to the 
objectives of the business venture which were all critical components of corporate 
governance within the entire company. 
 
There was another matter of efficiency of the subcategory of the private limited 
liability company under review. Here was the challenge with regards to that particular 
subcategory, where companies external to St. Vincent in the form of its complexity of 
corporate governance practices, directed and controlled from across borders. The 
subcategory was less dependent on existing regulations and resource management 
capacity in house and placed greater reliance on external corporate practices.  
 
The challenge was that the subcategory of companies lacked capacity due to its 
management structure and was stripped of its ability to implement its own qualitative 
and carefully crafted aspects of efficiency. The precursor to the contagion within this 
period was that a subcategory of the private limited liability company being directed 
and controlled from across geographical borders compromised all aspects of 
efficiency allowable. The balance of power shifted from country based to external.  
 
During this phase, another feature noticeable within the existing corporate governance 
structure or system was that boards of less encumbered private limited liability 
companies were responsible for “annual returns; and annual reports;” 564  the 
acceptance of “special resolutions;” 565 to discuss matters that allowed for 
accountability and transparency; to question decisions of management or the Chief 
Executive Officer charged with the day to day functioning of the company; to make 
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565 Ibid, [St. Vincent and the Grenadines Companies Act] s. 98 
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projections for the entire company; to make “amendments to the constitution of the 
company - articles of association;”566 to review original articles in keeping with the 
overall mandate of the company thereby changing the entire focus of the company. 
This was generally in response to the economic and social issues of the times in which 
companies were incorporated. There was an exception to the aforementioned since an 
unprecedented contagion tarnished an otherwise compliant corporate governance 
environment within the state of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
 
Finally, in a general sense the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development was built on European initiatives post world wars, “outlined a number 
of principles”567 for the boards of companies. Boards were to act in an ethical manner 
with good faith, care, due diligence and in the best interest of the company and its 
shareholders.  These principles were also codified in “the model by-laws and existing 
company law”568 locally and in “company laws”569 in Trinidad and Tobago. It took a 
strange departure from the aforementioned to have created a platform on which a 
financial contagion manifested itself. 
 
5.6 Re-evaluation of Table A and Model Articles of Association 
With respect to a distinct separation between shareholders and directors, this 
developed over time. This was likely due to the fact that there was an assumption that 
the company in general meeting was the supreme organ while the board of directors 
acted as its agent and was subject to the shareholders in meeting.  A case of 
persuasive precedence to law makers in St. Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago should 
be one where “decisions of the UK Court of Appeal”570prevailed. On this matter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566 Ibid, s. 177 
567www.oecd.org/corporate/ - accessed 11 September 2019where the emphasis on “good 
governance to build an environment of trust, transparency and accountability necessary for 
fostering long – term investment, financial stability and business integrity, thereby supporting 
stronger growth and more inclusive societies." 
568 St. Vincent Companies Act 1994; St. Vincent Companies Act Cap. 143: By-Law No.1, Art. 
4 - 11 
569 Companies Act 1995(TT) s. 151 – 157 
570 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co v Cunningham [1906] 2 Ch. 34   
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directors were not agents of the shareholders and were not bound to implement any of 
their shareholders resolutions. Whether this was a matter that occupied the minds of 
those within the subcategory of the private limited liability company that fell prey to 
the financial contagion is debatable. 
 
The division of powers between the board and the shareholder in their general 
meetings depended on how the “articles of association (which replaced the old 
memorandum and articles) were constructed as well as other fundamental changes 
that impacted corporate governance.”571 This also was persuasive precedence to 
companies in St. Vincent (and it follows a similar pattern in Trinidad and Tobago). In 
the instant case already mentioned, the court ruled that if the powers of management 
was vested in the board, then the general meeting could not interfere with such duly 
constituted exercise.   
 
The contractual nature of the Articles imposed such restrictions since members had 
agreed that the directors and they alone should direct and control the affairs of the 
company.  This matter was mandated in the current bylaws of private limited liability 
companies limited by shares articulated elsewhere. There appeared to be 
disengagement sometimes. It was that those who were assigned the tasks of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
571 Articles of Association replaced the memorandum and articles as per UK legislation 
previous to St. Vincent Companies Act 1994 (CA 1994)/Trinidad and Tobago Companies Act 
1995. There were a number of changes reflected in the ‘new’ Companies Act 1994 that did 
not form part of the substantive analyses, but were legislative provisions that sought to guide 
corporate governance procedure and practices. Further, these stipulations were those of the 
British legislature to enhance the functioning of the company in the UK as well as former 
colonies whose legislature remained ‘tied’ to this legacy of British laws and UK Companies 
Acts. Some of these changes are mentioned and or summarized as follows: the distinction 
between public and private companies was removed and reflected in the Companies Act 
1994; statutory prohibitions were placed on insider trading and takeover bids; the rules on 
auditing and accounting became more detailed in the CA 1994; provisions on amalgamation 
of companies; protection of minority shareholders, derivative action and remedies; directors 
duties, their powers and liabilities were codified; test for solvency as to whether a dividend 
may be payable; an outline as to how to deal with share capital and provisions for capital 
reductions that may be permitted; the issued shares are to be fully paid up was a requirement 
and the matter of a substitution of a system of no par value shares for a nominal or par value 
sort of arrangement; the ultra vires rule and constructive notice were abolished as well as an 
investing of the capacity of individuals in companies generally.  
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management were not necessarily those who could direct and control said companies. 
It must be borne in mind that management and corporate governance were not 
synonymous terminologies.  
 
As could be appreciated, it was not until the "House of Lords gave its ruling"572 that 
this decision received general acceptance. This was specific to corporate governance 
best practices. The ruling as far as is known has prevailed and remained pervasive in 
the modern approach that touch and concern companies in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. This was noted across both phases of corporate governance development 
and as hereinafter discussed.   
 
Again, Greer L J was instructive in that,  
“...The only way in which the general body of shareholders can control the 
exercise of powers by the articles in the directors is by altering the articles, or, 
if opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors of 
whose actions they disapprove.  They cannot themselves usurp the powers 
which by the articles are vested in the directors any more than the directors 
can usurp the powers vested by the articles in the general body of 
shareholders.”573 
 
Although seen by some as surprising and contradictory, the judge’s interpretation was 
no trite law. Company law procedural guidelines or its corporate governance best 
practices were laid down in a default Model Articles of Association for companies 
limited by shares as well as other types of companies. St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
has incorporated this default Model Article from its inception to modern times. Now, 
there may be need for further amendments with respect to the Supervisory Committee 
borrowed from German law if at all were included here. Also, a separate policy 
decision and or document may have to be taken to apply provisions borrowed from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 See fn 560 
573 Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 
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German law (a two tier board structure) to the private limited liability company 
limited by shares. As far as was known, this hybrid on board composition is relatively 
new and has not yet been fully tested. As stated previously, this remained part of the 
local legislation that governed private limited liability companies for this local legal 
jurisprudence. The discussions now turned towards differences in corporate 
governance procedure and practice applicable to companies over the span of their 
development within the state of St. Vincent. 
 
Differences as to applicable Model Articles 
For instance, companies that were incorporated on or after 28 April 2013 adhered to 
“Model Articles”574 for private companies limited by shares. Also, for companies that 
were incorporated prior to 28 April 2013, there were “Model Articles”575 for such 
companies limited by shares. Again, the aforementioned were applicable to all private 
limited liability companies limited by shares on St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
These prescribed practices appeared to have allowed for greatest synergy between 
companies on both islands of Trinidad and Tobago and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines and facilitated the operative business model that accommodated insurance 
purposes.  
 
As the amendments of UK Company Acts took effect, former colonies responded by 
adhering as far as was possible. For instance, the Model Articles were also amended 
by the “Mental Health (Discrimination) Act 2013.”576 The provisions to terminate the 
services of a director on the grounds that he or she was mentally ill were removed. If 
however any provision for amendment was already in the Articles, then the company 
merely had to amend those Articles through the adoption of the newer Model Articles. 
The operation was one of compliance with the dictates of British company laws and 
more specifically the UK Companies Acts. This was expedient so to do. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574 See UK Model Articles for private companies limited by shares on or after 28 April 2013 – 
Appendix 5(1) 
575 See UK Model Articles for private companies limited by shares prior to April 2013 – 
Appendix 5(2) 
576 See UK Mental Health (Discrimination) Act 2013 s. 3, para. 18 (e) 
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There was another major question that would have arisen as to which version was 
applicable to former colonies that had these procedural guidance on corporate 
governance through the default Table A. This was with regards to removal of 
directors on the grounds of mental incapacity. In the developmental phases of 
company law within the OECS and CARICOM, from 1845 or thereafter when Model 
Articles were introduced through the UK Companies Act 2006 and up to the more 
modern amended version of Model Articles, they were applicable by default to 
companies referenced in Appendix 5(1) and or Appendix 5(2) as mentioned 
previously. On the other hand, the older versions of the Model Articles were also 
applicable as default to all those companies that were incorporated between 1 October 
2009 and 27 April 2013 inclusive. The point is that at no point was there a lack of 
legislative guidance on corporate governance best practices. The challenge for private 
companies within the aforementioned geographical location was the implementation 
of these practices by some stakeholders. 
 
The importance of Table A cannot be over emphasized. It is at the heart of the 
corporate governance framework for all British companies and those on the islands 
that followed the British company laws and the UK Company Acts. This prescribed 
format for Model Articles for companies that were limited by shares remained within 
the legislation for more than two centuries. This was noted through a comparative 
analysis of company laws for St. Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago as member states 
of the OECS and CARICOM.  
 
The importance of a distinction has to be made here. Corporate governance best 
practices could be found as outlined within Articles of Association. The UK 
Companies Act 2006 makes provisions for a model set of articles and once companies 
adopt these they can do so with only slight amendments. These are subject to 
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“amendments or modifications.”577  Guidance to Vincentian companies is also sought 
from Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 [SI 2008/3229] once the 
company registered previously under Companies Act 2006 and had not adopted 
articles of its own. There seems to be more than a suggestion that power is delegated 
to shareholder under the model articles here, and that they gain the edge on power as 
opposed to old law. 
 
The matter of Table A revisited 
 Under Companies Act 1985 and the versions previous to this date, a prescribed 
format of Table A existed and is also known as Articles of Association. Here again 
were prescriptions of procedure and practices or the company’s corporate governance. 
The first prescribed format was made in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 was 
called Table B and would have been available to the first established company on St. 
Vincent – John Hazell Sons and Company Limited.  
 
This Table B was one that was preceded by what was then called a Memorandum of 
Association called Form A. However, in the Companies Act 1862, the articles were 
first referred to as Table A. There was now a special focus on continuing with the 
naming of Articles from 1906, 1908, 1929, and 1948 with amendments in 1967, 1976, 
1980, 1981, 1985, 2000 and 2007. There are changes that would become necessary. 
Once such changes take place after the date of incorporation, such changes may not 
be applicable to the company. Effective 2006, Table A is called “Model of 
Articles.”578 
 
There are several “ versions of Table A”579 and applicable to all companies limited by 
shares within and among former colonies of Great Britain as was noted in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 UK Companies Act 2006 s. 20 (1) (a), (b) – the version applicable to private companies limited by 
shares 
578 UK Companies Act 2006 s. 19 
579 See Appendix a4 – Versions of Table A for all private limited liability companies 1856 - 
2013 
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company laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago 
specifically. The notable difference between Table A and Model Articles, the latter is 
not applicable as of automatic right but is contingent on special resolution for its 
adoption.  What is in practice up to 2013 was the issuance of the default Table A to 
companies that sought incorporation in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
 
Finally, there should not be an issue with the Table A and the Model Articles of 
Association; the latter was introduced by the UK Companies (Model Articles) 
Regulations 2008 and pursuant to Companies Act 2006 section 20. The Model 
Articles of Association provided for all private companies limited by shares. What 
impacted the small private companies in countries that adapted the UK Company 
Laws and the British company Acts remained critical to their own local legislature 
and the understanding of their implications. 
 
The main provisions of the changes to the UK company laws were not necessarily 
applicable to St. Vincent wholesale, as it had developed its own company legislation 
modelled on those of the UK. The analysis revealed that there were contrasts.  Some 
examples were those of the “annual general meetings”580 this was still applicable; the 
“secretary”581 of the company; the reserve powers held by “shareholders”582; how 
“directors”583  may delegate; the decision making by members and “liability of 
members”584; written resolutions but in the case of St. Vincent, “dissenting to 
resolutions”585; the “Chairman’s casting vote”586; communication through “electronic 
medium”587 and “indemnity and insurance.”588  In other words, procedurally the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580 St. Vincent Companies Act 1994 s.79 provided for annual meetings of the company 
581 Ibid, s. 59 where every company shall have a secretary and multiple assistants 
582 Ibid, s. 134, s. 135, Hansmann, Henry, Pargendler, Mariana, The Evolution of Shareholder 
Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, Vol 123 No 4. Yale Law Journal, 
January 2014 
583 Ibid, s. 95, s. 96 
584 Ibid, s. 161 in this sense ‘liability of members’ and their decisions 
585 Ibid, s. 98 
586 Ibid, s. 71; s. 125; s. 129 
587 Ibid, s. 188 
588 Ibid, s. 101, s. 102, s. 103 
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proscribed corporate governance remained as solid guidelines and any lack, disregard 
or absent of those best practices were attributable to those responsible for actual 
execution of said practices.  
 
Private limited liability companies limited by shares prior to the UK Companies Act 
1907 
There was a claim made by the first company as being the ‘first house’ and a private 
limited liability company on the island.  The company in meetings substantiated these 
claims. Management constituted seven or eight directors who were also shareholders. 
In Great Britain, the size of the entity was relative in comparison to similar businesses 
that made their way onto the financial landscape St. Vincent. In the UK, a private 
company was known to have minimum of three members and or variable but was as 
likely to be as effective in the conduct of its businesses as those with members in 
excess of twenty.   
 
When it came to decision-making, the principle was established for many years.  
Historically, Lord Wilberforce, in the case Howard Smith Ltd 589 so that 'directors 
within their management powers, may take decisions against the wishes of the 
majority of shareholders and indeed the majority of shareholders cannot control them 
in the exercise of these powers while they remain in office...' although there may have 
been attempts to alter the practice, this essentially remained good law at the time. 
 
The “directors”590that constituted management were recognised as fundamental to 
corporate governance as well as “shareholders”591 within all types of businesses and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 Howard Smith Ltd. v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 
590  Op. cit. [St. Vincent Companies Act] s.58; Rambarran, Mangal, An Introduction to 
Company Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Canoe Press, UWI, Kingston, Jamaica, 
1995) 68;  
591Paul L. Davies, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (6th edn Sweet and Maxwell, 
UK 1999) 328 - 356 
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with no exception within the “family owned businesses.”592  In the first company on 
St. Vincent, this might have been an ‘incongruity’ as directors were the shareholders. 
Whether the first company appeared not to be incorporation, “the principle of legally 
limiting the financial liabilities of persons investing in business ventures”593 was laid 
down in British Parliament in the 1800s. The company remained, according to its 
records a private limited liability company limited by shares. It was established at the 
time period (1845) of one hundred years prior to the centenary celebrations. This was 
alluded to in the minutes of the meeting held in 1945.  
 
One of the acts of the directors was to pay the sum for a “conversion from partnership 
to becoming a private limited liability company”594. As far as is known, there are no 
records as to whom this fee was paid. Nonetheless, the functionalities of the company 
were detailed in one of its organs (company in meeting) of which a transcript is 
available.  
 
The argument is in favour of similar companies that followed the British legal 
traditions. It is respectfully submitted that some measure of “limited liability from 
1837” 595  was possible. From 1837 thereafter, “in the ensuing 17 years, 50 
companies”596were formed as testimony to the availability of some measure of 
'restriction on members liability'. It was quite interesting to note that this historical 
information about the existence of private limited liability companies limited by 
shares within the UK was not included and or repeated in at least, the seventh edition 
of Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
592  International Monetary Fund, Staff Country Report 2007, No 07/97 (International 
Monetary Fund publication, USA 2007) S.41 
593Gerald A. Cole, Management Theory and Practise (6th edn South Western Cengage 
Learning, UK 2008) 98 
594 See Appendix 1(6) – where a transcript from the meetings showed that a fee was paid as 
per incurred upon transitioning from partnership to private limited liability status. In the 
absence of clarification as to whom was this paid, speculation and presumptions suffice. It 
may have been payable to an existing authority (no available records for this entity) to satisfy 
registration and or incorporation. 
595 UK Chartered Companies Act 1837, s. IV 
596 Gower, L. C. B., The Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd edn Steven and Sons, UK 
1969) 41 
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The discussion here bears heavily on British company laws and the UK Company 
Acts that were in the ‘throes of struggle’ for legislative recognition. There was legal 
confusion as to the legislative premise on which companies were to access corporate 
advantages. In 1834 there was the introduction of the Trading Companies Act in the 
UK, which was pre the establishment of the John Hazell Sons and Company. That Act 
provided for a slight extension of corporate priviledge. The Crown gave letters patent 
and resulting incorporation except limited liability. A measure of corporate 
governance practices and procedures were undoubtedly included therein. The 
legislature was keen on this as was noted in one case by “Lord Eldon in Van Sandau v 
Moore (1825) 1 Russell 441, p. 472”597 as stated. 
 
Gower informed the discussions to substantiate the claims made here for an 
acceptance that the John Hazell Sons and Company was duly established and must be 
considered an incorporated company according to British law. There was public 
registration of members, a preservation of personal liability once they parted with 
their shares three years thereafter. However there were problems foreseen by the 
Board of Trade. Then in 1837, problems arose about the law of partnership and this 
matter laid the foundation for an Act that year – the Chartered Companies Act 1837. 
Personal liability of each member was subject to “letters patent to a specified amount 
per share.”598The question was whether this was the practice that was used to justify 
the John Hazell Sons and Company to give a payment for its limited liability status 
per se. It appeared that this was the practice going back years. This was no fraudulent 
company based on the readings of the minutes of the said John Hazell Sons and 
Company. It is quite regrettable that some records were lost given natural and 
manmade occurrences in a small island devoid of the necessary and safe haven for all 
documents and other valuables. To ‘steady’ the hands guiding the corporate agenda 
for one of the greatest nations on earth – Great Britain; there was the appointment of 
Gladstone who was the President of the Board of Trade in 1843.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597 Ibid 
598 Ibid 
	  
	  
	  
262	  
 
The formation of the Joint Stock Companies Act in 1844 was the occurrence of 
virtuosity. This was undoubtedly the basis on which company law stands. This 
substantively transcends time and impacted corporate governance practices. John 
Hazell Sons and Company was informed as to the lines of demarcation of private 
partnerships and joint stocks held by any company in the UK and applicable to them. 
Their decision, the members or shareholders decision to make the transition was 
inevitable. They knew the consequences of their actions if they held on to a 
partnership that would become obsolete and at best cumbersome according to British 
laws and the UK Companies Acts. There was more than a notion that incorporation 
was possible. Whether the fee paid was for its incorporation by registration, the 
unseen, age old (unavailable not because of trivial reasons) records held the secrets.  
 
While the substantive discussions were not on the “deed of settlement,”599 there was 
mention made by Gower of its significance in relation to its place in satisfaction of 
one of the requirements of early corporate practices. A Registrar of Companies was 
not mentioned in the minutes of John Hazell Sons and Company but certainly there 
was one possibly located in the UK. It is possible that payment made by John Hazell 
Sons and Company was made to that particular office but the paper trail is obscure. 
The Companies Clauses Consolidation Act in 1845 was pertinent.  The rigours of its 
explanations are beyond the scope of this exercise but it paved the way for a number 
of provisions on limited liability eventually and the distinctions on incorporation 
itself. Those concepts sometimes strike at the illogicality of both limited liability and 
incorporation. The question though is whether such attempts at “illogical reasoning” 
could transfer to whether corporate governance arises immediately upon 
incorporation.  
 
Gower has had an indefatigable reputation for recording accurate historical 
information on Company Acts and the British company laws. Additionally, the UK 
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Parliament struggled with the concept of limited liability with respect to “chartered 
banks established with only a limited liability....”600and “other businesses.”601 For 
emphasis, an established company as John Hazell Sons and Company must be 
accepted as authentic and maintain its rightful place in the history of company law in 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines. This should not be taken as an affront to the local 
authorities in St. Vincent but should be regarded as a consolidation of the findings 
that were preserved by one of the historical organs of the company. The records of the 
John Hazell Sons and Company in meeting remains unchallenged. 
 
John Hazell Sons and Company was a private limited liability company limited by 
shares and shared some similarities with the British private company. The private 
limited liability company struggled for relevance amidst private lobbying for years. In 
1890 (forty five years after the first Vincentian private limited liability company was 
established), Great Britain introduced another of its “Companies Acts,”602 which was 
geared generally at the existing public companies.  Two years on in 1892 there was 
much debate about the implementation of the said Act. Parliament debated the merits 
and demerits of such public companies and it was evident that at that time, there was 
no legislation for private limited liability limited by shares.  
 
There was no clear line of demarcation about what would constitute the private 
limited liability company limited by shares.  The latter developed incrementally as the 
need arose for companies that were more adaptable to the needs of the private 
families/purposes rather than for the public concerns. Thereafter the private limited 
liability company limited by shares was introduced in Britain by way of the UK 
Companies Act 1907.  The use of the word ‘private’ conveyed the meaning that the 
public was dealing with a new phenomenon of a company that was distinguishable 
from those well established for public purposes.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 Parliamentary History and Review containing Reports of the Proceedings of the Two 
Houses of Parliament during the session of 1826 with critical remarks on the Principal 
Measures of the Session (Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, UK 1826) 202 
601 Ibid 
602 UK Winding Up Companies Act 1890; see also HC Deb 10 March 1892 Vol 2 cc527-8 
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As stated elsewhere the first company on record at the Commercial and Intellectual 
Property Office in St. Vincent was registered in 1909. The establishment of John 
Hazell Sons and Company Limited pre dated even the formation of the local Registrar 
of Company on the island – the Commercial and Intellectual Property Office. No one 
knew the exact “number of private limited liability companies”603 that existed in the 
1800s in St. Vincent. The identification of a regulatory body or domestic companies 
was not “until 2003”604 through a number of consultative processes that led to the 
enactment of “ several laws.”605 On the other hand it was not until the 1990s that 
private companies within the international sector began to be recognised as viable 
economic entities for St. Vincent. 
 
Understanding corporate governance best practices: another perspective 
First phase: 1845 – 1945 
Upon careful reflection of early corporate St. Vincent and the incubation of the 
private limited liability company limited by shares, the "shareholder value principle 
also known as the shareholder primacy principle or the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm"606was of critical importance. Shareholders voluntarily contracted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603 Colony of St. Vincent, Annual Blue Book 1940 (Unknown publishers, UK 1940) 250 – St. 
Vincent Agricultural Credit and Loan Bank, Limited (Private) registered under “The 
Companies Act, 1874.” Savings Department incorporated in 1909, National Archives UK. 
604 The Commerce and Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) - Commerce and Intellectual 
Property Office Act, No. 43 of 2003. 
605 St. Vincent Companies Act 1994; St. Vincent Companies Regulations 1996; St. Vincent 
Registration of Business Names Act Cap. 111; St. Vincent Registration of Business Names 
Fees Regulations 1981; St. Vincent Societies Act Cap 330; St. Vincent Trade Marks Act 
2003; St. Vincent Trade Marks Regulations 2004; St. Vincent Patents Act Cap 110; St. 
Vincent Patents (Amendment) Rules 1998; Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act Cap 
112; Registration of United Kingdom Patent (Amendment) Rules No. 29 of 2001; St. Vincent 
Copyright Act 2003; St. Vincent Geographical Indications Act 2004 
606 The UK's Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) did refer to this principle as the 
shareholder value: Company Law Review Steering Group, Department of Trade and Industry, 
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework, 1999 @ 37; 
See Bainbridge, Stephen, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, Vol 199 
Harvard Law Review for general discussions on the value of the shareholder primacy; see 
also Bainbridge, Stephen, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply 
to Professor Green, Vol 50 Washington and Lee Law Review @ 1423 (1993)    
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with each other to be the source of capital for these companies. This trend continued 
for well over a century.   
 
The shareholder primacy approach was established practice. This was a statutory 
obligation and such an approach often gave shareholders the power to intercede 
directly and quite frequently in corporate decision-making. Shareholders have 
legislative mandate to amend corporate charters, participate in shareholder referenda 
on business decisions and attend regular corporate board elections all in their own 
interests and the safeguard of their financial input into these private companies.  
 
Second phase: 1945 – 2013 
Even before the global financial crisis in 2008, the doctrine of shareholder primacy 
has been under scrutiny. Within the context of the contagion among the insurance 
companies in 2009 in CARICOM, the complexity on management structures arises in 
corporate groups.  There was a response to management of private companies like the 
insurance companies. These were provided for with the introduction of a hybrid of 
German law with its two – tiered board structured and the existing one-tiered board. 
The latter was as a result of the inherited and imposed British company law and the 
UK Companies Acts.  The elements borrowed from German law were offered as the 
best - case scenario.  Without public consultation but through parliament, the proposal 
was that with the management of private companies under this hybrid of British and 
German corporate laws; managers and managing directors will have the same powers.   
 
The shareholders will continue to contribute to capitalise such entities.  German 
corporate law dictated that in this two – tiered board structure, the lower tier consisted 
of a supervisory committee whose membership was elected periodically by the 
shareholders and the workforces of the company in the proportion of two-thirds 
shareholder representatives and one third employee representatives. A few exceptions 
that existed in the mining and steel companies in Germany do not apply in the case of 
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St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  Here again, in practice, corporate governance best 
practices must allow for management by the board, which would be subjected to the 
supervision of a supervisory committee to which it must report on a periodic basis. 
 
Another phenomenon and requirement within German law was that supervisory 
committee members would be forbidden to undertake management of these private 
limited liability companies but the constitution of the company may require approval 
from the said supervisory committee for particular transactions.  These included but 
not limited to borrowing or the establishment of branches overseas especially so 
within the CARICOM and OECS regions. By law, it would be the supervisory 
committee that would fix remuneration of management and could dismiss them 
accordingly. 
 
Therefore, in St. Vincent shareholder primacy would be subject to a further imposed 
control exerted by an existing unitary board and the two –tiered boards representative 
of both the Anglo-American and German models of corporate governance post 2013. 
As a result, there would likely be drawbacks to the notion of shareholder primacy 
given that corporate decisions and strategy must be sifted through a longer process. 
These may transition into reaching more short - term goals within the private 
company in arriving at hasty corporate decisions characterized by short term 
incentives and bonuses to meet certain targets.  
 
If there were any likelihood of other significant and overwhelming changes to take 
place, it would come from within the companies. However, regulations and other 
amended company laws with emphases on corporate governance best practices may 
not be sufficient to combat a genuine change away from the shareholder primacy 
approach. This can only start from within a company through its internal corporate 
culture and environment as part of its overall strategy on the best approach towards 
corporate governance best practices.  
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An appreciation and acceptance of the domestic private company 
Despite its official language, institutions and historical experiences, St. Vincent 
developed a distinct set of characteristics that propelled it towards its drive for 
economic diversity. In support of the aforementioned, the private company with its 
mandate on corporate governance best practices was seen as a catalyst for change. 
Many argued that there should be more engagement on financial matters within 
corporate entities but this is a contentious issue played out in the media and is outside 
of the remit of the current thesis. One could not forget that from the pages of history 
that, Great Britain - a former colonizer - operated a "mercantilist model."607 This 
system organised productive activity to obtain economic self - sufficiency and short - 
term gains through favourable trade balances.  
 
St. Vincent like Trinidad was part of that "economic exchange" generally until 
emancipation. Still grappling with economic reality, the period of emancipation in 
time was realised as a result of the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century.  In 
the British Caribbean (to which Trinidad and St. Vincent belong), this came about 
around 1834, when a law was passed by the British Parliament to abolish slavery 
through the empire….608 This was a breakpoint, an era that allowed for transitioning 
to new realism – one in which stakeholders were willing participants. Although the 
company evolved over time, the ownership of shares in a company and a stake in an 
alternative form of economic exchange was welcomed news. 
 
It was the adeptness of such states that allowed for effective and efficient regulatory 
and supervisory mechanisms to be put in place when it comes to the harnessing of 
economic activity. There was room for improvement all around. See for example 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607  Findlay, Ronald et al, Eli Heckscher, International Trade and Economic History 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US 2006) 243  
608 Meditz, W. Sandra, Hanratty, M. Dennis, (Eds) Caribbean Islands: A Country Study 
(Washington, 1987) – accessed 23 - 27 February, 2019 – Section on The Post-Emancipation 
Societies – www.countrystudies.us/caribbean-islands/ - accessed 18 March 2019  
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states like the Isle of Man, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and especially 
"Guernsey"609 in terms of size and their regulatory and supervisory capabilities when 
compared to other countries within the commercial capital of the world. There is hope 
yet. 
 
The reformation on corporate governance was contextualized within the dynamic and 
multicultural intermixture that influenced the perceptions and practices throughout the 
life cycles of insurance companies and other categories of juridical bodies locally in 
St. Vincent and in the “wider Caribbean.”610 As far as was known there has not been 
much progress made since 2003 on accelerating a Caribbean perspective on corporate 
governance. Individual countries within the region created their own corporate agenda 
over time.  
 
Unlike other states that were affected, and more specifically in Trinidad and Tobago, 
there were no metals to be extracted from St. Vincent and no “oil and gas 
discoveries.”611 Some expressed fears of a further collapse or economic stagnation 
within the region, if more robust and timely steps are not taken to correct major 
defects in corporate governance within the private companies. For instance, the local 
inflection of the English language did not create any distortions in the printed and 
electronic communication among stakeholders of companies. From the days of a 
plantation society to the more modern society up to and including 2013, adult literacy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609  See the following verified by the Guernsey regulators as bona fide as of 8/5/12 for what 
the jurisdiction of Guernsey holds: www.guernseyregistry.com - accessed on 14 April, 2019 
www.dixcart.com/articles/2012/01/09/in172-key-features-of-guernsey-company-law-and-the-
guernsey-registry.htm - accessed on 8 May 2019 to 14 April, 2019 
www.ardelholdings.com/file/57/ardel-company-management.pdf - accessed on 8 May 2019 
www.collasday.com/Assets-F2CMS/Bulletin-Board-Issue-16-14.pdf - accessed on 14 April, 
2019  
www.careyolsen.com/downloads/publications/incorporating_a_guernsey_company.pdf - 
accessed on14 April, 2019 
www.tridenttrust.com/PDFs/TGUE-C-KF.pdf - accessed on 14 March 2019 
www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=86326 - accessed 14 October, 2019 
610 Report on the Caribbean Corporate Governance Forum (A Working Document) 30 – 43, 
ECCB Headquarters, St. Kitts, 3 – 5 September, 2003 
611 Velculescu, Delia, Rizavi, Saqib, Trinidad and Tobago: The Energy Boom and Proposals 
for a Sustainable Fiscal Policy (International Monetary Fund, Washington 2005) 3 
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was improved. An " adult literacy rate at 89 per cent"612 remained a significant 
achievement against the backdrop of conditions imposed on a small state that was 
once a colony with additional pre-emancipation legacies.  
 
As more companies became incorporated over time, there was a general ‘sluggish but 
quiet’ understanding and acceptance of the roles and responsibilities of shareholders 
and stakeholders. A significant gain among these beneficiaries on becoming literate 
was especially felt among the rural communities that were partially alienated from 
those communities that tended to be more literate and located in and around the main 
commercial centre.  
 
For obvious reasons, the commercial centre in Kingstown provided the platform for 
commercial and other exchanges among inhabitants more readily than the rural areas. 
This was among travellers and seafarers. The concept of company and its benefits 
were later taught to those who ‘escaped’ from plantation society. A more gradual 
infiltrated and ordered indoctrination’ by an education system from the British 
educators was visible and domiciled on the island. The ensuing discussion turned on 
general analyses. 
 
5.7 General observations and analyses  
Chapter Three and Chapter Four presented case studies on private limited liability 
companies that served different purposes. Chapter Three detailed the first company on 
the island. This was a multipurpose company that provided for household and other 
items for domestic use in construction, farming and other areas. In Chapter Four, this 
company was one that was used for insurance purposes but was a cross border 
phenomenon that was tied to other insurance companies. It was at one time deemed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612 IMF Country Report 14/360 - St. Vincent and the Grenadines: Request for Disbursement 
Under The Rapid Credit Facility And Purchase Under The Rapid Financing Instrument - 
Staff Report; Press Release (International Monetary Fund Publication Services, USA 
December 2014) 13
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“too big to fail”. Its impact on corporate governance practices in St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines was disruptive at best. Although the local insurance company was one 
registered in St. Vincent, it was so significant that it had to be included as a case study 
to show contrast to other types of existing private limited liability companies limited 
by shares.  
 
The British American Insurance Company Limited, which constituted Chapter Three, 
was one of the many insurance companies on the island. Its supervision and 
regulation was conjoined between the Ministry of Finance and the International 
Financial Services Authority up to 2011. In 2012, supervision of international 
insurance companies remained conjoined with the Financial Services Authority. This 
created a dichotomous regulatory and supervisory regime for insurance companies 
that conduct businesses locally and across borders or deemed international companies.  
 
Anticipated success of the businesses discussed so far was laid out along procedural 
lines in the bylaws and other local legislation. This was the main purpose for the 
historical instruments that contained detailed guidelines as to corporate governance 
best practices. The intent was to create such a system or systems whereby the 
direction and control of a company or companies would be guaranteed. The human 
element comes in with a subjectivity that should have been curbed by those who were 
entrusted with such a mandate to direct and control the affairs of businesses entrusted 
to them.  
 
For all intent and purposes there was another attempt by member states of 
CARICOM/OECS (namely St. Vincent and the Grenadines) to reposition the private 
limited liability company within the forefront of economical development. There was 
not an intended overemphasis on the collaboration in business networks between two 
of its member states – St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. Both 
countries had a diversity of natural and manmade resources. In the case of St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines comparatively speaking, it was an impoverished nation. The local 
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government financial and economic policies were to improve its national financial 
portfolio for its citizens especially for its growing working class. 
 
Succession planning was part of the process but to date, given the varied business 
models both companies ended up with different outcomes. The first case study 
focused on the John Hazell Sons and Company Limited, which was established in 
1845 according to the minutes of its centenary celebrations. For more than half of a 
century, this was the only company on the island and was established at the point of 
the nation’s history before the national company law registry. The latter was 
established in the early 1900s with a repository at the vault in the Registry of the 
Court House. Its current nomenclature is the Commercial and Intellectual Property 
Office when registration of companies takes place.  The role of this office was 
discussed previously. Since John Hazell Sons and Company Limited was a local 
company, some of its records were eventually housed at this Office. There was an 
amalgamation of this company eventually.  
 
The second case study was about British American Insurance Company Limited. This 
was part of its parent company the Colonial Life Financial Company. The principal 
purpose was that of insurance. The BAICO was part of the insurance industry since 
1961 within the region but was acquired by CL Financial in 1998. The Colonial Life 
Insurance Company was the predecessor to the CL Financial that held all its 
companies across the Caribbean region and beyond. It was from this group of 
companies that purported to conduct intra regional insurance business that the nature 
of corporate governance was compromised. Not only that, but the unprecedented 
financial contagion did little to divorce itself from the significant negative impact on 
the corporate governance system of St. Vincent that was established since 1845.  
 
Both case studies indicated how companies functioned as private limited liability 
companies for different purposes. The point of distinction though, was whether the 
British American Insurance Company Limited could be isolated from its position as 
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being part of a corporate group that transcended national borders. While it appeared 
as a separate identifiable company it could not act independently and therefore was 
treated as representative of a group of insurance companies. It was linked in purpose 
to all other insurance companies within the CL Group namely: Colonial Life 
Insurance Company; British American Insurance companies; Colonial and General 
Insurance Company Limited and CLICO International Life Insurance Company 
Limited. 
 
In practice, the British American Insurance Company Limited never operated 
independently and therefore its corporate governance best practices were 
representative of those of all other insurance companies under the umbrella of C L 
Financial. The applicable legislation for regulation and supervision was the English 
Company laws and the UK Companies Acts. Since the financial crises was so 
debilitating to all corporate structures under the CL Financial Group, this was 
indicative of the weaknesses that existed within the prevailing legislation. There were 
several attempts by regional governments to rescue the ailing private limited liability 
companies. The conglomerate was so huge and with such a diverse and complex 
corporate governance structure, that this “rescue mission” was so mobilised in order 
to prevent a destabilising effect on the entire financial sector of the Caribbean region. 
 
Contrasts 
What was unique about this situation between these two companies was that one was 
had its headquarters in another island across borders. Accessibility to and from either 
island by land, sea or air was not a problem. However, access to substantive records 
by the management of the British American Insurance Company appeared to be 
limited. The purpose for each company was diverse from the other. John Hazell Sons 
and Company Limited was directed and controlled by directors and management that 
had a ‘face’. This was not so within the British American Insurance Company 
Limited. Based on the report of the judicial manager, those who directed and 
controlled this company were also domiciled abroad. In function, even though it was 
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incorporated as a local company, its operations were those of a foreign - based 
company. 
 
The John Hazell Sons and Company was a transition from a partnership to a company 
in 1845. BAICO was a company that was handed to a beneficiary member of the 
same pioneer family in 1937. The historical analyses point to both companies as being 
pioneers in their own right. Both companies were started with shares being purchased 
by the family. Both companies adhered to the same English company jurisprudence. 
The lack, disregard or absence of corporate governance best practices could be 
interpreted as follows: 
ü When there was a lack of best practices, such was a lack of execution of those 
practices. In reality, those who effect the changes were those who presumably lacked 
the prerequisite knowledge of the procedural outline that existed in the legislation. 
ü When there was a disregard of best practices, it would appear that the 
responsible stakeholders were aware of the procedural outlines on corporate 
governance but they chose instead to demonstrate indifference to an execution of best 
practices. 
ü The absence of corporate governance best practices could only occur if and 
only if there was either misunderstanding, articulated ignorance of what exists and or 
lack of knowledge completely.  
 
The point has to be made though, that the legislation on corporate governance was 
organic and grew out of a set of circumstances. English or British law even up to 
today remain all about responding to questions or of finding solutions to explain 
problems. In the instance, the research on a financial contagion was not a prerequisite 
to find a solution to corporate governance best practices. Based on precedence, the 
legislation does exist. Therefore, the response to the current contagion falls within the 
purview of application and amendments of what exist and existed. There could be no 
attempt to try and justify why the financial crisis occurred in this current age.  
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However as one reflected, the inherited British legislation that governs corporations 
and or the private limited liability company limited by shares developed out of such 
justification of why financial scandals occurred.  As the case may be corporate law 
continues to emerge from legal derivations through court cases, text writers, and 
commentators. The current substantive corporate law and their hybrids were never by 
efforts to produce them but rather by ‘accident’ in the transactions that took place and 
the reasoning to solve or gave a solution. Herein lies the solution to this current 
financial crisis and others that may arise hereafter. 
 
The long-term success of the business was always paramount within the two case 
studies that were presented. St. Vincent and the Grenadines adhered largely to the 
established and recognizable international best practices on corporate governance for 
many years.  The companies in question although not listed on the UK Stock 
Exchange adhered as well to those principles as outlined on good corporate 
governance charter articulated by the Institute of Directors and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. There was an absence of a Code on 
Corporate Governance for Vincentian companies. As such the nature of corporate 
governance on island was largely influenced by international best practices as alluded 
to earlier.  
 
Critical too was that the island’s entrepreneurial and prudent management styles were 
bolstered by the concept of an existing Code external to its small but growing 
corporate sector.  There was emphasis somewhat on leadership, corporate 
effectiveness; accountability of staff; remuneration for officers and strengthening of 
relations with shareholders once they were identified.  In some companies, the law 
provided for non-disclosure of registered names of shareholders. Up to the time of 
writing, the ‘comply and explain’ approach utilized in the UK for its own application 
of its Code on corporate governance was embraced in a general ‘spirit’ or sense 
within and among private limited liability companies limited by shares on St. Vincent.  
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Here was a theoretical notion that provided many with an understanding that this was 
merely a general mandate on corporate governance. As such, there was not a St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines Corporate Governance Code in existence either and 
specific to the unlisted companies. 
 
The argument for such a Code becomes more relevant given that a higher standard of 
accountability and responsibility rests with management, supervision and regulation 
especially of insurance companies.  This was because they were served as depositors 
of stakeholders’ funds and the corporate citizenry would require a greater sense of 
accountability. Especially so within the insurance companies, corporate governance 
was largely procedural and prescriptive and this was the manner by which the 
shareholders controlled their assets. Shareholders used the chief executive officer as a 
control mechanism valve on a day - to - day basis.  Positioned between themselves 
(shareholders) and the chief executive officer or a general manager was the board of 
directors.  It followed therefore that the board of directors, the chief executive officer 
and the executives, constituted management of the company.  
 
In general, it can be concluded that the existing nature of corporate governance in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines had more to do with: 
• Whether people in general perceived the private limited liability company 
limited by shares as having its own separate legal personality; 
• Whether such companies as insurance companies operated in the interest of 
officers, shareholders or in stakeholders’ personal interests and if so how was this 
explained to stakeholders; 
• Whether corporate governance was understood as the comprehensive 
constituents of the management and control of the private limited liability company 
limited by shares; 
• Whether some constituents of management of such juridical entities were 
knowledgeable enough about the responsibilities of corporate governance; 
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• Whether an understanding of corporate governance processes facilitated 
anything else but a collection of funds; 
•  To whose benefit were corporate activities performed and if so how were 
these prescribed and facilitated as corporate governance best practices;  
• Integrity, inclusiveness and continuous improvement were core values that 
characterized corporate governance continually generally from the establishment of 
the company through to incorporation, amalgamation of these companies 
Figure 4:1 
Organisational Structure for the Financial Services Authority in St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
 
Source: Financial Services Authority, Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
2012 - 2013 
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The organisational structure of the one of the regulatory bodies for companies in St. 
Vincent is displayed. According to the information extracted from that body, the 
named “Financial Services Authority”613 that came into being in 2011, the financial 
sector as of February 2013 was diverse. Created by Parliament, this regulatory body 
was to “manage, direct, control and supervise the international financial services 
industry and domestic non-bank institutions”614 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
The organizational chart showed a well - structured list of officers with assigned 
titles.  The domestic and international insurance companies were assigned a manager 
with Examiner II, Examiner I and a Clerk as a full compliment of officers. There was 
a domestic sector that comprised of six banks, one building society, five credit unions 
and thirteen motor and general insurance companies.  Four of the insurance 
companies operated locally while nine were spread across the CARICOM region.  
The services offered by these nine companies were long term and life insurance. 
 
The international finance sector comprised five banks, two international insurance 
companies, one international insurance broker, one insurance manager, one hundred 
and thirty Trusts, seven thousand international business companies, five hundred and 
sixty five CTDs; forty limited liability companies, one hundred and twenty mutual 
Funds and seventeen Registered Agents. Clearly, the financial services sector was a 
clear reminder of the government’s policy on making this sector a prominent part of 
its investment development strategy. The legislation on private limited liability 
companies and other financial institutions were subject to comprehensive overhaul in 
1996.  This was when this sector was repositioned at the forefront of economic 
development.   
 
Among other activities, the FSA claimed to have had a rigorous and vigilant oversight 
through its regulatory mechanisms on entities that exhibited best practices within their 
individual business operations and policies.  The private limited liability companies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Financial Services Authority Act 2011 
614 www.svgfsa.com/industry.html - accessed in December 7, 2017 and 15 February, 2018 
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within this sector were so held.  To bolster its regime on regulation additional laws 
were introduced and or amended over the years including and up to 2013.  They were: 
• The International Business Companies Act Chapter 149 
• Exchange of Information Act 2008 
• Proceeds of Crime Money Laundering (Prevention) Act 2001 (Act No. 39 of 
2001) 
• Proceeds of Crime Money Laundering (Prevention) Amendment Act (No. 25 
of 2002) 
• Proceeds of Crime Money Laundering Regulations 2002 (S R & O No. 39 of 
2002) 
• Amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Money Laundering Regulations (S R & 
O No. 29 of 2002) 
• Financial Intelligence Unit Act 2001 (No. 38 of 2001)  
• The Financial Intelligence Unit (Amendment) Act 2001 (No. 24 of 2002) 
• International Trust (Amendment) Act (No. 27 of 2002) 
• Exchange of Information Order S R & O 2002 No. 48 
• International Banks Act 2004 (No. 40 of 2004) 
• International Banks (Amendment) Regulations 2002 (S R & O No. 31 of 
2002) 
• United Nations Anti Terrorism Measures Act 2002 (No. 34 of 2002) 
• The Proceed of Crime and Money Laundering (Prevention) Act (POCA) 2013 
 
All of above sought to strengthen the nation’s legislative and administrative input in 
the private limited liability companies and others, in keeping with existing 
international standards on combatting money laundering and terrorist financing The 
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Proceed of Crime and Money Laundering (Prevention) Act (POCA) 2013 was even 
more specific.  It criminalized the laundering of the proceeds of serious crime. It 
outlined the procedure on assets confiscation, how property was recovered and 
cooperation with overseas authorities. The authority was equipped to report any 
suspicious financial activity to the “Financial Intelligence Unit.”615  POCA provided 
for a National Anti Money Laundering Committee (NAMLC).  
 
The above served as mechanisms by the Financial Services Authority augur well for 
mutual reinforcement.  However, the question arises as to the appropriateness of 
regulatory and supervisory structures that may or may not have existed. Regulation 
was directed at all financial institutions regardless to the admixture of businesses. The 
domestic and international private limited liability companies specialized in a 
particular business activity.  The distinction between institutional and functional 
regulation was blurred.  The regulation of insurance company meant the same thing as 
regulation of the business of insurance.  This may continue to be an issue on policy 
and up for debate as the nature of supervision and regulation was positioned to change 
beyond 2013. 
 
The second competent authority that regulated the private limited liability companies 
limited by shares was the “Commercial and Intellectual Property Office.”616 Their 
mandate was not limited to but included the aforementioned companies and 
constituted for their administration and regulatory framework.  The overall objective 
was to provide support needed for the development of commerce generated 
domestically.  
 
Figure 4(2) 
See overleaf 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Financial Services Unit Act 2001 
616 St. Vincent and the Grenadines Commercial and Intellectual Property Act No 43 of 2003 
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Figure 4(2) 
Organizational Structure of Commercial and Intellectual Property Office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Commercial and Intellectual Property Office, 
Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines – 2012 - 2013 
 
 
The insurance companies as well as all private limited liability companies limited by 
shares were well under the purview of the legislation administered by CIPO. There 
were a plethora of applicable laws from the inception of the Authority and to the 
current period such as: 
• Companies Act, 1994 
• Companies Regulations, 1996 
• Registration of Business Names Act, Cap. 111 
• Registration of Business Names Fees Regulations, 1981 
• Societies Act, Cap. 330 
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• Trade Marks Act, 2003 
• Trade Marks Regulations, 2004 
• Patents Act, Cap. 110 
• Patents (Amendment) Rules, 1998 
• Registration of United Kingdom Patents Act, Cap. 112 
• Registration of United Kingdom Patent (Amendment) Rules, No. 29 of 2001 
• Copyright Act, 2003 
• Geographical Indications Act, 2004 
 
The formation of both the Financial Services Authority and the Commercial and 
Intellectual Property Office fell well within the period of study (1845 to 2013).  
However, the services of these regulatory authorities were unavailable to the private 
limited liability companies limited by shares for the periods of 1845 to 2003 and 2011 
due to legislative enactments of the Commercial and Intellectual Property Office and 
the Financial Services Authority respectively. It must be reiterated that corporate 
governance within the aforementioned private companies was not without guidance.  
International best practices established and promoted by several international 
organizations and found within British company laws and UK Companies Acts. 
 
A dichotomy in regulatory regime 
Arguments for a dichotomy in regulatory regime (in favour of a unified regulatory 
body) 
Concerns were raised in some local circles that questioned the ability of the 
fragmentation on regulation of the financial sector. The argument suggested that an 
overall risk assessment was lacking on the status of the private limited liability 
companies like the insurance companies that operated domestically and 
internationally; or even on a consolidated basis. There was the notion expressed that a 
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dichotomy in regulation provided for an inability to ensure regulation was seamless 
and free of gaps. It was felt that there was a group wide risk within these companies 
that could not have been addressed adequately given that specialists’ regulators were 
an imperative within the insurance sector. The observation was also made when 
products and services within the insurance companies were blurred.   
 
Different regulators had slightly different approaches to regulation of the same 
activity for different stakeholders.  Once a unified regulator and supervisor, the 
function of the office when streamlined was likely to help improve and achieve a 
competitive neutrality. A unified approach to regulation allowed for more flexibility. 
The effectiveness of the current system of separate regulators appeared to be impeded 
by ‘turf wars’ or even a desire to ‘pass the buck’. Doubts were expressed even when 
there were enabling legislation on jurisdictions especially within the insurance sector 
and the insurance companies. There was reason enough to assess the generation of 
economies of scale under a unified approach to supervision and regulation.   
 
The larger the regulatory authority the more it permitted a more focused and detailed 
analysis through specialisation of labour and a more qualitative utilization of its 
inputs. A unified approach could implement cost cutting measures on shared 
infrastructure, administration and the support systems, some of which were already in 
place. Information technologies was definitely cost effective and accounted for less 
duplication of research and efforts at information gathering.  
 
The accountability of regulation was probably one of the best arguments in favour of 
having a unified approach.  It proved challenging to hold multiple regulatory bodies 
accountable for their own performance when put against their statutory objectives 
especially with regards to the cost of regulation; for their policies on discipline within 
the sector as well as for regulatory failures. 
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Arguments about the dichotomous regulatory regime 
Parliament saw the need to persist with multiple regulators. This was done through 
regulatory co-ordination and both bodies “(CIPO and FSA)”617 were strengthened 
through the amendments of their existing regulations up to 2013. There was an 
expressed view that this will continue given the nature of economic development for 
the island state as well as in keeping with world economic trends and the ease with 
which business was to be done through the private limited liability companies limited 
by shares.  
 
A couple of factors were analysed as critical and formed the basis to strengthen the 
argument in favour of such unified approach.  There was a noticeable increase on 
regulation within the financial sectors especially within CARICOM given that lessons 
were learnt from similar financial failures.  The borrowing of ideas from the Swiss 
and the US on their blending of functional regulation with umbrella supervision 
produced positive results. In the case of the US, the American Bankers Association 
and its bid to financial modernization, used the “Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act”618 for 
over sixty years the regulation of its financial institutions were divided among a 
number of diverse agencies. The insurance companies were among the vast number of 
financial institutions that adhered to the principles on blended regulatory approach 
referred to previously. 
 
In a similar situation with the government of Switzerland experiencing “positive real 
growth in gross premiums across both the life and non-life insurance sectors,” this 
could be attributed to its approach on regulation of the sector. The example of Swiss 
government was used so as to draw historical parallels on their input into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617 Commercial Intellectual Property Office and Financial Services Authority, separate entities located 
in capital, Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
618 American Bankers Association Financial Modernization: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
Summary, November 12, 1999 
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formation of the “international financial sector”619 and the associated corporate 
governance practices in 1976 in St. Vincent. Separate regulators as reflected in the 
Vincentian economy reflect the fact that equally compelling arguments persist against 
unified supervision and regulation.  There were a number of objectives noted that 
ranged from safeguarding systemic risk to shielding individual consumers from 
duplicitous practices within the private limited liability companies limited by shares. 
It was felt that a single regulator might not have a clear focus on the objectives and 
justification for regulation of these companies and might not be able to adequately 
differentiate between different types and usages made by and through the private 
limited liability companies limited by shares. 
 
Further, if there was a single unified regulator, it may suffer from some measure of 
diseconomies of scale. A source of inefficiency could occur as a result of a unified 
agency, which may have an effective regulatory monopoly. This in turn may give rise 
to the type of inefficiencies that usually correlate with monopolies. One concern about 
monopoly regulators was that of functionality that could be inflexible and 
bureaucratic than separate specialized agencies. Another source of diseconomy of 
scales had to do with a tendency for unified agencies to be assigned an ever-
increasing range of functions that may be referred to as having the ‘Christmas –tree 
effect.’(a regulator possessing the whole range of services to be effective holistically 
and at all material times).  
 
The critics argued that unified regulation could not be large enough to produce 
economies of scope in any significant way and less significant than economies of 
scale.  It was noted that a number of factors vary markedly such as cultures, focus and 
the skills of regulators.  In light of this, it was not an underestimation that most of the 
risks at insurance companies were generally on the liability side. Further, within the 
public domain and among the wider cross section of stakeholders, there was a 
tendency to assume that all creditors within the private limited liability companies 
limited by shares, regulated by a given regulator could receive an equal proportion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 www.svgfsa.com/industry.html - accessed on 10 - 19 February, 2019 
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protection that generates moral hazard. Therefore, depositors as well as creditors of 
all insurance companies regulated by the same regulatory authority could expect to be 
treated generally in a comparable manner. 
 
Finally, the change process itself could present with a serious disadvantage if a 
decision was made to create a unified approach to regulation and a single regulatory 
agency within the state. To begin with, once this was up for discussion a series of 
events could lead to the creation of a unified agency regardless of whether it would be 
appropriate to create.  Another risk associated here was that of amendment to existing 
legislation to create such a unified agency and this would create opportunity for 
exploitation by special interest groups.  Additionally, a reduction in regulatory 
capacity could be realized through the loss of key personnel and the matter of the 
management of the process itself could be derailed. 
 
Towards a modern trend 
There was the sense that the size of the largest limited liability companies limited by 
shares was a critical factor within a more modern era and a boost to economic activity 
within the Caribbean post 2000. With holdings across the world as was the case with 
CL Financial Holdings this has been a subject of discussions as it was deemed “too 
big to fail.”  There was talk of a rise in market and political power, which lasted for a 
few years.  There was some diversification carried to an extreme brought into 
existence the conglomerate company that led to the acquisition and operation of 
subsidiaries that were often in unrelated fields.   
 
The holding company, with the conglomerate – CL Financial in this instance, acted as 
a kind of internal stock market.  It allocated funds to its subsidiaries on the basis of 
financial performance.  The decline of the conglomerate did cast doubt upon the 
competency level of management and hence its corporate governance best practices 
spread across the diverse and unrelated operations. The empirical evidence from 
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CARICOM suggests that this largest privately held conglomerate was less successful 
financially and that other companies that had a clear product-market focus based on 
organizational strengths and competencies. The corporate failure was phenomenal and 
did not stem from an imperative of modern technology and lacked the capacity for 
innovating industrial processes to enter the international market place. 
 
The private limited liability company limited by shares continues to grow and should 
be encouraged to do so as it caters to the contemporary economy that calls for an 
intricate interaction of executives, experts and an extensive staff of a new breed of 
employees. The interesting dynamic of change amidst the failure of this conglomerate 
was that there was room for smaller private limited liability companies limited by 
shares to respond to stakeholders in more meaningful ways.  For instance, these 
smaller companies could respond to the kinds of goods and services that the public 
seems to want increasingly; those goods and services, which would require resources 
that only a large company, can master. 
 
Separation of ownership and control: another look 
There has always been the question as to who owns and who controls the private 
limited liability company limited by shares.  Given that the company remained a 
nexus of contracts, and has struggled to maintain its separate legality, a family or a 
group of friends cannot own it.  There was a call in St. Vincent for a hybrid on 
German and the Anglo American models of corporate governance and this presents 
with an interesting dialogue on separation of ownership and control.   
 
In the German model of corporate governance and in context of such companies and 
according to the law, the creation of the two tier boards (Aufsichtsrat) was for "stock 
corporations"620generally.  This concept was borrowed and applicable to the private 
limited liability companies limited by shares on St. Vincent.  On the other hand and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620 Hopt, J. Klaus, Wymeersch, Eddy, Comparative Corporate Governance (Gruyter, Walter 
& Co., Berlin1997) 13 
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coexisting was the Anglo American model with emphasis on the one tier boards. In 
St. Vincent the "FSA expects that institutions will adopt the two-tier model in 
structuring their boards."621 This was done without rigorous debate on the application 
of such a hybrid within the private limited liability company limited by shares.  This 
response would seek to solve the problem of the fall out on corporate governance 
evidenced during the contagion as was presented in Chapter Four.  Whether this was 
workable was yet to be tested. 
 
In Great Britain, from a historical perspective the "attractive features"622 of the limited 
liability company were never lost on shareholders. It was viewed as being for the 
"cumulative social and economic good." 623  The same was true for Vincentian 
shareholders. Given that the criteria for two tiered or one - tiered boards would form 
part of the dynamics of ‘ownership’ and control of the private limited liability 
companies, the goal should remain the same. Shareholder primacy should not be 
compromised. Changes were inevitable as was previously well articulated that 
"changes are emerging in the UK system"624 as was then.  
 
Among others, Ashworth made the following observations commenting on 
organization of companies in the nineteenth century.  It was felt that these sentiments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621  Directors of domestic regulated financial institutions - (with particular reference to 
insurance companies and credit unions) - minimum requirements for approval and continued 
approval by the authority (effective 15 may 2013) - Statement from the Financial Services 
Authority as per Financial Services Authority Act 2011 of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
The financial sector as at the 28th February 2013 was composed of both the domestic and the 
international financial sectors. The domestic sector consists of six banks; one building 
society; nine credit unions; thirteen motor and general insurance companies (four local and 
nine CARICOM) and nine long term and life insurance companies (all CARICOM). The 
international financial sector consisted of entities other than private limited liability 
companies - Five banks; two international insurance companies; one international insurance 
broker; one insurance manager; one hundred and thirty trusts; 7728 IBC's; five hundred and 
sixty five CTD's; eighteen LLC's; one hundred and twenty seven Mutual funds - 
Public/Private/Accredited Managers and seventeen Registered Agents  
622 Prasad, Kesho, Corporate Governance (Prentice - Hall of India Private Limited, Delhi 
2006) 9 
623 Daft, Richard, Organization Theory and Design (10th edn. Cengage Learning, USA 2008) 
12 - 13 
624 Bach, Stephen (Ed) Managing Human Resources (4th edn. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, UK 
2005) 26 
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could be germane to companies within the new hybrid models of corporate 
governance in St. Vincent in 2011 and beyond.  It was agreed that any change to the 
legislation and to corporate governance was that,  
“  “It facilitated an increase in scale which in many cases was economically 
essential; it helped firms to attain a size and position in which they could better 
accumulate reserves, either to protect themselves in times of bad trade or to contribute 
to their further expansion; it encouraged more precise and careful accounting, the 
advantages of which areas as the complexity of business grew; and it led slowly to a 
greater separation of ownership from management, and hence made it possible to use 
managerial ability which otherwise could have been neglected."625 
 
Finally, the investing public remains as a major source of funds for new or expanding 
private limited liability companies limited by shares as vehicles of economic activity.  
Companies continue to grow as their need for funds would also grow.  Legal 
ownership of such companies and their corporate governance would become even 
more widely dispersed.  It now appears that shareholders would continue to be 
counted into the thousands.  Several blocks of shares may be held by wealthy 
individuals or institutional investors with the effect that dispersion would give have 
implications for control and ownership of shares as well corporate governance 
mandate to salaried managers may become the greatest imperative.   
 
Irrespective of the holding of annual general meetings open to all shareholders, some 
may vote by proxy but the ratification of on-going policy was inevitable.  The 
overriding of outside proposals for change and conformity to a hybrid model on 
corporate governance for instance could be possible.  Whether there would be 
recourse for dissatisfied shareholders was yet to be seen.  It could be argued that such 
recourse could result in the sale of shares and to invest in private limited liability 
companies limited by shares whose policies were more in keeping with their desires. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625Ashworth, W., An Economic History of England 1870 – 1939 (Camelot Press Ltd, UK 
1960) 96 
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Whether enough shareholders could cause the demise of a particular private limited 
liability company limited by shares was a matter that would definitely impel changes 
in management or corporate governance policy of such a company.  Through the 
vehicle of the unanimous shareholder agreement also, proxy battles could be 
attempted and the persuasion of the majority of shareholders to vote against a 
company’s management or to secure some form of representation could be possible.  
It would almost always be in the manager’s interest to keep shareholders updated on 
policy changes and their implications.   
 
Other issues to be examined but outside of the remit of this thesis were generally 
contingent on the implementation of the hybrid corporate governance models.  A few 
of them that could serve as research material to name a few were: managerial 
autonomy; corporate social responsibility; expansion and sphere of corporate 
operations; employees rights and remuneration, executive management and 
managerial decision-making. The aforementioned would necessitate more than a 
passing mention in light of their connectivity to an emerging school of thought and 
scholarship on how do they relate if at all to the field of corporate governance. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
St. Vincent with its shared historical legacy with other neighbouring states and 
juridical bodies are members of several groupings one of which was CARICOM. St. 
Vincent boasted of having progressed to a post emancipation modern emerging 
economy. Its emphases continually were on economic growth and employment. 
Several national development plans positioned the private limited liability companies 
limited by shares to the forefront of the economy. They were situated within the 
dichotomous regulatory regime of the Financial Services Authority and the 
Commercial Intellectual Property Office.  
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Due to the porous borders between and among neighbouring countries, the Caribbean 
region served as an incubator for juridical bodies used as vehicles for stakeholders’ 
economic, social and political empowerment. The companies’ corporate governance 
best practices were probably known for emphases on procedure, systems and 
regulations that resonated with British Company laws and the UK Companies Acts. 
 
Given the unprecedented contagion that was highlighted in the case study of Chapter 
Four, the private limited liability company can be seen as a behemoth that rummaged 
through the corporate and business landscape of the Caribbean. The private company 
was not promoted as a market adaptation through private agreements. The whole 
aspect of boards of directors, shareholders meetings and their rights to vote as well as 
fiduciary duties and obligations were fundamental to the successful business 
networks. The Vincentian corporate law with recent emphases on elements of German 
corporate law and the Anglo-American model of corporate governance will create a 
hybrid of the structural framework for the private limited liability company beyond 
2013. The merits and demerits of each system have been discussed elsewhere.  
 
Legislation to accommodate cross border entrepreneurial spirit was amended 
incrementally.  Yet there were numerous challenges on the choice of management and 
dispersed ownership of shares through shareholding domestically, regionally and 
internationally. Having explored the nature of corporate governance within the private 
limited liability companies limited by shares on St. Vincent, such exploration was not 
exhaustive by any means.  There were still more areas to be explored.  
 
Since the private companies were largely left without an autochthonous code on 
corporate governance, such a “Code”626 for unlisted companies was developed and 
proposed. It adhered to international best practice with a view to providing additional 
guidance to approximately ten thousand unlisted companies. These companies are 
important and should not be left without some measure of guidance about their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 Appendix 5 (6) – Corporate Governance Code for St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
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viability and sustainability. It has been widely acknowledged that corporate 
governance was a fundamental to the wider remit of economic development of the 
country by way of providing a catalyst to bolster investor confidence and to create 
employment for some members of the stakeholder community.  
 
The principal role of corporate governance best practices remained the same. It was 
about guidance for the direction and control of the private limited liability company 
limited by shares. Finally, consideration about the findings of the hypothesis proved 
correct that a lack, disregard or absence of corporate governance best practices did 
contribute to genteel poverty, a condition that was imposed on an already 
impoverished nation. This took place during 2009 but was unprecedented in the 
history of the private limited liability companies and the country at large. The 
financial crisis had its origin in Trinidad and Tobago and external to the nation state. 
Nonetheless, the versatility of the private limited liability company remains 
procedurally strong against the odds. 
 
There is no doubt that the admixture of British corporate law, with adaptations from 
German corporate law, constituted the substantive nature of corporate governance on 
the island of St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  
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www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120327/business/business3.html - accessed on 
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*VISITS TO ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 
August 2012; September 2013 
*Student currently resident and domicile in St. Vincent but effective February 2010 to 
November 2017/Diplomatic representative (Deputy Head of Mission/Minister 
Counsellor) of the island of St. Vincent and the Grenadines where its High 
Commission was accredited to the Court of St. James/ Royal court for the Sovereign 
of the United Kingdom). Student returned to island as stated since this was in 
fulfilment of investigative research on the topic under study. 
 
INSTITUTIONS/PLACES VISITED 
Bank of Nova Scotia 
Bank of St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Building and Loan Association 
Commercial and Intellectual Property Office 
Coreas Hazells Incorporated 
Financial Services Authority 
General Employees Credit Union 
Kingstown Credit Union 
Lewis Building- Location of the former private limited liability company 
BAICL/BAICO 
Ministry of Finance, Kingstown 
Ministry of National Reconciliation, Public Service et al 
Other government offices 
Government Printer 
National Archives of St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
National Insurance Scheme 
National Public Library 
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Taxi Driver Association 
Hotel Association 
Churches 
Fish market/Meat market 
Office of Prime Minister, Honourable Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines - Dr Ralph Gonsalves, Kingstown 
Office of the Attorney General 
Original Site/Location  - Lot 35- Kingstown, SVG - John Hazell Sons and Co Ltd 
Travel around island and in discussions with various categories of stakeholders 
 
 
 
INTERVIEWS 
Attorney General of St. Vincent and the Grenadines (up to 2013) - Mrs Judith Jones 
Morgan 
Chief Executive Officer, Coreas Hazells Incorporated - Mr. Joel Providence 
 
Legal Practitioners 
Mr. Isaac Legair - Barrister 
Members of rural and urban communities 
Shareholders/Stakeholders 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRES/DISCUSSIONS/TELEPHONE DISCUSSIONS 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Financial Services Authority - August - December 
2013,  
(Verification of data) May to August 2014 
Commercial Property Office  
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August (Verification of data) - December 2013 
September 2013 to September 2014 
 
 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance, Newsletter - Vol V1 No1, January 2013 
Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance, Newsletter - Vol X11 No 3, March 2012 
Certificate of Incorporation 119 of 2002 - St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 7 May 
2002 
Jhinkoo, Julia, Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance - Newsletter Vol 6, No. 1, 
2013 
Government Gazette, Vol 102 No 8, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuesday 23 
December 1969 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Agreement between CL Financial Limited 
and the Government of Trinidad and Tobago - accessed 5 May 2019 
Register of Companies: 1909 - 2013 - Commercial and Intellectual Property Office, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Examined by researcher during visits to the island in 
2012 and 2013(Records examined at that time for more than a century (1800s to 
1900s) were in a state of disuse) 
Layne, William, Permanent Secretary (ret.) RECENT FINANCIAL FAILURES IN 
THE CARIBBEAN - WHAT WERE THE CAUSES AND WHAT LESSONS CAN 
BE LEARNT? The Ministry of Finance - Barbados 6, para. 2. 3 – www.da-
academy.org/Financial_Crisis_in_the_Caribbean.pdf - accessed on 3 May 2019 
British American Insurance Company Limited - Companies Act (St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines) 1994  
British American Insurance Company Limited (Judicial Management): Policyholder 
update: Proposed Plan of Arrangement (KPMG UK LLP /KPMG Europe LLP 
Publication UK 2016)  
Update on the ECCU response to issues relating to British American Insurance 
Company and CLICO in the Eastern Caribbean - accessed on 19 April 2019 
(Available as a pdf/Media Release) 
Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance, Newsletter - Vol X11 No 3 (March 2012)  
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Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance, Newsletter - Vol V1 No1 (January 2013) 
www.idsguyana.org/articles/prof-clive-thomas/global-crisis/60-the-stanford-financial-
group-scandals-and-scams.html - accessed on 12 January 2019 
www.broadstreetjournalbarbados.com/2011-03-22/clico-and-corporate-governance - 
accessed on 27 March 2019 
www.businessinsightcaribbean.com/documents/1086.pdf - accessed on 8 May 2019 
“Banks’ liquidity challenges in Trinidad and Tobago” - Comments by Ewart S. 
Williams, Governor of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago for the CIB/Clico 
Media Conference, Port of Spain Trinidad and Tobago, 30 January 2009 
Saint Vincent Building & Loan Association 70th Annual Report of the Directors and 
Statement of Accounts (December 31, 2010)  
National Economic and Social Development Plan 2010 - 2015, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines pdf/power point presentation - accessed on 29 October 2019 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines - National Economic and Social Development Plan 
2013-2025 - accessed on 23 February 2019 
Williams, Ewart. S., Governor, Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago: Presentation to 
Commonwealth Secretariat Conference on Sustaining Development in Small States in 
a Turbulent Economy (Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, July 2009) 
Minutes of the centennial meeting – Company records - John Hazell Sons and 
Company Limited, Kingstown, St. Vincent 1945 
Discussions with descendants of shareholders: ‘shares held by shareholders were 
transferrable and sold so as to purchase homes and other commodities.’ This 
information was relayed to researcher as part of the oral history that surrounds this 
company – Mr. Steve Maingot (London, UK November 2012) 
British American Insurance Company Limited - Certificate of Incorporation 119 of 
2002 - St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 7 May 2002 
	  
 
*Quotations and references to historical texts within the bibliographical material/footnotes before 2009 were imperatives and 
included generally for historical context/ information germane to this study in its originality and used parsimoniously. 
<>Websites: access dates may vary in many instances due to further verification as to their current functionability at the time of 
input into Bibliography versus time of input into footnotes.  
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APPENDIX (i) 
 
ORIGINAL LOCATION OF JOHN HAZELL SONS AND COMPANY LIMITED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lot 35 
The marked spot is still identifiable in Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
  
Source: Public domain 
Original site (Lot 35) conveyed to shareholders of John Hazell Sons and Company 
Limited 
Map of Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1897 
Post 1845 the controlling shareholder was reportedly Mr. John Hazell 
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APPENDIX (ii) 
 
THE NAMED COMPANY : JOHN HAZELL SONS & CO LTD 
 
 
 
Caption reads : 
Minutes of a General Meeting of John H. Hazell Sons & Co Ltd held at the offices of 
the Company on the 25th October 1945 at 2 p.m. 
(There were eight (8) persons recorded as being present at this meeting as seen in the 
minutes) 
Source: 
 The Coreas Hazells Incorporated Company  
With the kind permission of CEO - Mr. Joel Providence – 2012 - 2013 
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APPENDIX 1 (1) 
 
 
PRINCIPLES FUNDAMENTAL TO THE FIRST ESTABLISHED COMPANY – JOHN 
HAZELL SONS AND COMPANY LIMITED – EFFECTIVELY FROM 1845 
PARAGRAPHS ONE AND TWO 
“Strict adherence to the principals (principles) of square and honest dealing, laid 
down by our predecessors, the loyalty of our customers, and the steadfastness and 
application with which our staff has applied itself to the tasks allotted to	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Source: The Coreas Hazells Incorporated Company  
With the kind permission of CEO - Mr. Joel Providence – accessed 2012 - 2013 
 
APPENDIX 1 (2) 
SYMBOL 
LLOYDS OF LONDON AGENT/AGENCY 
(THIS WAS INDICATIVE OF THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LLOYDS OF 
LONDON AND THE FIRST ESTABLISHED COMPANY – JOHN HAZELLS SONS AND 
COMPANY LIMITED – REPORTED IN ITS CENTENNIAL MEETING 1945) 
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Symbol displayed on the premises of Coreas Hazells Incorporated (John Hazell Sons 
and Company Limited was one of the companies amalgamated to form this new 
incorporated entity which characterizes its brand identity)  
Photo courtesy Mr. Kurtland Barbour, Kingstown, St. Vincent 
April 2018 
 
APPENDIX 1 (3A) 
 
EXCERPT OF MENTION IN MINUTES OF MEETING ABOUT RISK MANAGEMENT 
DECISION – LLOYDS OF LONDON WAS APPROACHED THROUGH THE COMPANY’S 
AGENT – SEE LAST PARAGRAPH 
 
 
 
 
	  
“In the interest of all concerned, it was deemed advisable to fully cover our stock and the 
buildings belonging to the Company against all the usual risks, such as fire, earthquake, 
hurricanes & gales, volcanic eruption etc. and a policy was accordingly negotiated through 
our London agents with LLOYDS.” 
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Source: The Coreas Hazells Incorporated Company – 2012  - 2013 
With the kind permission of CEO - Mr. Joel Providence 
 
APPENDIX 1(3B) 
 
THE 81ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE ‘1935 RIOTS’ 
Fri, Oct 21, 2016 
Today is the 81st anniversary of the ‘1935 Riots’, an event that had far-reaching 
effects on St Vincent, in that it impacted on the colony’s political history and helped 
to shape the pathway to adult suffrage. Unfortunately, we know little about it and it 
passes by every year with virtually no acknowledgement of its historical importance. 
We missed a golden opportunity in 1979 to mark this day as the date of our 
Independence, for as far as I am aware, the 27th October has no historical 
significance. The ‘Riots’ was indeed a milestone to our Independence and represented 
another chapter in that long march from Emancipation. We were still searching for the 
promises and expectations of the Emancipation declaration. 
 
St Vincent was one of 10 British Caribbean colonies to have experienced disturbances 
in the 1930s (that is, including Belize and the Bahamas). The St Vincent Riots 
followed that of January 1935 in St Kitts and had some uniqueness of its own in that 
while most of the others were centred around the plantations and strikes, here it began 
in the yard of the Courthouse during a meeting of the Legislative Council in the upper 
chambers of the Courthouse. While developments between 1935 and 1951 were 
common in the British Caribbean colonies, St Vincent, like the others, had its own 
players and peculiar circumstances. 
 
What happened? 
 
The Legislative Council had, at a meeting on Friday, October 18, introduced some 
financial measures – Customs Duties and Licences Amendment Ordinances. Among 
the items subjected to increased duties were matches. The price of matches went from 
three boxes a penny to one box a penny. The measures were introduced on Friday and 
the Legislative Council was to meet again on Monday, October 21st to bring them 
into law. Even before the legislation was finalized, it appeared that some merchants, 
over the weekend, had begun to increase prices. This was of great concern and when 
Council was reconvened on the 21st, there were many anxious people flocking to the 
yard of the Courthouse. 
 
The Times newspaper described the scene. Among the first on the scene were 15 
women ‘with small sticks’. The crowd later increased to about 200, the majority being 
men, some with stones, sledgehammers, cutlasses and knives. George McIntosh, after 
being asked to intervene on their behalf with the Governor, was given a meeting time 
	  
	  
	  
326	  
at 5 p.m. when the session of Council would have ended. The people refused to accept 
that, fearing that the Governor would have been returning to Grenada that afternoon. 
Crowds continued moving into the Court yard and the noise brought an end to the 
Council meeting. The Governor moved downstairs and attempted to address the 
crowd, but his voice was drowned out. The Cable Office nearby was broken into, as 
was the Prison; Sheriff Lewis led the charge there, declaring himself ‘Haile Selassie’ 
and demanding that the prison gates be opened. 
 
Things got completely out of hand. One man was shot. Some persons, including the 
Chief of Police, were struck. Vehicles of officials parked in the Court yard were 
damaged. This included the Governor’s car with the official flag. Police 
reinforcements were called in and the crowd moved to the business places of FA 
Corea (Casson). The Riot Act was read, but sections of the crowd still remained at 
Coreas and the Court yard until later that afternoon; three persons died in the process 
and one woman later. 
 
North River Road and Cane Garden 
 
A few persons had by then been moving to the North River Road and Wilson Hill 
area. Fred Hazell, prominent merchant and lieutenant in the Volunteer Force, lived in 
the area where the St Joseph’s Convent is now located. Hazell was accused of 
shooting ‘John Bull’ during the disturbances at the Court yard, so he might have been 
a target. A contingent of police and volunteers forced the men out, some moving in 
the vicinity of the Guides Pavilion and up to McKie’s Hill. Two entered a 
neighbouring house where they were subdued but not before inflicting a wound on 
one of the policemen who had to be taken to the hospital. 
 
Cane Garden was the next trouble spot. A squad of police and volunteers, sent to the 
area was attacked by a group of about 30 men wielding cutlasses and sticks. One of 
the rioters was shot in his foot but they had already looted some of the houses and cut 
the telephone wires so that there was no communication with Kingstown. One house 
that escaped being looted was that of O.W Forde, lawyer and plantation owner who 
had some of the workers from his estate at Arnos Vale guarding his home. 
 
One of the other areas that witnessed disturbances on that Monday was the area of 
Byrea, Grand Sable and Georgetown. Telephone wires from that area were cut so 
information about the disturbances there did not get to Police Headquarters until late 
that night. Even then it was only with the arrival from Grenada of warship H.M.S 
Challenger at midnight that they were in a position to send reinforcements to 
Georgetown. (To be continued) 
 
Dr Adrian Fraser is a social commentator and historian. 
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APPENDIX 1(4) 
EXCERPT FROM MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN 1945 ON THE CENTENARY 
CELEBRATIONS OF THE JOHN HAZELL SONS AND COMPANY LIMITED  
 
The classic example of one of the organs of the company in its earliest days of efficient 
Annual General Meetings/Special meetings (the shareholders assembly/company in 
meeting) 
 
 
 
In paragraphs 1 and 2 the synopsis was that management gave guidance on greater 
applicability to work in light of the competition that was being faced by the company. 
The company was concerned that they had a duty to stakeholders (customers) to make 
sure that their needs are being met. The emphasis was on best practices. In the words 
of the scribe, “it is left up to those who have the direction of the business [a clear 
reference to directors] … to fit themselves for the tasks which lie ahead …” 
 
 
Source: The Coreas Hazells Incorporated Company - 2012 
With the kind permission of CEO - Mr. Joel Providence 
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APPENDIX 1 (5) 
SECTION A 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT TOOLS 
ASSESSMENT TOOL USED FOR PRIVATE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES ON 
ST.VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 
 
An adaptation from the OECD's Corporate Governance Assessment Tool was utilized for the 
purposes of evaluation of performance on six areas based on applicable legislation in use in 
St. Vincent and widely accepted international principles.  The following areas were assessed 
[as far as was practicable]. This is an original assessment and have limitations given that 
material (raw data has been subjected to a number of natural and manmade manipulation due 
to /loss of some information over time/disrepair/other). Some specific details are given as per 
itemized. Nonetheless, sufficient the result suggests that there is room for improvement 
within the field of corporate governance within domestic companies. It was challenging to get 
data to properly assess the international companies for a number of legitimate reasons. They 
are subjected to a higher standard of regulation and legislation itself is specific to levels of 
probity, transparency specific to directors and the requisite Register.  
Areas: 
7) Roles of Board members 
8) The composition of the Board 
9) The assigned tasks of Board members 
10) The processes of the Board 
11) Disclosure and Transparency mechanisms 
12) Relations with shareholders 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Assessment Tool includes thirty -two indicators of corporate governance practices that were 
possible within the private limited liability company 
For each Indicator there are 4 levels of maturity as follows:  
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
Level 4: Advanced governance practice. 
The task is to determine the company's level of maturity for each Indicator by stating 
whether the Test Statement presented is "True" or "False".  
 
Based on the response, progress to the next relevant Test Statement or the next Indicator. 
Some Levels may not be applicable and therefore could be disregarded. 
The following information was used to assess the nature of corporate governance 
practices. 
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1. The private limited liability company is a member of the Chamber of 
Commerce in St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
a) Yes ( )  (67.8 /678)  = Approximately 10% companies registered with 
Chamber of Commerce (there may be reasons why this is so for domestic 
companies…    
b) No (/ ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
 
2. The company is locally (SVG) or foreign owned? 
a. Local (/ )                          542.4/678 =  80% locally owned                                                 
b.  Foreign ( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
3. Number of employees       
 
a)   10 - 500  (/ )                                     676/678 = 99.71% 
b)   500 - 678 ( )                                    2/678 = 0.29 %(Flour Mills ?? 
and Coreas Hazells – the latter now part of Goddards Enterprises and listed on 
Barbados Stock Exchange) 
c)   678 -  5000( ) 
d)   5000 ( ) 
 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
4. Revenue Turnover annually ($XCD) 
 
Particulars of 
Company 
Annual Revenue Turnover 
XCD $ 
Observations 
 Below $100,000 / 
 $100, 000 - $500,000 
 
55% 
 $500,000 -   $1,000,000 
 
10% 
 $1,000,000 - $1,500,000 
 
15% 
 $1,500,000 - $2,000,000 
 
3% 
 $2,500,000 - $3,000,000 
 
3% 
 >$3,000,000 4% 
 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
5. Applicable Business Sector/Sectors  
  -   Construction/Engineering (/ )                                   10% 
  ---Finance/Insurance (/ )                                                25% 
  ---Energy related/Service and Supplies ( )                     8% 
  ---Manufacturing (/ )                                                       10% 
  ---Professional Services ( )                                                5% 
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  ---Consumer Production (Wholesale and Retail) (/ )  20% 
  ---Agro Industrial Base (Small Enterprises) ( )             20% 
  ---Other Services.........................( )                               2% 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
 
6. Main Source of Financing 
a. ---Bank ( )                                    80% 
b. ---Self Financed  (/ )                    12% 
c. ---Equity (/ )                                    8% 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
7. Board Size (Number of Directors) 
a. 1 - 5                        ( ) 
b. 5 - 10                      ( /) - 100% 
c. 10 - 15                    ( ) 
d. 15 ........................( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
1. Number of Independent Directors 
a) 1 - 5                        ( /)    - 100% 
b) 5 - 10                      ( ) 
c) 10 - 15                    ( ) 
d) > 15 ........................( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
2. Number of Female Directors 
a) 1 - 5                        ( ) - 100% 
b) 5 - 10                      ( ) 
c) 10 - 15                    ( ) 
d) > 15 ......................( ) 
Level:  Not applicable (challenging to assess) 
3. Number of Non-Executive Directors 
a)   1 - 5                        (/)   100% 
b)    5 - 10                     ( ) 
c)   10 - 15                    ( ) 
d)   > 15 ......................( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
4. DIVISION OF ROLES 
The board and management have distinct roles. There is a clear distinction between the 
decisions taken by the board and the running of the business. Best practice boards do not 
become involved in management or micro-manage decisions.  (in more than 50%) 
The core functions of the board are to communicate with the owners, to guide executives, 
and to monitor the performance of the company. The board adds value by determining what 
results are to achieve, testing the assumptions and the strategies of management, monitoring, 
and offering its advice to the executive on high-level strategic issues. 
Division of Roles 
 IN THIS SITUATION, BOTH BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS WERE 
MANAGING THE CORPORATE ENTITY JOINTLY AS COMPANIES WERE 
GENERALLY FAMILY RUN BUSINESS - 
• References to The Default Article of Association/Regulations 
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• Table B - 1856 -  
• Table A 1862 
• Table A 1906 
• Table A 1908 
• Table A 1929 
• Table A 1948 
Implementation Level 1 (L1): Complying with legal baseline - YES COMPLIANCE AS 
PER TABLE A/TABLE B 
At least 2 Directors have been appointed. 
a) True (/ )         80% of the cases                                                                         
b) False ( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
5. DUTY OF CARE 
Board decisions are taken based upon complete information and on a fully informed basis. 
Information should be complete and available to the board on a timely basis. The board 
makes important decisions that are founded upon the best possible available information, as 
well as informed, rigorous and open debate.  
 
In 80% of the cases - The duty of care is an obligation imposed on the board that they act on 
a fully informed basis, in good faith, and with due diligence. The board needs high quality 
information on which it can base its decisions. The information must also be complete and 
provided on a timely basis. It needs to be uncensored by management. An absence of good 
information leads to weak decision-making processes. (Extrapolation from minutes in 
general meetings) 
 Duty of Care 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
The duty of care is embodied in the company’s articles of Association, and or the 
Memorandum of Association 
a) True (/ )                                                                             
b) False ( ). 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
6. DUTY OF LOYALTY 
Directors take decisions objectively and in the exclusive interest of the company. Sometimes 
this is referred to as the “duty of loyalty” or a directors "fiduciary duty".  
80% of the companies- The duty of loyalty means that directors act exclusively in the 
interest of the company and its shareholders and do not allow their personal, or any other 
singular, interests to prevail. (Extrapolation from minutes of meetings and other documents) 
 Duty of Loyalty 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
The duty of loyalty is embodied in the company’s articles of Association, and or the 
Memorandum of Association 
a) True (/)                                                                             
b) False ( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
7. APPROPRIATE BOARD COMPOSITION 
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Generally this is true.... 
The skills and experience of board members are appropriate to the requirements of the 
business.  
Boards will require different skill sets, experience and personalities to properly fulfil their 
roles. These should be adapted to the evolving needs of the company. The aim is to maintain 
an appropriate balance of skills and experience on the board. 
 Appropriate Board Composition 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
The owners and the board recognize that the board needs appropriate skills and experience to 
best fulfil its responsibilities. 
True ( )                                                                                 False ( ) - difficult to ascertain 
but...(discuss this) 
8. CHOOSING DIRECTORS 
The board member nominations process is formal, documented and transparent. Board 
members are appointed based exclusively on merit.  - Not always as socio-culture elements 
impact decision-making process significantly. 
40% of Board members should be appointed based upon qualities that they bring to the 
board and the company that help them achieve company goals. Qualities can be technical 
such as financial skills, industry knowledge, legal expertise, or Management & Accounting 
expertise, but also soft skills like leadership. 
Choosing Directors 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
The appointment process considers not just family members, but people who contribute an 
outside perspective.  This has changed as time progressed 
a) True ( )                                                                                     
b) False (/) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
9. INDEPENDENCE FOR OVERSIGHT (Could omit due to insufficient checking and 
rechecking) 
In many instances, The board has sufficient independence to allow it to exercise objective 
oversight of the company. Independence is a quality that permits the board to make objective 
decisions in the interest of the company. Such independence requires a sufficient number of 
independent board members. 
Independence for Oversight 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps.  
There are independent or non-family members on the board. 
a) True ( )                                                                            
b) False (/ )  For the first one hundred years(Maybe/uncertain) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
10. NUMBER OF DIRECTORS 
The board size is appropriate for the requirements of the business. There is no single optimal 
board size as the correct board size depends upon the circumstances of the company.  
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A typical range of board size would be from 5 to 10 members. Excessively small boards 
have insufficient manpower and skills. Small boards of up to 6 members are better suited for 
closely held and family enterprises. Excessively large boards have cumbersome decision 
making processes and may lead to some directors seldom making contributions and therefore 
being non-effective. 
Number of Directors 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
At least two (2) Directors appointed. 
a) True (/)   - 80% of company appoint at least two of its directors                                                                  
b) False ( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
11. DIRECTING, DELEGATING & MONITORING 
The board fulfils certain expected responsibilities: establishing an effective link with owners, 
directing management, and assuring that the executive adheres to board policies through 
monitoring. 
For each of the statements below select the appropriate level for your company. 
 
Particulars  
L2: Responsibility 
formally specified in an 
adopted document 
Reviews and guides 
corporate strategy as 
proposed by 
management 
True 
Reviews and guides 
major plans of action 
including annual 
budgets and/or business 
plans 
• True 
Agrees and sets 
performance objectives 
with management and 
monitors management's 
implementation of plans 
• uncertain/True 
Evaluates, selects and 
dismisses the CEO 
• Uncertain as to 
the process that is 
followed for dismissal 
Oversees the setting of 
remuneration practices 
and approves 
remuneration plans 
• Not known 
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Monitors the 
effectiveness of the 
company's governance 
practices 
NA 
 
12. RISK OVERSIGHT AND BOARD AUDIT 
The board has established an audit committee and an internal control and risk oversight 
function is set up and working. Of all of the committees of the board, the audit committee is 
the most important having responsibility for overseeing the control and reporting 
environment of the company. 
 Risk Oversight & Board Audit 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
Level 4: Advanced governance practice.  
It is expected that Company has internal controls and risk oversight. 
a) True (/ )                                                                                   
b) False ( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
13. INTERNAL AUDIT 
Companies are generally in compliance here. 
The company has an internal audit function. The internal auditor has a direct reporting 
relationship to the audit committee of the board.  The internal auditor is not the same thing 
as internal control. Internal audit is an independent, objective assurance and consulting 
activity. It brings a systematic approach to improving the effectiveness of risk management, 
control, and governance processes. 
Internal Audit 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
Level 4: Advanced governance practice.  
Risks are being documented (e.g. a risk matrix). 
a) True ( /)                                                                                   
b) False ( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
14. CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Generally this is so...The board has systems in place for monitoring conflicts of interest, 
misuse of company assets, and related party transactions. A conflict of interest occurs when 
an individual or organization has multiple interests, one of which could possibly corrupt 
their motivation in a transaction. Conflicts of interest commonly result from family interests, 
ownership of other companies, gifts from friends or business partners, multiple places of 
employment and self-dealing i.e. entering into a transaction with oneself or a related party. 
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However, disciplinary actions are difficult to carry through due to family relationships 
among stakeholders/ 
Conflict of Interest 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Where there is a possible or perceived conflict of interest directors are understood to 
disqualify themselves from those decisions. 
a) True ( )                                                                               
b) False ( ) - difficult to ascertain 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
15. COMPLIANCE FUNCTION 
The company has a compliance function or systems that are able to ensure that the company 
complies with law. The compliance function is designed to protect the company from the 
risk of failure in processes and losses and fines from regulatory inspection. The compliance 
function ensures that the legal rights of stakeholders are respected. 
Compliance Function 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
The company has written compliance manual/policies. 
a) True (/)                                                                                
b) False ( ) This is an assumption 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
16. WHITLE BLOWER POLICY - not applicable 
A whistle blower policy allows the board to be informed of illegal or unethical practices and 
protects the whistle blower from reprisal. The board has put in place a whistle-blower policy 
to communicate illegal or unethical practices to the board. In addition, the board ensures the 
protection of the whistle-blower’s identity and their rights. 
 Whistle-blower Policy 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline.  
 The company has a written whistle-blower policy in place. 
a) True ( )                                                                          
b) False (/) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
17. SEPARATION OF CHAIRMAN AND CEO 
In some instances this is so.  The roles of chairman and chief executive (or managing 
director) are not exercised by the same individual Best practice suggests that the roles of the 
chairman and the CEO be separated in order to create a clear distinction between the 
oversight role of the chair and the executive role of management. Alternatively, it may be 
considered good practice to have a lead independent director to balance the powers of the 
chair in the event that the roles of chair and CEO are combined. 
 Separation of Chairman and CEO 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
 The separation of roles has been considered 
a) True ( )                                                                            
b) False ( ) Difficult to ascertain 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
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18. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS 
The board meets with sufficient regularity to properly discharge its duties. Too few board 
meetings means work is not being done, or the board does not understand its role. Too many 
board meetings could mean that the board is overly involved in management and may also 
stem from a misunderstanding of the role of the board. A minimum of 4 board meetings per 
year can be used as a rule of thumb. More than monthly meetings would be considered 
excessive. Some committees, in particular the audit committee of listed companies, tend to 
meet with greater frequency, sometimes on a monthly basis. 
Frequency meetings 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Board meetings are held as prescribed in the company's By-laws. (Generally so based on 
more than 50% records examined… historically so… but submission of reports ad hoc… 
over the years …) 
a) True ( )                                                                                      
b) False ( ) Yes - inference from Centenary celebrations @AGM and also from records 
at CIPO … (Coreas Hazell)/this is specific to John Hazell Sons and Company 
Limited 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
19. INDUCTION 
Some New board members receive induction training. The level of training reflects the size 
and complexity of the company. New board members need to receive sufficient training and 
background information to function appropriately. Preparing a board member for effective 
board contribution is referred to as induction training. 
Induction 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  - difficult to ascertain in each subsequent year 
 The company provides basic background information for board members to step into their 
new roles and begin to operate immediately. 
a) True ( )                                                                                   
b) False ( ) - Difficult to ascertain 
Level: Difficult to ascertain 
20. WRITTEN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: BOARD CHARTER AND 
COMMITTEE TERMS OF REFERENCE 
All companies have these - The board has a charter (Table A), committee terms of reference, 
and other documentation that define its roles, responsibilities and procedures. Written 
policies and procedures are necessary to formalize the company’s governance. 
 Written Policies and Procedures: Board Charter (Table A) and Committee Terms of 
Reference 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
The board has policies and procedures. In some cases there are basic charters, however, not 
all policies and procedures are always formalized. 
a) True ( /)                                                                                        
b) False ( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
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21. CODE OF ETHICS 
22. The board contributes to and ensures that a company code of ethics exists and is 
implemented. 
In addition to the board code of ethics itself, companies as a whole are expected to 
have a written ethics code and systems to ensure that the precepts of the ethics code 
are being followed. - examination of records – (not seen a written ethics code) 
Code of Ethics 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
The company has an ethics code that applies to both staff and board. 
a) True ( /)                                                                                     
b) False ( ) (Appeared not to be written but applicable moral suasion 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
23. EVALUATION 
Not a regular practice - The board conducts a formal annual evaluation of the company’s 
governance practices. Evaluations of the board’s and the company’s governance practices 
are typically considered a first step to improving governance. Evaluations can be self-
evaluations or externally assisted. An evaluation should lead under ideal circumstances to a 
governance improvement plan, which is implemented under board supervision. 
 Evaluation 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
The board has had explicit deliberation on the importance of Corporate Governance 
a) True ( /)                                                                                      
b) False ( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline 
24. DISCLOSURE 
Some material information is disclosed to relevant stakeholders. Closely held and family 
business typically have lower disclosure requirements, however, some of them may find it in 
their interest to maintain a high level of transparency towards the public for better 
stakeholder relations and to increase their general level of accountability. Transparency 
towards creditor stakeholders may result in better credit terms. 
 PARTICULARS L2: Disclosure according to applicable regulatory guidance 
Financial and operating 
results 
True 
Company objectives True 
Major share ownership and 
voting rights 
True 
Remuneration policy for key Maybe or should be/no 
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executives 
Identity and qualifications of 
board members 
Uncertain/unspecified 
Selection process of board 
members 
Somewhat 
Potential conflicts of interest 
of board members and 
executives 
Maybe 
Which board members are 
independent 
Uncertain 
Risk factors Yes 
Stakeholder issues Yes 
Governance policies and 
structures 
Yes 
Capital structures or other 
arrangements allowing 
disproportionate control of 
the company should be 
disclosed 
Uncertain 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
 
25. ACCOUNTING STANDARD 
The reporting standard is in keeping with international standards as reported in Reports to 
the AGM. Domestic companies generally comply.  International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). 
IFRS is the internationally accepted accounting standard. Closely held companies, listed 
companies and others are all expected to be able to comply with IFRS disclosure. 
 Accounting Standard 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps 
Level 4: Advanced governance practice.  
Company complies with national standards and is able to produce annual statements on a 
timely basis. 
a) True (/)                                                                                
b) False ( ) – Generally this is done by those companies that choose to produce same.  
In may instances it was difficult to determine from records 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
26. AUDITING STANDARD 
The audit standard is International Standards of Auditing (ISA). ISA are the internationally 
accepted standard for the audit of financial statements. Closely held companies, listed 
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companies and others are all expected to have their financial reports audited according to 
ISA. 
 Auditing Standard 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
Level 2: Understanding need to professionalize corporate governance 
Level 3: Significant concrete steps.  
Financial reports are audited according to ISA. The audit is conducted annually. 
a) True (/)                                                                                    
b) False ( ) - While audit was expected to be conducted annually, insufficient 
information available to suggest it was according to ISA, in the case of twenty four 
companies registered and or established for the first century, presumption was that 
financial reports were done for each year in most cases especially for first 
established company. 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
27. ONE SHARE ONE VOTE 
The principle of one-share-one-vote applies. The principle of one-share-one-vote means that 
all shareholders are treated equally on a proportional basis to ownership The board ensures 
that the legal rights of different shareholder groups are respected and that different 
shareholders are treated equitably and fairly and that minority shareholders are protected 
from abusive action by controlling shareholders. 
 One-share-one-vote 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
All shareholders are given their right to explicitly vote in accordance with the Companies 
Act provisions – presumption that shareholders had that right and made good with such 
right… 
a) True (/)                                                                                              
b) False ( ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
28. ANNUAL SHAREHOLDER'S MEETING (AGM) 
Generally this is done.  AGM processes allow for the effective participation of all 
shareholders. The annual general meeting (AGM), also referred to as the General 
Shareholders Meeting (GSM), is a meeting usually required by law and/or the articles. A 
GSM is typically held annually to elect the board of directors and inform shareholders of 
previous and future activities. It is an opportunity for the shareholders to receive and 
approve the company's accounts for the past year, to hold the board to account, and ask 
questions regarding the directions the business will take in the future. 
 Annual Shareholder's Meeting (AGM) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline  
AGMs are held within 15 months of each other. 
a) True ( /) – All records indicated that AGM were generally held within that time 
frame but not consecutively in some instances. Records were inaccessible for some 
companies due to state of disrepair/ill use/records were being updated/pages missing 
from some records/wet or just missing…[It must be noted that remaining records 
were being computerized at the time of visit] 
b) False (  ) 
Level 1: Complying with legal baseline (Nonetheless, compliance)  
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NOTES: 
Ø *Revised …1000 companies (Domestic companies) – all records (sections/pages etc.) 
were examined – approximate given records were torn/lost/in disuse up to 2013 
Ø There was a challenge to assess the companies registered under the International 
Financial Services Authority 
Ø FOR DOMESTIC COMPANIES: Realistic estimates, as some records were wet/in 
disrepair/some sections of records partially destroyed due to natural and manmade 
causes, while other relevant information was limited for some companies - 1845 – 
1945 
Ø The British American Insurance Company Limited was under judicial 
management/considered as per Level of maturity: Undecided 
Ø (Actual write up - September 2015) 
Ø Summary:   
OVERALL FINDINGS: 
Level of maturity for Vincentian companies was generally level 1 – 
Complying with legal baseline. 
 
SECTION B 
 
RESEARCH MATERIAL 
GUIDED DISCUSSIONS/QUESTIONS WITH SEVERAL STAKEHOLDERS 
FINDINGS 
Date:	  11/09/2012	  -­‐	  21/09/12	  and	  the	  following	  year	  2013	  	  (July,	  August,	  September,	  
November	  2013)	  
Discussions	  took	  place	  in	  St.	  Vincent	  and	  the	  Grenadines	  
(Final	  ‘write	  up’	  of	  findings	  on	  24/08/15)	  
Discussions	  with	  some	  policyholders	  -­‐	  BAICL/CLF/BAICO	  and	  others/Discussions	  with	  
employees	  of	  Coreas	  Hazells	  Inc.	  in	  as	  far	  as	  it	  is	  an	  amalgamated	  company...	  
Key	  discussions	  with	  Chief	  Executive	  Officer	  –	  Mr.	  Joel	  Providence	  proved	  exceptional	  
Total	  participants:	  5,000	  (10	  x	  500)	  1	  -­‐	  unsure	  as	  to	  the	  exact	  figure	  that	  were	  policy	  
holders	  but,	  due	  to	  the	  negative	  contagion	  effect	  that	  the	  collapse	  of	  BAICO	  had,	  it	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became	  a	  partisan	  political	  issue	  with	  radio	  talk	  shows	  as	  well	  as	  discussion	  points	  almost	  
every	  where	  
Discussions	  were	  engaged	  with	  persons	  who	  were	  met	  on	  the	  roads	  in	  the	  Capital	  city;	  after	  
church	  services;	  identified	  as	  'disgruntled'	  policy	  holders;	  persons	  who	  invested	  in	  BAICO	  
through	  intermediary	  Building	  and	  Loan	  Association;	  attendance	  at	  informal	  
meetings/discussion	  points	  in	  the	  market	  square	  where	  discussions	  were	  held	  openly	  about	  
BAICL;	  legal	  professionals	  (lawyers)	  self	  employed	  legal	  clerks	  who	  work	  at	  the	  Magistrate	  
courts;	  politicians;	  housewives;	  farmers;	  bus	  drivers;	  categories	  of	  civil	  servants;	  dentists;	  
policemen	  
everything;	  pensions;	  and	  was	  hoping	  for	  that	  policy	  would	  mature	  in	  my	  life,	  at	  a	  good	  old	  age	  
Guided	  discussions	  
1) How	  did	  you	  come	  to	  know	  about	  BAICL?	  Persons	  came	  to	  know	  about	  BAICL	  
through	  sales	  agents	  and	  various	  levels	  of	  advertising	  and	  over	  time,	  this	  
information	  was	  available	  publicly.	  	  	  Sold	  to	  me	  as	  an	  insurance	  company	  that	  will	  
cater	  for	  everything.	  	  This	  was	  through	  another	  intermediary	  -­‐	  the	  Building	  and	  Loan	  
Association	  -­‐	  money	  was	  to	  be	  made.	  
2) How	  did	  you	  pay	  towards	  your	  policy?	  Directly	  to	  the	  office	  or	  deductions	  from	  my	  
salary	  slips.	  	  I	  know	  that	  I	  am	  worst	  off	  now.	  	  My	  children's	  future	  is	  at	  stake	  and	  I	  
might	  die	  without	  ever	  getting	  back	  any	  money.	  All	  my	  pension	  was	  placed	  in	  this	  
insurance	  company	  transfer	  of	  my	  gratuity	  and	  each	  month	  after	  expenses,	  my	  
pension	  would	  be	  sent	  to	  that	  company.	  
3) How	  much	  information	  was	  given	  to	  you	  concerning	  your	  policies?	  As	  the	  agents	  
would	  explain	  and	  a	  few	  times	  I	  read	  the	  prospectus	  or	  some	  kind	  of	  book	  that	  was	  
published	  
4) How	  would	  you	  rate	  the	  service	  provided	  by	  BAICL	  to	  you?	  Excellent	  service	  
provided	  until	  now.	  I	  am	  still	  hoping	  for	  that	  policy	  would	  mature	  in	  my	  life,	  at	  a	  good	  old	  
age	  but	  what	  is	  hope	  when	  poverty	  is	  staring	  you	  in	  the	  face.	  
5) How	  were	  you	  assured	  that	  this	  was	  a	  bona	  fide	  insurance	  company?	  I	  trusted	  the	  
agents	  and	  they	  convince	  other	  policy	  holders	  with	  whom	  I	  was	  familiar/the	  country	  
is	  small	  and	  those	  who	  had	  access	  to	  information	  were	  able	  to	  share	  with	  others/at	  
AGM	  of	  credit	  union	  when	  questions	  were	  asked,	  the	  assurances	  was	  
given/Although	  not	  a	  committee	  member	  I	  pay	  keen	  attention	  to	  discussions	  at	  
AGM	  but	  suddenly	  after	  a	  few	  years	  you	  begin	  to	  understand	  that	  all	  was	  not	  well.	  
6) When	  did	  you	  know	  about	  the	  benefits	  on	  offer?	  -­‐	  For	  over	  ten	  -­‐	  fifteen	  years	  
generally	  within	  the	  region,	  you	  follow	  news,	  you	  hear	  about	  the	  CLICO	  but	  2009	  
changed	  everything	  when	  announcements	  on	  the	  radio	  and	  television	  alert	  that	  a	  
bailout	  was	  imminent.	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7) When	  was	  the	  last	  time	  that	  you	  were	  kept	  informed	  as	  to	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  
demise	  of	  BAICL?	  A	  few	  years	  ago	  through	  printed	  and	  electronic	  media;	  bits	  and	  
pieces	  here	  and	  there.	  
8) When	  were	  you	  given	  a	  statement	  of	  your	  financial	  input	  into	  the	  company?	  Each	  
time	  I	  deposited	  and	  upon	  request;	  	  
9) When	  last	  did	  you	  visit	  the	  offices	  of	  BAICL?	  Not	  within	  the	  past	  five	  years	  as	  I	  was	  
out	  of	  country/Monthly,	  every	  three	  months/	  To	  date,	  the	  doors	  were	  closed.	  
10) When	  were	  the	  doors	  closed	  to	  the	  public/policy	  holders?	  In	  2010	  and	  then	  re-­‐
opened	  as	  business	  appeared	  to	  be	  continuing	  as	  normal	  as	  reported	  by	  some	  
persons	  but	  I	  attended	  meetings	  with	  Building	  and	  Loan	  Association.	  	  Then	  a	  
newspaper	  publication	  caused	  real	  'mayhem'.	  	  It	  alleged	  among	  other	  things	  that	  
money	  was	  badly	  spent	  or	  invested	  and	  no	  one	  was	  brought	  to	  justice	  even	  to	  this	  
day.	  	  I	  guess	  not	  in	  my	  life	  time.	  	  Government	  seem	  to	  be	  attacking	  the	  problem	  so	  
we	  wait	  and	  see.	  
11) Why	  were	  you	  in	  shock	  if	  at	  all,	  at	  the	  news	  that	  BAICL	  was	  not	  functional?	  The	  
company	  was	  too	  big	  and	  too	  established	  for	  anyone	  to	  convince	  me	  that	  it	  was	  not	  
functional	  
12) Why	  would	  you	  say	  that	  'things'	  were	  hidden	  from	  you	  as	  a	  policy	  holder?	  	  Things	  
was	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  financial	  status	  of	  the	  company?	  Yes,	  because	  after	  a	  while,	  
after	  many	  years,	  you	  were	  assured	  that	  your	  money	  was	  safe,	  your	  deposits	  but	  
now,	  things	  are	  hidden.	  	  Reluctance	  is	  giving	  information	  
13) Why	  did	  you	  question	  the	  operations	  of	  BAICL?	  This	  was	  because	  of	  the	  rumours	  
that	  all	  was	  not	  well	  and	  then	  the	  news	  came	  from	  everywhere.	  	  Real	  fear	  gripped	  
this	  nation.	  	  Real	  fear	  and	  no	  money.	  	  This	  is	  poverty	  to	  the	  highest.	  	  No	  money	  for	  
the	  future	  generation	  especially	  as	  many	  of	  us	  [reference	  to	  persons	  at	  the	  time]	  are	  
no	  longer	  able	  to	  trust	  such	  an	  institution	  like	  Building	  and	  Loan.	  	  Took	  all	  our	  money	  
and	  invest	  with	  CLICO	  and	  BAICO.	  	  I	  truly	  did	  not	  know	  because	  I	  did	  not	  attend	  
meetings.	  	  It	  was	  one	  of	  those	  things.	  	  You	  trust	  people	  to	  do	  a	  good	  job.	  	  All	  our	  
money	  is	  gone.	  	  I	  heard	  a	  few	  people	  got	  back	  a	  small	  portion	  but	  this	  is	  ridiculous.	  
Poverty,	  that's	  what	  it	  is.	  
14) Why	  did	  you	  continue	  to	  pay	  premiums	  to	  BAICL	  if	  you	  knew	  or	  suspected	  if	  at	  all,	  
that	  'something'	  was	  wrong?	  The	  situation	  appeared	  to	  calm	  down	  and	  the	  rescue	  
plans	  announced	  and	  the	  intermediary	  B	  &	  L	  association	  placed	  a	  limit	  on	  the	  
amount	  of	  money	  I	  could	  get...[this	  point	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  BAICO	  was	  linked	  to	  
B	  &	  L	  Association];	  I	  was	  assured	  that	  the	  situation	  was	  resolved	  and	  I	  believed	  
15) Why	  would	  you	  say	  that	  you	  were	  lied	  to?	  Please	  explain...	  After	  the	  
announcements	  in	  the	  general	  public	  through	  the	  media,	  I	  realised	  that	  liquidation	  if	  
any,	  would	  never	  give	  me	  back	  value	  for	  money	  and	  that	  the	  situation	  with	  BAICO	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was	  far	  greater	  than	  was	  initially	  explained/Information	  was	  not	  readily	  given	  by	  
staff	  of	  BAICL/	  
16) What	  is	  it	  that	  first	  attracted	  you	  to	  the	  purchasing	  of	  policy	  or	  policies	  from	  BAICL?	  I	  
needed	  to	  invest	  and	  save	  for	  my	  retirement/children's	  investment;	  educational	  
purpose;	  maturing	  policies	  within	  a	  specified	  time	  frame;	  insurance	  policies	  upon	  
maturing	  could	  give	  a	  real	  return	  on	  you	  money	  
17) What	  would	  you	  say	  was	  the	  selling	  point	  of	  BAICL	  and	  its	  sales	  representatives?	  
Value	  for	  money	  
18) As	  a	  shareholder,	  were	  you	  allowed	  access	  to	  information?	  Yes	  
19) What	  was	  your	  role	  as	  you	  understand	  it	  as	  a	  shareholder?	  No,	  not	  a	  shareholder	  /	  
just	  investment	  portfolio	  
20) What	  do	  you	  know	  about	  corporate	  governance	  or	  best	  practices	  within	  BAICL	  or	  its	  
parent	  company?	  Bad	  practices	  led	  us	  to	  this	  place	  and	  the	  owner[reference	  to	  
Lawrence	  Duprey]	  should	  be	  held	  accountable	  
21) What	  was	  the	  organizational	  structure,	  and	  had	  you	  known	  of	  this;	  would	  it	  had	  
made	  a	  difference	  when	  investing	  in	  the	  company?	  	  I	  knew	  every	  worker	  in	  the	  
branch	  office	  	  and	  I	  did	  know	  a	  bit	  about	  the	  structure	  that	  existed	  and	  felt	  that	  the	  
current	  branch	  office	  should	  have	  been	  better	  served	  as	  a	  standalone	  entity.	  	  	  	  
22) What	  do	  you	  understand	  is	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  branch	  and	  the	  parent	  
company?	  It	  is	  like	  a	  tree.	  	  That	  is	  how	  it	  is.	  	  What	  is	  in	  the	  parent	  or	  the	  body	  of	  the	  
main	  company	  is	  also	  in	  the	  branch.	  
23) Where	  was	  the	  company	  and	  or	  the	  branch	  located?	  I	  was	  not	  aware	  that	  this	  was	  
so	  but	  I	  got	  to	  understand	  that	  one	  is	  in	  Trinidad	  and	  the	  other	  here.	  	  This	  is	  where	  I	  
put	  my	  money	  on	  a	  monthly	  basis.	  
24) Where	  do	  you	  think	  corporate	  governance	  fits	  into	  a	  branch	  or	  a	  company	  of	  this	  
sort?	  It	  is	  about	  management.	  	  Corporate	  governance	  is	  about	  control	  and	  balance.	  
25) Where	  would	  you	  be	  reimbursed	  your	  financial	  investments?	  It	  is	  a	  shame.	  I	  
understand	  that	  it	  is	  no	  value	  for	  money.	  	  We	  may	  get	  some	  back	  but	  this	  is	  so	  
unfair.	  	  I	  think	  the	  company	  would	  be	  re-­‐opened	  soon	  according	  to	  the	  news	  
feedback.	  
26) Where	  would	  you	  be	  allowed	  to	  speak	  more	  openly	  about	  the	  crisis	  as	  it	  now	  
stands?	  I	  go	  to	  the	  radio	  talk	  shows.	  	  I	  speak	  my	  mind	  in	  the	  general	  public.	  	  The	  
public	  needs	  to	  hear	  what	  this	  government	  has	  done	  to	  us	  by	  allowing	  a	  company	  to	  
come	  in	  and	  rip	  us	  off.	  	  	  
27) Where	  are	  other	  shareholders	  and	  stakeholders	  likely	  to	  discuss	  the	  current	  
situation	  and	  with	  whom?	  Except	  in	  Building	  and	  Loan	  Association	  or	  in	  the	  media.	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The	  insurance	  company	  was	  not	  really	  the	  main	  company,	  so	  that	  is	  a	  good	  
question.	  	  I	  have	  no	  idea.	  
28) Where	  do	  you	  think	  the	  money	  is	  invested?	  In	  all	  sorts	  of	  property	  and	  inter-­‐
company	  sweet	  heart	  deals.	  	  They	  have	  the	  money	  and	  bought	  stuff/assets	  are	  there	  
to	  be	  sold	  off.	  	  They	  should	  do	  so	  and	  give	  back	  people	  their	  money.	  
29) What	  is	  your	  opinion	  of	  the	  CEO	  -­‐	  Mr.	  Lawrence	  Duprey?	  I	  never	  heard	  of	  the	  man	  
until	  some	  time	  ago.	  	  He	  is	  to	  be	  blamed.	  	  	  
30) What	  is	  your	  understanding	  of	  a	  private	  limited	  liability	  company?	  
It	  is	  a	  private	  company	  really.	  	  Nothing	  more,	  nothing	  less	  and	  that	  is	  it.	  
31) Who	  do	  you	  think	  is	  responsible	  for	  regulating	  and	  supervising	  a	  conglomerate	  as	  
the	  CLF?	  The	  company	  was	  too	  big	  and	  they	  claimed	  too	  big	  to	  fail.	  	  Nonsense.	  	  
Regulations?	  	  The	  laws	  are	  there	  and	  government	  was	  responsible.	  	  This	  government	  
is	  responsible.	  	  Next	  elections	  they	  should	  not	  be	  put	  back	  into	  power.	  
32) Who	  can	  you	  report	  to	  in	  the	  case	  when	  your	  money	  is	  not	  returned?	  I	  call	  the	  
government	  and	  they	  are	  playing	  politics.	  	  I	  call	  the	  ministry	  involved.	  	  Building	  and	  
Loan	  Association;	  the	  insurance	  company	  and	  the	  lawyers.	  
33) Who	  do	  you	  think	  should	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  this	  crisis?	  Management	  and	  
owners.	  
34) Who	  do	  you	  think	  stands	  to	  benefit	  the	  most	  from	  this	  crisis?	  Probably	  politicians	  
but	  also	  those	  in	  management	  and	  ownership	  of	  this	  company.	  
35) Who	  is	  responsible	  for	  teaching	  about	  corporate	  governance	  within	  the	  
organisation?	  
36) Have	  you	  ever	  seen	  or	  read	  about	  corporate	  governance	  in	  this	  organization?	  Why	  
or	  why	  not?	  Please	  explain...	  None	  and	  it	  does	  not	  matter.	  	  Money	  is	  money	  and	  
those	  who	  have	  stolen	  should	  be	  brought	  to	  justice.	  	  I	  don't	  understand	  what	  
corporate	  governance	  has	  to	  do	  with	  my	  money.	  	  	  
Corporate	  governance	  means	  better	  money	  management	  by	  those	  in	  authority.	  	  If	  
Trinidad	  has	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  our	  money,	  they	  should	  pay	  us	  with	  interest.	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Ø Members	  of	  the	  community	  
Ø Fishermen/fisher	  folk	  
Ø Lawyers/legal	  practitioners	  
Ø Barbers	  
Ø Housewives	  
Ø Block	  makers/construction	  workers	  
Ø Gardeners	  
Ø CEO	  -­‐	  JHC/CH	  
Ø AG	  
Ø Secretaries/employees	  of	  insurance	  companies	  on	  the	  island	  /Others	  
The	  summary	  of	  comments	  
• Many	  were	  unaware	  of	  corporate	  governance	  as	  an	  active	  articulated	  concept	  but	  
were	  aware	  that	  private	  limited	  liability	  companies	  do	  have	  certain	  best	  practices.	  
• Not	  familiar	  with	  terminology	  
• Did	  not	  matter	  that	  terminology	  was	  unknown	  but	  best	  practices	  were	  key	  in	  terms	  
of	  service	  and	  delivery	  of	  products	  
• Attended	  meetings	  but	  corporate	  governance	  was	  not	  well	  articulated	  except	  that	  
written	  statements	  indicated	  such	  practices	  
• Were	  aware	  of	  some	  of	  the	  internal	  practices	  within	  domestic	  private	  limited	  
liability	  companies	  
• Offshore/international	  private	  limited	  liability	  companies	  were	  not	  the	  domain	  of	  
citizens	  but	  was	  aware	  that	  regulatory	  bodies	  did	  not	  perform	  task	  creditably	  well	  
• Legislation	  itself	  prevented	  full	  absorption	  of	  best	  practices	  and	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  so	  
due	  to	  nature	  of	  Ltds	  being	  'offshore'	  
• Company	  Laws	  and	  English	  Company	  Laws	  drive	  the	  corporate	  governance	  agenda	  
but	  regulators	  were	  untrained	  and	  refused	  to	  be	  trained	  further	  with	  respect	  to	  
corporate	  governance	  issues	  
• Corporate	  governance	  was	  not	  well	  articulated	  and	  in	  not	  known	  or	  discussed	  locally	  
previous	  to	  crises	  of	  BAICO/CLICO/CCL	  Financial	  Ltd	  in	  2009	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• Private	  companies	  are	  what	  they	  are	  -­‐	  private	  and	  their	  corporate	  governance	  
statements	  are	  their	  own	  to	  be	  operated	  solely	  within	  their	  remit	  /shared	  
sometimes	  when	  one	  has	  the	  time	  to	  read	  their	  Annual	  reports	  if	  and	  when	  
available	  
• As	  a	  shareholder	  I	  was	  disappointed	  by	  the	  lack	  or	  total	  disregard	  of	  corporate	  
governance	  best	  practices	  that	  should	  have	  been	  well	  advocated	  in	  favour	  of	  my	  
interests;	  no	  meetings	  were	  called	  for	  over	  a	  year;	  unable	  to	  get	  enough	  interests	  
from	  other	  key	  players	  to	  make	  it	  happen;	  concern	  was	  for	  my	  investment	  but	  I	  held	  
my	  peace	  until	  I	  complained	  -­‐	  crisis	  followed	  -­‐	  BAICO	  related	  
 
==================================================================
======================== 
 
QUESTIONS/STRUCTURED SURVEY 
(Extract) 
GENERAL QUESTIONS/STRUCTURED SURVEY ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
WITH RESPECT TO SVG 
JOHN HAZELL AND SONS COMPANY LIMITED 
1845 - 1945 
PRIVATE COMPANY/BRANCH BAICL 
	  
There	  are	  separate	  sections	  to	  be	  answered	  by	  each	  category/	  company.	  If	  your	  organization	  operates	  
in	  more	  than	  one	  segment	  please	  answer	  both	  the	  sections.	  Please	  feel	  free	  to	  use	  separate	  sheet(s)	  to	  
reply,	  where	  required.	  
I. Date	  of	  establishment	  of	  company?	  
II. Does	   your	   organization	   have	   a	   structure	   of	   corporate	   governance?	   If	   yes,	   please	  
provide	  copy	  of	  same	  
III. You	  are	   not	   a	   listed	   entity,	   are	   there	   any	   regulatory	   authority	   that	   has	   prescribed	  
compliance	   of	   corporate	   governance	   norms?	   	   Do	   you	   have	   a	   list	   of	   guidelines	   by	  
which	   you	   operate?	   	   Is	   there	   a	   Code	   on	   Corporate	   Governance	   that	   you	   follow?	  
Why?	  Why	  not?	  
IV. If	  you	  are	  a	  private	  company,	  have	  you	  voluntarily	  taken	  up	  compliance	  of	  corporate	  
governance	  norms?	  
V. How	   do	   you	   fulfil	   the	   compliance	   requirements	   of	   corporate	   governance?	   	   Any	  
reports	  available?	  
VI. If	   you	   have	   your	   internal	   corporate	   governance	   structure,	   please	   state	   after	   how	  
many	  intervals	  is	  the	  same	  revised/revisited?	  
Thank	  you.	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APPENDIX 1 (6) 
FROM PARTNERSHIP TO PRIVATE LIMITED LIBALITY COMPANY 
EXCERPT “TRANSITION FROM PARTNERSHIP TO PRIVATE LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANY” – MINUTES OF THE JOHN HAZELLS SONS AND COMPANY LIMITED 
IN MEETING. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The expenditure incurred in the conversion of the business from a partnership firm 
to the private limited liability company amounted to $913.80 and your Directors have 
considered it wise to write off this entire sum in the last business year.” 
Source: The Coreas Hazells Incorporated Company – 2012 /2013 
With the kind permission of CEO – Mr Joel Providence 
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APPENDIX 1(7) 
COMPARATIVE : CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ANGLO AMERICAN AND GERMAN 
MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Characteristics 
 
Anglo-American Model 
German Model 
Funds Equity financing  
Family 
Banks 
Banks  (But not 
applicable in SVG up to 
2013) 
The key players in the 
corporate environment 
Shareholders/investors, directors, management, Ltd in meetings 
(organizational, special meetings, AGM, shareholders meetings, directors 
meetings) government agencies, self regulatory organizations and the 
firms that consult with them on corporate governance and voting by 
proxy.   
The corporate triangle is formed primarily with management, 
shareholders and the board of directors.  While this is the ideal situation, 
an aggressive approach to corporate governance best practices was not 
well articulated, was lacking or was absent in some Private limited 
liability companies limited by shares.   
Voting rights 
restrictions that are 
legal/limit on 
shareholder voting a % 
of the GmbH's total 
share capital 
irrespective of the share 
ownership (Not 
applicable in SVG up to 
2013) 
Share ownership pattern 
in SVG 
Individual share ownership; 
Increasingly institutional investors not affiliated with the Ltd (outside 
shareholders/outsiders).  These institutional investors play a very 
important role also in capital markets and corporate governance 
A well-defined legal framework that detailed rights and responsibilities of 
management; directors and shareholders remained as pillars of this 
model.   
Within the Anglo-American model of governance operative in SVG to a 
large extent, share ownership of individuals is one of its features.   
It was only during the 1990s that emphasis on ownership shifted 
increasingly to institutional and investors who were not affiliated with the 
Ltd. (International Business Companies/Limited Liability 
Not applicable in SVG 
up to 2013 
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Companies/Limited Duration Companies)   
There is a noticeable uncomplicated procedure for interaction among 
these three major players and the Ltd itself.  Such interaction takes place 
among shareholders during and or outside the AGM 
Composition of Board(s) 
of Directors 
One - tier boards with CEO interchangeable roles? Two tier boards 
The Supervisory Board 
(Aufsichtsrat) and the 
Management Board 
(Vorstand) 
Supervisory board and 
management/in some 
cases supervisory board 
may be voluntary 
(aspects applicable in 
St. Vincent up to 2013) 
Regulatory framework Well developed with defined rights and responsibilities Currently being 
developed with defined 
rights and 
responsibilities as part 
of the hybrid system 
advocated up to 2013 
Corporate actions 
requiring shareholder 
approval 
The "election of directors"627 and the "appointment of auditors"628 are 
required under this model.  Also other actions that require approval are 
provisions for mergers and restructurings; and "amendments to the 
articles of association."629  Shareholders in the Private limited liability 
companies limited by shares on SVG do have the right to vote on the 
dividend proposal, as is the similar situation in the UK Private limited 
liability companies limited by shares.  The submission of" proposals"630 
to the agenda for the AGM by shareholders is also permitted.  These 
should relate to the business activity of the Ltd.   Shareholders that own at 
least "five per cent"631of total share capital, deemed an insider, can 
convene an extra ordinary general meeting of shareholders.   
Investors avoid liability by ceding to management, control of the Ltd and 
paid management huge sums for acting on their behalf as agents.   These 
agents effectively controlled the affairs of the Ltd.  This generates agency 
Not fully articulated but 
in discussions as to 
actual 
framework/amendments 
to laws in draft format 
up to 2013 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627 Companies Act, Cap. 143;  By-Law No.1, Art. 4.3 
628 Companies Act (SVG) 1994 S. 158 - 161 
629 Ibid, s. 177 ss1 (a); s. 214 
630 Ibid, s.114 
631 Companies Act, Cap. 143, By-Law No.1, Art. 12.2.1 
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costs commensurate to the cost of separation of ownership and control of 
the Ltd.   
Prescriptive laws on "election of board of directors" by shareholders 
require that boards act as "fiduciaries for shareholder's interests" as they 
exercised their oversight function towards management on behalf of 
shareholders. 
Interaction among key 
players 
Shareholders exercise their voting rights even without attending meetings 
in person.  They should ordinarily receive the agenda for meetings; proxy 
statements; Private limited liability companies limited by shares annual 
report and a voting card.   Some shareholders do vote by proxy by 
completing the voting card and return it by mail to the Ltd.  By so doing 
the shareholder authorizes the chairman of the BOD to act as his proxy 
and vote as was indicated by on card.  It is expected that some 
institutional investors (for example funds that invest in 'start up' Private 
limited liability companies limited by shares) and financial specialists 
(among them auditors) monitor performance and corporate governance 
within a private limited liability company limited by shares.  There is 
generally a strong relationship between a Ltd and its main bank 
Management, directors, shareholders with uncomplicated procedure for 
interaction with Ltd during or outside AGM 
Currently being 
developed up to 2013 
 
 
 
Source : Researcher’s compilation   - 2019 
 
APPENDIX 1(8)  
 
ST.VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES COMPANIES ACT, CAP. 143  
MODEL BY LAW NO. 1 
[A By-law relating generally to the conduct of the affairs of…] 
MODEL BY-LAW NO.1 
OF 
[NAME OF COMPANY] 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter                        Page 
1 Interpretation                   
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3 Seal                     
4 Directors                    
5 Borrowing Powers of Directors                 
6 Meetings of Directors                  
7 Remuneration of Directors                  
8 Submission of Contracts/Transactions to Shareholders  
9 For the Protection of Directors and Officers               
10 Indemnities to Directors and Officers                
11 Officers                    
12 Shareholder’s Meetings                  
13 Shares                   
14 Transfer of Shares and Debentures               
15 Dividends                  
16 Voting in Other Companies                
17 Information Available to Shareholders for Approval            
18 Notices                  
19 Cheques, Drafts and Notes                
20 Execution of Instruments                
21 Securities                  
22 Financial Year                 
 
 COMPANIES ACT, CAP. 143  
MODEL BY LAW NO. 1 
A By-law relating generally to the conduct of the affairs of: 
[INSERT NAME OF COMPANY] 
BE IT ENACTED as the general by-law of [INSERT NAME OF COMPANY] 
(Hereinafter called the "Company" as follows): 
1. INTERPRETATION 
1.1. In this by-law and all other by-laws of the Company, unless the context otherwise 
requires: 
(a) "Act" means the Companies Act 1994 as from time to time amended and 
every statute substituted therefore and, in the case of such substitution, any 
references in the by-laws of the Company to provisions of the Act shall be 
read as references to the substituted provisions therefore in the new statute or 
statutes. 
(b) "Regulations" means any Regulations made under the Act, and every 
regulation substituted therefore and, in the case of such substitution, any 
references in the by-laws of the Company to provisions of the Regulations 
shall be read as references to the substituted provisions therefore in the new 
regulations; 
(c) "By-laws" means any by-law of the Company from time to time in force; 
(d) all terms contained in the by-laws and defined in the Act or the Regulations 
shall have the meanings given to such terms in the Act or the Regulations; 
and 
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(e) the singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular;  the 
masculine gender includes the feminine and neuter genders;  the word 
"person" includes bodies corporate, companies, partnerships, syndicates, 
trusts and any association of persons, and the word "individual" means a 
natural person. 
2. REGISTERED OFFICE 
2.1. The registered office of the Company shall be in the State at such address as the 
directors may fix from time to time by resolution. 
3. SEAL 
3.1.1. The common seal of the Company shall be such as the directors may by resolution 
from time to time adopt. 
4. DIRECTORS 
4.1. Powers:  Subject to any unanimous shareholder agreement, the business and affairs of 
the Company shall be managed by the directors. 
4.2. Number:  There shall be [INSERT NUMBER OF DIRECTORS OR MINIMUM 
AND MAXIMUM NUMBER OF DIRECTORS] directors. 
4.3. Election:  Directors shall be elected by the shareholders on a show of hands unless a 
ballot is demanded in which case such election shall be by ballot. 
4.4. Tenure:  Unless his tenure is sooner determined, a director shall hold office from the 
date from which he is elected or appointed until the close of the annual meeting of the 
shareholders next following but he shall be eligible for re-election if qualified. 
4.4.1 A director who is also an officer shall continue to be a director until he ceases to be 
an officer. 
4.4.2. A director shall cease to be a director: 
(a) if he becomes bankrupt or compounds with his creditors or is declared 
insolvent; 
(b) if he is found to be of unsound mind;  or 
(c) if by notice in writing to the Company he resigns his office and any such 
resignation shall be effective at the time it is sent to the Company or at the 
time specified in the notice, whichever is later. 
4.4.3. The shareholders of the Company may, by ordinary resolution passed at a special 
meeting of the shareholders, remove any director from office and a vacancy created 
by the removal of a director may be filled at the meeting of the shareholders at which 
the director is removed. 
4.5 Committee of Directors:  The directors may appoint from among their number a 
committee of directors and subject to section 82(2) of the Act may delegate to such 
committee any of the powers of the directors. 
5. BORROWING POWERS OF DIRECTORS 
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5.1. The directors may from time to time: 
(a) borrow money upon the credit of the Company; 
(b) issue, reissue, sell or pledge debentures of the Company; 
(c) subject to section 53 of the Act, give a guarantee on behalf of the Company 
to secure performance of an obligation of any person;  and 
(d) mortgage, charge, pledge or otherwise create a security interest in all or any 
property of the Company, owned or subsequently acquired, to secure any 
obligation of the Company. 
5.2. The directors may from time to time by resolution delegate to any officer of the 
Company all or any of the powers conferred on the directors by paragraph 5.1. hereof 
to the full extent thereof or such lesser extent as the directors may in any such 
resolution provide. 
5.3. The powers conferred by paragraph 5.1. hereof shall be in supplement of and not in 
substitution for any powers to borrow money for the purposes of the Company 
possessed by its directors or officers independently of a borrowing by-law. 
6. MEETINGS OF DIRECTORS 
6.1. Place of Meeting:  Meetings of the directors and of any committee of the directors 
may be held within or outside the State. 
6.2. Notice:  A meeting of the directors may be convened at any time by any director or 
the Secretary, when directed or authorized by any director.  Subject to subsection 
79(1) of the Act the notice of any such meeting need not specify the purpose of or the 
business to be transacted at the meeting.  Notice of any such meeting shall be served 
in the manner specified in paragraph 18.1 hereof not less than two days (exclusive of 
the day on which                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
the notice is delivered or sent but inclusive of the day for which notice is given) 
before the meeting is to take place.  A director may in any manner waive notice of a 
meeting of the directors and attendance of a director at a meeting of the directors 
shall constitute a waiver of notice of the meeting except where a director attends a 
meeting for the express purpose of objecting to the transaction of any business on the 
grounds that the meeting is not lawfully called. 
6.2.1 It shall not be necessary to give notice of a meeting of the directors of a newly elected 
or appointed director for a meeting held immediately following the election of 
directors by the shareholders or the appointment to fill a vacancy among the directors.  
6.3. Quorum:  One Director shall form a quorum for the transaction of business and, 
notwithstanding any vacancy among the directors, a quorum may exercise all the 
powers of the directors.  No business shall be transacted at a meeting of directors 
unless a quorum is present. 
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6.3.1. A Director may, if all the directors consent, participate in a meeting of directors or of 
any committee of the directors by means of such telephone or other communications 
facilities as permit all persons participating in the meeting to hear each other and a 
director participating in such a meeting by such means is deemed to be present at that 
meeting. 
6.4. Voting:  Questions arising at any meeting of the directors shall be decided by a 
majority of votes.  In case of an equality of votes the chairman of the meeting in 
addition to his original vote shall have a second or casting vote. 
6.5. Resolution in lieu of meeting:  Notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions of 
this by-law a resolution in writing signed by all the directors entitled to vote on that 
resolution at a meeting of the directors or any committee of the directors is as valid as 
if it had been passed at a meeting of the directors or any committee of the directors. 
7.  REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS 
7.1. The remuneration to be paid to the directors shall be such as the directors may from 
time to time determine and such remuneration may be in addition to the salary paid to 
any officer or employee of the Company who is also a director.  The directors may 
also award special remuneration to any director undertaking any special services on 
the Company's behalf other than the routine work ordinarily required of a director and 
the confirmation of any such resolution or resolutions by the shareholders shall not be 
required.  The directors shall also be entitled to be paid their travelling and other 
expenses properly incurred by them in connection with the affairs of the Company. 
8. SUBMISSION OF CONTRACTS OR TRANSACTIONS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS FOR APPROVAL 
8.1.      The directors in their discretion may submit any contract, act or transaction for 
approval or ratification at any annual meeting of the shareholders or at any special 
meeting of the shareholders called for the purpose of considering the same and, 
subject to the provisions of section 91 of the Act, any such contract, act or transaction 
that is approved or ratified or confirmed by a resolution passed by a majority of the 
votes cast at any such meeting (unless any different or additional requirement is 
imposed by the Act or by the Company's articles or any other by-law) shall be valid 
and as binding upon the Company and upon all the shareholders as though it had been 
approved, ratified or confirmed by every shareholder of the Company. 
9. FOR THE PROTECTION OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
9.1. No director of the Company shall be liable to the Company for:- 
(a) the acts, receipts, neglects or defaults of any other director or officer or 
employee or for joining in any receipt or act for conformity; 
(b) any loss, damage or expense incurred by the Company through the 
insufficiency or deficiency of title to any property acquired by the Company 
or for or on behalf of the Company; 
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(c) The sufficiency or deficiency of any security in or upon which any of the 
moneys of or belonging to the Company shall be placed out or invested; 
(d) any loss or damage arising from the bankruptcy, insolvency or tortious act of 
any person, including any person with whom any moneys, securities or 
effects shall be lodged or deposited; 
(e) any loss, conversion, misapplication or misappropriation of or any damage 
resulting from any dealings with any moneys, securities or other assets 
belonging to the Company; 
(f) any other loss, damage or misfortune whatever which may happen in the 
execution of the duties of his respective office or trust or in relation thereto; 
unless the same happens by or through his failure to exercise the powers and 
to discharge the duties of his office honestly and in good faith with view to 
the best interests of the Company and in connection therewith to exercise the 
care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in 
comparable circumstances. 
9.2. Nothing herein contained shall relieve a director or officer from the duty to act in 
accordance with the Act or regulations made there under or relieve him from liability 
for a breach thereof. 
9.2.1. The Directors for the time being of the Company shall not be under any duty or 
responsibility in respect of any contract, act or transaction whether or not made, done 
or entered into in the name or on behalf of the Company, except such as are 
submitted to and authorized or approved by the directors. 
9.2.2. If any director or officer of the Company is employed by or performs services for the 
Company otherwise than as a director or officer or is a member of a firm or a 
shareholder, director or officer of a body corporate which is employed by or performs 
services for the Company, the fact of his being a shareholder, director or officer of 
the Company shall not disentitle such director or officer or such firm or body 
corporate, as the case may be, from receiving proper remuneration for such services. 
10. INDEMNITIES TO DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
10.1 Subject to section 99 of the Act, except in respect of an action by or on behalf of the 
Company to obtain a judgment in its favour, the Company shall indemnify a director 
or officer of the Company, a former director or officer of the Company or a person 
who acts or acted at the Company's request as a director or officer of a body corporate 
of which the Company is or was a shareholder or creditor, and his personal 
representatives, against all costs, charges and expenses, including an amount paid to 
settle an action or satisfy a judgment, reasonably incurred by him in respect of any 
civil, criminal or administrative action or proceeding to which he is made a party by 
reason of being or having been a director or officer of such company, if: 
(a) he acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
Company; and 
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(b) in the case of a criminal or administrative action or proceeding that is 
enforced by a monetary penalty, he had reasonable grounds for believing that 
his conduct was lawful. 
11. OFFICERS 
11.1 Appointment: The directors shall as often as may be required appoint a Secretary and, 
if deemed advisable, may as often as may be required appoint any or all of the 
following officers:  a Chairman, a Deputy Chairman, a Managing Director, a 
President, one or more Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, one or more Assistant 
Secretaries or one or more Assistant Treasurers.  A director may be appointed to any 
office of the Company but none of the officers except the Chairman, the Deputy 
Chairman, the Managing Director, the President and Vice-President need be a 
director.  Two or more of the aforesaid offices may be held by the same person.  In 
the case and whenever the same person holds the offices of Secretary and Treasurer 
he may but need not be known as the Secretary-Treasurer.  The directors may from 
time to time appoint such other officers and agents as they deem necessary who shall 
have such authority and shall perform such duties as may from time to time be 
prescribed by the directors. 
11.2. Remuneration:  The remuneration of all officers appointed by the directors shall be 
determined from time to time by resolution of the directors.  The fact that any officer 
or employee is a director or shareholder of the Company shall not disqualify him for 
receiving such remuneration as may be determined. 
11.3. Powers and Duties: All officers shall sign such contracts, documents or instruments 
in writing as require their respective signatures and shall respectively have and 
perform all powers and duties incident to their respective offices and such other 
powers and duties respectively as may from time to time be assigned to them by the 
directors. 
11.4. Delegation: In case of the absence or inability to act of any officer of the Company 
except a Managing Director or for any other reason that the directors may deem 
sufficient the directors may delegate all or any of the powers of such officer to any 
other officer or to any director. 
11.5. Chairman: A chairman shall, when present, preside at all meetings of the directors, 
and any committee of the directors or the shareholders. 
11.6. Deputy Chairman: If the Chairman is absent or is unable or refuses to act, the Deputy 
Chairman (if any) shall, when present, preside at all meetings of the directors, and 
any committee of the directors, or the shareholders. 
11.7 Managing Director: A Managing Director shall exercise such powers and have such 
authority as may be delegated to him by the directors in accordance with the 
provisions of section 82 of the Act. 
11.8. President: A President shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the Company.  He shall 
be vested with and may exercise all the powers and shall perform all the duties of a 
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Chairman and Deputy Chairman if none be appointed or the Chairman and the 
Deputy Chairman are absent or are unable or refuse to act. 
11.9.    Vice-President: A Vice-President or, if more than one, the Vice-Presidents, in order 
of seniority, shall be vested with all the powers and shall perform all the duties of the 
President in the absence or inability or ref””usa””l to act of the President. 
11.10. Secretary: The secretary shall give or cause to be given notices for all meetings of the 
directors, any committee of the directors and the shareholders when directed to do so 
and shall have charge of the minute books and seal of the Company and, subject to 
the provisions of paragraph 14.1 hereof, of the records (other than accounting 
records) referred to in section 177 of the Act. 
11.11. Treasurer: Subject to the provisions of any resolutions of the directors, a Treasurer 
shall have the care and custody of all the funds and securities of the Company and 
shall deposit the same in the name of the Company in such bank or banks or with 
such other depositary or depositaries as the directors may direct.  He shall keep or 
cause to be kept the accounting records referred to in section 187 of the Act.  He may 
be required to give such bond for the faithful performance of his duties as the 
directors in their uncontrolled discretion may require but no director shall be liable 
for failure to require any such bond or for the insufficiency of any such bond or for 
any loss by reason of the failure of the Company to receive any indemnity thereby 
provided. 
 
11.12. Assistant Secretary and Assistant Treasurer: The Assistant Secretary or, if more than 
one, the Assistant Secretaries in order of seniority, and the Assistant Treasurer or, if 
more than one, the Assistant Treasurers in order of seniority, shall respectively 
perform all the duties of the Secretary and the Treasurer, respectively, in the absence 
or inability or ref””usa””l to act of the Secretary or the Treasurer, as the case may be. 
11.13. General Manager or Manager: The directors may from time to time appoint one or 
more General Manager or Managers and may delegate to him or them full power to 
manage and direct the business and affairs of the Company (except such matters and 
duties as by law must be transacted or performed by the directors or by the 
shareholders) and to employ and discharge agents and employees of the Company or 
may delegate to him or them any lesser authority.  A General Manager or Manager 
shall conform to all lawful orders given to him by the directors of the Company and 
shall at all reasonable times give to the directors or any of them all information they 
may require regarding the affairs of the company.  Any agent or employee appointed 
by the General Manager or Manager may be discharged by the directors. 
11.14. Vacancies: If the office of any officer of the Company becomes vacant by reason of 
death, resignation, disqualification or otherwise, the directors by resolution shall, in 
the case of the Secretary, and may, in the case of any other office, appoint a person to 
fill such vacancy. 
12. SHAREHOLDERS' MEETINGS 
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12.1. Annual Meetings: Subject to the provisions of section 107 of the Act, the annual 
meeting of the shareholders shall be held on such day in each year and at such time as 
the directors may by resolution determine at any place within the State or, if all the 
shareholders entitled to vote at such meeting so agree, outside the State. 
12.2. Special Meetings: Special meetings of the shareholders may be convened by order of 
the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, the Managing Director, the President, a Vice-
President or by the directors at any date and time and at any place within the State or, 
if all the shareholders entitled to vote at such meeting so agree, outside the State. 
 
12.2.1. The directors shall, on the requisition of the holders or not less than five percent of 
the issued shares of the Company that carry a right to vote at the meeting 
requisitioned, forthwith convene a meeting of shareholders, and in the case of such 
requisition the following provisions shall have effect:- 
(1) The requisition shall state the purposes of the meeting and shall be signed by 
the requisition and deposited at the Registered Office, and may consist of 
several documents in like form each signed by one or more of the requisition. 
(2) If the directors do not, within twenty-one days from the date of the 
requisition being so deposited, proceed to convene a meeting, the requisition 
or any of them may themselves convene the meeting, but any meeting so 
convened shall not be held after three months from the date of such deposit. 
(3) Unless subsection (3) of section 131 of the Act applies, the directors shall be 
deemed not to have duly convened the meeting if they do not give such 
notice as is required by the Act within fourteen days from the deposit of the 
requisition. 
(4) Any meeting convened under this paragraph by the requisition shall be called 
as nearly as possible in the manner in which meetings are to be called 
pursuant to the by-laws and Divisions E and F of Part 1 of the Act. 
(5) A requisition by joint holders of shares shall be signed by all such holders. 
12.3 Notice: A printed, written or typewritten notice stating the day, hour and place of 
meeting shall be given by serving such notice on each shareholder entitled to vote at 
such meeting, on each director and on the auditor of the Company in the manner 
specified in paragraph 18.1 hereof, not less than twenty-one days or more than fifty 
days (in each case exclusive of the day for which the notice is delivered or sent and of 
the day for which notice is given) before the date of the meeting.  Notice of a meeting 
at which special business is to be transacted shall state (a) the nature of that business 
in sufficient detail to permit the shareholder to form a reasoned judgment thereon, 
and (b) the text of any special resolution to be submitted to the meeting. 
12.4. Waiver of Notice: A shareholder and any other person entitled to attend a meeting of 
shareholders may in any manner waive notice of a meeting of shareholders and 
attendance of any such person at a meeting of shareholders shall constitute a waiver 
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of notice of the meeting except where such person attends a meeting for the express 
purpose of objecting to the transaction of any business on the grounds that the 
meeting is not lawfully called. 
12.5. Omission of Notice: The accidental omission to give notice of any meeting or any 
irregularity in the notice of any meeting or the non-receipt of any notice by any 
shareholder, director or the auditor of the Company shall not invalidate any resolution 
passed or any proceeding taken at any meeting of the shareholders. 
12.6. Votes:  Every question submitted to any meeting of shareholders shall be decided in 
the first instance by a show of hands unless a person entitled to vote at the meeting 
has demanded a ballot and, if the Articles so provide, in the case of an equality of 
votes the chairman of the meeting shall on a ballot have a casting vote in addition to 
any votes to which he may be otherwise entitled. 
12.6.1. At every meeting at which he is entitled to vote, every shareholder, proxy holder or 
individual authorized to represent a shareholder who is present in person shall have 
one vote on a show of hands.  Upon a ballot at which he is entitled to vote, every 
shareholder, proxy holder or individual authorized to represent a shareholder shall, 
subject to the articles, have one vote for every share held by the shareholder. 
12.6.2. At every meeting unless a ballot is demanded, a declaration by the Chairman of the 
meeting that a resolution has been carried or carried unanimously or by a particular 
majority or lost or not carried by a particular majority shall be conclusive evidence of 
the fact. 
12.6.3. When the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, the President and the Vice-President are 
absent, the persons who are present and entitled to vote shall choose another director 
as chairman of the meeting, but if no director is present or all the directors present 
decline to the chair, the persons who are present and entitled to vote shall choose one 
of their number to be chairman. 
12.6.4. A ballot, either before or after any vote by a show of hands, may be demanded by any 
person entitled to vote at the meeting.  If at any meeting a ballot is demanded on the 
election of a chairman or on the question of adjournment it shall be taken forthwith 
without adjournment.  If at any meeting a ballot is demanded on any other question or 
as to the election of directors, the vote shall be taken by ballot in such manner and 
either at once, later in the meeting or after adjournment as the chairman of the 
meeting directs.  The result of a ballot shall be deemed to be the resolution of the 
meeting at which the ballot was demanded.  A demand for a ballot may be 
withdrawn. 
12.6.5. If two or more persons hold shares jointly, one of those holders present at a meeting 
of shareholders may, in the absence of the other, vote the shares; but if two or more 
of those persons who are present, in person or by proxy vote, they shall vote as one 
on the shares jointly held by them. 
12.7 Proxies: Votes at meetings of shareholders may be given either personally or by 
proxy or, in the case of a shareholder who is a body corporate or association, by an 
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individual authorized by a resolution of the directors or governing body of that body 
corporate or association to represent it at meetings of shareholders of the Company. 
12.7.1. A proxy shall be executed by the shareholder or his attorney authorized in writing and 
is valid only at the meeting in respect of which it is given or any adjournment thereof. 
12.7.2.  A person appointed by proxy need not be a shareholder. 
12.7.3. Subject to the provisions of Regulations 6 and 7 a proxy may be in the following 
form: 
The undersigned shareholder of [INSERT NAME OF COMPANY] 
hereby appoints                                           of                                                         , or 
failing him,                                                 of                                                              as 
the nominee of the undersigned to attend and act for the undersigned and on behalf of 
the undersigned at the Meeting of the shareholders of the said Company to be held on 
the 
             day of               , 19   and at any adjournment or adjournments thereof in the 
same manner, to the same extent and with the same powers as if the undersigned were 
present at the said meeting or such adjournment or adjournments thereof. 
DATED this                       day of                                               2005 
Signature of shareholder 
12.8. Adjournment: The chairman of any meeting may with the consent of the meeting 
adjourn the same from time to time to a fixed time and place and no notice of such 
adjournment need be given to the shareholders unless the meeting is adjourned by 
one or more adjournments for an aggregate of thirty days or more in which case 
notice of the adjourned meeting shall be given as for an original meeting.  Any 
business that might have been brought before or dealt with at the original meeting in 
accordance with the notice calling the same may be brought before or dealt with at 
any adjourned meeting for which no notice is required. 
12.9 Quorum: Subject to the Act, and except in the case of a Company having only one 
shareholder a quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the 
shareholders shall be one person present in person, each being either a shareholder 
entitled to vote thereat, or a duly appointed proxy holder or representative of a 
shareholder so entitled.  If a quorum is present at the opening of any meeting of the 
shareholders, the shareholders present or represented may proceed with the business 
of the meeting notwithstanding a quorum is not present throughout the meeting.  If a 
quorum is not present within 30 minutes of the time fixed for a meeting of 
shareholders, the persons present and entitled to vote may adjourn the meeting to a 
fixed time and place but may not transact any other business. 
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12.10 Resolution in lieu of meeting: Notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions of this 
by-law a resolution in writing signed by all the shareholders entitled to vote on that 
resolution at a meeting of shareholders is, subject to section 130 of the Act, as valid 
as if it had been passed at a meeting of the shareholders. 
13. SHARES 
13.1. Allotment and Issuance:  Subject to the Act, the articles and any unanimous 
shareholder agreement, shares in the capital of the Company may be allotted and 
issued by resolution of the directors at such times and on such terms and conditions 
and to such persons or class of persons as the directors determine. 
13.2 Certificates: Share certificates and the form of share transfer shall (subject to section 
197 of the Act) be in such form as the directors may by resolution approve and such 
certificates shall be signed by a Chairman or a Deputy Chairman or a Managing 
Director or a President or a Vice-President and the Secretary or an Assistant 
Secretary holding office at the time of signing. 
13.2.1. The directors or any agent designated by the directors may in their or his discretion 
direct the issuance of a new share or other such certificate in lieu of and upon 
cancellation of a certificate that has been mutilated or in substitution for a certificate 
claimed to have been lost, destroyed or wrongfully taken, on payment of such 
reasonable fee and on such terms as to indemnity, reimbursement of expenses and 
evidence of loss and of title as the directors may from time to time prescribe, whether 
generally or in any particular case. 
14. TRANSFER OF SHARES AND DEBENTURES 
14.1. Transfer: The shares of debentures of a company may be transferred by a written 
instrument of transfer signed by the transferor and naming the transferee 
14.2. Registers: Registers of shares and debentures issued by the Company shall be kept at 
the registered Office of the Company or at such other place in the State as may from 
time to time be designated by resolution of the directors. 
14.3. Surrender of Certificates:  Subject to section 195 of the Act, no transfer of shares or 
debentures shall be registered unless or until the certificate representing the shares or 
debentures to be transferred has been surrendered for cancellation. 
14.4. Shareholder indebted to the Company: If so provided in the articles, the Company has 
a lien on a share registered in the name of a shareholder or his personal representative 
for a debt of that shareholder to the Company.  By way of enforcement of such lien 
the directors may refuse to permit the registration of a transfer of such share. 
15. DIVIDENDS 
15.1. The directors may from time to time by resolution declare and the company may pay 
dividends on the issued and outstanding shares in the capital of the Company subject 
to the provisions (if any) of the articles and sections 51 and 52 of the Act. 
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15.1.1. In case several persons are registered as the joint holders of any shares, any one of 
such persons may give effectual receipts for all dividends and payments on account 
of dividends. 
16. VOTING IN OTHER COMPANIES 
16.1. All shares or debentures carrying voting rights in any other body corporate that are 
held from time to time by the Company may be voted at any and all meetings of the 
shareholders, debenture holders (as the case may be) of such other body corporate 
and in such manner and by such person or persons as the directors of the Company 
shall from time to time determine.  The officers of the Company may for and on 
behalf of the Company from time to time: 
(a) execute and deliver proxies; and 
(b) arrange for the issuance of voting certificates or other evidence of the right to 
vote; 
 
in such names as they may determine without the necessity of a resolution or other 
action by the directors. 
17. INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS 
17.1. Except as provided by the Act, no shareholder shall be entitled to any information 
respecting any details or conduct of the Company's business which in the opinion of 
the directors it would be inexpedient in the interests of the Company to communicate 
to the public. 
17.2. The directors may from time to time, subject to rights conferred by the Act, determine 
whether and to what extent and at what time and place and under what conditions or 
regulations the documents, books and registers and accounting records of the 
Company or any of them shall be open to the inspection of shareholders and no 
shareholder shall have any right to inspect any document or book or register or 
accounting record of the Company except as conferred by statute or authorized by the 
directors or by a resolution of the shareholders. 
18. NOTICES 
18.1. Method of giving notice: Any notice or other document required by the Act, the 
Regulations, the articles or by-laws to be sent to any shareholder, debenture holder, 
director or auditor may be delivered personally or sent by prepaid mail or cable or 
telex to any such person at his latest address as shown in the records of the Company 
or its transfer agent and to any such director at his latest address as shown in the 
records of at his business address. 
18.2. Waiver of notice: Notice may be waived or the time for the notice may be waived or 
abridged at any time with the consent in writing of the person entitled thereto. 
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18.3 Undelivered notices: If a notice or document is sent to a shareholder or debenture 
holder by prepaid mail in accordance with the paragraph and the notice or document 
is returned on three consecutive occasions because the shareholder or debenture 
holder cannot be found, it shall not be necessary to send any further notices or 
documents to the shareholder or debenture holder until he informs the Company in 
writing of his new address. 
18.4 Shares and debentures registered in more than one name: All notices or other 
documents with respect to any shares or debentures registered in more than one name 
shall be given to whichever of such persons is named first in the records of the 
Company and any notice or other document so given shall be sufficient notice of 
delivery to all the holders of such shares or debentures. 
18.5 Persons becoming entitled by operation of law:  Subject to section 200 of the Act, 
every person who by operation of law, transfer or by any other means whatsoever 
becomes entitled to any share is bound by every notice or other document in respect 
of such share that, previous to his name and address being entered in the records of 
the Company is duly given to the person from whom he derives his title to such share. 
18.6. Deceased Shareholders: Subject to section 200 of the Act, any notice or other 
document delivered or sent by prepaid mail, cable or telex or left at the address of any 
shareholder as the same appears in the records of the Company shall, notwithstanding 
that such shareholder is deceased, and whether or not the Company has notice of his 
death, be deemed to have been duly served in respect of the shares held by him 
(whether held solely or with any other person) until some other person is entered in 
his stead in the records of the Company as the holder or one of the holders thereof 
and such service shall for all purposes be deemed a sufficient service of such notice 
or document on his personal representatives and on all persons, if any, interested with 
him in such shares. 
18.7. Signature to notices:  The signature of any director or officer of the Company to any 
notice or document to be given by the Company may be written, stamped, typewritten 
or printed or partly written, stamped, typewritten or printed. 
18.8. Computation on time:  Where a notice extending over a number of days or other 
period is required under any provisions of the articles or the by-laws the day of 
sending the notice shall, unless it is otherwise provided, be counted in such number of 
days or other period 
18.9. Proof of service:  Where a notice required under paragraph 18.1 hereof is delivered 
personally to the person to whom it is addressed or delivered to his address as 
mentioned in paragraph 18.1 hereof, service shall be deemed to be at the time of 
delivery of such notice. 
18.9.1. Where such notice is sent by post, service of the notice shall be deemed to be effected 
forty-eight hours after posting if the notice was properly addressed and posted by 
prepaid mail. 
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18.9.2. Where the notice is sent by cable or telex, service is deemed to be effected on the date 
on which the notice is sent. 
18.9.3. A certificate of an officer of the Company in office at the time of the making of the 
certificate or of any transfer agent of shares of any class of the Company as to facts in 
relation to the delivery or sending of any notice shall be conclusive evidence of those 
facts. 
19. CHEQUES, DRAFTS AND NOTES 
19.1 All cheques, drafts or orders for the payment of money and all notes and acceptances 
and bills of exchange shall be signed by such officers or persons and in such manner 
as the directors may from time to time designate by resolution. 
20. EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENTS 
20.1. Contracts, documents or instruments in writing requiring the signature of the 
Company may be signed by: 
(a) a chairman, a Deputy Chairman, a Managing Director, a President or a Vice-
President together with the Secretary or the Treasurer, or 
(b) any two directors 
and all contracts, documents and instruments in writing so signed shall be binding 
upon the Company without any further authorization or formality.  The directors shall 
have power from time to time by resolution to appoint any officers or persons on 
behalf of the Company either to sign certificates for shares in the Company and 
contracts, documents and instruments in writing generally or to sign specific 
contracts, documents or instruments in writing. 
20.1.1. The common seal of the Company may be affixed to contracts, documents and 
instruments in writing signed as aforesaid or by any officers or persons specified in 
paragraph 20.1. hereof. 
20.1.2. Subject to section 136 of the Act 
(a) a Chairman, a Deputy Chairman, a Managing Director, a President or a Vice-
President together with the Secretary or the Treasurer, or 
(b) any two directors 
 
shall have authority to sign and execute (under the seal of the Company or otherwise) 
all instruments that may be necessary for the purpose of selling, assigning, 
transferring, exchanging, converting or conveying any such shares, stocks, bonds, 
debentures, rights, warrants or other securities 
21. SECURITIES 
21.1. The signature of a Chairman, a Deputy Chairman, a Managing Director, a President, 
a Vice-President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, an Assistant Secretary or an Assistant 
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Treasurer or any director of the Company or of any officer or person, appointed 
pursuant to paragraph 20 hereof by resolution of the directors may, if specifically 
authorised by resolution of the directors, be printed engraved, lithographed or 
otherwise mechanically reproduced upon any certificate for shares in the Company or 
contract, document or instrument in writing, bond, debenture or other security of the 
Company executed or issued by or on behalf of the Company.  Any document or 
instrument in writing on which the signature of any such officer or person is so 
reproduced shall be deemed to have been manually signed by such officer or person 
whose signature is so reproduced and shall be as valid to all intents and purposes as if 
such document or instrument in writing had been signed manually and 
notwithstanding that the officer or person whose signature is so reproduced has 
ceased to hold office at the date on which such document or instrument in writing is 
delivered or issued. 
22. FINANCIAL YEAR 
22.1. The directors may from time to time by resolution establish the financial year of the 
company. 
ENACTED this                             day of                                                  20 
                    Corporate 
Seal 
 ………………………………….   
 …………………………………  
                             President                                        Secretary 
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APPENDIX 2(1) 
SOME COUNTRIES/AGENCIES/ORGANISATIONS TO WHICH ST. VINCENT 
HOLDS MEMBERSHIP AS A BONAFIDE STAKEHOLDER AS PER 
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCIAL PROGRESS  
Organisations/Institutions Acronyms 
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Association of Caribbean and Pacific states 
www.acp.int/content/secretariat-acp 
ACP 
Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – 
The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America ALBA 
Alliance of Small Island States AOSIS 
Caribbean Community CARICOM 
Caribbean Development Bank CDB 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/community-latin-american-
and-caribbean-states-celac/ 
CELAC 
Food and Agriculture Organisation  
The Group of 77 at the United Nations G77 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IBRD 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation ICAO 
International Development Association IDA 
International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD 
International Financial Reporting Standards IFRS 
International Labour Organisation ILO 
International Monetary Fund IMF 
International Maritime Organisation IMO 
International Criminal Police Organisation more commonly known 
as Interpol 
ICPO-
INTERPOL 
International Olympic Committee IOC 
International Organisation for Standardisation ISO 
International Telecommunications Unit ITU 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency MIGA 
OAS OAS 
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Source : Compilation by researcher  -  2018  
 
 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES CITED 
NB. SOME OF THE FOLLOWING NEWSPAPER ARTICLES REFLECT THE 
DISTILLED BUT SOMEWHAT SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS OF THE 
www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_A-
41_charter_OAS_signatories.asp 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development OECD 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States OECS 
Agency for the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
OPANAL 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW 
www. dictionary.sensagent.com/PETROCARIBE/en-en/ - Caribbean 
oil alliance between Venezuela and some Caribbean countries 
PETROCARIB
E 
United Nations 
www.svg-
un.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid
=11 
UN 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD 
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNESCO 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation UNIDO 
Universal Postal Union UPU 
World Federation of Trade Unions WFTU 
World Health Organisation WHO 
World Intellectual Property Organisation WIPO 
World Trade Organisation WTO 
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND ALSO GENERALLY REPORT ON 
THE PREVAILING SENTIMENTS OF STAKEHOLDERS (INSTITUTIONAL AND 
NON-INSTITUTIONAL) 
THE OPINIONS ARE NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF THE RESEARCHER SAVE 
AND EXCEPT WHERE STATEMENTS AND REPORTS WERE DIRECTLY FROM 
JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND QUOTATIONS 
TAKEN FROM ANNUAL GENERAL MEETINGS AND OTHER ARTICLES THAT 
ARE SUBSTNATITATED AS REFERENCES 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 (2) 
NEWS PAPER ARTICLE  
www.searchlight.vc/sugar-slavery-and-emancipation-in-stvincent-a-brief-overview-
p27899-86.htm - last accessed on 16 April 2018 
SUGAR, SLAVERY AND EMANCIPATION IN ST. VINCENT- A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW 
Fri, Jul 23, 2010 
Sunday, August 1, is the anniversary of Emancipation, but the annual holiday will be 
celebrated on the next day, Monday, August 2.  
 
To mark the occasion, I am doing a two-part article reflecting on issues pertaining to 
Emancipation in St. Vincent. In this first article I will provide a brief overview of Slavery. 
 
The first point that should perhaps be made is that this country got into the sugar business at a 
late stage. While other Caribbean colonies had begun the production of sugar from the 1640s 
and 50s, St. Vincent was still in the hands of the Caribs who controlled what were considered 
the best sugar lands. Colonies such as Barbados and Antigua had, therefore, been producing 
sugar for over 120 years at the time when St. Vincent began its period of British colonisation. 
St. Vincent became a colony of Britain in 1763, and three years later it began to export sugar 
but in very small quantities. In fact the export in that year, 1766, was a mere 35 tons.  
 
By 1771 it had reached 2,218 tons. However, in 1828, following the expulsion of the Caribs, 
it reached 14,403 tons, an amount that was never surpassed in its history. A major effort into 
the expansion of sugar began with the expulsion of the Caribs since the British planters then 
had access to the prized Carib lands in the north, lands considered ideal for sugar production. 
In 1813, the Byrea Hill tunnel was cut through Mount Young, facilitating communication 
with the north of the island. Later, the Black Point tunnel, as we call it, was also created at the 
sea end of Mount Young, to accommodate easier shipment of sugar to the calmer Byrea end. 
Georgetown was created from the Grand Sable estate which was the largest estate in the 
colony and the remainder of the Carib lands were divided into 7 large estates: Mt. Bentinck, 
Langley Park, Rabacca, Lot 14, Waterloo, Orange Hill, and Tourama.  
 
In 1791 the Grenadines were divided into two blocs with the north bloc linked 
administratively with St. Vincent. On Bequia there were 9 estates with Industry (1,000 acres) 
being the largest, Mustique -2 estates, Cheltenham (663 acres) and Adelphi (1,992 acres); 
Canouan 1 estate-Careenage 600 acres and Union Island 1 estate, 2057 acres. Cotton was 
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planted in Union Island, Canouan, Petit St. Vincent and Mayreau with Balliceaux and 
Batowia used as stock islands from 1821.In any attempt to understand the state and fate of the 
Sugar Industry in St. Vincent, it is important to know that the country started exporting Sugar 
a mere 10 years before the start of the War of American Independence which deprived 
planters of cheap sources of supplies for their estates. Added to this there were a series of 
disasters that played havoc with the Sugar Industry; a hurricane in 1780, the eruption of the 
Soufriere Volcano in 1812, another hurricane in 1819 and yet another in 1831. Loans 
advanced for hurricane relief following that of 1831 were up to 30 years after, not repaired 
and had brought a great burden on the estates. With Sugar came slavery. Although a few 
slaves existed before, working on the small farms of the French planters, it was not until the 
development of the Sugar Industry that slavery expanded. It meant, however, that slavery did 
not exist for any major period in St. Vincent and began at a time when persons were 
beginning to raise serious issues about that institution and the challenge to the system began. 
Slaves came from different parts of Africa.  
 
Advertisements in the newspapers referred to the sale of Eboe and Malay slaves. Sir William 
Young in his diaries left accounts of the sale of Windward and Gold Coast slaves. While it 
might be argued that Slavery in St. Vincent for the reasons already outlined did not attain the 
brutality that it did in the older slave colonies, slavery was slavery, a brutal institution and 
moreover slaves were property. A notice in one of the newspapers in 1808 tells it all, “For 
Sale - A stout healthy Negro man of the Ebo nation, well seasoned to the island and sold for 
no fault but that the owner is in want of cash. For further particulars enquire of Mr. James O’ 
Flaherty.” 
 
Slave laws put severe restrictions on the lives of slaves. Meetings of slaves after 10 pm were 
prohibited. Slaves were not allowed to leave the estates without a ticket except when they 
were going to the markets. Their houses, too, were often searched for weapons. Preaching of 
slaves was forbidden. Despite the restrictions prescribed in the laws, the slaves tried to 
fashion a life of their own and to create the space to do so. They had access to provision 
grounds and yam pieces and planted food, which they took to the market. Mrs. Carmichael, 
the wife of a Scottish planter, left us some accounts:  
 
“After morning service at the Chapel, the country Negroes eat cold fried jack fish and drink 
mobee, grog or some other beverage with their friends in the market place under a tree, and 
soon after, the well disposed people may be seen trudging home again with their empty trays 
and baskets. Mobee is a drink prepared with sugar, ginger and snake root, as a bitter it is 
fermented and is a wholesome cooling beverage.” Ashton Warner who was a slave on the 
Penniston estate and who left an account of slavery mentioned that his mother made sausages 
and souse made from pig head for sale. There was no major slave revolt in St. Vincent but 
there were individual acts of violence. St.Hilaire, a planter of French descent who lived in 
Mayreau was murdered by his slaves while working in the field. Charles Warner, the 
proprietor of Friendship estate in Bequia was murdered by two of his slaves.  
 
There were major disturbances on the estates in the Carib Country area in 1833, so much so 
that mention of this was made during the debate on abolition in the British parliament. The 
country was then experiencing serious economic difficulties, to the extent that the British 
Government had to meet the salary of the Lieutenant Governor. What I have provided is a 
brief glimpse of aspects of the Sugar Industry and Slavery. Next week I will focus on issues 
related to Emancipation as they were played out in this country. 
 
 
SUGAR, SLAVERY AND EMANCIPATION IN ST. VINCENT - A BRIEF OVERVIEW  
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The traditional view of Emancipation put the role of the humanitarians above everything else, 
so that the contribution of Wilberforce, Granville Sharpe, Thomas Clarkson and the others 
who constituted that body was highlighted. This was until the late 1940s when Eric Williams 
without denying that the humanitarians played an important role placed emphasis on the 
social, political and economic changes taking place in England.  
In fact, Elsa Goveia, Guyanese historian, now deceased, gave support to this when she argued 
that, “If the British West Indian Sugar Industry had not been in severe economic difficulties 
from the beginning of the 19th century it appears most unlikely that the humanitarians could 
have succeeded in abolishing either the British Slave Trade or British Colonial Slavery...” In 
recent times the role of the slaves has been highlighted, with Jamaican Richard Hart 
producing two volumes on the “Slaves Who Abolished Slavery”. Not only was the Haitian 
Revolution identified as a major player but so were the rebellions in Barbados (1816), 
Demerara (1823) and Jamaica 1831. Missionaries came under strong attack from the belief 
that they played key roles in these rebellions.  
The case of John Smith who was put in prison in Demerara and others who suffered at the 
hands of the planters crossed the line. It was one thing to be attacking and prosecuting the 
slaves but when it touched their kith and kin then it was something else. William Shrewsbury, 
a Weslyan Minister in Barbados, had to flee to St. Vincent after his chapel was burnt, and 
Lumb, a Weslyan Missionary, was also imprisoned in St. Vincent for allegedly preaching the 
gospel without a proper licence. All of this impacted on public opinion. All of this was being 
played out in the context of an economy in Britain that was shifting from an agricultural base 
to one involving manufacturing. 
The Act that brought an end to the Slave Trade was passed in 1807 to take effect in the 
colonies from January 1, 1808. The evidence shows that for the period 1815-1830 more 
slaves were sold in the Americas than in the last two decades of the 18th century. British 
goods were sold to the slave traders and British merchants purchased Slave grown produce, 
even though there was no direct British participation in the actual trade.  
 
Although the slave trade to the colonies was illegal the inter-island slave trade was still legal. 
The issue of Registration then became a critical one in an effort to ensure that slaves were not 
brought into the colonies. The St. Vincent Assembly like others in the colonies strongly 
condemned the efforts to introduce a Slave Registration Bill, which they regarded as an effort 
by the parliament in Britain to intervene in their internal affairs. An Act to provide for a 
triennial return of slaves was eventually passed. Interest in the conditions existing under 
slavery began to surface in the early 1820s and in 1823 the Society for the Mitigation and 
Gradual Abolition of Slavery was formed. One of the key issues at this time was the matter of 
amelioration where pressure was being exerted on the slave owners to improve the condition 
of their slaves.  
 
Even the Society of Absentee Planters and Merchants recognised the handwriting on the wall 
and tried unsuccessfully to get the planters in the colonies to undertake major improvement in 
the lives of their slaves. Efforts by the British Parliament to get the colonies to pass 
Amelioration legislation created an uproar and strong opposition in St. Vincent until 1830 
when its Parliament was able to pass legislation that was acceptable to the British Parliament. 
While the movement for Emancipation took centre stage in England with numerous 
resolutions and pieces of legislation being taken to Parliament, the situation in St. Vincent 
became quite serious in 1833, to the extent that this was mentioned during the debates in the 
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British Parliament. The slaves became agitated and the Governor had to visit the island in a 
warship to try to keep the situation under control. He left the 69th regiment to try and 
maintain calm but serious disturbances continued on the Carib Country estates, with slaves 
not turning out to work on time, going in large numbers to the hospital and letting their 
managers know that they were prepared to go to the Governor in the event of any punishment 
being meted out to them.  
 
A Committee that was set up to investigate the disturbances heard virtually the same story 
from the managers and overseers of the estates. Alexander Cumming, proprietor of Lot 14 
and Rabacca, stated that the slaves were coming into the hospital in considerable numbers 
ranging from about 30-50 without any appearance of sickness. Other managers claimed that 
they were turning out to work much later than usual. Others claimed that threats were made to 
them. One slave informed them that although his master had bought him, he had worked long 
enough to pay him for what it cost.  The manager of Lot 14 referred to what he described as a 
spirit of obstinacy and disobedience. There was also the belief that slaves from the different 
estates were meeting at night to coordinate their plans, prompted by the belief that the King of 
England had already freed them but that the planters were resisting it. Finally the passage of 
the Act in England brought fury to the Assembly, which protested what it considered an 
undue invasion of their rights. Reference was made to the millions they contributed to 
England. The protests continued until they were reminded that failure to pass an Act in their 
colony was going to prevent them from getting the compensation money on which they so 
greatly depended for cultivating their estates. Eventually on May 28, 1834, the Act for the 
Abolition of Slavery in St. Vincent was sent to Britain.  
On August 1, 1834, 18,102 slaves became apprentices. 2,959 children less than 6 years were 
freed immediately as were 1,189 persons who were aged or incapacitated. A total of 
£1,602,307 was paid to the planters for compensation. August 1, 1834, was a Friday and on 
that day, according to Ebenezer Duncan, the Methodist Chapel was filled with slaves who 
sang lustily Wesley’s hymn “Blow Ye the Trumpet, blow.” What the slaves got was a state of 
semi-freedom called Apprenticeship. ‘Full freedom’ only came in 1838 some four years later. 
 
Dr. Adrian Fraser is a social commentator and historian. Former Resident Tutor/Head of the 
University of the West Indies Centre, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
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www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/may/18/decline-caribbean-banana-trade-europe - 
Accessed from *2011 but last accessed 2 April 2018 
(In keeping with work program as part of preparatory work on government’s agenda and 
discussions on the implications for the decline on the industry for the island of St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines … 
Caribbean banana industry decline is no sideshow 
Aurelie Walker 
Europe's trade policy has sold the Caribbean banana industry down the river, exacerbating 
drug trafficking and poverty 
Tue 18 May 2010 09.00 BST 
First published on Tue 18 May 2010 09.00 BST 
Today, EU leaders and their counterparts from Colombia and Peru will strike lucrative trade 
agreements spanning financial services, industry and agriculture – the first between the EU 
and any Latin American nation since 2003. The EU's attention will then focus on securing 
similar deals with the mighty Latin American Mercosur bloc that includes Brazil and 
Argentina. 
Another example of the power of globalisation to generate wealth? Maybe, but there is a less 
rosy side to the seemingly inevitable victory march of trade liberalisation. 
As European business interests ready themselves for new markets, it should not be forgotten 
that breakthrough would never have materialised without selling the Caribbean banana 
industry down the river. Unlikely as it may seem, until last December, there was an impasse 
in closer trade ties between Europe and Latin America. It came in the form of the banana – 
the world's most exported fruit. 
Since 1975, Europe protected Caribbean banana growers. But the largely American interests 
that controlled the vast banana plantations in Ecuador and Colombia, where workers' rights 
are at best an afterthought, persuaded the then fledgling Clinton administration, whose 
election they lavishly funded, to lodge a complaint with the World Trade Organisation 
demanding they overturn this perceived unjust support. 
For 17 years, the banana wars raged. Then, five months ago, with one eye on huge trade deals 
between Colombia and Peru, Europe relented. 
Compensation for banana farmers in a dozen Caribbean and African countries comes in the 
form of €190m fund. The money will be paid to Caribbean governments in the form of budget 
support. In other words, farmers won't see the cash. 
The most serious challenge to agriculture in the Caribbean comes as islands face falls in 
tourism, foreign direct investment and financial services. This after the international 
community told the islands to pursue these paths.  
 
The decline of the Caribbean banana industry may seem like a sideshow. But abandoned 
farms together with laid-off financial workers are a seedbed for enveloping the Caribbean 
economy and political system in a drug morass. 
There is evidence of the spread of marijuana cultivation and trafficking, especially in St 
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Vincent where a Marijuana Growers Association was publicly announced, despite the practice 
being illegal. 
Strategically placed on the cocaine route from South to North America, the Caribbean used to 
be just a stopping-off point for traffickers. Now, say well-placed sources, drug barons are 
making connections with the marijuana trade and supplying them with guns and cocaine. 
In a region where unemployment surpasses 30% in some countries, according to International 
Labour Organisation estimates, this is what happens when you lose a trade war. Farmers 
question whether it is worth tilling the soil against a shrinking export market, a lower return 
and a lack of credit. 
Trade is not a cure-all for poverty reduction. Investment in infrastructure, technology and 
human capital are also prerequisites for development. 
But the economies of vulnerable nations are being sacrificed to satisfy the interests of western 
corporations. The last rites are administered by global food giants who have and continue to 
diminish workers' rights to increase their profits. 
The remaining Windward farmers are fighting back by shortening supply chains and investing 
in community and business developments. Backed by the better nature of UK consumers, 
who are choosing Fairtrade in increasing numbers, at least there is one way they can still 
receive a decent price for their crop in a market that has seen long-term real-terms price 
decline. 
But the big, contradictory picture is at the very same time that Caribbean governments are 
fighting poverty, drugs and crime, the same curse of poverty, drugs and crime is being 
exacerbated – as a direct consequence of the European commission's trade policy 
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NEWSPAPER ARTICLE 
HISTORY THIS WEEK – REASONS FOR THE RAPID GROWTH OF A BLACK 
PEASANTRY IN BRITISH GUIANA AND TRINIDAD IMMEDIATELY AFTER 1838 
By Staff Writer April 9, 2009 Comments Tweet Print Email 
By Clyde W. Thierens 
The high wages received by freed Africans immediately after Emancipation also helped to 
stimulate the rapid growth of a Black peasantry in British Guiana and Trinidad. Wages in 
these colonies ranged from one shilling and six pence to two shillings and one penny per task. 
Able- bodied Africans were often able to push themselves to complete as many as three tasks 
on some days. This enabled them to earn substantial sums which they saved up to purchase 
available lands in the colonies. To some measure, workers in Jamaica had similar 
experiences. However, the situation was somewhat different in the colonies of Barbados, 
Antigua, and St Kitts where the earnings of workers were as low as one shilling per day or 
less. The low earnings they received in those colonies generally prohibited them from 
purchasing scarce, highly priced lands in their territories. 
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The rapid growth of a Black peasantry in Trinidad and British Guiana was also stimulated by 
the weakened economic state of the sugar industry in the two colonies. Many planters found it 
difficult to cope with the loss of labour and the demands of the newly freed workers for 
higher pay and better terms of work. While being forced to offer inducements to keep 
workers, many planters found it impossible to remain in operation in the light of declining 
sugar prices. In these two colonies, as in Jamaica, a Black peasantry rapidly developed as a 
result of the post- Emancipation difficulties of the planters and their inability to adjust 
quickly. Many estates were abandoned as planters were forced to sell land to the Africans in 
an effort to cut their losses and accumulate desperately needed cash. The shortage of labour 
and capital led to reductions in the areas under cultivation. Between 1838 and 1844 there was 
a decrease in production. The situation worsened further in 1846 when the Sugar Duties Act 
was introduced. The drastic cuts in the price of sugar added to the planters’ woes. 
However, in contrast, the sugar industry in Barbados, Antigua and St Kitts remained 
dominant. Cultivation in these colonies actually expanded and production increased. The 
continued dominance of the industry precluded the significant development of a peasantry in 
these colonies. 
As unprofitable estates in British Guiana and Trinidad were abandoned or sold, many planters 
sought to enhance their labour supply by selling some of their estate lands to the Africans. 
This resulted in significant purchases being made by the ex- slaves and the hastening of the 
growth of a Black peasantry. Much of the land acquired in this manner was partially drained 
and therefore ‘workable’. This was in contrast to the Leeward Islands where any lands the ex- 
slaves could acquire were found in areas that were marginal to the estates and in difficult 
terrain. These lands, unlike much of those acquired in Trinidad and British Guiana, were unfit 
for effective utilization. 
In Nevis, despite the collapse of the sugar industry, and then of cotton, a significant peasantry 
failed to develop partly due to a marked exodus of workers from the colony, in addition to the 
scarcity of land for this purpose.  Similarly in Barbados, no real growth was experienced as 
only six villages were established by 1859. This was due to the unwillingness of planters to 
sell land to the ex- slaves and, whenever they did, they asked for exorbitant prices ranging 
from as much as one hundred to two hundred pounds per acre. However, a few ex-slaves 
acquired small portions of land from charitable proprietors. 
Despite the chronic labour shortage in British Guiana and Trinidad, the decreasing levels of 
cultivation and production meant that many labourers could not be fully employed-especially 
during out of crop time. This helped to contribute to the rapid growth of a Black peasantry. In 
addition to this, the introduction of new techniques and machinery, to help counter the labour 
shortages also reduced labour requirements and thereby ‘pushed’ more freed Africans into the 
ranks of the peasantry. 
Throughout the British Caribbean, planters individually and collectively devised a number of 
official and unofficial policies to keep the freed Africans tied to plantation work. In British 
Guiana, and in Jamaica, acts such as the wanton destruction of fruit trees and provision 
grounds backfired on the planters. Instead of these acts achieving the desired objective of 
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keeping the Africans bound to the plantations, they resulted in the opposite effect of driving 
the Black workers away from the plantations and making them more determined to free 
themselves as much as possible from being in positions where they could be victims of such 
spite and vindictiveness. 
In Trinidad, planters’ actions such as the introduction of the tenancy system, the withdrawal 
of allowances and the attempts to reduce wages, forced many Africans to leave the estates. 
Hall is of the view that there would not have been the mass exodus away from some 
plantations in some territories if planters had sought to foster better relations with the 
labourers. He contends that they may very well have fared better had they not imposed such 
harsh conditions for workers’ use of estate residences and provision grounds. 
The tenancy-at-will system, which combined rents and wages, and confined labourers to work 
on particular estates or be evicted, was utilized in Dominica, Nevis, Montserrat, St Lucia, 
Tobago, St Vincent and Antigua. Successful resistance was mounted by Jamaican labourers, 
leading to the withdrawal of the system in that colony in 1842.  In St Lucia, the system 
proved ineffective because of the moderate population density of that colony. Implementation 
of the system in British Guiana and Trinidad was not vigorously pursued as it was felt that- as 
was the case in St Lucia- the low population density of these territories would have rendered 
it unsuccessful. 
The Barbadian planters, by the Masters and Servants Acts, maintained their stranglehold on 
the labourers by keeping them working on the estates for wages that were less than market 
rates. Barbadian workers were forced to pay high rents for dwellings. They were only allowed 
to remain on the plantations at the discretion of the planters. With land in the colony already 
scarce, proprietors themselves immediately bought or rented any plots that became available 
so that African workers could not acquire them. African Barbadian labourers were forced to 
continue working under onerous conditions on the plantations or face starvation as a result of 
the employment of these strategies. 
Planters in British Guiana and Trinidad introduced measures to lessen production costs, and 
control workers’ wages and conduct, as a result of falling sugar prices. In 1842, African 
Guianese workers resisted these draconian ‘Rules and regulations’ by staging massive strikes. 
Many plantations were ruined as a result of the withdrawal of labour and this led to decreases 
in the prices of land from which the Africans benefitted. The measures adopted by the 
planters helped to convince many more Black workers that they would be better off on their 
own ‘pieces of ground’. This was demonstrated in the substantial growth of the peasantry. 
A similar situation unfolded in Trinidad as labourers resisted regulations by moving to 
available lands in the colony away from the plantations. In Jamaica, planters also attempted to 
cut wages but strikes by workers there threatened the impending production and labourers left 
the estates in protest. In 1847-48, the Black peasantry in British Guiana again received a 
boost as planters once more attempted to reduce wages. More labourers fled to areas up the 
creeks and rivers, many anticipating the collapse of the entire economic system. 
Anticipating that Emancipation would result in a mass exodus of Africans from the 
plantations, the Secretary of State for the colonies had outlined a land policy to prevent free 
access to Crown lands in order to keep the labourers on the estate. This official policy did not 
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have the desired effect in British Guiana and Trinidad. Some African Trinidadians were able 
to squat on Crown lands, while in British Guiana, in addition to some squatting, significant 
numbers of Africans purchased many of the abandoned plantations on the coast. In both 
instances the freed Black populations were able to circumvent official policy and acquire 
land. This contributed immensely to the growth of a Black peasantry in the two colonies. 
In Trinidad, despite the passage of legislation in 1839, many labourers were able to squat 
successfully on Crown lands until the 1860s. In British Guiana, the Peter Rose Report of 1850 
indicated that there was significant squatting on the banks of the Demerara River. Africans in 
this area were engaged in farming, fishing, hunting and the production of firewood and 
charcoal to support themselves. 
It must be noted that there was some measure of official support of the growth of a Black 
peasantry in Trinidad and British Guiana. Governor Light reported favourably on its growth 
while at least two Stipendiary Magistrates provided legal advice to the Africans regarding 
their purchases of land. In Trinidad, Governor Lord Harris supported the growth of a 
peasantry by selling one-acre plots of land to workers and making some attempts to regularize 
squatting in the col 
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Source: 
Sheppard, Charles, An Historical Account of the Island of Saint Vincent (W. Nicol, 
Cleveland Row St.James, London 1831) IV – (Researcher's extraction/composition of 
table) 
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NEWSDAY NEWSPAPER 
Newspaper article – last accessed on 1 April 2018 
Year Negroes Caribs Whites Coloreds Slaves 
1735 6,000 4,000 - - - 
1764 - - 2,104 - 7,414 
1787 - - 1,450 300 11,853 
1805 - - 1,600 450 16,500 
1812 - - 1,053 1,482 24,920 
1825 - - 1,301 2,824 - 
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www.archives.newsday.co.tt/2009/06/11/clico-shocks-caricom/ 
CLICO ‘SHOCKS’ CARICOM 
CL Financial’s troubles are not only a problem for Trinidad and Tobago and the 
“shocks” of this crisis continues to be felt across the Caricom region, so much so, 
that it has even sent up a red flag at the International Monetary Fund, according 
to economist Sir Ronald Sanders. 
Through flagship insurance subsidiaries Colonial Life Insurance Co Ltd (Clico) and 
British American, fear of what impact a total collapse of the CL Financial group could 
have on regional economies is real, Sanders told journalists attending a 
Commonwealth Caribbean Business Media Workshop at Crowne Plaza, in Port-of-
Spain last week. “For some people there is a fear of loss of insurance annuities, long -
term savings and insurance coverage. The latter fear has less to do with the global 
financial crisis than it has to do with the collapse of CL Financial holdings,” he said 
on June 3. Noting that CL Financial’s subsidiaries have “an outreach across the 
majority of Caricom states”, Sanders said the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has 
observed that “shocks emanating from the collapse of CL Financial have also 
increased the stress in the non-bank financial sector with knock on effects for the 
domestic market and the domestic banks in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS). With this connection, we might not yet have seen the end of matters 
related to Clico and British American in the Eastern Caribbean,” he warned. Sanders 
predicted that if these institutions are unable to meet their insurance coverages, 
mortgages and other lendings by domestic banks, “further problems will develop”. 
The troubles of CL Financial mirror on a smaller but equally significant scale the 
impact, which the collapse of the banking systems of developed nations has had 
around the economies of the world. Indeed the tentacles of the global economic crisis 
had already begun to reach out to the Caribbean when CL Financial sought a bailout 
from the Trinidad and Tobago Government when it ran into problems. Stating that the 
CL Financial saga has made the need for a regional regulator for banking and non-
banking financial institutions “absolutely necessary”, Sanders welcomed the initiative 
by TT, Grenada, St Vincent and St Lucia to form an economic union by 2011 and a 
political union by 2013.  
“Whether this particular initiative comes to fruition or not, it emphasises the 
recognition that Caricom countries cannot go it alone,” he stated. He noted that while 
some Caricom countries may be worried about a loss of sovereignty through regional 
integration, the example of the European Union put those fears to rest. Integration 
would be timely as the region seeks to maintain its space in such blocs as the 
Commonwealth, said Sanders, noting that when members meet in Port-of-Spain from 
November 27 to 29 it would be an opportune time for Caricom states to seek out new 
business to once again shore up their economies. 
Observing that Prime Minister Patrick Manning will become chairman of the 
Commonwealth for a two-year period after meeting in November, Sanders said 
Manning and his Caricom colleagues must seize this opportunity to advance the 
region’s interests. 
Sanders said this is critical given the continued pressures, which the region faces from 
the global crisis, and the internal economic challenges, best exemplified by the 
problems of the CL Financial Group. Prior to the start of the Commonwealth Heads of 
	  
	  
	  
380	  
Government Meeting (CHOGM), the Commonwealth Business Forum (CBF) will be 
held on board the Royal Caribbean cruise liner Serenade of the Seas at the Port-of-
Spain International Waterfront Complex from November 23 to 26.  
The CBF is one of the most important pre-CHOGM events and will be “among the 
biggest business conferences” ever hosted in TT and Caricom. At least 700 delegates, 
comprising government and business leaders from all 53-member nations of the 
Commonwealth, are expected to attend the CBF. Information provided by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat shows the importance, which the CBF has regarding 
foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI into Malta increased two years after it hosted the 
2005 CHOGM, infrastructure projects worth US$3 billion were discussed at the 2003 
CBF in Nigeria and over US$1 billion worth of projects in infrastructure, energy and 
telecommunications have been commissioned in Uganda since that country hosted the 
last CHOGM in 2007.  
Manning underscored the importance of the 2009 CBF when he addressed its launch 
at the Royal Automobile Club in London on May 21. He observed that the CBF “is 
happening at a time when it is sorely needed”. “In these recessionary days, we 
especially need the courage, dynamism and creativity of the private sector. There is 
no other way to return to anywhere near the level of growth that the world economy 
experienced before the present crisis,” Manning stated.  
“Business activity will not fully flourish in most countries unless we transform an 
international economic system that has contributed immeasurably to very uneven 
global development. This global imbalance is reflected quite starkly in our own 
grouping. The tragic result has been wide scale poverty and underdevelopment 
affecting hundreds of millions of people all over the developing world. The present 
crisis is already making the situation worse.” In his address to the workshop, Sanders 
said the Caribbean Development Bank has reported that in seven of the 13 Caricom 
countries, negative growth is projected for 2009. “In the next six cases (including 
TT), the growth rate, although positive, will be slower in 2009,” he stated. With the 
economies of Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) expected to 
contract by 2.9 per cent this year, Sanders said, “There is no question that the crisis, 
through poor regulation, has adversely affected the Caribbean.”  Serious declines in 
revenues in some Caricom countries, a fall in remittances and many construction 
projects being halted because of tightening credit facilities are just some signs of the 
impact which the crisis has had on the region. The economist added that the human 
face of the crisis in the Caribbean has been seen in a “marked increase in 
unemployment in single mothers and unskilled workers.” However, no single group 
anywhere in the Caribbean has been unscathed by the crisis. “The accustomed quality 
of life has declined across the board,” Sanders added. 
 Thursday 11 June 2009, Clint Chan Tack 
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SEE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY – 2010 GAZETTED INFORMATION PRIOR TO THIS 
NEWSPAPER ABOUT A COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY –  
”HCU Report Dated 16 July 2014 by The Hon Sir Anthony Colman  
Rowley: CLICO Commission Report Alleges ‘Criminal Misconduct’ 
 
Published: Tuesday | July 5, 2016 | 12:01 AM 
 
Prime Minister Dr Keith Rowley said on Friday that the report of a commission of enquiry 
into the failed regional insurance giant, CLICO, has made "very serious allegations of 
criminal misconduct" and is urging Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Roger Gaspard to 
review them. Rowley told Parliament that he would not disclose details of the report pending 
legal advice from Gaspard, to whom a copy had been sent.Rowley said it would be "wholly 
irresponsible" to publish or release the report of the one-man commission that probed the 
circumstances that led to the collapse of the CL Financial Group and its insurance subsidiary 
CLICO in 2009. 
"A number of adverse findings of criminal misconduct ... were found and recommendations 
made which would be for the DPP to consider. I make no further comment with respect to 
these areas in the report," Rowley told legislators, adding that the sole commissioner Sir 
Anthony Coleman had submitted a number of recommendations, which were now being dealt 
with by the government. 
Rowley said the commission found several factors had contributed to the collapse of CLICO, 
resulting in the Trinidad and Tobago government having to pump "many billions of dollars" 
into a bailout plan. 
He said Minister of Finance Colm Imbert was doing an audit of the bailout programme to 
determine its cost, including payments to lawyers. 
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SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS 
Rowley said that having perused the report himself, "I can advise the population that it 
contains very serious allegations of criminal misconduct on the part of a handful of privileged 
individuals who were associated with the CLICO/CLF group of companies. "Accordingly, 
these findings of the report must, of necessity, require the attention of law enforcement 
through the office of the DPP..." 
But Rowley also said there were some aspects of the report he could relate, saying there was 
overleveraging and unacceptable, intercompany transactions that seriously, negatively 
affected CLICO, CLICO Investment Bank (CIB) and the British American Insurance 
Company. "CLF paid high premium prices in acquiring various assets - thereby resulting in 
overall prices being more than originally anticipated," said the PM. "CLF's auditors expressed 
disquiet in the course of 2008 at the rapidity with which the group was acquiring new 
companies ... at the growth of intercompany balances, particularly the indebtedness of CLF to 
CLICO and CIB, as well as the limited ability of CLF management to operate a much 
enlarged group". 
Rowley said that the auditors had also recommended "that there be no further acquisitions 
until the group had consolidated its new holdings and paid down the unsecured part of its 
indebtedness to CLICO", but that "recommendation was ignored in as much as CLF 
management proceeded to go ahead with what can be described as a reckless manner". 
 
DEFECTIVE BUSINESS MODEL 
He said the underlying causes of the collapse of all of the companies were the defective 
business model of the CLF Group, poor corporate governance, and ignoring the 
recommendations of their external auditors. Rowley told legislators that the business model 
which ultimately crippled the entire CLF Group involved as its central feature "the 
deployment by CLF, either directly or through subsidiaries, of funds originating in monies 
deposited by external depositors as well as by CLICO and BAT in CIB", as well as the use of 
funds "originating in policy premium income and investment dividends belonging to CLICO 
and BAT for the purpose of making investments in equities and real estate and, latterly, for 
the payment of the operating expenses of CLF itself and other group companies". 
"In essence, therefore, the insurance companies were treated as the means of funding the 
investments made by or directed by CLF," Rowley said. "The fundamental defects in this 
business model were first, that once funds had been transferred out of CLICO, CIB and BAT, 
and invested by CLF and/ or other group component companies in real estate and equities, 
those assets lost the key attribute of liquidity which was essential to the safe conduct of the 
business of both CIB and the insurance companies, CLICO and BAT. "Consequently, those 
companies lost the ability to respond to the requirements of external policyholders and 
depositors for money payments as and when they fell due," he said. 
- CMC 
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www.stabroeknews.com/2009/news/stories/04/15/worst-case…clico-liabilities-exceed-assets-
by-119b/ - last accessed April 5, 2018 
WORST CASE…. CLICO LIABILITIES EXCEED ASSETS BY $11.9B 
By Staff Writer April 15, 2009 Comments 
Maria van Beek 
In the worst case scenario of liquidation, the liabilities of CLICO (Guyana) will exceed its 
assets by $11.9 billion dollars, Judicial Manager, Maria van Beek said in a report submitted to 
the High Court yesterday. 
Clico (Camp Street) – photo removed due to size - too large 
In a highly anticipated report she also strongly criticized the manner in which the insurance 
company was run. 
A best case presentation at liquidation shows the liabilities exceeding assets by $8.1B, the 
Judicial Manager said, emphasizing that there are on-going concerns as it relates to the 
company’s assets and liabilities 
Based on an investigation by Nizam Ali & Company, van Beek said that as a going concern, 
the book value of the company’s assets and liabilities shows the net asset position of the 
company is approximately -$1.6B. She said that given the likely impairment of the 
investment in CLICO (Bahamas) valued at $7.1B and “assuming some write-off in the value 
of the remaining assets of the company”, the net deficit could rise to $11.9B should the 
company be wound-up. She stressed however that these estimates are dependent on the value 
of the long-term liabilities produced by the actuary who is dependent on the policy data stored 
and compiled by the staff of CLICO (Trinidad) who were subcontracted to perform the 
work.  CLICO (Bahamas) was last week ordered wound up by a judge in Nassau. It was the 
placing of this business into liquidation that precipitated the placing of CLICO (Guyana) 
under judicial management. The final position of CLICO (Bahamas) showed its liabilities 
exceeding its assets by US$18M. 
Chief Justice Ian Chang yesterday requested additional information on CLICO (Guyana’s) 
statutory fund – money set aside to cover needs in each class of insurance. He said that more 
information is needed in relation to the particulars of the fund, noting that the Judicial 
Manager must provide information on all the lines of businesses that CLICO (Guyana) 
conducts, which relates to the various categories of insurances such as accident, fire and 
motor. Justice Chang then granted the Judicial Manager, who is also the Commissioner of 
Insurance leave to file a further report that would be reflective of the entire financial position 
of the company. 
In reporting on the company’s statutory fund, van Beek, has said that when the necessary 
calculation is done for the Actuary’s report, it is expected that there would be insufficient 
funds to cover all classes of business. She stated that it is possible however that some classes 
of business could be adequately funded. However, she said that there was insufficient time to 
do this analysis, adding that The [Insurance] Act provides insurers with up to six months to 
revise their statutory funds following the financial end of year. CLICO (Guyana) entered an 
appearance in the court matter yesterday through its attorney, Roysdale Forde, signalling a 
possible challenge to the wind-up application before the court, and even a challenge to the 
contents of the report by the Judicial Manager. 
The company is to file a formal entry of appearance within a few days.  CLICO (Guyana) had 
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opted out of the court proceedings prior to yesterday’s hearing, but the company is permitted 
by law to enter an appearance and challenge the wind-up application. 
Van Beek also revealed yesterday in her report that CLICO (Guyana) commenced the 
preparation of an information memorandum for distribution to interested parties with the 
intention of determining whether the company or parts of its business could be sold. She 
noted that despite the reported difficulties of the company interest has been expressed by local 
insurers. “… I would like to seek the permission of the court to fully explore this by sharing 
information on the insurance business of the company with these parties and reporting back to 
the court”, van Beek said. 
She stated that the sale of the local assets of the company would allow greater certainty with 
regard to the best possible treatment of the company’s policyholders.  She theorized that it 
may for example permit a scheme whereby the viable parts of the business can be transferred 
to one or more local insurer and the remaining policies could be paid up to an amount to be 
determined and that the larger policies could be repaid over a period of time under terms to be 
agreed with the government and/ or parties, policyholders and the company.  The government 
has said that no policyholder or investor will lose as a result of the CLICO debacle. 
Generally poor 
(Maria van Beek – photo removed too large) 
Van Beek lamented the state of the company’s documentation in her report, calling it 
“generally poor”. She said that based on the documents reviewed to date and a review of the 
investment decisions made by the company, “it appears that any assessment of the 
appropriateness of the investments in group subsidiaries was ineffectual.”  She noted that this 
is of particular concern given that two of the Directors are also Directors on the board of 
CLICO (Bahamas) Ltd. 
She said it does not appear that there were clear lines of communication between the actuary, 
management and the board. Further, she said discussions on critical assumptions for the 
actuarial valuation of the long-term liabilities do not appear to have been properly 
documented. “While the investment in The Bahamas appeared liquid on the company’s 
books, the directors should have been aware of the high level of liquidity risk that the 
investments in The Bahamas entailed in recent years. There was also some common 
directorship with Caribbean Resources Ltd”, the Judicial Manager continued. 
She added “The Directors and management of the Company operated without a basic 
understanding of managing an insurance business or pursued a strategy that has resulted in 
significant losses to the Company. This has jeopardized the ability of the company to meet its 
policyholder obligations”. She stated that as at February 28, 2009, the company had 
approximately $1.7B in Executive Flexible Premium Annuity (EFPA) and Flexible Premium 
Annuity (FPA) claims outstanding and approximately $382 million in other claims 
outstanding. But, she noted that at least a further $5.7B in EFPA and FPA claims were 
submitted. 
She also said in the report that if additional time is permitted she intended to instruct Nizam 
Ali to review the claims paid by the company during 2009 “and to determine whether any 
preferential disbursement was made”. During a run on CLICO (Guyana) in February after it 
was reported that Trinidad was bailing out its parent company, C L Financial, CLICO 
(Guyana) sold its Berbice Bridge bonds to the New Building Society to fund the surrenders of 
policies and investments. Questions have been raised about who cashed in on this. According 
to the report, several non-essential agencies in Rose Hall, Bartica, Parika and Georgetown 
were closed in an effort o save costs, since the closure of these offices it expected to save the 
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company at least $2.4 million per month. 
The report stated that the employment and services of 40 permanent staff and 3 contractual 
and non-essential staff were also terminated in an effort to reduce costs; the expected savings 
related to the basic salary costs totalled $5.85M per month or approximately 40 per cent of 
the total basic payroll. She said that the personnel were largely associated with the sale and 
marketing of insurance business and in all cases their positions were not essential for the 
effective and economic functioning of the company. 
Cost assessments 
She noted that they were paid severance on and after 27th March 2009 in accordance with the 
labour laws of Guyana, adding that the remaining staff has been retained at this time to 
service existing policyholders and assist the Judicial Manager in protecting the interest of 
policyholders of the company. 
On the issue of the termination of services provided by Premium Security Services Inc. 
(PSSI), a subsidiary of CL Financial Ltd, she said that it was found that no contract existed 
for the provision of this service nor was the service secured under normal business 
considerations such as cost assessments. According to van Beek, it became necessary to 
replace these services on 24th April due to deliberate delinquency on the part of a senior 
employee of PSSI. She said that investigations revealed that PSSI owes CLICO (Guyana) 
about $243 million and that despite being requested to repay this amount, PSSI has refused. 
RK Security Services have since been temporarily retained as replacement, she added. 
 
The Judicial Manager reported that an investigation into CLICO (Guyana) investments with 
Caribbean Resources Ltd. and PSSI, both subsidiaries of CL Financial, reveals that both 
companies have little or no ability to repay the loans from the company. “Over the years they 
have been largely dependent on the company to provide cash for both these organizations to 
function. All support to both companies has ceased since my appointment as Judicial 
Manager, and efforts are being made to recover the loans”, van Beek stated. 
 
Further, she added that it appears unlikely that the investments totalling $2.4B would be 
recovered. She said too, that the report by Nizam Ali & Company estimates a recovery of 
approximately $402M, adding that any shortfall is guaranteed by the parent company CL 
Financial. In addition, she reported that CLICO Guyana is wholly dependent on CLICO 
Trinidad to produce information and accounting information, and that this has caused some 
delays during the reporting period. Further, she said that any data problems have to be 
discussed with personnel in Trinidad. 
As an illustration of the state of the company’s investments, the going concern value is $7.5b 
but in the liquidation worst-case scenario the investments are reduced to  $344m – the 
difference representing the investment in The Bahamas company. She revealed that on the 
announcement by Trinidad on January 30, 2009 that some assets of C L Financial were being 
taken over CLICO (Guyana) “began experiencing heavier than normal surrenders. As at 28th 
February 2009, $1.5 billion in claims were paid during 2009 and $1.6 billion in claims remain 
outstanding on 28th February 2009” 
In an affidavit accompanying the report, van Beek noted that Winston Ramalho, claiming to 
be a director of CLICO (Guyana) had filed a motion seeking her removal as judicial manager. 
She averred that the motion was invalid and authorized and she had filed an affidavit in 
answer seeking to have it struck out and dismissed. 
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We meet today to present the annual accounts. This is a yearly occurrence.” 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2(9) 
LETTER TO CARICOM 
EXCERPT OF LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER RALPH GONSALVES TO 
CARICOM 
 
The Prime Minister 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  
West Indies  
February 09, 2012 
H.E. Mr Irwin La Rocque  
Secretary General 
CARICOM 
Greater Georgetown 
P.O. Box 10827 
Georgetown  
Guyana 
ON STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR CARICOM 
Dear ....................... 
The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) consists of the six independent countries of 
the OECS plus Anguilla and Montserrat.  The CLICO-BAICO debacle has caused an 
exposure in insurance liabilities of EC $2 billion (US $800 million) or roughly 16 per cent of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the ECCU.  By and large, CARICOM as an organised 
entity has stood askance from this formidable threat to the financial stability of the ECCU 
member-countries, the most vulnerable, collectively, in CARICOM.  To be sure, there has 
been reportage at the Conference of Heads and at COFAP but CARICOM has largely been 
disengaged.  The resolution of this issue has been left mainly up to the member-countries of 
the ECCU, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago; recently, the Caribbean Development Bank 
(CDB) has become involved.  
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The CLICO-BAICO conundrum represents, arguably, the greatest danger to the integrity of 
CARICOM if it is not resolved speedily, fairly, and cooperatively.  This matter has the 
potential to wreck CARICOM; and this is not hyperbole.  I am hopeful that the government of 
Trinidad and Tobago in respect of BAICO and CLICO (Trinidad) and the government of 
Barbados regarding CLICO International will shoulder their especial responsibilities.  
Admittedly, the satisfactory resolution of these matters is extremely difficult; some progress 
has been made, but there is still a long and arduous journey ahead.  CARICOM’s productive 
engagement is still required on “this insurance business”, now, and on-going.  But does it 
possess the institutional and juridical capacity?  I doubt; should it? Yes! 
Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Ralph Gonsalves 
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UK COMPANIES ACTS APPLICABLE TO ST. VINCENT 
COMPANIES FROM 1800 - 2013 
[SEE ALSO APPLICABLE HISTORICAL TABLE A] 
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TABLE A 
MODEL ARTICLES/DEFAULT FORM OF ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION FOR 
COMPANIES THAT ARE LIMITED BY SHARES 
 
Effective 
Dates in 
the UK 
Effective Dates 
in SVG 
Regulations of the 
UK Companies 
Acts 
Provisions in the 
SVG Acts 
Observations 
14 July 
1856 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Joint Stock 
Companies Act 
1856 Table B 
As per UK 
Companies Acts 
 
“Table A”? 
Table A is simply 
the name given to 
the prescribed 
format for Articles 
of Association of 
a company limited 
by shares under 
the Companies 
Act 1985 and 
earlier legislation. 
The Articles set 
out the regulations 
by which the 
company will be 
managed. The first 
prescribed format 
of Articles was 
made in “The 
Joint Stock 
Companies Act, 
1856”. In this Act, 
the Articles were 
called “Table B” 
(simply because 
they were 
preceded by a 
form of 
Memorandum of 
Association called 
“Form A”). At the 
next prescription, 
which happened in 
1862, the 
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Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and the Articles 
became “Table 
A”.  
 
Memorandum of 
Association 
necessary to file to 
incorporate 
company…this is 
part of the 
constitution of the 
company 
7 August 
1862 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
The Companies 
Act 1862 
As per UK 
Companies Acts 
Operative Act in 
SVG same as the 
UK – Table A as 
amended but only 
applicable to 
public Table B 
was changed to 
Table A under the 
UK Companies 
Act1862 (Possibly 
served as guidance 
to the Directors 
and Shareholders 
in the early 
establishment and 
or continuance of 
the First House – 
John Hazell Sons 
and Company 
Limited, save and 
except to say that 
such guidance 
would have been 
post 1845. The 
First House would 
have had to refer 
to this Table 
B/later Table A as 
per applicable and 
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prevailing 
legislative period) 
companies 
1 October 
1906 
 
*1907 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Board of Trade 
Order 1906 
 
 
*UK Companies 
Act 1907 provides 
for ‘private 
company’ for the 
first time 
Memorandum 
was moved into 
the body of the 
Act 
 
Memorandum was 
adopted from the 
public companies 
and moved into 
the body of the 
Act and Table A 
also incorporated 
in the body of the 
Act 
1 April 
1909 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Companies 
Consolidation Act 
1908 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
1 
November 
1929 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Companies Act 
1929 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
1 July 
1948 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Companies Act 
1948 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
27 January 
1968 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1967 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
^18 April 
1977, 1  
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1976 (^^^3 
Discussion on the 
Limited Liability 
Company/Private 
Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
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^June 
1977, 1  
 
^October 
1977 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Commencement 
dates) 
Limited Liability 
Company Limited 
by Shares but 
Articles of 
Association 
binding 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
2 February 
1979 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
As amended by 
the Stock 
Exchange 
(Completion of 
Bargains) Act 
1976 Part 1 
Same as above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
2 February 
1979 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
As amended by 
the Stock 
Exchange 
(Completion of 
Bargains) Act 
1976 Part 2 
Same as above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
 
 
 
2 February 
1979 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
As amended by 
the Stock 
Exchange 
(Completion of 
Bargains) Act 
1976 Part 3 
Same as above  
22 
December 
1980 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1980 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
3 
December 
1981 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1981 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
	  
	  
	  
392	  
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
body of the Act 
1 July 
1985 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
Regulations 1985 
As Above Applicable to the 
Company in as 
much as they are 
not excluded or 
varied by the 
Articles of 
Association of the 
Company limited 
by shares 
1 August 
1985 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies (Table 
A to F) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 1985 
As Above Table A remained 
valid for 
companies 
incorporated 
under Companies 
Act 1985 in the 
same format that it 
existed at the time 
of incorporation of 
the Company 
under Companies 
Act 1985 
22 
December 
2000 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1985 (Electronic 
Communications) 
Order 2000 
 
As Above Amended by SI 
2000/3373 
1 October 
2007 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2007 
and The 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
(Amendment) (No 
2) Regulations 
2007 for private 
Fundamental 
change to 
simplification of 
previous 
combination of 
memorandum and 
set of articles of 
association based 
on default Table 
A regulations as 
Articles of 
Article 50 of 
Table A with 
regards to the 
Chairman having 
a casting vote was 
removed from 
Table A. 
Amendment (No 
2) Regulations 
2007/2826.  If 
however the right 
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companies limited 
by shares 
Association based 
on a model 
set…However, 
Memorandum of 
association still 
exists but now 
reduced and 
contains 
statement of 
subscribers; intent 
(As Above) 
The Articles can 
be seen as a rule 
book on 
corporate 
governance of 
the company. 
The word 
‘Model’ not to 
be confused 
other than a set 
from which one 
can make 
changes to 
reflect 
company’s 
intention. 
existed in the 
Company’s 
articles once it 
was incorporated 
before this date, it 
remains valid as 
per Sch 3 para 
23A Companies 
Act 2006 
(Commencement 
No. 3, 
Consequential 
Amendments, 
(Transitional 
Provisions and 
Savings) Order 
2007/2194 (see 
Sch 5 para 2(5) 
Companies Act 
2006 
(C0mmencement 
No. 5, Transitional 
Provisions and 
Savings) Order 
2007/3495 
1 October 
2007 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 1985 
as amended by the 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
(Amendment 
(Regulations 
1985), the 
Companies (Table 
A to F) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2007 
and the 
Companies (Table 
        As Above Table A as 
amended 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
Regulations 1985 
as amended by SI 
2007/2541 and SI 
2007/2826 
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A to F) 
(Amendment) 
(No. 2) 
Regulations 2007 
2008 
 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As above Companies 
Model Articles 
Regulations 2008 
Table A replaced 
for new 
companies by 
Model Articles 
UK Companies 
Act 2006 which 
came into effect 1 
October 2009 
2009 Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As Above As Above Table A replaced 
for new 
companies by 
Model Articles 
UK Companies 
Act 2006 which 
came into effect 1 
October 2009 
See Part 13 as per 
procedures for 
resolutions and 
meetings  
2010 Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As Above As Above Same as above 
2011  Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As Above As Above Same as above 
2012 Independent As Above As Above Same as above 
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nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
2013 Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As Above As Above Same as above 
 
TABLE B –AMENDED AND TRANSPOSED TO TABLE A 
Time 
Periods 
Number 
of Board 
members 
Number of 
Shareholders 
Applicable laws 
(Company laws) 
Statutory 
Instrument/By-
laws specific 
reference to 
management and 
control of 
companies 
(Table A/B- 
Outline of 
responsibilities of 
management and 
control) 
1845 - 
1865 
 7 and 
more?  
7 and more? 
1845 – 1909, one 
company dominated 
with up to 8 board 
members  
UK Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844 
UK Companies 
Clauses Consolidation 
Act 1845  
Table B 
Table B was 
changed to Table 
A under the UK 
Companies 
Act1862 
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UK Limited Liability 
Act 1855 
UK Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1856 
UK Companies Act 
1862 
UK Company Clauses 
Act 1863 
UK Company Seals 
Act 1864 
 
1865 - 
1885 
Variable Variable UK Companies Act 
1864 
amended/consolidated 
by UK Companies Act 
1867 
UK Company Clauses 
Act 1869 
UK Joint Stock 
Companies 
Arrangement Act 1870 
UK Companies Act 
1877 
UK Companies Act 
1879 
UK Companies Act 
1880 
UK Companies 
(Colonial Registers) 
Act 1883 
UK Companies Act 
1884 
 
1885 - 
1905 
Variable Variable UK Companies Act 
1884 
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amended/consolidated 
by Companies Act 
1886 
UK Companies 
Clauses Consolidation 
Act 1888 
UK Company Clauses 
Act 1889 
UK Companies 
(Memorandum of 
Association) Act 1890 
UK Companies 
(Winding-up) Act 1890 
UK Directors Liability 
Act 1890 
UK Companies 
(Winding-up) Act 1893 
1905 - 
1925 
Variable	   Variable	   UK Companies Acts 
1890/1893 amended by 
UK Companies Act 
1907 
UK Companies 
(Consolidation) Act 
1908 
Adaptation of 
Table A with 
relevance to the 
private company 
1925 - 
1945 
Variable	   Variable	   UK Companies Act 
1928  
UK Companies Act 
1929 
 
Adaptation of 
Table A with 
relevance to the 
private company 
1945 - 
1965 
Variable	   Variable	   UK Companies Act 
1947 
UK Companies Act 
1948 
Adaptation of 
Table A with 
relevance to the 
private company 
 
1965 - 
1985 
Minimum 
3 and 
Minimum 3 and UK Companies Act 
1948 
Adaptation of 
Table A with 
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variable	   variable	   amended/consolidated 
by UK Companies Act 
1967  
UK Companies Act 
1976 
relevance to the 
private company 
Company was 
amalgamated in 
1981 
1985 –  
2013 
 
Minimum 
3 and 
variable 
Gender 
diversity 
encourage 
Minimum 3 and 
variable  
Gender diversity 
encouraged – See 
Davies Report – Lord 
Davies of Aberscoch, 
CBE but for FTSE 
100 companies...May 
have been used as 
guidance for gender 
equality and 
inclusion on private 
unlisted companies 
UK Companies Act 
1976 
amended/consolidated 
by UK Companies Act 
1985 
* On or after 28 
April 2013 – 
Table A as Model 
Articles for 
private companies 
limited by shares  
Amendments to 
Model Articles by 
Mental Health 
(Discrimination) 
Act 2013 
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EXCERPT FROM THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY ON 
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MINIMUN REQUIREMENTS FOR APPROVAL AND CONTINIUNED APPROAVAL 
BY THE AUTHORITY 
DIRECTORS OF DOMESTIC REGULATED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(With particular reference to insurance companies and credit unions) 
 
 
EFFECTIVE: 15 MAY 2013 
The Authority expects that institutions will adopt the two-tier model in structuring their 
boards. Executive directors (including the CEO) will be employed in the organization on a 
day to day basis, while independent non-executive directors (including the Chairman), though 
forming the majority of the board, may have little day to day involvement in running the 
organization. A ratio of 2 Executive Directors to 3 Non-Executive directors, though not 
prescriptive, may be a useful guide for institutions to adopt. 
 
 
 
 
SEE OVERLEAF 
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CLIENTS MONEY FUNDED DUPREY’S PERSONAL NEEDS 
www.trinidadexpress.com/news/local/clients-money-funded-duprey-s-personal-
needs/article_f4b53cc8-1dc4-550b-a84f-dd586c7ab4e0.html - last accessed on 19 April 2018 
June 9, 2011 
Mark Fraser 
Money invested by CLICO policyholders and mutual fund investors was improperly used to 
fund the personal needs and lifestyle of Lawrence Duprey and other members of his family 
and his private companies. 
This is the assertion of the Central Bank in its Statement of Case, which was filed in the High 
Court on Tuesday. The Central Bank also stated that CLICO funding was used for the 
"pursuit of Mr Duprey's personal global ambitions". 
"Mr Duprey and Mr Monteil procured CLICO to fund unsuitable and high-risk projects in 
pursuit of Mr Duprey's personal global ambitions contrary to the interests of CLICO and its 
policyholders. These projects included real estate in Florida, acquisitions of European and 
Caribbean drinks companies, acquisitions of energy companies and ventures building 
methanol plants in the Caribbean and in the Gulf. The projects were characterised by little or 
no regard to the costs of borrowing, high leverage (because the bulk of money used was 
borrowed) and no, or no adequate, due diligence," it said. 
It said Duprey procured money from CLICO to fund his personal expenses and lifestyle in the 
form of "consultancy" fees, salary and bonuses. The Statement of Case said between 2001 
and 2008, it is currently estimated that he received direct payments from CLICO totalling 
TT$96.8 million. Through commission or other payments to DALCO (in which he had a 99 
per cent equity interest); it is currently estimated DALCO received payments and financial 
assistance totalling TT$468.9 million for the period 1997 to 2008, the Central Bank claimed. 
Other payments to other companies owned by him, for example included TT$15.2 million 
received by Sable Investment Company from CLICO for the period 1999 to 2008. 
The Central Bank asserts that Andre Monteil procured and assisted Mr Duprey in the 
diversion of money from CLICO for his own personal benefit in the form of: 
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1. Salary and discharge of liabilities (estimated to total TT$16.8 million between 2004 and 
2008. This despite the fact that he (Monteil) was no longer a director after 2/5/2005. 
2. "Consultancy fees" paid to him or his company, Stone Street, such as a payment of US$3.5 
million to CLF who paid it onto Mr Monteil or Stone Street. This was the fee for his role in 
executing the 2004 CIB ten per cent RBL (Republic Bank Ltd) shareholding purchase. There 
were also payments totalling at least US $1.1 million by CLICO to Stone Street for his role in 
the acquisition of the Jamaican spirits company (LDM). 
The Bank further stated that Mr Duprey and Mr Monteil procured CLICO fund for other 
companies which were used to make payments for their personal benefit, in particular to CL 
Financial (in which Dr Duprey and Mr Monteil had an interest either directly or via other 
entities); DALCO (in which Mr Duprey owned a 99 per cent shareholding) and DITL (in 
which DALCO was a 31 per cent shareholder). It added that such funding included the 
following: a transfer of TT$7.5 million to CLF which was used to part-fund a CLF dividend 
payment; on or around 19/5/2005 2) CLICO's placing of TT$22.5 million into a RBTT 
account which was transferred to CLF to fund CLF dividend payments on or around 1/2/06. 
Examining the Home Mortgage Bank transaction, the Central Bank noted that as a result of 
the February/March 2007 transaction, "the CIB loan of TT$78 million to Stone Street was 
caused to be financed by CLICO from the TT$100 million caused to be deposited by CLICO 
with CIB and consequently TT$78 million of the sale price of TT$110 million due to CLICO 
from Stone Street was indirectly caused to be financed by CLICO itself". "Neither the sale of 
the seven million HMB shares by CLICO to Stone Street nor the related deposit by CLICO of 
TT $100 million with CIB were authorised by CLICO, nor were such sale and deposit in the 
interests of CLICO," the Bank said. 
The Bank stated that Duprey exercised almost absolute control over CLICO as though it were 
his own unregulated company. He replaced CLICO's actuaries, Watson Wyatt, when it was 
not prepared to issue the normal actuarial certificate (refusing to let them meet with the 
CLICO board) and engaged Buck Consultants in 2001 which changed the basis on which the 
obligations to policyholders were valued, with the result that a surplus of policyholders' funds 
were reported on a companies act basis. 
	  
	  
	  
402	  
The Statement of Case also noted that Duprey dismissed the entire board of directors, apart 
from himself, in April 2005 and appointed a new board. "Before appointment of the new 
board, Duprey with the assistance of Monteil, Gita Sakal, caused to be effected a power of 
attorney which gave them absolute control over CLICO and its assets. For example, the 
power of attorney was used to divert RBL dividends due to CLICO to CLF during 2006 and 
2007 until its revocation on 16/6/07. Duprey did not disclose the existence of the power of 
attorney to the new board," the Statement of Case said. 
It added that Duprey generally ignored the board of directors and all normal corporate 
governance. "Board meetings of CLICO were few, rare and for many years non-existent. And 
Mr Duprey procured the commitment of CLICO to transactions without board approval. He 
procured the sale of CLICO's 17 per cent stake in CLICO Energy on 4.2.09 without 
disclosure to the CLICO board or the obtaining of its authority in the form of a board 
resolution," it noted. Reiterating that CLICO was not operated as regulated entity, the 
Statement of Case said Duprey and Monteil consistently failed to match the assets of CLICO 
with its liabilities and obligations to policyholders and investors; b. caused CLICO to invest 
in high-risk and speculative investments that were unsuitable, such as Florida real estate and 
high-risk debt (including with CLF and/or CIB); c. failed to manage risks adequately or at all; 
d. failed to ensure that there was adequate capital to meet liabilities to policyholders and 
investors and engaged in interest-free lending to CLF. 
The Statement quoted an e-mail sent by Mr Dziadyk of CLICO in 11.04.06, which stated: 
"Generally every risk known to man and then some are in CLICO's balance sheet... CLICO 
does not invest assets in support of its liabilities. The balance sheet is not managed. CLICO is 
an asset appreciation company; not much asset appreciation in 2005; and asset appreciation 
usually is in non-interest bearing intercompany or related party debt while liabilities 
continuously appreciate. CLICO is getting caught in the market cycle; asset values invariably 
fluctuate with cycles; but liabilities are impervious, which makes for an extremely dangerous 
combination". The Statement said Duprey and Monteil and /or CLF (CL Financial) each 
procured CLICO not to seek to recover sums owing to it from CLF and or/CIB and that 
CLICO accept fresh certificates of deposit in respect of principal and accumulated unpaid 
interest in relation to sums owing from CIB. 
It said CLICO's operation was grossly deficient and egregious in the following (and other) 
respects: the interests of policyholders and mutual fund investors were subordinated to the 
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interests (and demands) of others, in particular the private interests of Mr Duprey and Mr 
Monteil;) returns offered on products and related costs were excessive and unsustainable; 
CLICO's assets were improperly dealt with; CLICO was improperly exposed to liabilities 
unrelated to its interests; CLICO was improperly caused to provide an interest-free current 
account facility to CLF; assets were not matched to liabilities, in particular in order to 
generate the sums needed to pay the rates of return contractually due to policyholders and 
mutual fund investors. 
The Statement noted that over the years CLICO's assets and liabilities were misrepresented, 
misreported, and manipulated, including by related party transactions in order to conceal the 
deficit and increasing chasm in the statutory fund. The Statement of Case said Duprey and 
Monteil procured CLICO in act in breach of the Insurance Act and contrary to the interests of 
CLICO and its policyholders. Duprey (including on behalf of DALCO) and Monteil procured 
CLICO to pay commissioners or other consideration to himself or companies owned or 
controlled by him, contrary to the director benefit prohibition and/or the pecuniary interest 
prohibition, such as the US $3.5 million commission payment for the 2004 CIB ten per cent 
RBL shareholding purchase and the payments totalling US $1.1 million in respect of the 
LDM acquisition; Duprey and Monteil procured CLICO to make unsecured loans to CIB, 
such as the loan to CIB on 8.11.04 of US $163.3 million in connection with CIB's purchase of 
an additional ten per cent RBL shareholding in breach of the unsecured credit prohibition. 
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EXCERPTS FROM MINUTES OF CENTENARY CELEBRATIONS OF OLDEST 
ESTABLISHED COMPANY 
1845 - 1945, KINGSTOWN, ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 
(Named members of the meeting are listed) 
 
 
 
Extract: ”...being shareholders and workers in an organisation that has lasted for 
100 years and has during all that time period, maintained its good name and served 
the community faithfully and well through peace and war.  One the occasion of our 
Centenary Celebrations, we received quite a number of letters and cables from well 
wishers both here and abroad, and the pleasant entertainment we were able to offer 
our employees at Ratho Mill, and the dinner to certain of our competitors…” 
Source:  
Minutes of the John Hazells Sons and Company Limited 1845 - 1945 
Used with permission, CEO Joel Providence 2012 - 2013 
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APPENDIX 3 (2) 
 
COPY OF THE INDENTURE [SECTION] – REPORTEDLY A LEGAL 
CONTRACT FOR LOT 35 ON WHICH THE JOHN HAZELL SONS AND 
COMPANY CONSTRUCTED THE FIRST BUILDING 
(An agreement that indicates benefits and obligations to two or more parties. In 
bankruptcy law, this is a mortage or deed of trust and could constitute a claim against 
a debtor.) 
	  
	  
Source: Minutes of the John Hazells Sons and Company Limited 1845 - 1945 
Used with permission, CEO Joel Providence – 2012 - 2013 
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APPENDIX 3 (3)  
 
SECTIONS OF THE INDENTURE INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source 
: Coreas Hazells Inc - Accessed with permission on 28 September 2012 in St. Vincent - 
Through the kind permission of Managing Director - Mr. Joel Providence 
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APPENDIX 3 (4)  
 
DEED OF CONVEYANCE   
 
NB: A conveyance did occur when the owner of this real estate did transfer ownership in said 
proprety to another. Reportedly, an action was filed in the Supreme Court in 1845 and it does 
appear that the owner did transfer more than a portion of the ownership interest. It ws the 
conveyance of the title of the whole of the real estate that was in writing as it does appear 
that it involved a sale. This action gave rise to all that property at Lot 35 (current location of 
one subsidiary of (amalgamated Coreas Hazells Inc -) to be so conveyed as actual 
conveyance did occur when the holder of legal and equitable title expressed their intent to 
transfer title to the other person (interested party). Thereafter it was reportedly conveyed to 
John Hazell Sons and Company Limited (a company limited by shares). The records of the 
company indicated that it was so established as the First House – First company in the island 
of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Deed of conveyance was reportedly registered in 
1847. 
 
 
 
Source: 
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Coreas Hazells Inc - Accessed with permission on 28 September 2012 in SVG - Through the 
kind permission of Managing Director - Mr. Joel Providence – 2012 - 201 
 
APPENDIX 3 (5) 
NAMES OF SOME SHAREHOLDERS WHO ALSO SERVED AS DIRECTORS 
OF THE JOHN HAZELL SONS AND COMPANY LIMITED 
(TWO MEMBERS OF THE HAZELL FAMILY ARE MENTIONED)  
(NB : THERE WERE EIGHT SHAREHOLDERS ON RECORD - NAMES OF SOME OF 
SHAREHOLDERS MAY HAVE CHANGED DUE TO DEATH OR SALE OF SHARES BUT THE 
NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS WERE SUBJECT TO NO UPPER LIMIT ON MAXIMUM BUT 
NO LESS THAN TWO AS PER PREVAILING UK AND DOMESTIC COMPANY LEGISLATION) 
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Used by permission of Coreas Hazells Incorporated 
Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines - accessed 2012 - 2013 
 
APPENDIX 4(1) 
 
TABLE INDICATING TENURE OF DIRECTORS OF CLF (LIMITED 
LIABILITY HOLDING COMPANY 1993 - 2009) 
SEPTEMBER 2008 - JUNE 2009 
 
During the nine months under review from the table above, there were seven directors. One resigned in 
September 2008 while one was removed in the same month. Four months later, another resigned. 
Within four months of that resignation another director resigned. One month on and another resigned. 
During the period of April 2009 to June 2009 two directors were appointed and subsequently resigned 
within their three - month tenure. The high rate of resignation and or removal indicated among other 
things that management was quite unstable. This instability certainly put pressure on the conduct of 
affairs of the company as well as signalled to the shareholders that they were not in control. 
Names	  of	  
Directors	  
September	  
2008	  	  
October	  
2008	  
November	  
2008	  
December	  
2008	  
January	  
2009	  
February	  
2009	  
March	  
2009	  
April	  2009	  
May	  
2009	  
June	  
2009	  
L.	  Duprey	   Resigned	   x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   X	   x	   x	   X	  
B	  Branker	   Removed	   x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   X	   x	   x	   X	  
V	  
Ramlogan	  
x	   x	   x	   x	   Resigned	   x	   X	   x	   x	   X	  
R	  
Ramnarine	  
x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   X	   x	   Resigned	   X	  
R	  
Fullerton	  
x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   X	   x	   x	   Resigned	  
K	  King	   x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   X	   Appointed	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   Resigned	  
E	  
Hamilton	  
x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   x	   X	   Appointed	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   Resigned	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Source: Extracted from a number of records/articles/magazines as pre CL Financial Limited - 
2012 
 
 
APPENDIX 4(1A) 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLE 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO NEWS 
SPEECH BY MINISTER OF FINANCE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
http://www.trinidadandtobagonews.com/selfnews/viewnews.cgi?newsid1233372133,23367,.s
html - last accessed on 9 April, 2018 
Minister of Finance on CLICO's Bailout  
Posted: Friday, January 30, 2009 
 
Mr Chairman, Governor, Mr Duprey, members of the media. I would like to make a short 
statement with respect to this issue. Since the enactment of the Insurance Act over twenty-
eight (28) years ago, the Act has remained fundamentally unchanged. Over that period, 
however, the regulatory authority for insurance companies and pension funds shifted from the 
Ministry of Finance to the Central Bank, and in keeping with international standards and best 
practices, the Bank has been updating the regulatory framework governing licensed and 
registered financial institutions so as to maintain an effective, fair, safe and stable financial 
sector for the benefit and protection of policyholders. 
 
The insurance industry has adapted to the forces of globalization through continuous financial 
innovation, a blurring of the boundaries between its various sub-sectors (banks, insurance 
companies and other institutions) and through the adoption of new structures, including 
conglomerates and holding companies. Another major change over the past few years has 
been the cross-border expansion of our financial sector. Currently, locally-owned insurance 
companies operate throughout the English and Dutch-speaking Caribbean. The present 
international financial crisis also gives a new urgency to strengthen our regulatory system. 
While there are many reasons for the crisis, clearly one of them is inadequate risk 
management systems and lax regulation of financial institutions. We have seen over the past 
few years Insurance companies in Trinidad and Tobago getting more and more involved in 
innovative instruments which heightens the importance for having proper risk management 
policies and ensuring that good governance practices are in place. 
 
In the US, UK, Europe and the Far East countries, Governments have undertaken massive 
support and intervention programmes into various parts of their financial sectors and 
increasingly into their productive sectors. The strategies adopted by the world’s major 
governments were agreed to last October and set out clearly by the G20 group. These 
strategies centered around the intervention in the financial sectors, the strengthening of 
regulatory oversight over financial operations and the removal of the significant gaps in 
	  
	  
	  
411	  
regulatory oversight and capacity. 
 
In order to protect the interests of our citizens, The Central Bank and the Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago have maintained our commitment to maintain the integrity of the 
financial sector as a whole, and thus protect the interests of each of our citizens and our 
business community, whether it relates to savings, investments, loans and insurances, or any 
other kind of financial trust. More specifically, as we have heard previously, in the last 
fortnight it has become clear that a situation has arisen within the CL Financial Group which 
requires intervention by the Central Bank and, where necessary, the Government, into the 
operations of the financial institutions comprising the Group. 
 
The proposed action will be initiated with Clico Investment Bank (CIB) which is the 
institution over which the Central Bank currently has the greatest leverage under the new 
Financial Institutions Act. At the same time, the scope of the oversight will be broadened to 
include CLICO, the insurance entity, and British American Insurance Company. The 
proposed strategy for these institutions requires the Government to gain a degree of leverage 
over the operations of the holding company, CL Financial, in order to allow the orderly 
rationalization of assets and liabilities of the Group. Many of the Group’s transactions are 
interwoven, not only among and between the separate CL subsidiaries, but in almost all cases 
with the parent holding company. The wide scope of coverage and the sheer size of the Group 
mean that the Central Bank and the Government are particularly cautious about the potential 
impact of its financial problems. It is our assessment that the present circumstances may 
require not only an infusion of liquidity, but substantial additional steps undertaken for the 
express purpose of protecting the depositors and other liability holders of the Group, 
especially life insurance clients and pension fund beneficiaries. 
 
The Government supports the intended action of the Central Bank which we believe will 
permit an orderly restructuring of the institutions and safeguard the interests of our citizens 
who are depositors, insurance clients and pension fund members. Moreover, the Government 
and Central Bank have agreed to contract an international firm to assist in the restructuring of 
the companies along the lines agreed to by the Central Bank. To you, citizens of Trinidad and 
Tobago, many of whom may have a financial tie of one kind or another, to a greater or lesser 
degree, with the CL Financial companies, and all of whom are dependent on the financial 
institutions of our country, this is a time when we must show our mettle. This intervention is 
timely and thorough, and it is geared to 
protect, to the greatest extent possible, the jobs and the hard earned money of our citizens and 
commercial sector. I will keep you abreast of developments as they happen. 
 
I wish to reiterate this Government’s commitment to ensure that depositors’ assets will not be 
at risk. We are going to weather the storm. All of us, and the only way to do it is to take 
action swiftly and decisively. In this way our financial sector will remain healthy and our 
people will be able to depend on those systems, which are so integral to our present security 
and future prosperity. 
 
I Thank You. 
 
STATEMENT for the CIB/CLICO MEDIA CONFERENCE 
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Mrs Karen Nunez-Tesheira, Minister of Finance 
January 30 2009 
 
 
APPENDIX 4(1B) 
STATEMENT FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE 
CL FINANCIAL GROUP 
www.news.gov.tt/content/statement-office-attorney-general-cl-financial-
group#.WseYma2ZPaY - accessed on 19 August, 2015 and 2 April 2018 
 
 
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 
November 28, 2012:   
In January 2009 the then Government announced a major intervention into the affairs of the 
CL Financial Group. The intervention was premised upon the necessity to stem contagion and 
prevent economic collapse. 
For the first time there was a public admission and disclosure that CLICO was in financial 
difficulty. If CLICO had collapsed, it would have had a severe impact on the local economy 
and financial shockwaves would have reverberated throughout already fragile regional 
economies. 
Subsequent to this announcement, there appeared on the local press a series of articles, which 
made startling revelations and allegations and which suggested wanton financial irregularity 
and impropriety on the part of Directors and Executive Management of CLICO. The financial 
wheeling and dealing and unashamed transgression of the rudiments of proper corporate 
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governance that led to the collapse of this financial empire was laid bare in the public domain. 
Many, particularly our older citizens, and pensioners who had invested with CLICO to 
provide for the proverbial rainy day and their twilight years saw this financial collapse the 
spectre of financial ruin. The blatant and callous mismanagement jarred the national 
conscience and cried out for answers. 
It would have been incumbent on the law enforcement authorities to launch an immediate 
criminal investigation into the allegations of fraud and misconduct, which emerged, if only 
because certain documentary evidence accompanied the media stories and made the position 
more evident. 
By the time this government assumed office, almost 17 months would have elapsed since the 
sudden announcement of CLICO’s financial distress and the consequential revelations about 
the cavalier and reckless manner in which it allegedly conducted its business and affairs. The 
government considered the various options available to it. It could not direct a police 
investigation because it had no power to do so. In October 2010 the government announced 
the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry to enquire into the facts and circumstances that 
led to the collapse of CLICO. 
At the time, the government had the benefit of the experience of three high profile 
Commissions of Inquiry, namely (i) the Uff Commission of Inquiry into the construction 
sector (December 2008), (ii) the Annistine Sealy Commission into the Scarborough 
Hospital/Landate affair (2005) and (iii) the Bernard Commission of Inquiry into the 
construction of the Piarco Airport Terminal (2002). 
No concerns were then raised about the potential for compromising criminal investigations 
from the evidence, which publicly emerged from any of these Commissions. In the last of 
such Commissions, namely the Uff Commission, no concerns were raised in relation to 
investigations pertaining to Calder Hart. The Commission was allowed to fully probe Mr. 
Hart about his role in the massive cost overruns in several mega projects, and as well the 
allegation that he had improperly awarded lucrative contracts to a company owned by his 
brother-in-law, whom he claimed he did not know. The police investigations into that matter 
are still on going and 32 months later remain outstanding. The government has however 
initiated civil proceedings against Mr. Hart for breach of fiduciary duty and other related 
issues concerning his conduct while he held office. 
It is to be noted that the Piarco Inquiry, which began in August 2002, continued alongside the 
police investigation into the conduct of a former Prime Minister, certain government 
ministers and others. No concerns were expressed by the DPP about the potentially adverse 
impact, which the continuation of such inquiry would have had on the on-going police 
investigation, which had started in 2000. It should be noted that the Commission of Inquiry 
(COI) appointed in August 2002, Piarco No. 1 commenced in March 2002 and Piarco No. 2 
charges were laid on 17th May 2004. The fact that charges in Piarco no. 2 were laid in May 
2004 meant that investigations were taking place while the COI was in progress. 
Further, the Sealy Commission of Inquiry into the Landate affair, which probed the conduct 
of a government minister, resulted in no concerns being expressed by the DPP about the 
impact this inquiry could have had on any police investigation. That police investigation is 
continuing. 
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Police investigations often follow or occur as a result of the findings and recommendations of 
a Commission of Inquiry. Indeed they sometimes take place simultaneously (as in the case of 
Piarco Inquiry). 
The Commission of Inquiry is an important tool that can supplement and even complement a 
police investigation as the Commissioner has powers, which the police do not. 
Whilst the AG is happy with the announcement of a criminal investigation, he is mindful of 
the wider public interest in having the CLICO fiasco comprehensively examined and fully 
ventilated. The AG does not share the view that it is necessary for the Inquiry to be stopped at 
this stage. 
The position may have been different had criminal charges been laid and prosecution of 
someone about to start. 
The Sir Anthony Coleman Commission of Inquiry was appointed by the present government 
in the face of the silence and inaction on the part of law enforcement authorities as evidenced 
by the recent announcement of the commencement of a belated and long overdue criminal 
investigation. 
The available information in the public domain led to the inescapable conclusion that a 
criminal investigation was warranted and justified. The lack of urgency displayed was a cause 
for major concern. The collapse of CLICO has traumatized the nation and caused great 
distress, frustration and depression to many. The public interest therefore demanded swift 
action. 
The government cannot direct a police investigation. The State has however through the 
institution of the Central Bank commenced action against Lawrence Duprey and Andre 
Monteil seeking substantial sums of monies for misapplication and misappropriation of 
income and assets to the detriment of policyholders and investors. Sir Anthony Coleman is 
the Deputy Chief Justice in the Commercial Court of Dubai. He is a former Judge of the 
Commercial Court in the United Kingdom. He is a Queen’s Counsel of international repute 
and recognized as one of the finest minds in the field of commercial law. The on-going 
Coleman Inquiry is an independent Commission appointed by the President of the Republic. 
It has reached a critical stage and is about to examine crucial witnesses including Mr. 
Lawrence Duprey, Andre Monteil and a former Governor of the Central Bank. 
Sir Anthony has full and complete responsibility and control over this Inquiry. In the 
circumstances the Attorney General considers that it would be inappropriate, if not improper 
to pre-emptively advise the Commission how it should conduct its on-going inquiry. The 
Commissioner would no doubt address the concerns raised by the DPP and conduct the 
Inquiry in an appropriate manner. The independence of the Commission dictates that it alone 
should balance the competing principles of the necessity to protect the integrity of a criminal 
investigation with that of the continuity of the Inquiry in the public interest. 
The failure to initiate a criminal investigation before the appointment of this Commission of 
Inquiry was appointed is a matter of grave public concern and disappointment. This was the 
responsibility of the Commissioner of Police and not the DPP. 
The AG had raised the failure of the Police to Act in this matter with the former 
Commissioner of Police Dwayne Gibbs on several occasions to no avail. The AG is grateful 
for the intervention of the DPP in this matter. He did not need to intervene; he could have 
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remained in his Constitutional crease and simply await the report from the Police. His 
expertise is clearly required in this matter. The DPP has a duty to protect the integrity of any 
Criminal investigation because it could lead to criminal prosecution. The AG respects this. Sir 
Anthony equally has a duty to fulfil his mandate to inquire into the collapse of CLICO in the 
public interest.  
The AG is confident that the common goal of justice will guide both parties in their 
deliberations in this matter and hopeful that an amicable resolution can be found. 
There are many innovative options that are open to both parties to reach a reasonable 
compromise to ensure that the interests of both are protected and that these two considerations 
of equal importance are not jeopardized. For at the end of the day the DPP is a critical and 
indispensable part of the administration of justice which it is the AG's constitutional remit to 
oversee and each has to faithfully embrace and adhere to their respective roles. They should 
do so in tandem and in the spirit of service to the country. For its part the Government wishes 
to reaffirm its commitment to the pursuit of justice in the CLICO fiasco. It therefore remains 
willing to provide the necessary resources to finance a police investigation into the numerous 
allegations of fraud and wrongdoing in the CLICO fiasco. 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 5(1) 
MODEL ARTICLES FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES LIMITED BY SHARES 
REGISTERED ON OR AFTER 28 APRIL 2013 
     SCHEDULE 1    
         Regulation 2 
INDEX TO THE ARTICLES 
PART 1 
INTERPRETATION AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
	  
1. Defined terms 
2. Liability of members 
PART 2 
DIRECTORS 
DIRECTORS’ POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
3. Directors’ general authority 
4. Shareholders’ reserve power 
5. Directors may delegate 
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6. Committees 
DECISION-MAKING BY DIRECTORS 
7. Directors to take decisions collectively 
8. Unanimous decisions 
9. Calling a directors’ meeting 
10. Participation in directors’ meetings 
11. Quorum for directors’ meetings 
12. Chairing of directors’ meetings 
13. Casting vote 
14. Conflicts of interest 
15. Records of decisions to be kept 
16. Directors’ discretion to make further rules 
APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTORS 
17. Methods of appointing directors 
18. Termination of director’s appointment 
19. Directors’ remuneration 
20. Directors’ expenses 
PART 3 
SHARES AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
SHARES 
21. All shares to be fully paid up 
22. Powers to issue different classes of share 
23. Company not bound by less than absolute interests 
24. Share certificates 
25. Replacement share certificates 
26. Share transfers 
27. Transmission of shares 
28. Exercise of transmittees’ rights 
29. Transmittees bound by prior notices 
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DIVIDENDS AND OTHER DISTRIBUTIONS 
30. Procedure for declaring dividends 
31. Payment of dividends and other distributions 
32. No interest on distributions 
33. Unclaimed distributions 
34. Non-cash distributions 
35. Waiver of distributions 
CAPITALISATION OF PROFITS 
36. Authority to capitalise and appropriation of capitalised sums 
PART 4 
DECISION-MAKING BY SHAREHOLDERS 
ORGANISATION OF GENERAL MEETINGS 
37. Attendance and speaking at general meetings 
38. Quorum for general meetings 
39. Chairing general meetings 
40. Attendance and speaking by directors and non-shareholders 
41. Adjournment 
VOTING AT GENERAL MEETINGS 
42. Voting: general 
43. Errors and disputes 
44. Poll votes 
45. Content of proxy notices 
46. Delivery of proxy notices 
47. Amendments to resolutions 
PART 5 
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
48. Means of communication to be used 
49. Company seals 
50. No right to inspect accounts and other records 
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51. Provision for employees on cessation of business 
DIRECTORS’ INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE 
52. Indemnity 
53. Insurance 
PART 1 
INTERPRETATION AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
Defined terms 
1. In the articles, unless the context requires otherwise— 
“articles” means the company’s articles of association; 
“bankruptcy” includes individual insolvency proceedings in a jurisdiction other than 
England and Wales or Northern Ireland which have an effect similar to that of 
bankruptcy; 
“chairman” has the meaning given in article 12; 
“chairman of the meeting” has the meaning given in article 39; 
“Companies Acts” means the Companies Acts (as defined in section 2 of the Companies 
Act 2006), in so far as they apply to the company; 
“director” means a director of the company, and includes any person occupying the 
position of director, by whatever name called; 
“distribution recipient” has the meaning given in article 31; 
“document” includes, unless otherwise specified, any document sent or supplied in 
electronic form; 
“electronic form” has the meaning given in section 1168 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“fully paid” in relation to a share, means that the nominal value and any premium to be 
paid to the company in respect of that share have been paid to the company; 
“hard copy form” has the meaning given in section 1168 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“holder” in relation to shares means the person whose name is entered in the register of 
members as the holder of the shares; 
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“instrument” means a document in hard copy form; 
“ordinary resolution” has the meaning given in section 282 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“paid” means paid or credited as paid; 
“participate”, in relation to a directors’ meeting, has the meaning given in article 10; 
“proxy notice” has the meaning given in article 45; 
“shareholder” means a person who is the holder of a share; 
“shares” means shares in the company; 
“special resolution” has the meaning given in section 283 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“subsidiary” has the meaning given in section 1159 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“transmittee” means a person entitled to a share by reason of the death or bankruptcy of a 
shareholder or otherwise by operation of law; and 
“writing” means the representation or reproduction of words, symbols or other 
information in a visible form by any method or combination of methods, whether sent or 
supplied in electronic form or otherwise. 
Unless the context otherwise requires, other words or expressions contained in these articles 
bear the same meaning as in the Companies Act 2006 as in force on the date when these 
articles become binding on the company. 
Liability of members 
2.   The liability of the members is limited to the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares held 
by them. 
PART 2 
DIRECTORS 
DIRECTORS’ POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
Directors’ general authority 
 
3. Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s 
business, for which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company. 
Shareholders’ reserve power 
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4.—(1) The shareholders may, by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or refrain 
from taking, specified action. 
(2) No such special resolution invalidates anything which the directors have done before 
the passing of the resolution. 
Directors may delegate 
5.—(1) Subject to the articles, the directors may delegate any of the powers which are 
conferred on them under the articles— 
(a) to such person or committee; 
(b) by such means (including by power of attorney); 
(c) to such an extent; 
(d) in relation to such matters or territories; and 
(e) on such terms and conditions; 
as they think fit. 
(2) If the directors so specify, any such delegation may authorise further delegation of the 
directors’ powers by any person to whom they are delegated. 
(3) The directors may revoke any delegation in whole or part, or alter its terms and 
conditions. 
Committees 
6.—(1) Committees to which the directors delegate any of their powers must follow 
procedures which are based as far as they are applicable on those provisions of the articles 
which govern the taking of decisions by directors. 
(2) The directors may make rules of procedure for all or any committees, which prevail 
over rules derived from the articles if they are not consistent with them. 
DECISION-MAKING BY DIRECTORS 
Directors to take decisions collectively 
7.—(1) The general rule about decision-making by directors is that any decision of the 
directors must be either a majority decision at a meeting or a decision taken in  accordance 
with article 8. 
(2) If— 
(a) the company only has one director, and 
(b) no provision of the articles requires it to have more than one director, 
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the general rule does not apply, and the director may take decisions without regard to any of 
the provisions of the articles relating to directors’ decision-making. 
Unanimous decisions 
8.—(1) A decision of the directors is taken in accordance with this article when all eligible 
directors indicate to each other by any means that they share a common view on a matter. 
(2) Such a decision may take the form of a resolution in writing, copies of which have been 
signed by each eligible director or to which each eligible director has otherwise indicated 
agreement in writing. 
(3) References in this article to eligible directors are to directors who would have been 
entitled to vote on the matter had it been proposed as a resolution at a directors’ meeting. 
(4) A decision may not be taken in accordance with this article if the eligible directors would 
not have formed a quorum at such a meeting. 
Calling a directors’ meeting 
9.—(1) Any director may call a directors’ meeting by giving notice of the meeting to the 
directors or by authorising the company secretary (if any) to give such notice. 
(2) Notice of any directors’ meeting must indicate— 
(a) its proposed date and time; 
(b) where it is to take place; and 
(c) if it is anticipated that directors participating in the meeting will not be in the same 
place, how it is proposed that they should communicate with each other during the 
meeting. 
(3) Notice of a directors’ meeting must be given to each director, but need not be in writing. 
(4) Notice of a directors’ meeting need not be given to directors who waive their entitlement 
to notice of that meeting, by giving notice to that effect to the company not more than 7 days 
after the date on which the meeting is held. Where such notice is given after the meeting has 
been held, that does not affect the validity of the meeting, or of any business conducted at it. 
Participation in directors’ meetings 
10.—(1) Subject to the articles, directors participate in a directors’ meeting, or part of a 
directors’ meeting, when— 
(a) the meeting has been called and takes place in accordance with the articles, and 
(b) they can each communicate to the others any information or opinions they have on 
any particular item of the business of the meeting. 
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(2) In determining whether directors are participating in a directors’ meeting, it is irrelevant 
where any director is or how they communicate with each other. 
(3) If all the directors participating in a meeting are not in the same place, they may decide 
that the meeting is to be treated as taking place wherever any of them is. 
Quorum for directors’ meetings 
11.—(1) At a directors’ meeting, unless a quorum is participating, no proposal is to be voted 
on, except a proposal to call another meeting. 
(2) The quorum for directors’ meetings may be fixed from time to time by a decision of the 
directors, but it must never be less than two, and unless otherwise fixed it is two. 
(3) If the total number of directors for the time being is less than the quorum required, the 
directors must not take any decision other than a decision— 
(a) to appoint further directors, or 
(b) to call a general meeting so as to enable the shareholders to appoint further directors. 
Chairing of directors’ meetings 
12.—(1) The directors may appoint a director to chair their meetings. 
(2) The person so appointed for the time being is known as the chairman. 
(3) The directors may terminate the chairman’s appointment at any time. 
(4) If the chairman is not participating in a directors’ meeting within ten minutes of the time 
at which it was to start, the participating directors must appoint one of themselves to chair it. 
Casting vote 
13.—(1) If the numbers of votes for and against a proposal are equal, the chairman or other 
director chairing the meeting has a casting vote. 
(2) But this does not apply if, in accordance with the articles, the chairman or other director is 
not to be counted as participating in the decision-making process for quorum or voting 
purposes. 
Conflicts of interest 
14.—(1) If a proposed decision of the directors is concerned with an actual or proposed 
transaction or arrangement with the company in which a director is interested, that director is 
not to be counted as participating in the decision-making process for quorum or voting 
purposes. 
(2) But if paragraph (3) applies, a director who is interested in an actual or proposed 
transaction or arrangement with the company is to be counted as participating in the decision-
making process for quorum and voting purposes. 
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(3) This paragraph applies when— 
(a) the company by ordinary resolution disapplies the provision of the articles which 
would otherwise prevent a director from being counted as participating in the decision-
making process; 
(b) the director’s interest cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest; or 
(c) the director’s conflict of interest arises from a permitted cause. 
(4) For the purposes of this article, the following are permitted causes— 
(a) a guarantee given, or to be given, by or to a director in respect of an obligation 
incurred by or on behalf of the company or any of its subsidiaries; 
(b) subscription, or an agreement to subscribe, for shares or other securities of the 
company or any of its subsidiaries, or to underwrite, sub-underwrite, or guarantee 
subscription for any such shares or securities; and 
(c) arrangements pursuant to which benefits are made available to employees and 
directors or former employees and directors of the company or any of its subsidiaries 
which do not provide special benefits for directors or former directors. 
(5) For the purposes of this article, references to proposed decisions and decision-making 
processes include any directors’ meeting or part of a directors’ meeting. 
(6) Subject to paragraph (7), if a question arises at a meeting of directors or of a committee of 
directors as to the right of a director to participate in the meeting (or part of the meeting) for 
voting or quorum purposes, the question may, before the conclusion of the meeting, be 
referred to the chairman whose ruling in relation to any director other than the chairman is to 
be final and conclusive. 
(7) If any question as to the right to participate in the meeting (or part of the meeting) should 
arise in respect of the chairman, the question is to be decided by a decision of the directors at 
that meeting, for which purpose the chairman is not to be counted as participating in the 
meeting (or that part of the meeting) for voting or quorum purposes. 
Records of decisions to be kept 
15. The directors must ensure that the company keeps a record, in writing, for at least 10 
years from the date of the decision recorded, of every unanimous or majority decision taken 
by the directors. 
Directors’ discretion to make further rules 
16. Subject to the articles, the directors may make any rule which they think fit about how 
they take decisions, and about how such rules are to be recorded or communicated to 
directors. 
APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTORS 
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Methods of appointing directors 
17.—(1) Any person who is willing to act as a director, and is permitted by law to do so, may 
be appointed to be a director— 
(a) by ordinary resolution, or 
(b) by a decision of the directors. 
(2) In any case where, as a result of death, the company has no shareholders and no directors, 
the personal representatives of the last shareholder to have died have the right, by notice in 
writing, to appoint a person to be a director. 
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (2), where 2 or more shareholders die in circumstances 
rendering it uncertain who was the last to die, a younger shareholder is deemed to have 
survived an older shareholder. 
Termination of director’s appointment 
18. A person ceases to be a director as soon as— 
(a) that person ceases to be a director by virtue of any provision of the Companies Act 
2006 or is prohibited from being a director by law; 
(b) a bankruptcy order is made against that person; 
(c) a composition is made with that person’s creditors generally in satisfaction of that 
person’s debts; 
(d) a registered medical practitioner who is treating that person gives a written opinion to 
the company stating that that person has become physically or mentally incapable of 
acting as a director and may remain so for more than three months; 
(e) [paragraph omitted pursuant to The Mental Health (Discrimination) Act 2013] 
(f) notification is received by the company from the director that the director is resigning 
from office, and such resignation has taken effect in accordance with its terms. 
Directors’ remuneration 
19.—(1) Directors may undertake any services for the company that the directors decide. 
(2) Directors are entitled to such remuneration as the directors determine— 
(a) for their services to the company as directors, and 
(b) for any other service which they undertake for the company. 
(3) Subject to the articles, a director’s remuneration may— 
(a) take any form, and 
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(b) include any arrangements in connection with the payment of a pension, allowance or 
gratuity, or any death, sickness or disability benefits, to or in respect of that director. 
(4) Unless the directors decide otherwise, directors’ remuneration accrues from day to day. 
(5) Unless the directors decide otherwise, directors are not accountable to the company for 
any remuneration which they receive as directors or other officers or employees of the 
company’s subsidiaries or of any other body corporate in which the company is interested. 
Directors’ expenses 
20. The company may pay any reasonable expenses which the directors properly incur in 
connection with their attendance at— 
(a) meetings of directors or committees of directors, 
(b) general meetings, or 
(c) separate meetings of the holders of any class of shares or of debentures of the 
company, or otherwise in connection with the exercise of their powers and the discharge 
of their responsibilities in relation to the company. 
PART 3 
SHARES AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
SHARES 
All shares to be fully paid up 
21.—(1) No share is to be issued for less than the aggregate of its nominal value and any 
premium to be paid to the company in consideration for its issue. 
(2) This does not apply to shares taken on the formation of the company by the subscribers to 
the company’s memorandum. 
Powers to issue different classes of share 
22.—(1) Subject to the articles, but without prejudice to the rights attached to any existing 
share, the company may issue shares with such rights or restrictions as may be determined by 
ordinary resolution. 
(2) The company may issue shares which are to be redeemed, or are liable to be redeemed at 
the option of the company or the holder, and the directors may determine the terms, 
conditions and manner of redemption of any such shares. 
Company not bound by less than absolute interests 
23. Except as required by law, no person is to be recognised by the company as holding any 
share upon any trust, and except as otherwise required by law or the articles, the company is 
not in any way to be bound by or recognise any interest in a share other than the holder’s 
absolute ownership of it and all the rights attaching to it. 
Share certificates 
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24.—(1) The company must issue each shareholder, free of charge, with one or more 
certificates in respect of the shares which that shareholder holds. 
(2) Every certificate must specify— 
(a) in respect of how many shares, of what class, it is issued; 
(b) the nominal value of those shares; 
(c) that the shares are fully paid; and 
(d) any distinguishing numbers assigned to them. 
(3) No certificate may be issued in respect of shares of more than one class. 
(4) If more than one person holds a share, only one certificate may be issued in respect of it. 
(5) Certificates must— 
(a) have affixed to them the company’s common seal, or 
(b) be otherwise executed in accordance with the Companies Acts 
Replacement share certificates 
25.—(1) If a certificate issued in respect of a shareholder’s shares is— 
(a) damaged or defaced, or 
(b) said to be lost, stolen or destroyed, that shareholder is entitled to be issued with a 
replacement certificate in respect of the same shares. 
(2) A shareholder exercising the right to be issued with such a replacement certificate— 
(a) may at the same time exercise the right to be issued with a single certificate or 
separate certificates; 
(b) must return the certificate which is to be replaced to the company if it is damaged or 
defaced; and 
(c) must comply with such conditions as to evidence, indemnity and the payment of a 
reasonable fee as the directors decide. 
Share transfers 
26.—(1) Shares may be transferred by means of an instrument of transfer in any usual form or 
any other form approved by the directors, which is executed by or on behalf of the transferor. 
(2) No fee may be charged for registering any instrument of transfer or other document 
relating to or affecting the title to any share. 
(3) The company may retain any instrument of transfer which is registered. 
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(4) The transferor remains the holder of a share until the transferee’s name is entered in the 
register of members as holder of it. 
(5) The directors may refuse to register the transfer of a share, and if they do so, the 
instrument of transfer must be returned to the transferee with the notice of ref””usa””l unless 
they suspect that the proposed transfer may be fraudulent. 
Transmission of shares 
27.—(1) If title to a share passes to a transmittee, the company may only recognise the 
transmittee as having any title to that share. 
(2) A transmittee who produces such evidence of entitlement to shares as the directors may 
properly require— 
(a) may, subject to the articles, choose either to become the holder of those shares or to 
have them transferred to another person, and 
(b) subject to the articles, and pending any transfer of the shares to another person, has 
the same rights as the holder had. 
(3) But transmittees do not have the right to attend or vote at a general meeting, or agree to a 
proposed written resolution, in respect of shares to which they are entitled, by reason of the 
holder’s death or bankruptcy or otherwise, unless they become the holders of those shares. 
Exercise of transmittees’ rights 
28.—(1) Transmittees who wish to become the holders of shares to which they have become 
entitled must notify the company in writing of that wish. 
(2) If the transmittee wishes to have a share transferred to another person, the transmittee 
must execute an instrument of transfer in respect of it. 
(3) Any transfer made or executed under this article is to be treated as if it were made or 
executed by the person from whom the transmittee has derived rights in respect of the share, 
and as if the event which gave rise to the transmission had not occurred. 
Transmittees bound by prior notices 
29. If a notice is given to a shareholder in respect of shares and a transmittee is entitled to 
those shares, the transmittee is bound by the notice if it was given to the shareholder before 
the transmittee’s name has been entered in the register of members. 
DIVIDENDS AND OTHER DISTRIBUTIONS 
Procedure for declaring dividends 
30.—(1) The company may by ordinary resolution declare dividends, and the directors may 
decide to pay interim dividends. 
	  
	  
	  
428	  
(2) A dividend must not be declared unless the directors have made a recommendation as to 
its amount. Such a dividend must not exceed the amount recommended by the directors. 
(3) No dividend may be declared or paid unless it is in accordance with shareholders’ 
respective rights. 
(4) Unless the shareholders’ resolution to declare or directors’ decision to pay a dividend, or 
the terms on which shares are issued, specify otherwise, it must be paid by reference to each 
shareholder’s holding of shares on the date of the resolution or decision to declare or pay it. 
(5) If the company’s share capital is divided into different classes, no interim dividend may be 
paid on shares carrying deferred or non-preferred rights if, at the time of payment, any 
preferential dividend is in arrear. 
(6) The directors may pay at intervals any dividend payable at a fixed rate if it appears to 
them that the profits available for distribution justify the payment. 
(7) If the directors act in good faith, they do not incur any liability to the holders of shares 
conferring preferred rights for any loss they may suffer by the lawful payment of an interim 
dividend on shares with deferred or non-preferred rights. 
Payment of dividends and other distributions 
31.—(1) Where a dividend or other sum which is a distribution is payable in respect of a 
share, it must be paid by one or more of the following means— 
(a) transfer to a bank or building society account specified by the distribution recipient 
either in writing or as the directors may otherwise decide; 
(b) sending a cheque made payable to the distribution recipient by post to the distribution 
recipient at the distribution recipient’s registered address (if the distribution recipient is a 
holder of the share), or (in any other case) to an address specified by the distribution 
recipient either in writing or as the directors may otherwise decide; 
(c) sending a cheque made payable to such person by post to such person at such address 
as the distribution recipient has specified either in writing or as the directors may 
otherwise decide; or 
(d) any other means of payment as the directors agree with the distribution recipient 
either in writing or by such other means as the directors decide. 
(2) In the articles, “the distribution recipient” means, in respect of a share in respect of which 
a dividend or other sum is payable— 
(a) the holder of the share; or 
(b) if the share has two or more joint holders, whichever of them is named first in the 
register of members; or 
(c) if the holder is no longer entitled to the share by reason of death or bankruptcy, or 
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otherwise by operation of law, the transmittee. 
No interest on distribution 
32. The company may not pay interest on any dividend or other sum payable in respect of a 
share unless otherwise provided by— 
(a) the terms on which the share was issued, or 
(b) the provisions of another agreement between the holder of that share and the 
company. 
Unclaimed distributions 
33.—(1) All dividends or other sums which are— 
(a) payable in respect of shares, and 
(b) unclaimed after having been declared or become payable, 
may be invested or otherwise made use of by the directors for the benefit of the company 
until claimed. 
(2) The payment of any such dividend or other sum into a separate account does not make the 
company a trustee in respect of it. 
(3) If— 
(a) twelve years have passed from the date on which a dividend or other sum became due 
for payment, and 
(b) the distribution recipient has not claimed it, 
the distribution recipient is no longer entitled to that dividend or other sum and it ceases to 
remain owing by the company. 
Non-cash distributions 
34.—(1) Subject to the terms of issue of the share in question, the company may, by ordinary 
resolution on the recommendation of the directors, decide to pay all or part of a dividend or 
other distribution payable in respect of a share by transferring non-cash assets of equivalent 
value (including, without limitation, shares or other securities in any company). 
(2) For the purposes of paying a non-cash distribution, the directors may make whatever 
arrangements they think fit, including, where any difficulty arises regarding the distribution— 
(a) fixing the value of any assets; 
(b) paying cash to any distribution recipient on the basis of that value in order to adjust 
the rights of recipients; and 
(c) vesting any assets in trustees. 
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Waiver of distributions 
35. Distribution recipients may waive their entitlement to a dividend or other distribution 
payable in respect of a share by giving the company notice in writing to that effect, but if— 
(a) the share has more than one holder, or 
(b) more than one person is entitled to the share, whether by reason of the death or 
bankruptcy of one or more joint holders, or otherwise,  
the notice is not effective unless it is expressed to be given, and signed, by all the holders or 
persons otherwise entitled to the share. 
CAPITALISATION OF PROFITS 
Authority to capitalise and appropriation of capitalised sums 
36.—(1) Subject to the articles, the directors may, if they are so authorised by an ordinary 
resolution— 
(a) decide to capitalise any profits of the company (whether or not they are available for 
distribution) which are not required for paying a preferential dividend, or any sum 
standing to the credit of the company’s share premium account or capital redemption 
reserve; and 
(b) appropriate any sum which they so decide to capitalise (a “capitalised sum”) to the 
persons who would have been entitled to it if it were distributed by way of dividend (the 
“persons entitled”) and in the same proportions. 
(2) Capitalised sums must be applied— 
(a) on behalf of the persons entitled, and 
(b) in the same proportions as a dividend would have been distributed to them. 
(3) Any capitalised sum may be applied in paying up new shares of a nominal amount equal 
to the capitalised sum which are then allotted credited as fully paid to the persons entitled or 
as they may direct. 
(4) A capitalised sum which was appropriated from profits available for distribution may be 
applied in paying up new debentures of the company which are then allotted credited as fully 
paid to the persons entitled or as they may direct. 
(5) Subject to the articles the directors may— 
(a) apply capitalised sums in accordance with paragraphs (3) and (4) partly in one way 
and partly in another; 
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(b) make such arrangements as they think fit to deal with shares or debentures becoming 
distributable in fractions under this article (including the issuing of fractional certificates 
or the making of cash payments); and 
(c) authorise any person to enter into an agreement with the company on behalf of all the 
persons entitled which is binding on them in respect of the allotment of shares and 
debentures to them under this article. 
PART 4 
DECISION-MAKING BY SHAREHOLDERS 
ORGANISATION OF GENERAL MEETINGS 
Attendance and speaking at general meetings 
37.—(1) A person is able to exercise the right to speak at a general meeting when that person 
is in a position to communicate to all those attending the meeting, during the meeting, any 
information or opinions which that person has on the business of the meeting. 
(2) A person is able to exercise the right to vote at a general meeting when— 
(a) that person is able to vote, during the meeting, on resolutions put to the vote at the 
meeting, and  
(b) that person’s vote can be taken into account in determining whether or not such 
resolutions are passed at the same time as the votes of all the other persons attending 
the meeting. 
(3) The directors may make whatever arrangements they consider appropriate to enable those 
attending a general meeting to exercise their rights to speak or vote at it. 
(4) In determining attendance at a general meeting, it is immaterial whether any two or more 
members attending it are in the same place as each other. 
(5) Two or more persons who are not in the same place as each other attend a general meeting 
if their circumstances are such that if they have (or were to have) rights to speak and vote at 
that meeting, they are (or would be) able to exercise them. 
 
Quorum for general meetings 
38. No business other than the appointment of the chairman of the meeting is to be transacted 
at a general meeting if the persons attending it do not constitute a quorum. 
Chairing general meetings 
39.—(1) If the directors have appointed a chairman, the chairman shall chair general meetings 
if present and willing to do so. 
(2) If the directors have not appointed a chairman, or if the chairman is unwilling to chair the 
meeting or is not present within ten minutes of the time at which a meeting was due to start— 
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(a) the directors present, or 
(b) (if no directors are present), the meeting, 
must appoint a director or shareholder to chair the meeting, and the appointment of the 
chairman of the meeting must be the first business of the meeting. 
(3) The person chairing a meeting in accordance with this article is referred to as “the 
chairman of the meeting”. 
Attendance and speaking by directors and non-shareholders 
40.—(1) Directors may attend and speak at general meetings, whether or not they are 
shareholders. 
(2) The chairman of the meeting may permit other persons who are not— 
(a) shareholders of the company, or 
(b) otherwise entitled to exercise the rights of shareholders in relation to general 
meetings, 
to attend and speak at a general meeting. 
Adjournment 
41.—(1) If the persons attending a general meeting within half an hour of the time at which 
the meeting was due to start do not constitute a quorum, or if during a meeting a quorum 
ceases to be present, the chairman of the meeting must adjourn it. 
(2) The chairman of the meeting may adjourn a general meeting at which a quorum is present 
if— 
(a) the meeting consents to an adjournment, or 
(b) it appears to the chairman of the meeting that an adjournment is necessary to protect 
the safety of any person attending the meeting or ensure that the business of the meeting 
is conducted in an orderly manner. 
(3) The chairman of the meeting must adjourn a general meeting if directed to do so by the 
meeting. 
(4) When adjourning a general meeting, the chairman of the meeting must— 
(a) either specify the time and place to which it is adjourned or state that it is to continue 
at a time and place to be fixed by the directors, and 
(b) have regard to any directions as to the time and place of any adjournment which have 
been given by the meeting. 
	  
	  
	  
433	  
(5) If the continuation of an adjourned meeting is to take place more than 14 days after it was 
adjourned, the company must give at least 7 clear days’ notice of it (that is, excluding the day 
of the adjourned meeting and the day on which the notice is given)— 
(a) to the same persons to whom notice of the company’s general meetings is required to 
be given, and 
(b) containing the same information which such notice is required to contain. 
(6) No business may be transacted at an adjourned general meeting which could not properly 
have been transacted at the meeting if the adjournment had not taken place. 
VOTING AT GENERAL MEETINGS 
Voting: general 
42. A resolution put to the vote of a general meeting must be decided on a show of hands 
unless a poll is duly demanded in accordance with the articles. 
Errors and disputes 
 
43.—(1) No objection may be raised to the qualification of any person voting at a general 
meeting except at the meeting or adjourned meeting at which the vote objected to is tendered, 
and every vote not disallowed at the meeting is valid. 
(2) Any such objection must be referred to the chairman of the meeting, whose decision is 
final. 
Poll votes 
44.—(1) A poll on a resolution may be demanded— 
(a) in advance of the general meeting where it is to be put to the vote, or 
(b) at a general meeting, either before a show of hands on that resolution or immediately 
after the result of a show of hands on that resolution is declared. 
(2) A poll may be demanded by— 
(a) the chairman of the meeting; 
(b) the directors; 
(c) two or more persons having the right to vote on the resolution; or 
(d) a person or persons representing not less than one tenth of the total voting rights of 
all the shareholders having the right to vote on the resolution. 
(3) A demand for a poll may be withdrawn if— 
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(a) the poll has not yet been taken, and 
(b) the chairman of the meeting consents to the withdrawal. 
(4) Polls must be taken immediately and in such manner as the chairman of the meeting 
directs. 
Content of proxy notices 
45.—(1) Proxies may only validly be appointed by a notice in writing (a “proxy notice”) 
which— 
(a) states the name and address of the shareholder appointing the proxy; 
(b) identifies the person appointed to be that shareholder’s proxy and the general meeting 
in relation to which that person is appointed; 
(c) is signed by or on behalf of the shareholder appointing the proxy, or is authenticated 
in such manner as the directors may determine; and 
(d) is delivered to the company in accordance with the articles and any instructions 
contained in the notice of the general meeting to which they relate. 
(2) The company may require proxy notices to be delivered in a particular form, and may 
specify different forms for different purposes. 
(3) Proxy notices may specify how the proxy appointed under them is to vote (or that the 
proxy is to abstain from voting) on one or more resolutions. 
(4) Unless a proxy notice indicates otherwise, it must be treated as— 
(a) allowing the person appointed under it as a proxy discretion as to how to vote on any 
ancillary or procedural resolutions put to the meeting, and 
(b) appointing that person as a proxy in relation to any adjournment of the general 
meeting to which it relates as well as the meeting itself. 
Delivery of proxy notices 
46.—(1) A person who is entitled to attend, speak or vote (either on a show of hands or on a 
poll) at a general meeting remains so entitled in respect of that meeting or any adjournment of 
it, even though a valid proxy notice has been delivered to the company by or on behalf of that 
person. 
(2) An appointment under a proxy notice may be revoked by delivering to the company a 
notice in writing given by or on behalf of the person by whom or on whose behalf the proxy 
notice was given  
(3) A notice revoking a proxy appointment only takes effect if it is delivered before the start 
of the meeting or adjourned meeting to which it relates. 
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(4) If a proxy notice is not executed by the person appointing the proxy it must be 
accompanied by written evidence of the authority of the person who executed it to execute it 
on the appointor’s behalf. 
Amendments to resolutions 
47.—(1) An ordinary resolution to be proposed at a general meeting may be amended by 
ordinary resolution if— 
(a) notice of the proposed amendment is given to the company in writing by a person 
entitled to vote at the general meeting at which it is to be proposed not less than 48 hours 
before the meeting is to take place (or such later time as the chairman of the meeting 
may determine), and  
(b) the proposed amendment does not, in the reasonable opinion of the chairman of the 
meeting, materially alter the scope of the resolution. 
(2) A special resolution to be proposed at a general meeting may be amended by ordinary 
resolution, if— 
(a) the chairman of the meeting proposes the amendment at the general meeting at which 
the resolution is to be proposed, and 
(b) the amendment does not go beyond what is necessary to correct a grammatical or 
other non-substantive error in the resolution. 
(3) If the chairman of the meeting, acting in good faith, wrongly decides that an amendment 
to a resolution is out of order, the chairman’s error does not invalidate the vote on that 
resolution. 
PART 5 
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
Means of communication to be used 
48.—(1) Subject to the articles, anything sent or supplied by or to the company under the 
articles may be sent or supplied in any way in which the Companies Act 2006 provides for 
documents or information which are authorised or required by any provision of that Act to be 
sent or supplied by or to the company. 
(2) Subject to the articles, any notice or document to be sent or supplied to a director in 
connection with the taking of decisions by directors may also be sent or supplied by the 
means by which that director has asked to be sent or supplied with such notices or documents 
for the time being. 
(3) A director may agree with the company that notices or documents sent to that director in a 
particular way are to be deemed to have been received within a specified time of their being 
sent, and for the specified time to be less than 48 hours. 
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Company seals 
 
49.—(1) Any common seal may only be used by the authority of the directors. 
(2) The directors may decide by what means and in what form any common seal is to be used. 
(3) Unless otherwise decided by the directors, if the company has a common seal and it is 
affixed to a document, the document must also be signed by at least one authorised person in 
the presence of a witness who attests the signature. 
(4) For the purposes of this article, an authorised person is— 
(a) any director of the company; 
(b) the company secretary (if any); or 
(c) any person authorised by the directors for the purpose of signing documents to which 
the common seal is applied. 
No right to inspect accounts and other records 
50. Except as provided by law or authorised by the directors or an ordinary resolution of the 
company, no person is entitled to inspect any of the company’s accounting or other records or 
documents merely by virtue of being a shareholder. 
Provision for employees on cessation of business 
51. The directors may decide to make provision for the benefit of persons employed or 
formerly employed by the company or any of its subsidiaries (other than a director or former 
director or shadow director) in connection with the cessation or transfer to any person of the 
whole or part of the undertaking of the company or that subsidiary. 
DIRECTORS’ INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE 
Indemnity 
52.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a relevant director of the company or an associated 
company may be indemnified out of the company’s assets against— 
(a) any liability incurred by that director in connection with any negligence, default, 
breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company or an associated company, 
(b) any liability incurred by that director in connection with the activities of the company 
or an associated company in its capacity as a trustee of an occupational pension scheme 
(as defined in section 235(6) of the Companies Act 2006), 
(c) any other liability incurred by that director as an officer of the company or an 
associated company. 
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(2) This article does not authorise any indemnity which would be prohibited or rendered void 
by any provision of the Companies Acts or by any other provision of law. 
(3) In this article— 
(a) companies are associated if one is a subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of 
the same body corporate, and 
(b) a “relevant director” means any director or former director of the company or an 
associated company. 
Insurance 
53.—(1) The directors may decide to purchase and maintain insurance, at the expense of the 
company, for the benefit of any relevant director in respect of any relevant loss. 
(2) In this article— 
(a) a “relevant director” means any director or former director of the company or an 
associated company, 
(b) a “relevant loss” means any loss or liability which has been or may be incurred by a 
relevant director in connection with that director’s duties or powers in relation to the 
company, any associated company or any pension fund or employees’ share scheme of 
the company or associated company, and 
(c) companies are associated if one is a subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of 
the same body corporate. 
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51. Provision for employees on cessation of business 
DIRECTORS’ INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE 
52. Indemnity 
53. Insurance 
PART 1 
INTERPRETATION AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
Defined terms 
1. In the articles, unless the context requires otherwise— 
“articles” means the company’s articles of association; 
“bankruptcy” includes individual insolvency proceedings in a jurisdiction other than 
England and Wales or Northern Ireland which have an effect similar to that of 
bankruptcy; 
“chairman” has the meaning given in article 12; 
“chairman of the meeting” has the meaning given in article 39; 
“Companies Acts” means the Companies Acts (as defined in section 2 of the Companies 
Act 2006), in so far as they apply to the company; 
“director” means a director of the company, and includes any person occupying the 
position of director, by whatever name called; 
“distribution recipient” has the meaning given in article 31; 
“document” includes, unless otherwise specified, any document sent or supplied in 
electronic form; 
“electronic form” has the meaning given in section 1168 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“fully paid” in relation to a share, means that the nominal value and any premium to be 
paid to the company in respect of that share have been paid to the company; 
“hard copy form” has the meaning given in section 1168 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“holder” in relation to shares means the person whose name is entered in the register of 
members as the holder of the shares; 
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“instrument” means a document in hard copy form; 
“ordinary resolution” has the meaning given in section 282 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“paid” means paid or credited as paid; 
“participate”, in relation to a directors’ meeting, has the meaning given in article 10; 
“proxy notice” has the meaning given in article 45; 
“shareholder” means a person who is the holder of a share; 
“shares” means shares in the company; 
“special resolution” has the meaning given in section 283 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“subsidiary” has the meaning given in section 1159 of the Companies Act 2006; 
“transmittee” means a person entitled to a share by reason of the death or bankruptcy of a 
shareholder or otherwise by operation of law; and 
“writing” means the representation or reproduction of words, symbols or other 
information in a visible form by any method or combination of methods, whether sent or 
supplied in electronic form or otherwise. 
Unless the context otherwise requires, other words or expressions contained in these articles 
bear the same meaning as in the Companies Act 2006 as in force on the date when these 
articles become binding on the company. 
 
Liability of members 
 
2.   The liability of the members is limited to the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares held 
by them. 
PART 2 
DIRECTORS 
DIRECTORS’ POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Directors’ general authority 
3. Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s 
business, for which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company. 
Shareholders’ reserve power 
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4.—(1) The shareholders may, by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or refrain 
from taking, specified action. 
(2) No such special resolution invalidates anything , which the directors have done 
before the passing of the resolution 
Directors may delegate 
5.—(1) Subject to the articles, the directors may delegate any of the powers which are 
conferred on them under the articles— 
(a) to such person or committee; 
(b) by such means (including by power of attorney); 
(c) to such an extent; 
(d) in relation to such matters or territories; and 
(e) on such terms and conditions; 
as they think fit. 
(2) If the directors so specify, any such delegation may authorise further delegation of the 
directors’ powers by any person to whom they are delegated. 
(3) The directors may revoke any delegation in whole or part, or alter its terms and 
conditions. 
 
Committees 
 
6.—(1) Committees to which the directors delegate any of their powers must follow 
procedures which are based as far as they are applicable on those provisions of the articles 
which govern the taking of decisions by directors. 
(2) The directors may make rules of procedure for all or any committees, which prevail 
over rules derived from the articles if they are not consistent with them. 
DECISION-MAKING BY DIRECTORS 
Directors to take decisions collectively 
7.—(1) The general rule about decision-making by directors is that any decision of the 
directors must be either a majority decision at a meeting or a decision taken in  accordance 
with article 8. 
(2) If— 
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(a) the company only has one director, and 
(b) no provision of the articles requires it to have more than one director, 
the general rule does not apply, and the director may take decisions without regard to any of 
the provisions of the articles relating to directors’ decision-making. 
Unanimous decisions 
8.—(1) A decision of the directors is taken in accordance with this article when all eligible 
directors indicate to each other by any means that they share a common view on a matter. 
(2) Such a decision may take the form of a resolution in writing, copies of which have been 
signed by each eligible director or to which each eligible director has otherwise indicated 
agreement in writing. 
(3) References in this article to eligible directors are to directors who would have been 
entitled to vote on the matter had it been proposed as a resolution at a directors’ meeting. 
(4) A decision may not be taken in accordance with this article if the eligible directors would 
not have formed a quorum at such a meeting. 
Calling a directors’ meeting 
9.—(1) Any director may call a directors’ meeting by giving notice of the meeting to the 
directors or by authorising the company secretary (if any) to give such notice. 
(2) Notice of any directors’ meeting must indicate— 
(a) its proposed date and time; 
(b) where it is to take place; and 
(c) if it is anticipated that directors participating in the meeting will not be in the same 
place, how it is proposed that they should communicate with each other during the 
meeting. 
(3) Notice of a directors’ meeting must be given to each director, but need not be in writing. 
(4) Notice of a directors’ meeting need not be given to directors who waive their entitlement 
to notice of that meeting, by giving notice to that effect to the company not more than 7 days 
after the date on which the meeting is held. Where such notice is given after the meeting has 
been held, that does not affect the validity of the meeting, or of any business conducted at it. 
Participation in directors’ meetings 
10.—(1) Subject to the articles, directors participate in a directors’ meeting, or part of a 
directors’ meeting, when— 
(a) the meeting has been called and takes place in accordance with the articles, and 
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(b) they can each communicate to the others any information or opinions they have on 
any particular item of the business of the meeting. 
(2) In determining whether directors are participating in a directors’ meeting, it is irrelevant 
where any director is or how they communicate with each other. 
(3) If all the directors participating in a meeting are not in the same place, they may decide 
that the meeting is to be treated as taking place wherever any of them is. 
Quorum for directors’ meetings 
11.—(1) At a directors’ meeting, unless a quorum is participating, no proposal is to be voted 
on, except a proposal to call another meeting. 
(2) The quorum for directors’ meetings may be fixed from time to time by a decision of the 
directors, but it must never be less than two, and unless otherwise fixed it is two. 
(3) If the total number of directors for the time being is less than the quorum required, the 
directors must not take any decision other than a decision— 
(a) to appoint further directors, or 
(b) to call a general meeting so as to enable the shareholders to appoint further directors. 
 
Chairing of directors’ meetings 
12.—(1) The directors may appoint a director to chair their meetings. 
(2) The person so appointed for the time being is known as the chairman. 
(3) The directors may terminate the chairman’s appointment at any time. 
(4) If the chairman is not participating in a directors’ meeting within ten minutes of the time 
at which it was to start, the participating directors must appoint one of themselves to chair it. 
Casting vote 
13.—(1) If the numbers of votes for and against a proposal are equal, the chairman or other 
director chairing the meeting has a casting vote. 
(2) But this does not apply if, in accordance with the articles, the chairman or other director is 
not to be counted as participating in the decision-making process for quorum or voting 
purposes. 
Conflicts of interest 
14.—(1) If a proposed decision of the directors is concerned with an actual or proposed 
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transaction or arrangement with the company in which a director is interested, that director is 
not to be counted as participating in the decision-making process for quorum or voting 
purposes. 
(2) But if paragraph (3) applies, a director who is interested in an actual or proposed 
transaction or arrangement with the company is to be counted as participating in the decision-
making process for quorum and voting purposes. 
(3) This paragraph applies when— 
(a) the company by ordinary resolution disapplies the provision of the articles which 
would otherwise prevent a director from being counted as participating in the decision-
making process; 
(b) the director’s interest cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest; or 
(c) the director’s conflict of interest arises from a permitted cause. 
(4) For the purposes of this article, the following are permitted causes— 
(a) a guarantee given, or to be given, by or to a director in respect of an obligation 
incurred by or on behalf of the company or any of its subsidiaries; 
(b) subscription, or an agreement to subscribe, for shares or other securities of the 
company or any of its subsidiaries, or to underwrite, sub-underwrite, or guarantee 
subscription for any such shares or securities; and 
(c) arrangements pursuant to which benefits are made available to employees and 
directors or former employees and directors of the company or any of its subsidiaries 
which do not provide special benefits for directors or former directors. 
(5) For the purposes of this article, references to proposed decisions and decision-making 
processes include any directors’ meeting or part of a directors’ meeting. 
(6) Subject to paragraph (7), if a question arises at a meeting of directors or of a committee of 
directors as to the right of a director to participate in the meeting (or part of the meeting) for 
voting or quorum purposes, the question may, before the conclusion of the meeting, be 
referred to the chairman whose ruling in relation to any director other than the chairman is to 
be final and conclusive. 
(7) If any question as to the right to participate in the meeting (or part of the meeting) should 
arise in respect of the chairman, the question is to be decided by a decision of the directors at 
that meeting, for which purpose the chairman is not to be counted as participating in the 
meeting (or that part of the meeting) for voting or quorum purposes. 
Records of decisions to be kept 
	  
	  
	  
446	  
15. The directors must ensure that the company keeps a record, in writing, for at least 10 
years from the date of the decision recorded, of every unanimous or majority decision taken 
by the directors. 
Directors’ discretion to make further rules 
16. Subject to the articles, the directors may make any rule, which they think fit about how 
they take decisions, and about how such rules are to be recorded or communicated to 
directors. 
APPOINTMENT OF DIRECTOR 
Methods of appointing directors 
17.—(1) Any person who is willing to act as a director, and is permitted by law to do so, may 
be appointed to be a director— 
(a) by ordinary resolution, or 
(b) by a decision of the directors. 
(2) In any case where, as a result of death, the company has no shareholders and no directors, 
the personal representatives of the last shareholder to have died have the right, by notice in 
writing, to appoint a person to be a director. 
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (2), where 2 or more shareholders die in circumstances 
rendering it uncertain who was the last to die, a younger shareholder is deemed to have 
survived an older shareholder. 
Termination of director’s appointment 
18. A person ceases to be a director as soon as— 
(a) that person ceases to be a director by virtue of any provision of the Companies Act 
2006 or is prohibited from being a director by law; 
(b) a bankruptcy order is made against that person; 
(c) a composition is made with that person’s creditors generally in satisfaction of that 
person’s debts; 
(d) a registered medical practitioner who is treating that person gives a written opinion to 
the company stating that that person has become physically or mentally incapable of 
acting as a director and may remain so for more than three months; 
(e) by reason of that person’s mental health, a court makes an order which wholly or 
partly prevents that person from personally exercising any powers or rights which that 
person would otherwise have; 
	  
	  
	  
447	  
(f) notification is received by the company from the director that the director is resigning 
from office, and such resignation has taken effect in accordance with its terms. 
Directors’ remuneration 
19.—(1) Directors may undertake any services for the company that the directors decide. 
(2) Directors are entitled to such remuneration as the directors determine— 
(a) for their services to the company as directors, and 
(b) for any other service which they undertake for the company. 
(3) Subject to the articles, a director’s remuneration may— 
(a) take any form, and 
(b) include any arrangements in connection with the payment of a pension, allowance or 
gratuity, or any death, sickness or disability benefits, to or in respect of that director. 
(4) Unless the directors decide otherwise, directors’ remuneration accrues from day to day. 
(5) Unless the directors decide otherwise, directors are not accountable to the company for 
any remuneration which they receive as directors or other officers or employees of the 
company’s subsidiaries or of any other body corporate in which the company is interested. 
Directors’ expenses 
20. The company may pay any reasonable expenses which the directors properly incur in 
connection with their attendance at— 
(a) meetings of directors or committees of directors, 
(b) general meetings, or 
(c) separate meetings of the holders of any class of shares or of debentures of the 
company, or otherwise in connection with the exercise of their powers and the discharge 
of their responsibilities in relation to the company. 
PART 3 
SHARES AND DISTRIBUTIONS 
SHARES 
All shares to be fully paid up 
21.—(1) No share is to be issued for less than the aggregate of its nominal value and any 
premium to be paid to the company in consideration for its issue. 
(2) This does not apply to shares taken on the formation of the company by the subscribers to 
the company’s memorandum. 
Powers to issue different classes of share 
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22.—(1) Subject to the articles, but without prejudice to the rights attached to any existing 
share, the company may issue shares with such rights or restrictions as may be determined by 
ordinary resolution. 
(2) The company may issue shares which are to be redeemed, or are liable to be redeemed at 
the option of the company or the holder, and the directors may determine the terms, 
conditions and manner of redemption of any such shares. 
Company not bound by less than absolute interests 
23. Except as required by law, no person is to be recognised by the company as holding any 
share upon any trust, and except as otherwise required by law or the articles, the company is 
not in any way to be bound by or recognise any interest in a share other than the holder’s 
absolute ownership of it and all the rights attaching to it. 
Share certificates 
24.—(1) The company must issue each shareholder, free of charge, with one or more 
certificates in respect of the shares which that shareholder holds. 
(2) Every certificate must specify— 
(a) in respect of how many shares, of what class, it is issued; 
(b) the nominal value of those shares; 
(c) that the shares are fully paid; and 
(d) any distinguishing numbers assigned to them. 
(3) No certificate may be issued in respect of shares of more than one class. 
(4) If more than one person holds a share, only one certificate may be issued in respect of it. 
(5) Certificates must— 
(a) have affixed to them the company’s common seal, or 
(b) be otherwise executed in accordance with the Companies Acts. 
Replacement share certificates 
25.—(1) If a certificate issued in respect of a shareholder’s shares is— 
(a) damaged or defaced, or 
(b) said to be lost, stolen or destroyed, that shareholder is entitled to be issued with a 
replacement certificate in respect of the same shares. 
(2) A shareholder exercising the right to be issued with such a replacement certificate— 
(a) may at the same time exercise the right to be issued with a single certificate or 
separate certificates; 
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(b) must return the certificate which is to be replaced to the company if it is damaged or 
defaced; and 
(c) must comply with such conditions as to evidence, indemnity and the payment of a 
reasonable fee as the directors decide. 
Share transfers 
26.—(1) Shares may be transferred by means of an instrument of transfer in any usual form or 
any other form approved by the directors, which is executed by or on behalf of the transferor. 
(2) No fee may be charged for registering any instrument of transfer or other document 
relating to or affecting the title to any share. 
(3) The company may retain any instrument of transfer which is registered. 
(4) The transferor remains the holder of a share until the transferee’s name is entered in the 
register of members as holder of it. 
(5) The directors may refuse to register the transfer of a share, and if they do so, the 
instrument of transfer must be returned to the transferee with the notice of ref””usa””l unless 
they suspect that the proposed transfer may be fraudulent. 
Transmission of shares 
27.—(1) If title to a share passes to a transmittee, the company may only recognise the 
transmittee as having any title to that share. 
(2) A transmittee who produces such evidence of entitlement to shares as the directors may 
properly require— 
(a) may, subject to the articles, choose either to become the holder of those shares or to 
have them transferred to another person, and 
(b) subject to the articles, and pending any transfer of the shares to another person, has 
the same rights as the holder had. 
(3) But transmittees do not have the right to attend or vote at a general meeting, or agree to a 
proposed written resolution, in respect of shares to which they are entitled, by reason of the 
holder’s death or bankruptcy or otherwise, unless they become the holders of those shares. 
Exercise of transmittees’ rights 
28.—(1) Transmittees who wish to become the holders of shares to which they have become 
entitled must notify the company in writing of that wish. 
(2) If the transmittee wishes to have a share transferred to another person, the transmittee 
must execute an instrument of transfer in respect of it. 
(3) Any transfer made or executed under this article is to be treated as if it were made or 
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executed by the person from whom the transmittee has derived rights in respect of the share, 
and as if the event which gave rise to the transmission had not occurred. 
Transmittees bound by prior notices 
 
29. If a notice is given to a shareholder in respect of shares and a transmittee is entitled to 
those shares, the transmittee is bound by the notice if it was given to the shareholder before 
the transmittee’s name has been entered in the register of members. 
DIVIDENDS AND OTHER DISTRIBUTIONS 
Procedure for declaring dividends 
30.—(1) The company may by ordinary resolution declare dividends, and the directors may 
decide to pay interim dividends. 
(2) A dividend must not be declared unless the directors have made a recommendation as to 
its amount. Such a dividend must not exceed the amount recommended by the directors. 
(3) No dividend may be declared or paid unless it is in accordance with shareholders’ 
respective rights. 
(4) Unless the shareholders’ resolution to declare or directors’ decision to pay a dividend, or 
the terms on which shares are issued, specify otherwise, it must be paid by reference to each 
shareholder’s holding of shares on the date of the resolution or decision to declare or pay it. 
(5) If the company’s share capital is divided into different classes, no interim dividend may be 
paid on shares carrying deferred or non-preferred rights if, at the time of payment, any 
preferential dividend is in arrear. 
(6) The directors may pay at intervals any dividend payable at a fixed rate if it appears to 
them that the profits available for distribution justify the payment. 
(7) If the directors act in good faith, they do not incur any liability to the holders of shares 
conferring preferred rights for any loss they may suffer by the lawful payment of an interim 
dividend on shares with deferred or non-preferred rights. 
Payment of dividends and other distributions 
31.—(1) Where a dividend or other sum which is a distribution is payable in respect of a 
share, it must be paid by one or more of the following means— 
(a) transfer to a bank or building society account specified by the distribution recipient 
either in writing or as the directors may otherwise decide; 
(b) sending a cheque made payable to the distribution recipient by post to the distribution 
recipient at the distribution recipient’s registered address (if the distribution recipient is a 
holder of the share), or (in any other case) to an address specified by the distribution 
recipient either in writing or as the directors may otherwise decide; 
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(c) sending a cheque made payable to such person by post to such person at such address 
as the distribution recipient has specified either in writing or as the directors may 
otherwise decide; or 
(d) any other means of payment as the directors agree with the distribution recipient 
either in writing or by such other means as the directors decide. 
(2) In the articles, “the distribution recipient” means, in respect of a share in respect of which 
a dividend or other sum is payable— 
(a) the holder of the share; or 
(b) if the share has two or more joint holders, whichever of them is named first in the 
register of members; or 
(c) if the holder is no longer entitled to the share by reason of death or bankruptcy, or 
otherwise by operation of law, the transmittee. 
No interest on distributions 
32. The company may not pay interest on any dividend or other sum payable in respect of a 
share unless otherwise provided by— 
(a) the terms on which the share was issued, or 
(b) the provisions of another agreement between the holder of that share and the 
company. 
Unclaimed distributions 
33.—(1) All dividends or other sums which are— 
(a) payable in respect of shares, and 
(b) unclaimed after having been declared or become payable, 
may be invested or otherwise made use of by the directors for the benefit of the company 
until claimed. 
(2) The payment of any such dividend or other sum into a separate account does not make the 
company a trustee in respect of it. 
(3) If— 
(a) twelve years have passed from the date on which a dividend or other sum became due 
for payment, and 
(b) the distribution recipient has not claimed it, 
the distribution recipient is no longer entitled to that dividend or other sum and it ceases to 
remain owing by the company. 
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Non-cash distributions 
34.—(1) Subject to the terms of issue of the share in question, the company may, by ordinary 
resolution on the recommendation of the directors, decide to pay all or part of a dividend or 
other distribution payable in respect of a share by transferring non-cash assets of equivalent 
value (including, without limitation, shares or other securities in any company). 
(2) For the purposes of paying a non-cash distribution, the directors may make whatever 
arrangements they think fit, including, where any difficulty arises regarding the distribution— 
(a) fixing the value of any assets; 
(b) paying cash to any distribution recipient on the basis of that value in order to adjust 
the rights of recipients; and 
(c) vesting any assets in trustees. 
Waiver of distributions 
35. Distribution recipients may waive their entitlement to a dividend or other distribution 
payable in respect of a share by giving the company notice in writing to that effect, but if— 
(a) the share has more than one holder, or 
(b) more than one person is entitled to the share, whether by reason of the death or 
bankruptcy of one or more joint holders, or otherwise,  
the notice is not effective unless it is expressed to be given, and signed, by all the holders or 
persons otherwise entitled to the share. 
CAPITALISATION OF PROFITS 
Authority to capitalise and appropriation of capitalised sums 
36.—(1) Subject to the articles, the directors may, if they are so authorised by an ordinary 
resolution— 
(a) decide to capitalise any profits of the company (whether or not they are available for 
distribution) which are not required for paying a preferential dividend, or any sum 
standing to the credit of the company’s share premium account or capital redemption 
reserve; and 
(b) appropriate any sum which they so decide to capitalise (a “capitalised sum”) to the 
persons who would have been entitled to it if it were distributed by way of dividend (the 
“persons entitled”) and in the same proportions. 
(2) Capitalised sums must be applied— 
(a) on behalf of the persons entitled, and 
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(b) in the same proportions as a dividend would have been distributed to them. 
(3) Any capitalised sum may be applied in paying up new shares of a nominal amount equal 
to the capitalised sum which are then allotted credited as fully paid to the persons entitled or 
as they may direct. 
(4) A capitalised sum which was appropriated from profits available for distribution may be 
applied in paying up new debentures of the company which are then allotted credited as fully 
paid to the persons entitled or as they may direct. 
(5) Subject to the articles the directors may— 
(a) apply capitalised sums in accordance with paragraphs (3) and (4) partly in one way 
and partly in another; 
(b) make such arrangements as they think fit to deal with shares or debentures becoming 
distributable in fractions under this article (including the issuing of fractional certificates 
or the making of cash payments); and 
(c) authorise any person to enter into an agreement with the company on behalf of all the 
persons entitled which is binding on them in respect of the allotment of shares and 
debentures to them under this article. 
PART 4 
DECISION-MAKING BY SHAREHOLDERS 
ORGANISATION OF GENERAL MEETINGS 
 
Attendance and speaking at general meetings 
37.—(1) A person is able to exercise the right to speak at a general meeting when that person 
is in a position to communicate to all those attending the meeting, during the meeting, any 
information or opinions which that person has on the business of the meeting. 
(2) A person is able to exercise the right to vote at a general meeting when— 
(a) that person is able to vote, during the meeting, on resolutions put to the vote at the 
meeting, and  
(b) that person’s vote can be taken into account in determining whether or not such 
resolutions are passed at the same time as the votes of all the other persons attending 
the meeting. 
(3) The directors may make whatever arrangements they consider appropriate to enable those 
attending a general meeting to exercise their rights to speak or vote at it. 
(4) In determining attendance at a general meeting, it is immaterial whether any two or more 
members attending it are in the same place as each other. 
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(5) Two or more persons who are not in the same place as each other attend a general meeting 
if their circumstances are such that if they have (or were to have) rights to speak and vote at 
that meeting, they are (or would be) able to exercise them. 
Quorum for general meetings 
 
38. No business other than the appointment of the chairman of the meeting is to be transacted 
at a general meeting if the persons attending it do not constitute a quorum. 
Chairing general meetings 
39.—(1) If the directors have appointed a chairman, the chairman shall chair general meetings 
if present and willing to do so. 
(2) If the directors have not appointed a chairman, or if the chairman is unwilling to chair the 
meeting or is not present within ten minutes of the time at which a meeting was due to start— 
(a) the directors present, or 
(b) (if no directors are present), the meeting, 
must appoint a director or shareholder to chair the meeting, and the appointment of the 
chairman of the meeting must be the first business of the meeting. 
(3) The person chairing a meeting in accordance with this article is referred to as “the 
chairman of the meeting”. 
Attendance and speaking by directors and non-shareholders 
40.—(1) Directors may attend and speak at general meetings, whether or not they are 
shareholders. 
(2) The chairman of the meeting may permit other persons who are not— 
(a) shareholders of the company, or 
(b) otherwise entitled to exercise the rights of shareholders in relation to general 
meetings, 
to attend and speak at a general meeting. 
Adjournment 
41.—(1) If the persons attending a general meeting within half an hour of the time at which 
the meeting was due to start do not constitute a quorum, or if during a meeting a quorum 
ceases to be present, the chairman of the meeting must adjourn it. 
(2) The chairman of the meeting may adjourn a general meeting at which a quorum is present 
if— 
	  
	  
	  
455	  
(a) the meeting consents to an adjournment, or 
(b) it appears to the chairman of the meeting that an adjournment is necessary to protect 
the safety of any person attending the meeting or ensure that the business of the meeting 
is conducted in an orderly manner. 
(3) The chairman of the meeting must adjourn a general meeting if directed to do so by the 
meeting. 
(4) When adjourning a general meeting, the chairman of the meeting must— 
(a) either specify the time and place to which it is adjourned or state that it is to continue 
at a time and place to be fixed by the directors, and 
(b) have regard to any directions as to the time and place of any adjournment which have 
been given by the meeting. 
(5) If the continuation of an adjourned meeting is to take place more than 14 days after it was 
adjourned, the company must give at least 7 clear days’ notice of it (that is, excluding the day 
of the adjourned meeting and the day on which the notice is given)— 
(a) to the same persons to whom notice of the company’s general meetings is required to 
be given, and 
(b) containing the same information which such notice is required to contain. 
(6) No business may be transacted at an adjourned general meeting which could not properly 
have been transacted at the meeting if the adjournment had not taken place. 
VOTING AT GENERAL MEETINGS 
Voting: general 
42. A resolution put to the vote of a general meeting must be decided on a show of hands 
unless a poll is duly demanded in accordance with the articles. 
Errors and disputes 
43.—(1) No objection may be raised to the qualification of any person voting at a general 
meeting except at the meeting or adjourned meeting at which the vote objected to is tendered, 
and every vote not disallowed at the meeting is valid. 
(2) Any such objection must be referred to the chairman of the meeting, whose decision is 
final. 
Poll votes 
44.—(1) A poll on a resolution may be demanded— 
(a) in advance of the general meeting where it is to be put to the vote, or 
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(b) at a general meeting, either before a show of hands on that resolution or immediately 
after the result of a show of hands on that resolution is declared. 
(2) A poll may be demanded by— 
(a) the chairman of the meeting; 
(b) the directors; 
(c) two or more persons having the right to vote on the resolution; or 
(d) a person or persons representing not less than one tenth of the total voting rights of 
all the shareholders having the right to vote on the resolution. 
(3) A demand for a poll may be withdrawn if— 
(a) the poll has not yet been taken, and 
(b) the chairman of the meeting consents to the withdrawal. 
(4) Polls must be taken immediately and in such manner as the chairman of the meeting 
directs. 
Content of proxy notices 
45.—(1) Proxies may only validly be appointed by a notice in writing (a “proxy notice”) 
which— 
(a) states the name and address of the shareholder appointing the proxy; 
(b) identifies the person appointed to be that shareholder’s proxy and the general meeting 
in relation to which that person is appointed; 
(c) is signed by or on behalf of the shareholder appointing the proxy, or is authenticated 
in such manner as the directors may determine; and 
(d) is delivered to the company in accordance with the articles and any instructions 
contained in the notice of the general meeting to which they relate. 
(2) The company may require proxy notices to be delivered in a particular form, and may 
specify different forms for different purposes. 
(3) Proxy notices may specify how the proxy appointed under them is to vote (or that the 
proxy is to abstain from voting) on one or more resolutions. 
(4) Unless a proxy notice indicates otherwise, it must be treated as— 
(a) allowing the person appointed under it as a proxy discretion as to how to vote on any 
ancillary or procedural resolutions put to the meeting, and 
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(b) appointing that person as a proxy in relation to any adjournment of the general 
meeting to which it relates as well as the meeting itself. 
Delivery of proxy notices 
46.—(1) A person who is entitled to attend, speak or vote (either on a show of hands or on a 
poll) at a general meeting remains so entitled in respect of that meeting or any adjournment of 
it, even though a valid proxy notice has been delivered to the company by or on behalf of that 
person. 
(2) An appointment under a proxy notice may be revoked by delivering to the company a 
notice in writing given by or on behalf of the person by whom or on whose behalf the proxy 
notice was given. 
(3) A notice revoking a proxy appointment only takes effect if it is delivered before the start 
of the meeting or adjourned meeting to which it relates. 
(4) If a proxy notice is not executed by the person appointing the proxy, it must be 
accompanied by written evidence of the authority of the person who executed it to execute it 
on the appointor’s behalf. 
Amendments to resolutions 
47.—(1) An ordinary resolution to be proposed at a general meeting may be amended by 
ordinary resolution if— 
(a) notice of the proposed amendment is given to the company in writing by a person 
entitled to vote at the general meeting at which it is to be proposed not less than 48 hours 
before the meeting is to take place (or such later time as the chairman of the meeting 
may determine), and  
(b) the proposed amendment does not, in the reasonable opinion of the chairman of the 
meeting, materially alter the scope of the resolution. 
(2) A special resolution to be proposed at a general meeting may be amended by ordinary 
resolution, if— 
(a) the chairman of the meeting proposes the amendment at the general meeting at which 
the resolution is to be proposed, and 
(b) the amendment does not go beyond what is necessary to correct a grammatical or 
other non-substantive error in the resolution. 
(3) If the chairman of the meeting, acting in good faith, wrongly decides that an amendment 
to a resolution is out of order, the chairman’s error does not invalidate the vote on that 
resolution. 
PART 5 
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
Means of communication to be used 
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48.—(1) Subject to the articles, anything sent or supplied by or to the company under the 
articles may be sent or supplied in any way in which the Companies Act 2006 provides for 
documents or information which are authorised or required by any provision of that Act to be 
sent or supplied by or to the company. 
(2) Subject to the articles, any notice or document to be sent or supplied to a director in 
connection with the taking of decisions by directors may also be sent or supplied by the 
means by which that director has asked to be sent or supplied with such notices or documents 
for the time being. 
(3) A director may agree with the company that notices or documents sent to that director in a 
particular way are to be deemed to have been received within a specified time of their being 
sent, and for the specified time to be less than 48 hours. 
Company seals 
49.—(1) Any common seal may only be used by the authority of the directors. 
(2) The directors may decide by what means and in what form any common seal is to be used. 
(3) Unless otherwise decided by the directors, if the company has a common seal and it is 
affixed to a document, the document must also be signed by at least one authorised person in 
the presence of a witness who attests the signature. 
(4) For the purposes of this article, an authorised person is— 
(a) any director of the company; 
(b) the company secretary (if any); or 
(c) any person authorised by the directors for the purpose of signing documents to which 
the common seal is applied. 
No right to inspect accounts and other records 
50. Except as provided by law or authorised by the directors or an ordinary resolution of the 
company, no person is entitled to inspect any of the company’s accounting or other records or 
documents merely by virtue of being a shareholder. 
Provision for employees on cessation of business 
51. The directors may decide to make provision for the benefit of persons employed or 
formerly employed by the company or any of its subsidiaries (other than a director or former 
director or shadow director) in connection with the cessation or transfer to any person of the 
whole or part of the undertaking of the company or that subsidiary. 
DIRECTORS’ INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE 
Indemnity 
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52.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a relevant director of the company or an associated 
company may be indemnified out of the company’s assets against— 
(a) any liability incurred by that director in connection with any negligence, default, 
breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company or an associated company, 
(b) any liability incurred by that director in connection with the activities of the company 
or an associated company in its capacity as a trustee of an occupational pension scheme 
(as defined in section 235(6) of the Companies Act 2006), 
(c) any other liability incurred by that director as an officer of the company or an 
associated company. 
(2) This article does not authorise any indemnity which would be prohibited or rendered void 
by any provision of the Companies Acts or by any other provision of law. 
(3) In this article— 
(a) companies are associated if one is a subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of 
the same body corporate, and 
(b) a “relevant director” means any director or former director of the company or an 
associated company. 
Insurance 
53.—(1) The directors may decide to purchase and maintain insurance, at the expense of the 
company, for the benefit of any relevant director in respect of any relevant loss. 
(2) In this article— 
(a) a “relevant director” means any director or former director of the company or an 
associated company, 
(b) a “relevant loss” means any loss or liability which has been or may be incurred by a 
relevant director in connection with that director’s duties or powers in relation to the 
company, any associated company or any pension fund or employees’ share scheme of 
the company or associated company, and 
(c) companies are associated if one is a subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of 
the same body corporate 
 
APPENDIX 5(3) 
HISTORIC MODEL/OLD TABLE A 
MODEL ARTICLES/DEFAULT FORM OF ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION FOR 
COMPANIES THAT ARE LIMITED BY SHARES – FOR DIRECTION AND 
CONTROL OF THE COMPANY 
OLD NAME [TABLE B]TABLE A AS PER MODEL ARTICLES 
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Effective 
Dates in 
the UK 
Effective Dates 
in SVG 
Regulations of the 
UK Companies 
Acts 
Provisions in the 
SVG Acts 
Observations 
14 July 
1856 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Joint Stock 
Companies Act 
1856 Table B 
As per UK 
Companies Acts 
 
“Table A”? 
Table A is simply 
the name given to 
the prescribed 
format for Articles 
of Association of 
a company limited 
by shares under 
the Companies 
Act 1985 and 
earlier legislation. 
The Articles set 
out the regulations 
by which the 
company will be 
managed. The first 
prescribed format 
of Articles was 
made in “The 
Joint Stock 
Companies Act, 
1856”. In this Act, 
the Articles were 
called “Table B” 
(simply because 
they were 
preceded by a 
form of 
Memorandum of 
Association called 
“Form A”). At the 
next prescription, 
which happened in 
1862, the 
Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and the Articles 
became “Table 
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A”.  
 
Memorandum of 
Association 
necessary to file to 
incorporate 
company…this is 
part of the 
constitution of the 
company 
7 August 
1862 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
The Companies 
Act 1862 
As per UK 
Companies Acts 
Operative Act in 
SVG same as the 
UK – Table A as 
amended but only 
applicable to 
public companies 
1 October 
1906 
 
*1907 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Board of Trade 
Order 1906 
 
 
*UK Companies 
Act 1907 provides 
for ‘private 
company’ for the 
first time 
Memorandum 
was moved into 
the body of the 
Act 
 
Memorandum was 
adopted from the 
public companies 
and moved into 
the body of the 
Act and Table A 
also incorporated 
in the body of the 
Act 
1 April 
1909 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Companies 
Consolidation Act 
1908 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
1 
November 
1929 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
Companies Act 
1929 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
1 July Corresponding 
date to the UK 
Companies Act As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
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1948 by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
1948 body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
27 January 
1968 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1967 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
^18 April 
1977, 1  
 
^June 
1977, 1  
 
^October 
1977 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1976 (^^^3 
Commencement 
dates) 
Discussion on the 
Limited Liability 
Company/Private 
Limited Liability 
Company Limited 
by Shares but 
Articles of 
Association 
binding 
Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
2 February 
1979 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
As amended by 
the Stock 
Exchange 
(Completion of 
Bargains) Act 
1976 Part 1 
Same as above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
2 February 
1979 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
UK 
As amended by 
the Stock 
Exchange 
(Completion of 
Bargains) Act 
1976 Part 2 
Same as above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
 
 
 
2 February 
1979 
Corresponding 
date to the UK 
by virtue of 
island being a 
colony of the 
As amended by 
the Stock 
Exchange 
(Completion of 
Bargains) Act 
Same as above  
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UK 1976 Part 3 
22 
December 
1980 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1980 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
3 
December 
1981 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1981 
As Above Memorandum was 
moved into the 
body of the Act 
and Table A also 
incorporated in the 
body of the Act 
1 July 
1985 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
Regulations 1985 
As Above Applicable to the 
Company in as 
much as they are 
not excluded or 
varied by the 
Articles of 
Association of the 
Company limited 
by shares 
1 August 
1985 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies (Table 
A to F) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 1985 
As Above Table A remained 
valid for 
companies 
incorporated 
under Companies 
Act 1985 in the 
same format that it 
existed at the time 
of incorporation of 
the Company 
under Companies 
Act 1985 
22 
December 
2000 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
As amended by 
Companies Act 
1985 (Electronic 
Communications) 
As Above Amended by SI 
2000/3373 
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remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
Order 2000 
 
1 October 
2007 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2007 
and The 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
(Amendment) (No 
2) Regulations 
2007 for private 
companies limited 
by shares 
Fundamental 
change to 
simplification of 
previous 
combination of 
memorandum and 
set of articles of 
association based 
on default Table 
A regulations as 
Articles of 
Association based 
on a model 
set…However, 
Memorandum of 
association still 
exists but now 
reduced and 
contains 
statement of 
subscribers; intent 
(As Above) 
The Articles can 
be seen as a rule 
book on 
corporate 
governance of 
the company. 
The word 
‘Model’ not to 
be confused 
other than a set 
from which one 
can make 
changes to 
reflect 
company’s 
intention. 
Article 50 of 
Table A with 
regards to the 
Chairman having 
a casting vote was 
removed from 
Table A. 
Amendment (No 
2) Regulations 
2007/2826.  If 
however the right 
existed in the 
Company’s 
articles once it 
was incorporated 
before this date, it 
remains valid as 
per Sch 3 para 
23A Companies 
Act 2006 
(Commencement 
No. 3, 
Consequential 
Amendments, 
(Transitional 
Provisions and 
Savings) Order 
2007/2194 (see 
Sch 5 para 2(5) 
Companies Act 
2006 
(C0mmencement 
No. 5, Transitional 
Provisions and 
Savings) Order 
2007/3495 
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1 October 
2007 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As amended by 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 1985 
as amended by the 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
(Amendment 
(Regulations 
1985), the 
Companies (Table 
A to F) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2007 
and the 
Companies (Table 
A to F) 
(Amendment) 
(No. 2) 
Regulations 2007 
As Above Table A as 
amended 
Companies 
(Tables A to F) 
Regulations 1985 
as amended by SI 
2007/2541 and SI 
2007/2826 
2008 
 
Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As above As Above  
2009 Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As Above As Above Table A replaced 
for new 
companies by 
Model Articles 
UK Companies 
Act 2006 which 
came into effect 1 
October 2009 
2010 Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
As Above As Above Same as above 
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former colony 
2011  Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As Above As Above Same as above 
2012 Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As Above As Above Same as above 
2013 Independent 
nation state by 
1979 but laws 
of the UK 
remain 
predominantly 
those of the 
former colony 
As Above As Above Same as above 
 
 
HISTORIC TABLE B – WITH SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THE DIRECTION AND 
CONTROL OF THE COMPANY  
Time 
Periods 
Number 
of Board 
members 
Number of 
Shareholders 
Applicable laws 
(Company laws) 
Statutory Instrument/By-
laws specific reference to 
management and control of 
companies 
(Table A/B- Outline of 
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responsibilities of 
management and control) 
1845 
?? - 
1865 
 7 7 UK Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844 
UK Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845  
UK Limited Liability 
Act 1855 
UK Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1856 
UK Companies Act 
1862 
UK Company Clauses 
Act 1863 
UK Company Seals Act 
1864 
 
Table B 
Table B was changed to 
Table A under the UK 
Companies Act1862 
(Possibly served as 
guidance to the Directors 
and Shareholders in the 
early establishment and or 
continuance of the First 
House – John Hazell Sons 
and Company Limited, 
save and except to say that 
such guidance would have 
been post 1845. The First 
House would have had to 
refer to this Table B/later 
Table A as per applicable 
and prevailing legislative 
period) 
1865 - 
1885 
7 7 UK Companies Act 
1864 
amended/consolidated 
by UK Companies Act 
1867 
UK Company Clauses 
Act 1869 
UK Joint Stock 
Companies 
Arrangement Act 1870 
UK Companies Act 
1877 
UK Companies Act 
1879 
UK Companies Act 
1880 
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UK Companies 
(Colonial Registers) 
Act 1883 
UK Companies Act 
1884 
1885 - 
1905 
7 7 UK Companies Act 
1884 
amended/consolidated 
by Companies Act 
1886 
UK Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1888 
UK Company Clauses 
Act 1889 
UK Companies 
(Memorandum of 
Association) Act 1890 
UK Companies 
(Winding-up) Act 1890 
UK Directors Liability 
Act 1890 
UK Companies 
(Winding-up) Act 1893 
 
1905 - 
1925 
5 5 UK Companies Acts 
1890/1893 amended by 
UK Companies Act 
1907 
UK Companies 
(Consolidation) Act 
1908 
Adaptation of Table A with 
relevance to the private 
company 
1925 - 
1945 
5 5 UK Companies Act 
1928  
UK Companies Act 
1929 
 
Adaptation of Table A with 
relevance to the private 
company 
1945 - 5 5 UK Companies Act Adaptation of Table A with 
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1965 1947 
UK Companies Act 
1948 
relevance to the private 
company 
1965 - 
1985 
5 5 UK Companies Act 
1948 
amended/consolidated 
by UK Companies Act 
1967  
UK Companies Act 
1976 
Adaptation of Table A with 
relevance to the private 
company 
Company was 
amalgamated in 1981 
1985 –  
2013 
 
5 5 UK Companies Act 
1976 
amended/consolidated 
by UK Companies Act 
1985 
* On or after 28 April 2013 
– Table A as Model 
Articles for private 
companies limited by 
shares – See Appendix a1 
referenced in Chapter 5 of 
this Thesis 
Amendments to Model 
Articles by Mental Health 
(Discrimination) Act 2013 
 
 
APPENDIX 5(4) 
 
BEWARE OF BOASTING 
20th September 2017  
At the press conference of January 30, held in 
Trinidad, and discussed in last week’s column, Chairman Duprey of the CL Financial Group 
had indicated that the credit squeeze caused by German bankers refusing the company credit 
was a main reason for its troubles. Just prior to that, however, his statements in regard to the 
effects of the global economic crisis on the group’s business were very boastful. Duprey 
claimed there were very good business opportunities arising from the global economic crisis.  
Indeed he stated in newspaper reports “with the global economy in tatters and companies 
everywhere bracing for a reversal in fortunes” his group was poised to “take advantage of the 
world-wide financial crisis to snap up under-priced assets.” There was clearly nothing to 
worry about. 
He further promised that his brokerage subsidiary (Caribbean Money Market Brokers Ltd), 
would become the base for developing a world-wide network of brokerage firms. At the time 
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the CL Financial Group had four brokerage firms located in the Caribbean, Central America, 
New York and London. The development of a global network, he suggested, would transform 
Port of Spain, Trinidad, into a major global financial centre and along with this the fortunes of 
the CL Financial Group would rapidly expand. 
As he explained it, these developments were to be based on leveraging the network created by 
the brokerage firms centred on Caribbean Money Market Brokers Ltd. 
At that time the Trinidad and Tobago Guardian had also reported that the brokerage houses 
already in the group controlled an asset value of US$1.3B. This was projected by Duprey to 
grow by a factor of about 2.3, to US$3B within five years. 
That such grand schemes could fall apart so soon after, bringing disaster to the group rested 
on a very faulty assessment of the global economic crisis and the unprecedented risks which it 
posed. 
At no stage of the crisis so far has it truly represented “a unique opportunity to acquire assets 
at greatly undervalued prices” as Chairman Duprey put it. This was dangerous rhetoric for a 
group whose very existence was predicated on continuing prosperity because of the business 
model it employed. 
The moral of all this is to beware of boasting. Let your achievements speak for themselves. 
Idle boasting has been the ruin of so many. 
Flawed business model 
From what has been revealed so far, the group’s business model was flawed in several major 
areas. First, as the Governor of the Trinidad and Tobago Central Bank pointed out, it was too 
reliant on inter-company related-party transactions. As he puts it: “excessive related-party 
transactions pose contagion risks.” 
When the economy is prospering and rapid growth is taking place, such a mode of operation 
looks good. A virtuous cycle is set in train. However, as soon as the economic environment 
turns sour, reliance on related-party transactions puts the entire group at risk. Contagion 
ensues and the virtuous cycle becomes vicious. 
Second, the corporate culture of the group and its unorthodox styles of corporate governance 
were far too commandist, secretive and lacking in transparency. Modern ethical standards, 
befitting a global corporation are very different from those the group practised, as its 
meltdown across the region reveals. 
 
Third, because of poor corporate governance, as the Governor of the Central Bank further 
pointed out, the group was only too willing to engage in excessive leveraging of assets. I 
would add to this also, regulatory arbitrage. There is now no doubt that the group routinely 
exploited regulatory loopholes within and across Caricom jurisdictions. 
Excessive leveraging of assets reduces the likely proceeds from disposal of these assets, if it 
becomes necessary. 
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Finally, through the practice of regulatory arbitrage the group operated deposit-taking 
schemes, premised on the payment of unusually higher interest rates than the financial 
markets would seem to be able to afford. As an example of this aggressive high interest 
strategy for acquiring funds, a relatively large value of highly liquid high-priced deposits 
flowed to its insurance subsidiary in Guyana, (CLICO). 
This firm, however, was not registered to engage in deposit-taking as a commercial bank is 
entitled to do in Guyana. 
It did so, however, with the knowledge of the regulatory authorities. It did not, however, 
come under either the regulatory jurisdiction of the Central Bank of Guyana, or the 
Commissioner of Insurance in regard to its deposit-taking schemes. 
As soon as the global financial crisis erupted last September inflows of deposits faltered. And, 
worse, withdrawals soon began. This experience exposed the flawed business model. 
 
In conclusion, two very important questions arise. One is, why did the Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago feel it necessary to provide a rescue package for such a firm? The 
second is, what is being done to correct the regulatory loopholes at the trans-Caricom level? 
In the former case the answer centres on the notion that the CL Financial Group is “too big to 
fail.” For the second question, I shall review efforts at the Caricom summit recently held in 
Belize to address these concerns. These matters will be treated in later columns. 
 
APPENDIX 5(5) 
NEWS ARTICLE 
PMS SAY CLICO DEBACLE COULD THREATEN CARICOM 
Published: Wednesday | February 29, 2012 | 12:00 AM 
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The financial problems plaguing the Trinidad-based Colonial Life Insurance Company 
(CLICO) and its sister company, British American Insurance Company, could "wreck" 
the regional integration movement, St Vincent and the Grenadines Prime Minister Dr 
Ralph Gonsalves has said. 
 
The Barbados Nation newspaper said that Gonsalves and his Antigua and Barbuda 
counterpart have been responding to the CLICO International Life (CIL) forensic audit report 
published by the newspaper over the weekend. 
For his part, Prime Minister Baldwin Spencer has described the situation as the worst thing to 
hit his country since the Allen Stanford debacle unfolded in 2009. 
Stanford, a Texan billionaire, is now before a United States court facing charges related to a 
multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme allegedly carried out using his Antigua Investment Bank. 
He has pleaded not guilty to the changes. 
The paper said that while the two Caribbean Community leaders have not been seen a copy of 
the Deloitte Canada-led audit, they are equally troubled by what they have been able to glean 
from the published report in the newspaper. 
The two leaders have expressed strong concern for the plight of thousands of policyholders 
and investors affected across the region while insisting that justice must be done. 
Both leaders also declared that they had no personal relationship with former CLICO 
executive chairman Leroy Parris. 
CIL's funds questioned 
The audit report has called into question the use of CIL's funds by the Barbados-based Parris-
led management team, with Gonsalves expressing concern of the impact of the company's 
decision-making on the region. 
"Justice must be done. I mean we are not talking here about one million, two million, we are 
talking in the case of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) of in the region of EC$2 
billion (US$800 million) in liabilities in CLICO Trinidad, CLICO Barbados and also British 
American." 
He said put another way, the total exposure amounted to 16 per cent GDP for ECCU 
countries, and that it also translated into "serious damage to a lot of people's lives" and "a new 
species of poverty" known as "gentile poverty" that has enveloped this region as a 
consequence of the insurance debacle. 
Gonsalves said he therefore wants to know "if countries, for instance Trinidad, in the case of 
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CLICO Trinidad and British American and Barbados, in the case of CLICO Barbados, don't 
come up to the plate and address this matter efficaciously, where are we going in 
CARICOM?" 
It is a concern about which he has already written to new CARICOM Secretary General Irwin 
La Rocque and which he believes should be discussed before the July summit of regional 
leaders. 
Prime Minister Spencer has described the entire situation as "most unfortunate", saying it 
needed to be resolved soonest. "A lot of people are hurting. Some (had) all their savings, 
whatever they had, they went for this thing in a big way, and not only individuals but 
businesses, state corporations with trust funds that were placed at the disposal of the CLICO 
conglomerate." 
In the case of Antigua & Barbuda, he said, "some EC$300 million (US$111 million) has been 
tied up in this entire fiasco. "We have had a double whammy because we not only had 
Stanford to contend with but we had CLICO and BAICO to contend with literally at the same 
time," he said, noting that he was somewhat surprised to learn that the Antigua Commercial 
Bank was named in the forensic report. 
The bank was named with respect to payments made by CIL to different associates. One of 
the recurring themes of the judicial manager's report was that CLICO was used as a 'cash cow' 
for its Trinidad parent company. The way they put it was that CIL operated as if it were the 
parent company's personal bank. This does not come as a surprise to Gonsalves, who pointed 
out that a similar blueprint was used by CL Financial to take funds out of British American. 
However, Gonsalves noted that in the case of BAICO, the regional judicial manager had 
already launched civil proceedings in the Florida courts against the company and several top 
officials, including former CL Financial chairman Lawrence Duprey. The legal suit stems 
from the famous Green Island transaction, which involved the purchase of 6,000 acres of land 
in Osceola County in the largest investment done by BAICO Trinidad Limited. 
While he waits patiently to see what action would be taken in Barbados, Gonsalves is not 
totally in support of liquidation, since based on current assets the judicial manager is saying, 
"we get 60 cents out of the dollar". 
"I want more than that," he said, adding, [that] "those who have caused pain to individuals, 
pain and suffering and put the financial system at risk, must pay". 
"If the authorities amass the evidence to proceed with criminal proceedings against any 
individual or groups of individuals, so be it. 
"This is going to be a long-drawn-out drama and a lot of reputations are going to be sullied in 
the process and a lot justifiably," Gonsalves told the newspaper without elaborating. 
- CMC 
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APPENDIX 5(6) 
CODE FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ST. VINCENT 
CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FOR UNLISTED COMPANIES IN ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES 
Foreword 
There are a number of unlisted companies that continue to make incremental contributions to 
economic growth and financial development in St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  Generally, 
these unlisted companies are private limited liability companies limited by shares having been 
initially established as having ownership of shares by families. From the inception, the family 
played a significant role in pooling their resources within these nexus of contracts. Thereafter, 
foreign investors with dispersed ownership of shares were encouraged to use the vehicle of 
these judicial entities so as to invest in a country – St. Vincent – located miles away from 
their homeland.  This ‘ownership’ dynamism presented with its own challenges and 
opportunities.  To codify corporate governance of such companies remains a stimulating topic 
for many experts and policy makers in emerging states such as St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. 
 
The guidance suggested a contextual framework for a code on corporate governance for this 
species of companies within the broader financial sector.  Each company can use these 
guiding principles in pragmatic ways but always in keeping with the socio cultural and socio 
political circumstances that present themselves in each company. Management, boards of 
directors and shareholders alike should use these principles to benefit the individual 
companies and their stakeholders.  This is a suggestion that should prove useful in keeping 
with the reformation of the Vincentian company law as proposed. 
 
While it could not be ascertained the exact number of companies registered in St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, it was generally acknowledged that 10,000 companies were categorised as 
unlisted and or not quoted or traded on equity markets.  These are private limited liability 
companies limited by shares and were predominantly under the control of founding families. 
Ownership of shares was concentrated among families. 
These companies contribute to the Vincentian economy and were responsible for near to 20% 
of the Gross Domestic Product and for employment. These companies account for the 
entrepreneurial spirit and among various enterprises.  Therefore, the contribution made to the 
alleviation of poverty and contribution to the emerging modern economy of a post-
emancipation era cannot be underestimated. 
 
The contagion effect of the recent financial crisis of CL Financial Limited originated from 
outside St. Vincent and the Grenadines and impacted the overall nature of the island’s 
corporate governance. There was a need for a dynamic governance framework in the 
emerging local financial sector. Good corporate governance remains relevant to all financial 
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institutions including but not limited to unlisted private limited liability companies limited by 
shares. The researcher was convinced that suitable corporate governance practices could 
contribute to the continuing success of Vincentian companies especially those that were listed 
or privately held.  
 
In the following paragraphs, a number of principles were outlined which were largely 
influenced by the direction given on similar international best practices outlined by the 
Institute of Directors.  A phased approach was recommended.  The sizes of Vincentian 
unlisted companies were reviewed and found to be wholly family - owned in many instances.  
The outlined framework if followed should be a guide on companies’ long - term viability; to 
provide for the hybrid of corporate governance models on board composition; to assist with 
the pooling of funds and to create a new and dynamic synergy between and among 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
While it may be that the subsequent Principles and Guidance would be applicable on a 
voluntary basis, the practical guidelines were provided with the objective that unlisted 
Vincentian companies might wish to garner a greater understanding on how to become more 
effective at their own agenda on corporate governance.  
Executive Summary 
 The researcher suggests a corporate governance overview for Vincentian unlisted 
companies in St. Vincent and the Grenadines but which could be adjusted to similar 
unlisted companies located across the porous borders of the CARICOM and OECS 
states. 
 Although these unlisted companies made a significant contribution to the nation’s 
economic growth and employment of persons, corporate governance decision makers, 
regulators and other experts generally neglected them. There was no other Corporate 
Governance to date in St. Vincent, as there were no listed companies either. 
 Share ownership in unlisted companies were owned and controlled by individuals or 
family members or a group of family members related by biologically or through 
marriages. Good corporate governance was about building relationships between and 
among boards and shareholders within a socio cultural and political context; creating 
an environment that builds trust among stakeholders even when formalized 
procedures and rules were prescribed by law; and sound principles on good 
governance provide a framework that lay the foundation for corporate successes. 
 Best practices on corporate governance were about creating building blocks for 
shareholders to demonstrate commitment to and depend on such practices for a 
sustainable business. 
 Among the private limited liability companies limited by shares, those within the 
insurance sector and were categorized as international businesses lend themselves to 
a higher level of scrutiny by the public, as they were depositors of public funds.  
Therefore good governance was needed to maintain transparency, accountability and 
trust among the wider stakeholders.   
 The approach to implementation of the Code should be guided by other established 
international best practices as the phased implementation approach.  This takes into 
account such issues like the cultural differences within each company, the nature of 
corporate governance locally and regionally; the size of the company; the educational 
levels of board members and the life cycle of the business itself. 
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 The composition of the boards would be critical given the incremental approach to a 
new and evolving model on local corporate governance.  The maturity of board 
members and how they respond to the new changes would further shape the socio 
cultural dynamics of the company and these matters should not be ignored. 
 All corporate governance initiatives should remain applicable across local and 
regional companies within the framework of a larger Caribbean wide consensus on 
business ethics and principles.  Other juridical bodies and any other financial 
institution within the international or domestic financial sectors should be so inspired 
to follow the corporate governance code of best practices in the interest of growth, 
development and employment. 
Eighteen Major Principles 
In addition to these major principles, a comprehensive Code on Corporate Governance should 
be guided by the established framework on corporate governance for unlisted companies 
advocated by the “Institute of Directors”632 and the “European Convention of the Directors’ 
Association”633 The justification for this is that the substantive domestic law on companies 
were dictated by the already well established and time tested British company laws and the 
UK Company Acts.  These outlined the nature of such juridical bodies (companies) that 
formed an established body of laws and procedure on corporate governance.   Additionally, 
consideration to be given to the hybrid models on corporate governance that used elements 
borrowed from both the Anglo American model and the German model on corporate 
governance.  
The eighteen principles of the Code are, broadly speaking applicable to all unlisted 
companies: 
1. Shareholders should create written guidelines as to how they see a functioning 
corporate governance agenda if implemented, can improve the productivity and 
succession planning for all unlisted companies.  Reference is to be made to the 
articles of association but also to the domestic and international focus of business 
development within the country. 
2. An effective Board of Directors should head every company, which is responsible for 
its corporate governance implementation that will take into consideration the socio 
cultural and political factors internal and external to the company. 
3. The directors should strive to accommodate elements of both the Anglo American 
and German corporate governance models when the composition of the board 
becomes the catalyst for change in complexity and size of the board in relation to 
similar issues within the company. 
4. Directors should maintain best practices of business conduct, where integrity and 
ethical behaviour function effectively while exercising due care and diligence and at 
all times and act honestly and openly. As one of the main organs of the company the 
board of directors should hold meetings and plan appropriately for the execution of 
its corporate governance agenda. 
5. The duly elected board must demonstrate that formal and transparent arrangements 
are effectively in place for presenting a balanced and comprehensible evaluation of 
the company's position and projections and for considering how they apply financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 www.iod.com/about/our-history - accessed on 16 January 2018 and 20 February 2018 
633 www.ecoda.org/about-ecoda/ - accessed on 17 January 2018 and 20 February, 2018 
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reporting and internal control principles and mechanisms. Among these should be 
outlined the rationale for remuneration of non-executive and executive board 
members in keeping with maintenance of well educated and qualified staff to run the 
companies. 
6.  The Board of Directors should provide appropriate supervision for risk management 
and maintain a sound system of risk measurement and control mechanisms for the 
safeguarding investments by shareholders or as shareholders engage in an 
entrepreneurial spirit using the company’s assets. 
7. All Boards should ensure the timely and reasonable disclosure to shareholders and or 
regulators of all substantive matters in relation to the company and that this can best 
be achieved through honest and open dialogue at all times over the life cycle of the 
company. This is in keeping with any amendments to objectives, unanimous 
shareholder agreements and any other concerns. 
8. Requirements as a member of the board are that of being qualified as directors and or 
possess the ability to be trainable in keeping with regional and or international 
standards on corporate governance.  Directors should be subjected to continual 
training with initial induction as a board member and thereafter at identified regional 
and international institutes for corporate governance.   
9. Family and or foreign controlled companies should be encouraged to foster an 
atmosphere of corporate governance that would be applicable to their companies but 
in keeping with established international best practices.   
10. Unfettered power in decision making within any of these unlisted companies should 
not be encouraged but organizational charts and other internal management practices 
to be so enshrine on a corporate charter so that all members of boards and 
shareholders will note the clear lines of responsibilities and authority. 
11. The qualification of board members with admixtures of skills, knowledge and other 
competencies should be clearly advocated among and throughout the company where 
possible and be an indicator of a diverse decision making process that exist within the 
company. 
12. The boards in conjunction with the shareholders should be responsible for the 
selection or election of broad based committees that would be responsible for specific 
tasks and duties. 
13. In consultation with the shareholders, the board should design performance appraisal 
forms and set criteria for peer review on its performance within the yearly cycle of 
the company.  This should be tabled at meetings as part of directors’ report to the 
company in meeting.  The result should serve to assess productivity by board 
members and to raise the bar on their fiduciary duties to shareholders and the 
company. 
14. Stakeholder engagement is critical for successive planning in that the shareholders 
and the boards gain a clearer understanding as to what are the areas in which the 
company can best address the needs of the stakeholder. 
15. The pressure groups on behalf of the environment as well as the corporate citizen and 
institutional investors should be allowed to provide feedback to the company on its 
performance on a yearly basis over its life cycle.  In this way, the company should 
improve on its delivery of services and products to these constituents’ stakeholders by 
using such feedback.  
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16. The issues of accountability and transparency should always be at the forefront of all 
business activities and it would be the duty of the director in consultation with the 
shareholder to present to categories of stakeholders, copies of requested reports on 
business activities. 
17. Grievance procedure should be displayed and other such procedures to be given 
priority and an officer to be assigned to assist with any conflict of interests well in 
advance of an annual general meeting where issues can become sources of 
unnecessary conflicts. To comply and to complain may be necessary attributes. 
18. On-going education of members and other constituents’ stakeholders about corporate 
governance should be part of the mandate of the company over its life cycle.  A 
revolution on education should result in the establishing and empowering of all 
stakeholders about their individual roles, the nature of corporate governance, the 
benefits of belonging to the company within the context of poverty alleviation and 
economic enfranchisement 
 
 
 
 
 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL FORM 
SENT SEPARATELY 
TO BE ATTACHED 
 
 
 
 
 
The End. 
 
 
